Norman Joseph Porche, Jr. Versus Sharon Dawsey Porche

NORMAN JOSEPH PORCHE, JR. NO. 23-CA-471

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

SHARON DAWSEY PORCHE COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 85,431, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE CONNIE M. AUCOIN, JUDGE PRESIDING

April 24, 2024

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson

REVERSED AND REMANDED
SMC
JGG
MEJ

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
NORMAN JOSEPH PORCHE, JR.
Corey M. Oubre

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
SHARON DAWSEY PORCHE
Russell C. Monroe

CHEHARDY, C.J.

In this case involving a partition of community property, Sharon Dawsey

Porche, appeals a June 28, 2023 judgment of the trial court granting an oral motion

to enforce settlement agreement and a rule for sanctions brought by her ex-

husband, Norman Joseph Porche, Jr., and a June 28, 2023 judgment homologating

the partition of community property. For the following reasons, we reverse the

trial court’s judgments and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Norman Porche (“Norman”) and Sharon Porche (“Sharon”) were married on

November 10, 1990, and a judgment granting Norman’s petition for divorce

pursuant to La. C.C. art. 103 was rendered on January 21, 2020. Norman filed a

motion to partition community property and to set a trial on the merits of the

community property partition on October 13, 2022. Later, a status conference was

held, wherein deadlines were set for the filing of detailed descriptive lists and

traversals, and a trial date was set for February 28, 2023.

By agreement of the parties, the February 28, 2023 trial date was converted

to a status conference in an attempt to settle and formally resolve all issues related

to the partition of community property, specifically any equalizing payment that

might be due between the parties. Both Norman and Sharon were present in court

with their respective counsel, Corey Oubre and Jonathan Rhodes. Following an

extensive off-the-record bench conference, and as a result of the settlement

discussions that took place between the parties and their counsel during the status

conference, the trial court expressed its understanding on the record that Norman

had extended to Sharon an offer to settle the entire community property partition

for an equalizing payment of $10,000.00, and that the offer was good for twenty-

four hours.

23-CA-471 1

The transcript from the February 28, 2023 hearing reflects that neither of the

parties were questioned by counsel or the trial judge as to their acquiescence or

objection to any of the specific or substantive terms of the proposed settlement

offer. However, it was noted by the trial judge that there remained a dispute

between the parties concerning the value of the former marital home. In that

regard, the trial court continued the trial of the community property partition to

April 20, 2023, and ordered that, in the event the 24-hour period lapsed without an

agreed upon settlement, an appraisal of the home was to be completed within 20

days, and that an appraisal report be exchanged between counsel prior to trial.

Following the status conference, Sharon rejected the $10,000.00 offer. The

parties continued to negotiate a settlement through their respective counsel.

Emails and text messages were exchanged between counsel, and in a March 3,

2023 text message which, according to Sharon, concerned only one substantive

provision of the settlement, counsel for the parties agreed to an equalizing payment

of $12,500.00 to be paid by Norman to Sharon to settle the community property

partition.

On March 10, 2023, after counsel for the parties had purportedly reached a

settlement agreement, Sharon sent an email to her attorney’s office requesting that

Mr. Rhodes withdraw as her counsel of record, stating: “Please take the funds for

the new bill out of the trust and I will pay the difference. Tell Mr. Rhodes to

withdraw.” According to Sharon, she made similar written requests for Mr.

Rhodes’ withdrawal on March 15, March 16, and April 12, 2023.1

Believing that the offer to settle all matters related to the community

property for an equalizing payment of $12,500.00 had been accepted by Mr.

Rhodes on behalf of Sharon, Mr. Oubre emailed Mr. Rhodes on March 17, 2023,

1
According to Sharon, on April 12, 2023, she wrote to Mr. Rhodes, “Attention, Mr. Rhodes. This
is the fourth request for your official withdrawal from my case.”

23-CA-471 2

attaching the “DRAFT” of a nine-page document entitled, “Consent Judgment,

Homologating Agreement, Partition of Community Property” (hereafter, “consent

judgment”). In that e-mail, Mr. Oubre requested the VIN number of Sharon’s

vehicle and information regarding any bank accounts in her name. When Mr.

