Ardent Services, LLC Versus G & v. Investments, LLC

ARDENT SERVICES, LLC NO. 23-CA-253

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

G & V INVESTMENTS, LLC COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 799-516, DIVISION "I"
HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER, JUDGE PRESIDING

February 28, 2024

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

REVERSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART;
REMANDED
SJW
SMC
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
ARDENT SERVICES, LLC
Lawrence R. DeMarcay, III

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE-2ND APPELLANT,
G & V INVESTMENTS, LLC
Raymond B. Landry
Thomas M. Flanagan
Anders F. Holmgren
Alixe L. Duplechain

WINDHORST, J.

In this appeal, plaintiff-appellant, Ardent Services, LLC, seeks review of the

trial court’s January 30, 2023 judgment, granting the motion for involuntary

dismissal filed by defendant-appellee, G&V Investments, LLC and dismissing

Ardent’s claim against G&V. In addition, G&V filed a cross-appeal, seeking review

of the trial court’s February 9, 2023 judgment, denying its request for attorney’s fees.

For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment granting G&V’s

motion for involuntary dismissal and dismissing Ardent’s claim against G&V, and

remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying

G&V’s reqeust for attorney’s fees.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY and EVIDENCE

On September 17, 2019, Ardent (Lessee) filed a petition for breach of lease

agreement, to enforce lease agreement, and to mandate specific performance of the

terms of the lease agreement against G&V.1 According to the petition, on September

18, 2009, the parties entered into a “Commercial Build To Suit Lease” (the “Lease”)

relative to property located in Kenner, Louisiana. At all relevant times, the property

was subject to a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Whitney National Bank,

for which G&V was the mortgagor and borrower.

Pursuant to the lease, G&V (Lessor) was to complete certain improvements

and/or a buildout on the property for Ardent. The parties agreed that the initial five-

year lease term would commence upon completion of the improvements and

buildout, and that Ardent had the option to renew for two additional five-year terms,

as well as an option to purchase the property. The “option to purchase” gave Ardent

the option to purchase during the term of the lease and any subsequent option term

1 Ardent’s claim for specific performance of the option to purchase appears to have been resolved prior to
trial, and is not an issue in this appeal.

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and provided that the “purchase price at any given time shall be that amount

necessary to payoff [sic] in full the mortgage indebtedness.”

With regard to monthly rent, Section 6(E) of the Lease provides:
. . . The rental payment is fixed for the initial term of this lease at
$7,706.13 per month [(“monthly rent”)]. The monthly rental payment
is agreed to be the equivalent of the monthly debt service payment due
by Lessor [to Whitney], i.e., the cash amount required monthly for the
repayment of principal and fixed rate interest (currently six and one-
half (6.500 %) per cent) constituting the mortgage indebtedness bearing
against the property which is the subject of this lease, plus a Lessor’s
[G & V’s] fee of eight (8.00%) per cent [sic] of that amount.... At the
commencement of any option term, the monthly rental shall be adjusted
for increase or decrease consistent with the current “market rate”, i.e.,
the fixed rate of interest a company such as Lessor must pay to borrow
funds, plus the Lessor’s fee. [Boldface in original.]

In the petition, Ardent stated that it had paid the $7,706.13 monthly rent for the first

term of the Lease and had continued to pay the monthly rent into the second term of

the Lease as of the date of filing of the petition.

Pursuant to Section 6(E), the Lease provided for re-calculation of the monthly

rental payments upon the commencement of each option term, in this case, March

21, 2015 and March 21, 2020. The pertinent language is as follows:

. . . At the commencement of any option term, the monthly rental shall
be adjusted for increase or decrease consistent with the current “market
rate”, i.e., the fixed rate of interest a company such as Lessor must pay
to borrow funds, plus the Lessor’s fee.

