Renton Properties, LLC Versus 213 Upland, LLC

RENTON PROPERTIES, LLC NO. 23-CA-479

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

213 UPLAND, LLC COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 775-357, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG, JUDGE PRESIDING

December 27, 2024

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson

AFFIRMED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
JGG
SMC
MEJ

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
RENTON PROPERTIES,LLC
Patrick S. McGoey
Andrea V. Timpa
Robert L. Raymond

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE-2ND APPELLANT,
213 UPLAND, LLC
Thomas M. Flanagan
Anders F. Holmgren
Kansas M. Guidry

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
MARGARET W. TONTI, ROBERT J. TONTI, AND OHIO MANAGEMENT,
LLC
Jefferson R. Tillery
Madeleine Fischer
Jessica S. Allain

GRAVOIS, J.

Defendants/appellants, 213 Upland, LLC (“Upland”), Margaret Tonti,

Robert J. Tonti, and Ohio Management, LLC, appeal the jury verdict rendered in

favor of plaintiff/appellee, Renton Properties, LLC (“Renton”). For the reasons

that follow, we affirm in part, amend in part, and reverse in part. We affirm the

jury verdict finding that Upland breached its contract with Renton. We reverse the

jury verdict finding that Upland breached the contract with Renton in bad faith.

We reverse the jury verdict and judgment against Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, and Ohio

Management. We amend and reduce the jury award of damages in favor of Renton

against Upland from $2,067,400.00 to the stipulated damages amount of

$20,000.00, plus legal interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid.

We affirm the award of attorney’s fees and costs to Renton as follows: attorney’s

fees in the amount of $233,703.00, plus legal interest thereon from February 17,

2023 until paid; expert witness fees in the amount of $26,683.33; deposition costs

in the amount of $2,949.15; and court costs in the amount of $18,324.61. Finally,

we reverse the treble damages award to Renton.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Margaret Tonti is the owner and sole member/manager of 213 Upland, LLC

(“Upland”). In 2017, Mrs. Tonti decided to sell Upland’s only asset:

approximately four acres of land located at 213 Upland Avenue in River Ridge,

Louisiana. Mrs. Tonti asked her son, Robert Tonti, to help her sell the property,

and she gave him full authority to act on her behalf. Real estate agents Mary

“Meg” Carrone and Emily Kramer with Corporate Realty Leasing Company, Inc.,

listed the property for sale.

23-CA-479 1

On August 10, 2017, Renton Properties, LLC (“Renton”) tendered an offer

to purchase the property for the sum of $365,000.00 (the “Renton Agreement”).1

Renton’s offer stated: “Upon acceptance of this offer, SELLER and PURCHASER

shall be bound by all of its terms and conditions and PURCHASER becomes

obligated to deposit immediately with Seller’s agent $10,000.00 and failure to do

so shall be considered a breach of this agreement.” (Emphasis added.) The offer

provided for a 90-day due diligence period, followed by a closing within 30 days.

Mr. Renton intended to build 16 buildings consisting of 32 townhomes on the

property.

On August 14, 2017, Upland responded to Renton’s offer with a counter-

offer of $425,000.00 and a deposit of $20,000.00. Renton accepted the counter-

offer on Thursday, August 17, 2017. Renton’s real estate agent, Charles Mullin,

emailed the signed counter-offer to Ms. Carrone and Ms. Kramer at 2:19 p.m. and

asked: “Should the deposit check be made to ‘Corporate Realty Sales Escrow

Account’ and sent to your offices at 201 St. Charles Avenue? Please advise.” Ms.

Carrone responded by email at 3:22 p.m. stating: “The check should be made to

Corporate Realty and you can send it to Emily’s attention at 201 St. Charles.”

Mr. Mullin forwarded the email to Mr. Renton at 5:05 p.m. Mr. Renton

received the email while out with clients. Mr. Mullin and Mr. Renton spoke on the

telephone sometime later that evening and discussed the matter. Because Mr.

Renton would be in Port Fourchon the next day, Friday, August 18, 2017, and in

Kentucky on Monday, August 21, 2017, Mr. Mullin and Mr. Renton agreed that

Mr. Renton would sign the $20,000.00 deposit check over the weekend. Mr.

Mullin would pick the check up from Mr. Renton’s office and deliver the check to

Corporate Realty on Monday morning. Mr. Renton testified that he printed and

1
Renton is owned by Edward Renton, Jr.

23-CA-479 2

signed the check on Sunday, August 20, 2017, and left it taped to the front window

in the reception area of his business located in Kenner, Louisiana.

On Friday, August 18, 2017, Mr. Mullin emailed Ms. Carrone and Ms.

Kramer, requesting permission to “begin filling the site” with sand. The request

was denied. Neither party discussed the pending deposit on this day.

Meanwhile, during this time, on August 15, 2017, another party, Charles R.

Cannon, III, put in an offer to purchase the property for $500,000.00 with a 15-day

due diligence period and a closing within 5 days (the “Cannon Agreement”). On

August 17, 2017, Upland responded with a counter-offer, adding solely that the

purchase agreement is “subject to termination of the Purchase Agreement with

Counter signature of today’s date and presently in effect between Seller and third

party purchaser [Renton].” Mr. Cannon returned the executed counter-offer on

Friday, August 18, 2017.