Rhodes presented the draft consent judgment to Sharon, she refused to sign it,

claiming that it was unacceptable due to errors in the document and that it was

inconsistent with her understanding or desires for the settlement. Additionally,

Sharon claimed that Mr. Rhodes never explained the contents of the nine-page

consent judgment to her.

By agreement of counsel for both parties, a request was made to convert the

scheduled April 20, 2023 trial to a status conference. At that time, Mr. Oubre, on

behalf of Norman, made an oral motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and

moved for sanctions and penalties. Mr. Oubre argued that the March 3, 2023 text

messages exchanged between counsel, and the subsequent emails that followed,

established a binding and enforceable agreement on behalf of the parties to settle

all claims relative to the community property partition, with Norman paying an

equalizing payment to Sharon in the amount of $12,500.00. Mr. Oubre also argued

that it was further agreed between counsel that he was to prepare all paperwork

related to the settlement, including the consent judgment.

At the April 20, 2023 status conference, Mr. Rhodes expressed on the record

that Mr. Oubre had “summed up the last few weeks accurately,” but explained that

once Sharon received the draft consent judgment, she expressed that it was

“inconsistent with her understanding or desires for the settlement” and no longer

wished to sign the agreement. Mr. Rhodes then orally moved to withdraw as

counsel of record for Sharon, which request was denied, given the pending trial

and procedural posture of the case. Mr. Rhodes was ordered to remain as counsel

of record until such time as the pending matters were resolved. The trial court then

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set Norman’s oral motion to enforce settlement agreement for trial on May 15,

2023. The trial court advised Sharon that at the May 15, 2023 trial, she would

have the opportunity to dispute her acquiescence to the draft consent judgment

and/or introduce any evidence regarding the agreement that she contended was

inaccurate.

On May 15, 2023, prior to the commencement of trial, Mr. Rhodes re-urged

his motion to withdraw. Sharon confirmed for the court that she had attempted to

terminate Mr. Rhodes on several occasions and did not wish to be represented by

him, but advised that she had not yet retained other counsel to represent her. After

questioning Sharon and Mr. Rhodes, the trial judge determined that the March 3,

2023 text messages and emails exchanged between counsel, confirming the

settlement of the community property partition, were exchanged seven days prior

to Sharon’s March 10, 2023 attempt to terminate Mr. Rhodes. Consequently, the

trial judge denied Mr. Rhodes’ oral motion to withdraw and proceeded with the

trial on Norman’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and rule for

sanctions.

Norman was then examined under oath by his counsel and acknowledged his

authorization given to Mr. Oubre to increase the original $10,000.00 offer to settle

made on February 28, 2023, to $12,500.00. Although Norman testified that it was

his understanding that a binding agreement was reached between his counsel and

Mr. Rhodes to settle the community property partition for $12,500.00, he

acknowledged that he never signed the proposed consent judgement, as it was

never presented to him for signature.

Sharon was called to testify as an adverse witness, at which time she

invoked the Fifth Amendment. Sharon stated on the record that she was “not

properly represented and that [the] nine-page document of the Consent Judgment

23-CA-471 4

was never explained to [her] ... by Mr. Rhodes.” The trial judge then recessed the

trial giving Sharon time to retain additional counsel.

Trial of the matter continued on May 24, 2023. In the interim, however,

Sharon had not retained additional counsel, despite the opportunity afforded to her

by the trial court to do so.2 Nevertheless, the trial proceeded.

Sharon was recalled as an adverse witness and asked whether she recalled

that on February 28, 2023, a settlement offer was placed on the record “for

$10,000.00 as an equalizing payment, that was good for 24 hours[?]” Sharon

responded that on that date, it was her understanding that she had two choices—

one to “get[] an appraisal on the property that was not complete,” and the other

was that Norman “had the funds of [sic] and had cash.” Sharon testified that she

“did not make a settlement agreement” on that day. She stated that based on what

the trial judge stated that day in open court, it was her understanding that “there

was a settlement offer for $10,000 for 24 hours. And after that, it’s no good.”