Section 6(G) of the Lease provided that Ardent “has the option of making the

debt service portion of the monthly rental payment directly to the financial institution

(Whitney National Bank) to which the indebtedness is owed.” If Ardent paid the

monthly rent to G&V, G&V was responsible for paying the full monthly rent (less

G&V’s eight percent fee) to Whitney to reduce the mortgage indebtedness against

the property.

Under the Lease, Ardent also agreed to (1) pay all insurance, utilities and

taxes; (2) “all costs connected with or arising out of the leased premises, and all other

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expenses of every nature whatsoever, including but not limited to all repairs,

excluding the building structure and roof. Ardent further agreed to maintain the

premises in good and safe condition, including, “plate glass, electrical wiring,

elevator, plumbing (even when damaged by freeze), heating, ventilation and air

conditioning systems and any other system or equipment on the premises, with the

exception of the building structure and roof which will be maintained by Lessor.”

By letter dated May 1, 2019, Ardent notified G&V of its intent to exercise the

option to purchase the property and provided a purchase and sale contract setting

forth the terms by which it proposed to purchase the property. In response, G&V

attempted to renegotiate the option to purchase. In May 2019, Ardent obtained

information from Whitney dated May 21, 2019, identifying the principal balance on

the indebtedness (“Indebtedness Balance”) for the property as $660,854.82. Ardent

determined that this amount was significantly higher than expected based on

Ardent’s records. Based on its records, Ardent determined that as of May 21, 2019,

the Indebtedness Balance and the purchase price under the Lease should have been

$552,974.21.

In its petition, Ardent alleged that G&V breached the Lease by failing to pay

Whitney all monthly rent payments (less G&V’s eight percent fee) that Ardent paid

G&V. Specifically, Ardent claimed that G&V failed to pay Whitney $56,514.48,

and that Ardent is entitled to a credit against the Indebtedness Balance. Ardent also

alleged that G&V breached the Lease by failing to pass on to Ardent the decrease

market rate resulting from G&V re-financing the Whitney mortgage for the property,

which totaled is $51,366.13. Ardent claimed that it is also entitled to a credit against

the Indebtedness Balance on this basis.

At a bench trial on January 17, 2023, Ardent called the following witnesses to

testify: (1) Albert Vallotton III, an executive vice president at Ardent; (2) Jody Grass,

the owner/manager for G&V; (3) James Heurtin, Jr., Ardent’s chief financial officer.

23-CA-253 3

Mr. Vallotton testified that the Lease was executed by Mr. Grass on behalf of

G&V as the lessor and Dale Brem on behalf of Ardent as the lessee relative to a

commercial/industrial office at 17 Veterans Boulevard, Kenner, Louisiana. Mr.

Brem was a vice president and one of the co-founders of Ardent. Mr. Vallotton

testified that the Lease term was for five years with options for two additional five-

year terms. He confirmed that the Lease contained a provision stating that the “terms

and payment schedules/calculations are to remain consistent throughout the lease to

include the additional option terms” referred to the “underlying calculation for the

lease amount during the additional terms.”

Mr. Vallotton testified that the Lease included an option for Ardent to

purchase the property, and that it was always the parties’ intention for Ardent to

eventually purchase the property. He stated that Ardent paid G&V $300,000.00 to

secure the option to purchase.

Mr. Vallotton testified that the rent obligation for the first five years of the

lease was calculated based on the amount due on G&V’s loan for the property, plus

an eight percent commission fee paid to G&V. Mr. Vallotton also testified that G&V

was obligated to pass Ardent’s monthly rent minus its eight percent fee directly to

Whitney because the monthly lease payments were intended to reduce the

Indebtedness Balance. He indicated that the parties intended for the monthly rent to

reduce the Indebtedness Balance because the option purchase price was based on the

full loan amount on the property with an additional eight percent fee to compensate

G&V for its efforts as lessor. Mr. Vallotton confirmed that the monthly rent would

be adjusted for increase or decrease at the commencement of an additional option

term, and that the recalculated monthly rent would be the equivalent of the monthly

debt service payment of the lessor, plus the eight percent Lessor’s fee.

Mr. Vallotton testified that Ardent exercised its right to extend the lease

through a second five-year term that began in March of 2020. He also stated that it

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was his understanding that G&V had refinanced the loan with Whitney at a lower

interest rate, but that G&V did not inform Ardent of the refinancing or pass along

the changed rate or payment decrease to Ardent.

At trial, Mr. Grass, who owns G&V, testified as a G&V representative. Mr.

Grass testified that he and Mr. Brem negotiated the Lease. Mr. Grass agreed that the

Lease provided for adjustment of the monthly rent at the option term consistent with

the then market rate, i.e., the fixed rate of interest that the company, such as lessor,

must pay to borrow funds plus the Lessor’s fee. Mr. Grass was asked, “the provision

says that the monthly rental shall be adjusted, correct? So if the rate went up they

wouldn’t have an option not to pay, correct?” Mr. Grass responded affirmatively,

“[t]hat’s correct.” Mr. Grass indicated that Ardent would have had to pay whatever

the interest rate was on the loan. Mr. Grass also agreed that it was reasonable for

Ardent to assume that G&V was going to pay the Indebtedness Balance with the

monthly rent payments G&V received from Ardent.

Mr. Grass testified that when G&V refinanced the loan in 2014-2015 on the

leased property, G&V had twenty or thirty different notes and mortgages with

Whitney that it was renewing at the same time. Mr. Grass indicated that he

negotiated the new interest rate based on his credibility, his financial ability at the

time, and G&V’s assets.

Mr. James Heurtin, Ardent’s chief financial officer, testified regarding the

loan balance after Ardent’s payments to G&V. He testified that in March of 2010,

Ardent requested a report from Whitney as to the amount remaining due on the loan.

Ardent obtained a report from Whitney, which detailed every loan transaction or

payment, the amount allocated between principle, interest, interest deductions, fees,

insurance payments, and insurance credits. Mr. Heurtin testified that the balance on

the loan did not match Ardent’s records as to the amount that should be due on the

23-CA-253 5

loan. Mr. Heurtin stated that the amount due on the loan was $40,000.00 to

$50,000.00 greater than Ardent’s records indicated.

According to Mr. Heurtin, Ardent discovered that the discrepancy in the

amount remaining due on the loan was due to the fact that G&V had refinanced the

loan at a different interest rate, and that the amounts Ardent had been paying to G&V

were not passed through dollar-to-dollar for the reduction of the principle and/or

interest due on the loan. Mr. Heurtin confirmed that all payments Ardent made to

G&V were intended to go directly to Whitney, except for Ardent’s eight percent

Lessor’s fee.

After discovering the discrepancy in the amount due on the loan, Ardent

protested the Indebtedness Balance due on the loan to G&V. Ardent continued to

make the same monthly rent payments under the Lease until it purchased the

property. Ardent’s purchase of the property was delayed due to this dispute;

however, by Act of Cash Sale and Conveyance dated November 12, 2020, Ardent

purchased the property from G&V, subject to a reservation of rights to negotiate,

settle, or litigate this lawsuit. On November 13, 2020, the parties cancelled the Lease

and reserved their rights relative to this lawsuit.

After the presentation of Ardent’s case at the bench trial, G&V moved for an

involuntary dismissal of Ardent’s claim against it. The trial court granted G&V’s

motion for involuntary dismissal, and dismissed Ardent’s claim with prejudice.

Following trial, G&V filed a request for attorney’s fees under the Lease. After

a hearing, the trial court denied G&V’s request for attorney’s fees by judgment dated

February 9, 2023.

LAW and ANALYSIS

On appeal, Ardent asserts the trial court erred in granting G&V’s motion for

involuntary dismissal because the Lease provides that G&V shall modify Ardent’s

monthly rent obligation upon commencement of each lease option term pursuant to

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the financing costs incurred by G&V. In a cross-appeal, G&V asserts that the trial

court erred in denying its request for attorney’s fees under the Lease.