[Emphasis added.]

Sharon further testified that she was aware that a “draft” document entitled,

“Consent Judgment, Homologating Agreement, Partition of Community Property,”

was sent by Norman’s counsel to Mr. Rhodes on March 17, 2023. According to

Sharon, after she received and reviewed the draft consent judgment, she refused to

sign it, explaining that “[t]his was an out-of-court settlement that failed. I did not

sign or agree to the unfair terms of this nine-page draft document. There was no

bank information given. No one explained this document to me … .” Sharon was

then asked if she agreed that the draft consent judgment sent to her through her

counsel was to “confirm an agreement on [an] equalizing payment and the

allocation of the assets, with [Norman] paying [her] $12,500,” and she replied,

2
Despite Mr. Rhodes’ efforts to withdraw as Sharon’s counsel, and Sharon’s desire that he
withdraw, the trial judge ordered that he remain on the case for the duration of the trial.

23-CA-471 5

“No. ... Mr. Rhodes was informed that I had to review it.” Sharon claimed that

after reviewing the proposed draft consent judgment, she emailed Mr. Rhodes the

following on April 3, 2023:

The draft has errors about a new identity on the
document, or a son born to Norman - - there is no
Norman III - - and is not in agreement with what you
stated to me. It has, he waived his reimbursements.
However, according to your e-mail, this is what I would
get with him getting his reimbursements. I can’t agree,
what doesn’t make sense. And the house be sold without
repairs too?

When questioned by Mr. Rhodes, Sharon testified that she did recall that

“other discussion[s]” with him had occurred after the February 28, 2023 hearing,

and that in a March 14, 2023 email, she confirmed to him the VIN number of the

vehicle Norman had given to her. Sharon claimed that she did not understand that

the “request for the VIN number was made in order to complete the settlement

offer paperwork[.]” Interestingly, when questioning Sharon at trial, Mr. Rhodes

referred to the March 17, 2023 draft consent judgment received from Mr. Oubre as

a “DRAFT of the proposed settlement offer:”

Q. And do you recall me sending you a draft of the
proposed settlement offer?

A. As Mr. Oubre questioned, yes; and I responded to
it, that I wasn’t in agreement with it.

Sharon concluded her testimony by repeating that when she received the

draft settlement offer from Mr. Rhodes, he never fully explained the terms of the

agreement to her, the document contained inaccuracies, and that it was inconsistent

with her understanding or desires for the settlement. She reiterated that she told

Mr. Rhodes that she was not in agreement with the draft of the proposed settlement

offer and, thus, refused to sign it.

Copies of the text messages and e-mails exchanged between counsel—which

Norman contends resulted in a binding, enforceable settlement agreement between

23-CA-471 6

himself and Sharon—were admitted into evidence. The actual draft consent

judgment, however, which neither Norman nor Sharon signed, was not offered or

admitted into evidence and is not a part of the record on appeal. Additionally,

except for the equalizing payment, neither party was questioned by counsel at trial

regarding any of the specific terms of the draft consent judgment and/or about their

acquiescence or objections to those terms.3

At the close of the hearing, the trial court orally granted Norman’s motion to

enforce the settlement agreement and for sanctions, assigning oral reasons, and

orally granted judgment homologating the partition of community property. In

oral reasons, the trial court stated the following, in part:

According to [Sharon’s] testimony today, she did not
attempt to terminate attorney Jonathan Rhodes until
March 10th, well over seven days after this agreement
was confirmed between counsel.

[Sharon] did not testify as to any substantive
disagreement with the written terms of the consent
judgment. Specifically, what she noted was that there
was a clerical error with respect to the Plaintiff’s name
being the “III” instead of, “Jr.” and that there was
missing bank account information. There was no
indication that the terms of the agreement were
substantially different than what had been agreed to on
March 3rd.

Further, [Sharon] continued to provide the necessary
information required by the consent judgment, the
proposed consent judgment.

In addition, with no evidence in the record that the trial court had ever

actually reviewed the written terms of the draft settlement offer or consent

judgment prepared by Mr. Oubre on behalf of Norman, the court ruled:

I am going to order that [Norman] pay [Sharon] the
amount of $12,500 as an equalizing payment to resolve
any and to dispose of any and all claims arising from the
community property partition trial and traversals, in
accordance with the proposed consent judgment that was

3
The trial court did ask Sharon to iterate which specific written terms of the consent judgment she
disagreed with; however, Sharon was unable to effectively do so.

23-CA-471 7

sent by Mr. Oubre to Mr. Rhodes in connection with this
matter.

I am further ordering that [Sharon] pay to [Norman] the
amount of $1,200 in attorney’s fees and any and all court
costs associated with this hearing and Motion to Enforce
the settlement. That payment is to be received within 30
days.

[Norman], you are to prepare and submit the judgment of
the Court, which will include any and all terms which
were previously submitted to Mr. Rhodes, in connection
with the consent judgment ... as an order of this Court.

In accordance with its oral reasons, the trial court issued a written judgment

on June 28, 2023, granting Norman’s motion to enforce community property

settlement and rule for sanctions and ordering Sharon to pay $1,200.00 to Norman

in attorney’s fees and $400.00 in costs. The trial court issued a separate written

judgment on June 28, 2023, homologating the partition of community property.

This judgment, in essence, ostensibly incorporated the exact terms and conditions

of the draft consent judgment, which was not admitted into evidence, and which

Sharon refused to sign. The judgment, among other things, ordered the following:

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the
parties have reached an agreement as to how to partition
the assets and liabilities ... as well as how to settle any
and all claims which each may have against the other for
reimbursement.

***
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED …[b]oth
parties acknowledge that this partition of community
property is fair and equitable to both parties.
Additionally, both parties agree that they are hereby
satisfied with the reimbursements to their respective
estates ... Both parties acknowledge that each has had the
benefit of independent legal counsel to review this
settlement with full understanding of the document being
signed.

Most significantly, the judgment ordered that:

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the
parties agree and acknowledge that they are entering into
this agreement freely and voluntarily, that they have
ascertained and weighed all of the facts and

23-CA-471 8

circumstances likely to influence their judgment herein;
that they have been duly apprised of their respective legal
rights with respect to a community property settlement;
that all provisions of this agreement, as well as questions
pertinent thereto, have fully and satisfactorily been
explained to them; that they have given due consideration
to such provisions in question and that they understand
clearly and consent to all provisions of this agreement.

Lastly, as there was a trial and Sharon never signed the draft

consent judgment, the trial court’s judgment erroneously states:

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that by
signing this Consent Judgment of Partition for
submission to the Court without a hearing or trial, both
parties acknowledge that its provisions accurately reflect
the terms of an agreement which they have made with
one another to amicably partition their community
property and debts, and to satisfy in full all
reimbursement, rental or other financial claims which
each may have against the other.

Sharon’s timely appeal of both June 28, 2023 judgments followed.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

On appeal, Sharon raises four assignments of error: (1) whether the trial

court erred in enforcing a “transaction compromise” on all community property

issues, and in rendering a judgment that adopted by reference, in toto, all

provisions of Norman’s proposed draft consent judgment, when neither the

document, nor its substantive content, were offered or admitted into evidence at the

trial, nor was the substance of the consent judgment proven at the hearing, nor

discernable from the appellate record; (2) whether the trial court erred in issuing

judgments enforcing a transaction compromise and homologating partition of

community property between Norman and Sharon, when Norman failed to prove

that Sharon had signed, or authorized Mr. Rhodes to bind her to, the draft consent

judgment; (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that Norman proved the legal

requirements of a transaction compromise binding upon the parties were satisfied;

and (4) whether the trial court erred in awarding sanctions against Sharon.