Ardent’s Appeal

A motion for involuntary dismissal is raised in a judge trial after the plaintiff

has completed the presentation of his evidence. Chateau Homes by RJM, Inc. v.

Aucoin, 11-1118 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/31/12), 97 So.3d 398, 405, writ denied, 12-

1526 (La. 10/12/12), 98 So.3d 872; Brock v. Singleton, 10-550 (La. App. 5 Cir.

03/29/11), 65 So.3d 649, 660, writ denied, 11-1216 (La. 09/23/11), 69 So.3d 1160.

In this motion, a party may move for a dismissal of the action against him on the

ground that the plaintiff has shown no right to relief based upon the facts presented

and the law. Pitre v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 16-361 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/28/16), 210 So.3d 502, 507, writ denied, 17-150 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So.3d 802;

Chateau Homes, 97 So.3d at 405; Zapalowski v. Campbell, 08-55 (La. App. 5 Cir.

06/19/08), 988 So.2d 772, 774-775. In determining whether an involuntary

dismissal should be granted after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his

evidence during a bench trial, the appropriate standard is whether the plaintiff has

presented sufficient evidence in his case-in-chief to establish his claim by a

preponderance of the evidence. Pitre, 210 So.3d at 507; Chateau Homes, 97 So.3d

at 405.

An appellate court should not reverse an involuntary dismissal under La.

C.C.P. art. 1672 B in the absence of manifest error. Pitre, 210 So.3d at 507. Under

the manifest error standard, the trial court’s factual findings can be reversed only if

the appellate court finds, based on the entire record, no reasonable factual basis for

the factual finding and the fact finder is clearly wrong. Cousin v. Cousin, 21-150

(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/21), 365 So.3d 784, 791.

“Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the

parties.” La. C.C. art. 2045. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit

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and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search

of the parties’ intent.” La. C.C. art. 2046. “Generally, where the words of a contract

are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd consequences, the meaning and intent of the

parties must be sought within the four corners of the document and cannot be

explained or contradicted by parol evidence.” Gilbert v. Gottsegen, 14-593 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 5/21/15), 171 So.3d 289, 294, writ denied, 15-1406 (La. 10/2/15), 178

So.3d 993. Contracts, subject to interpretation from the instrument’s four corners

without the necessity of extrinsic evidence, are to be interpreted as a matter of law,

and the use of extrinsic evidence is proper only where a contract is ambiguous after

an examination of the four corners of the agreement. Derbes v. GBS Properties,

LLC, 04-1460 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/26/05), 902 So.2d 1109, 1111-12. In cases in which

the contract is ambiguous, the agreement shall be construed according to the intent

of the parties. Id. Intent is an issue of fact which is to be inferred from all of the

surrounding circumstances. Id.

La. C.C. art. 2053 provides that “a doubtful provision must be interpreted in

light of the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before

and after the formation of the contract, and of other contracts of a like nature between

the same parties.” Billiot v. Plambeck, 16-265 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/21/16), 209 So.3d

379, 382. A contract is considered ambiguous on the issue of intent when either it

lacks a provision bearing on that issue, the terms of a written contract are susceptible

to more than one interpretation, there is uncertainty or ambiguity as to its provisions,

or the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the language employed.

Campbell v. Melton, 01-2578 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So.2d 69, 75.

The focus of the dispute in this case involves the interpretation of the

following provision in Section 6(E) of the Lease:

E. Upon acceptance by Lessee of the Building/Improvements, Lessee
shall be obligated to pay monthly rentals due in advance on the first
(1st) day of each month. The parties agree to prorate the initial

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monthly payment as of the Commencement Date. The rental payment
is fixed for the initial term of this lease at $7,706.13 per month. The
monthly rental payment is agreed to be the equivalent of the monthly
debt service payment due by Lessor, i.e., the cash amount required
monthly for the repayment of principal and fixed rate interest
(currently six and one-half (6.500 %) per cent) constituting the
mortgage indebtedness bearing against the property which is the
subject of this lease, plus a Lessor’s fee of eight (8.000 %) per cent of
that amount. See annexed Exhibit “C”. At the commencement of any
option term, the monthly rental shall be adjusted for increase or
decrease consistent with the then current "market rate”, i.e., the fixed
rate of interest a company such as Lessor must pay to borrow funds,
plus the Lessor’s fee. [Boldface in original.]