23-CA-471 9

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

When a trial court rules on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, it

makes a factual determination as to whether a contract existed between the parties,

and therefore, we review the trial court’s determination under a manifest error or

clearly wrong standard. Quintanilla v. Whitaker, 21-160 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/1/21),

334 So.3d 892, 893; Hancock Bank of La. V. Holmes, 09-1094 (La. App. 5 Cir.

5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1131, 1134. This is because the trial court’s determination of

the existence, validity and scope of a compromise agreement depends on a finding

of the parties’ intent, an inherently factual finding. Id. However, where a legal

error interdicts the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard no longer

applies and, if the record is complete, an appellate court should make its own de

novo review of the record. Lam ex rel. Lam v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 05-

1139 (La. 11/29/06). 946 So.2d 133, 135. Further, statutory interpretation is a

question of law subject to de novo review. Harvard v. Jeanlouis, 21-00810 (La.

6/29/22), 345 So.3d 1005, 1007. Mixed questions of fact and law are also subject

to the manifest error standard of review. Marietta Trust v. J.R. Logging Inc., 16-

1136 (La App. 1 Cir. 5/11/17), 225 So.3d 1144, 1147-48, writ denied, 17-1751 (La.

12/5/17), 231 So.3d 631.

DISCUSSION

Enforceability of the “Draft Consent Judgment, Homologating
Agreement, Partition of Community Property”

In her first three assignments of error, Sharon argues the trial court

committed manifest error in finding that, pursuant to La. C.C. arts. 3071 and 3072,

Norman proved the existence of a legally binding, enforceable agreement to settle

all community property issues between himself and Sharon, when the substantive

terms of that agreement were not recited into the record in open court nor testified

23-CA-471 10

to by the parties, and when the draft consent judgment sought to be enforced was

not entered into evidence at trial, or signed by either party. We agree.

A compromise or settlement is “[a] contract whereby the parties, through

concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty

concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.” La. C.C. art. 3071; Chaisson

v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 12-352 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/21/13), 110 So.3d 1147,

1148. To be enforceable, a compromise must be either reduced to writing and

signed by the parties or their agents, or be recited in open court and be capable of

transcription from the record of the proceeding. La. C.C. art. 3072;4 Trahan v.

Coca Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 04-100 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1096, 1104;

Sullivan v. Sullivan, 95-2122 (La. 4/8/96), 671 So.2d 315, 318. A compromise

agreement, which is not reduced to writing and evidenced by documentation

signed by both parties, is unenforceable. Hawthorne v. Barbier, 02-1903 (La. App.

4 Cir. 2/19/03), 841 So.2d 28. As a written document is contemplated by a

settlement agreement, the documentation evidencing the agreement must be signed

by both parties. Albarado v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 05-1084 (La. App. 3

Cir. 4/5/06), 926 So.2d 94. Until the parties sign a written document or documents

evincing their consent to the terms of a proposed settlement agreement, a party is

free to change his or her mind. Coppage v. Transdev. Services, Inc., 20-419 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 3/19/21), 320 So.3d 1206, 1121, writ denied, 21-549 (La. 6/8/21), 317

So.3d 328.

The requirement that a compromise be reduced to writing in order to be

enforceable does not necessarily mean that the agreement must be contained in one

document; however, the purpose of the writing requirement is to serve as proof of

the agreement and acquiescence of the parties thereto and, as such, must be signed

4
La. C.C. art. 3072 provides that “[a] compromise shall be made in writing or recited in open
court, in which case the recitation shall be susceptible of being transcribed from the record of the
proceedings."

23-CA-471 11

by both parties, and aims at avoiding litigation over the terms of the settlement.

Southern Nights, Inc. v. Barnett, 04-411 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/18/04), 881 So.2d 1125,

1128. See also Coppage, 320 So.3d at 1121; Morris, Lee & Bayle, LLC v.

Macquet, 14-1080 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 198, 210. The writing

requirement for a valid compromise is satisfied when emails and documents

exchanged between counsel, when read together, clearly outline each parties’

obligations to the other and evidence the parties’ mutual intent to put an end to

their dispute and acquiescence in the agreement. See Dozier v. Rhodus, 08-1813

(La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/09), 17 So.3d 403, 409-410, writ denied, 09-1647 (La.