The trial court interpreted the last sentence of Section 6(E) to mean that an increase

or decrease in monthly rent would depend on the market rate available to companies

similar to G&V. The trial court concluded that Ardent was not entitled to the benefit

of the reduced interest rate because Ardent did not introduce evidence of the market

rate at the time of refinancing to establish that G&V’s rate was the market rate

available to similarly situated companies. In other words, the trial court found that

Ardent was not entitled to G&V’s refinanced interest rate because Ardent did not

show that other similarly situated companies could have obtained the same rate G&V

obtained at the time of refinancing. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied

on G&V’s assertion that the refinancing of this loan was a small part of a larger

financial package which allowed G&V to obtain an interest rate not otherwise

available on the financial market. For the following reasons, we disagree with the

trial court’s interpretation of Section 6(E).

First, Section 6(E) states, “[t]he monthly rental payment is agreed to be the

equivalent of the monthly debt service payment due by Lessor, i.e., the cash amount

required monthly for the repayment of principal and fixed rate interest (currently six

and one-half (6.500 %) per cent) constituting the mortgage indebtedness bearing

against the property which is the subject of this lease, plus a Lessor’s fee of eight

(8.000 %) per cent of that amount.” This language expressly provides that the

23-CA-253 9

monthly rent equaled the amount G&V owed each month for repayment towards the

Indebtedness Balance, including principal and interest, which was six and one-half

percent during the initial term of the Lease, plus the eight percent Lessor’s fee. Thus,

this language indicates that the parties intended for the monthly rent to be the same

amount as G&V’s financial obligation to Whitney towards the Indebtedness Balance

plus the eight percent Lessor’s fee for G&V’s efforts.

Second, Section 2 of the Lease states, “[t]his lease is for a five (5) year term

with options for two (2) additional five (5) year terms. Terms and payment

schedules/calculations are to remain consistent throughout the lease to include the

additional option terms.” This provision reflects that the parties intended for the

monthly rent, i.e., payment schedules and calculations, to be calculated consistently

throughout the Lease terms, including the two additional five-year option terms.

Significantly, G&V’s representative, Mr. Grass, testified that had the interest rate

increased after refinancing of the loan, Ardent would have been obligated to pay the

increased amount. Thus, an interpretation resulting in payments by G&V to Whitney

of the monthly rental payments by Ardent, less G&V’s eight percent fee, maintains

consistency throughout the terms of the Lease.

Third, the terms of the Lease indicate that the parties intended for the eight

percent Lessor’s fee to constitute the entirety of G&V’s compensation as lessor. No

provision of the Lease suggests that G&V was to receive any additional payment or

compensation. Thus, the express provisions of the Lease do not support G&V’s

assertion that it was entitled to keep any amounts from Ardent that were in excess of

the reduced interest rate it obtained when it refinanced the loan.

Fourth, G&V’s argument that the refinanced rate was not a “market rate”

because G&V obtained the refinanced rate based on its credibility, relationship with

Whitney, and the number of notes and mortgages G&V had with Whitney is without

merit. This argument was based solely on a comment during the testimony of Mr.

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Grass, a signatory to the lease, which, in the absence of factual support, was a

conclusory and self-serving opinion. Mr. Grass was not accepted as an expert to

provide testimony regarding the “market rate,” nor was any testimony or other

factual support offered upon which to base this conclusion.

Finally, the trial court’s interpretation of the monthly rent calculation upon

commencement of an optional term isolates and relies upon one sentence of the

Lease to the exclusion of the other provisions of the Lease. La. C.C. art. 2050

provides that “[e]ach provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other

provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.”

429 Bourbon St., LLC v. RMDR Invs., Inc., 16-800 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 230

So.3d 256, 263, writ denied, 17-2054 (La. 2/2/18), 235 So.3d 1106. Taking into

consideration all relevant provisions, the clear language of the Lease provides that

the monthly rental payment was the equivalent of the “monthly debt

service” payment due by lessor, G & V, (defined as the cash amount required

monthly for the repayment of principal and interest constituting the mortgage

indebtedness), plus G&V’s lessor’s fee of eight percent of that amount.

Moreover, for the price of $300,000.00, Ardent purchased an option to purchase

the leased property at any time for the specified price of “that amount necessary to

payoff in full of the mortgage indebtedness,” as provided in Section 8. No payment

in excess of the payoff of the full mortgage indebtedness due to Whitney was due.

Considering the above, we find that the trial court erred in interpreting the

Lease to conclude that Ardent had to present evidence of the “market rate” in order

for the monthly rent to be adjusted. We conclude that after presentation of its case,

Ardent had established a right to relief based on the evidence presented and the law.

Accordingly, we find the trial court’s granting of G&V’s motion for

involuntary dismissal was clearly erroneous, and therefore reverse the trial court’s

judgment granting G&V’s motion for involuntary dismissal of Ardent’s claim.

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G&V’s Cross-Appeal

G&V asserts the trial court misinterpreted Paragraph 37 of the Lease

regarding attorney’s fees. The trial court found that no provision of the Lease

provided for the award of attorney’s fees to G&V relative to this lawsuit.

Paragraph 37 of the Lease states:

Should an attorney be employed to enforce any provision of this lease,
or to assist in collection of the rents, Lessee shall pay as compensation
for such legal services:
i. an additional charge of twenty five (25%) percent of the claim, or
ii. if the claim not be for money, a reasonable charge; but
iii. in no event shall the amount of attorney’s fees be less than $750.

As a general rule, attorney’s fees are not allowed except when authorized by

statute or contract. Hoffman v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins. Co., 14-2279 (La. 10/2/15),

209 So.3d 702, 707. Attorney’s fees are not awarded to make the injured party

whole, but rather to discourage a particular activity or activities on the part of the

other party. Garden Lakes Condo. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Perrier, 10-1016 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 66 So.3d 1147, 1148.

Paragraph 37 clearly states that it applies when G&V employs an attorney “to

enforce any provision of this lease, or to assist in the collection of rents.” Applying

this provision to the circumstances of this lawsuit, we find the trial court properly

denied G&V’s request for attorney’s fees. G&V did not have to enforce any

provision of the lease or collect any rent payments. Ardent paid all rent that was due

under the Lease, and is seeking return of the excess amount it paid to G&V. There

is no evidence or indication that Ardent did not comply with any term of the Lease.

Furthermore, we find that Paragraph 37 does not grant G&V recovery of

attorney’s fees when Ardent files suit against G&V for breach of the Lease and,

more particularly, when Ardent asserts a viable claim against G&V. Paragraph 37

does not apply to the situation present here, in which G&V incurred attorney’s fees

to defend a valid claim by Ardent that G&V breached the Lease.

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We therefore find no error in the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to G&V.

DECREE

For the above stated reasons, we reverse the trial court’s January 30, 2023

judgment, granting G&V’s motion for involuntary dismissal of Ardent’s claim with

prejudice. We affirm the trial court’s February 9, 2023 judgment, denying G&V’s

request for attorney’s fees. We remand this case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART;
REMANDED

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
FEBRUARY 28, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-CA-253
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER (DISTRICT JUDGE)
LAWRENCE R. DEMARCAY, III ALIXE L. DUPLECHAIN (APPELLANT) ANDERS F. HOLMGREN (APPELLANT)
(APPELLANT) THOMAS M. FLANAGAN (APPELLANT)
RAYMOND B. LANDRY (APPELLANT)

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