10/30/09), 21 So.3d 294; Greer v. BP America Production Co., 14-450 (La. App. 3

Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 621, 626-628, writ denied, 14-2558 (La. 2/27/15), 159

So.3d 1070. A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly

intended to settle. La. C.C. art. 3076.

The authority to enter into a compromise must be expressly given. La. C.C.

art. 2997. It is well settled that a party’s counsel of record does not have authority

to settle a client’s claim without the client’s clear and express consent.

Quintanilla, 334 So.3d at 893; Coppage, 320 So.3d at 1121. The general authority

granted to an attorney in an attorney/client contract of employment to settle the

client’s case constitutes only the authority to negotiate a settlement. Id. Evidence

of a “settlement” consisting only of correspondence between the attorneys is

insufficient to bind the parties. Lizama v. Williams, 99-1040 (La. App. 5 Cir.

3/22/00), 759 So.2d 865, 868.

In the instant case, Sharon argues that she never accepted or agreed to the

provisions of the draft consent judgment prepared by Mr. Oubre. She argues that it

was never read into the record under oath, where it was susceptible of

transcription, was never signed by her, and was never offered or admitted into

evidence at trial. According to Sharon, the only substantive provision contained in

23-CA-471 12

the text messages exchanged between counsel on March 3, 2023 concerned a

$12,500.00 payment she was to receive from Norman. And, when presented with

the proposed draft consent judgment, she advised Mr. Rhodes that she rejected it,

refused to sign it, and never gave him authority to bind her to it. Sharon argues

that the trial court erred in finding that the legal requirements for a valid

compromise were met and in adopting in its entirety the proposed draft consent

judgment prepared by Norman’s counsel—the terms of which she had rejected and

which the trial court had never seen or reviewed—as the judgment of the court,

when no competent evidence proving the substance of the document was

introduced at trial or exists in the record. By ordering Mr. Oubre to prepare the

judgment of the court to “include any and all terms which were previously

submitted to Mr. Rhodes in connection with the consent judgment,” the trial court

relied solely on counsel’s representation as to what was actually contained in the

March 17, 2023 proposed draft consent judgment.

In response, Norman contends that based on the exhibits introduced into

evidence, without objection, at the May 15, 2023 and May 24, 2023 hearings, the

requirements for a valid enforceable compromise have been met. Specifically, he

argues that the text messages and email correspondence exchanged between the

parties’ counsel regarding the agreement to settle all outstanding community

property claims for an “equalizing payment” of $12,500.00 to be paid by Norman

to Sharon, included both an offer and an acceptance, sufficient to satisfy the “in

writing” requirement under La. C.C. art. 3072. Norman further avers that the text

messages and emails executed by Mr. Rhodes on March 3, 2023, when he

allegedly had the authority of his client to settle the claims on her behalf, evidence

a binding and enforceable agreement between himself and Sharon had been

established.

23-CA-471 13

The text messages and emails exchanged between counsel constitute the

totality of the evidence submitted by Norman at trial as proof of the alleged

enforceable agreement between Norman and Sharon. On March 3, 2023, the

following text messages were exchanged:

Mr. Rhodes: We’re good at 12.5 plus you do the
pleadings. Talk Monday?
Mr. Oubre: Yes. This confirms our agreement.
Mr. Rhodes: Yes sir. Enjoy the weekend.

On March 16, 2023, Mr. Rhodes texted Mr. Oubre, “How are we looking

with settlement docs in Porche? My client is anxious.”5 Mr. Oubre responded,

“Wrapping it up. Hopefully can send to you by tomorrow[,]” to which Mr. Rhodes

replied, “Good deal. Thanks.” Later that same day, Mr. Oubre texted Mr. Rhodes

requesting the VIN number for Sharon’s vehicle.

On March 17, 2023, Mr. Oubre emailed Mr. Rhodes, stating:

Please find attached a DRAFT of the Consent Judgment
for your review. I need the VIN for your client’s vehicle
as well as any credit cards in her name that she is
assuming (if any) and any bank accounts she needs to list
as her asset (I do not believe there are any).
[Capitalization in original.]6

As previously noted, while a copy of this email was admitted into evidence,

without objection, the attached “DRAFT of the Consent Judgment” was not. Even

when reading the text messages and emails exchanged between counsel together,

we find that without more—i.e., a copy of the nine-page draft consent judgment or

testimony by the parties regarding the substantive terms of the agreement and their

acquiescence thereto—they do not clearly outline the obligations the parties owed

to each other, nor evidence the party’s mutual intent to put an end to the

community property dispute. In fact, we find there was nothing before the trial

5
Interestingly, the record shows that by this date, Sharon had already requested that Mr. Rhodes
withdraw from her case on three occasions, including such a request made that very day.
6
Emails were also exchanged between counsel on May 30, 2023, regarding the status of settlement
documents. On May 31, 2023, Mr. Rhodes emailed Mr. Oubre with the VIN number of Sharon’s vehicle.

23-CA-471 14

court that addressed the various obligations of the parties under that agreement,

other than Norman’s obligation to pay Sharon $12,500.00, and nothing evidencing

the “mutual” intent of the parties to settle all of the remaining issues related to the

community property partition. Even though the record contains Norman’s

testimony that his attorney had his authority to settle all claims for the equalizing

payment of $12,500.00, Sharon’s testimony at numerous hearings was emphatic

that she was not in agreement with Norman’s settlement offer, that it was

inconsistent with her understanding or desires for the settlement, and that a

settlement agreement had not been reached.7

We acknowledge that text messages and emails, when read together, may in

some circumstances satisfy the requirement that a compromise agreement be

reduced to writing. See Dozier, 17 So.3d at 409-410; Greer, 150 So.3d at 626-628.

However, given the absence of a settlement document outlining the obligations of

the parties or their acquiescence to its terms for this Court to review, we find the

text messages and emails relied upon by Norman in this case were insufficient to

satisfy the writing requirement of La. C.C. art. 3072. When the requirements of

La. C.C. art. 3072 are not followed, Louisiana courts have generally declined to

enforce a compromise. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 95-2122 (La. 4/8/96), 671 So.2d

315, 318. Based on the record before us, we find the trial court manifestly erred in

concluding that the exchange of text messages and emails between counsel alone

culminated in an enforceable settlement agreement between Sharon and Norman,

and thereby committed manifest error in granting Norman’s motion to enforce

settlement. Accordingly, the trial court’s June 28, 2023 judgments granting

7
While attorneys are presumed to have authority to negotiate a settlement proposal for their
clients, they may not enter a binding settlement without the client’s clear and express consent. Coppage,
320 So.3d at 1212. Here, the record suggests that Mr. Rhodes did not have Sharon’s clear and express
authority to enter into a binding agreement to settle the community property partition. See, e.g., Tran v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 01-675 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/01), 806 So.2d 103, 106 (denying a motion to enforce
settlement where “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the plaintiff ever gave her attorney the
express consent necessary to accept the terms of the settlement.”).

23-CA-471 15

Norman’s motion to enforce settlement agreement and homologating the partition

of community property are reversed.

Sanctions

An appellate court reviews trial court’s rulings in an action for sanctions

applying an “abuse of discretion,” “manifest error,” or “clearly wrong” standard of

review. Parish of Jefferson v. Levenson, 96-1067 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/14/97), 695

So.2d 1018, 1019.

The trial court imposed sanctions in the amount of $1,200.00 in attorney fees

and $400.00 in costs against Sharon, presumably as a penalty for not signing what

the court found to be a valid and enforceable settlement agreement. Having found

the trial court manifestly erred in granting Norman’s motion to enforce settlement

agreement, we likewise find the trial court abused its discretion in assessing

penalties and attorney’s fees against Sharon.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s June 28, 2023

judgments, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

23-CA-471 16

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
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GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
APRIL 24, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-CA-471
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE CONNIE M. AUCOIN (DISTRICT JUDGE)
COREY M. OUBRE (APPELLEE) RUSSELL C. MONROE (APPELLANT)

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