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 21, 2017, Ms. Kramer was

at her office at Corporate Realty when she discovered that Renton had not yet

furnished the $20,000.00 deposit. She called both Ms. Carrone and Mr. Tonti. Mr.

Tonti advised her to contact Upland’s attorney, R. Lewis McHenry, for a legal

opinion since it “sound[ed] like its null and void.”

At 9:09 a.m., Lori Marshall, Mr. McHenry’s legal secretary, emailed a letter

to Mr. Mullin from Mr. McHenry, which stated:

Our Firm represents Mrs. Margaret W. Tonti and 213 Upland,
LLC, the owner of 213 Upland Avenue, River Ridge, Jefferson
Parish, Louisiana. This will advise you that the Owner did not
receive the Deposit when the signed counteroffer was delivered to
Owner’s Broker, in contravention of the Purchase Agreement. The
Purchase Agreement requires the Deposit to be delivered
“immediately” and “failure to do so shall be considered a breach of
this agreement.” Accordingly, the Purchase Agreement is null and
void and without any force or effect.

After receiving the letter, Mr. Mullin attempted to hand-deliver the

$20,000.00 deposit check to Ms. Kramer at Corporate Realty. There, he met with

23-CA-479 3

Ms. Kramer who informed him that she could not accept the check on the advice of

her client, Mr. Tonti, and Mr. McHenry. At trial, Mr. Tonti testified that he

advised Ms. Kramer not to accept the deposit check on Monday based on Mr.

McHenry’s advice. At that point, he understood the Renton Agreement was

terminated based on Mr. McHenry’s legal counsel, and thus, he could do anything

he wanted to do with the property.

Thereafter, Mr. Mullin contacted Renton’s attorney, Patrick McGoey. On

Monday afternoon, Mr. McGoey began discussing the alleged nullity and

enforceability of the Renton Agreement with Mr. McHenry. Mr. McGoey testified

that he disagreed with Mr. McHenry’s interpretation that the Renton Agreement

was null and void and shared law he found concerning the matter. Both lawyers

agreed they needed to resolve the matter short of litigation. On Wednesday,

August 23, 2017, Mr. McGoey responded to a proposal by Mr. McHenry and

informed him that Renton would not agree to pay an increased purchase price for

the property, but would agree to shorten the due diligence period. However, if the

parties could not agree by Friday, August 25, 2017, Mr. McGoey indicated that he

would file a lawsuit and a notice of lis pendens. Mr. McHenry told Mr. McGoey

he would speak with his client and get back to Mr. McGoey. Mr. McGoey testified

that he never heard back from Mr. McHenry.2 On Friday, August 25, 2017, at 1:06

p.m., Renton filed a petition naming Upland as a defendant and seeking specific

performance, or alternatively, damages and injunctive relief.

2
On Thursday, Ms. Marshall, Mr. McHenry’s secretary, called Mr. McGoey to inform
him that Mr. McHenry was busy and would call him back later. Mr. McGoey testified that Mr.
McHenry never called him back.

23-CA-479 4

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of Monday, August 21, 2017, Mr. Tonti

emailed Ms. Kramer and Ms. Carrone a “signed Cannon purchase agreement.”3

He asked that they contact Mr. Cannon’s agent, Duff Friend, and inform him that:

… [O]n advice of counsel we feel the purchase agreement with Mr.
Renton is null and void. Mr. Renton is not happy about it but we
are moving on to Mr. Cannon’s Offer/Purchase agreement. Please
have Duff delivery [sic] deposit asap to Corp. Realty.

Mr. Cannon subsequently dropped off the deposit check at Corporate Realty.

Mr. Friend emailed the agents on Monday afternoon to confirm that the due

diligence period would expire on September 5, 2017 and the closing would take

place on September 11, 2017.

On Wednesday, August 23, 2017, Mr. Friend emailed Ms. Carrone and Ms.

Kramer to inform them that Mr. Cannon wished to close the sale on Friday

morning. Danya Duffy at Acquisition Title served as the closing attorney. She

testified that Mr. Cannon wanted the closing done as soon as possible. As part of

the closing, she was given the purchase agreement signed on Monday, August 21,

2017; it did not include the previous counter-offer language. She testified that had

she been given the counter-offer, she would have “done something,” including

asking Upland questions about why the Renton Agreement was terminated.

Depending on the answers, she may have delayed the closing.4

The cash sale of the property to JodyCorp, LLC5 for $500,000.00 occurred

on Friday, August 25, 2017. Mr. McHenry’s legal secretary, Robin Riviere,

3
It was established at trial that Mr. Tonti re-signed the original Cannon offer on Monday,
August 21, 2017, which did not include the previous counter-offer language concerning
termination of the Renton Agreement.
4
Both Ms. Kramer and Mr. Tonti testified regarding getting the sale done quickly. In an
email on Friday morning, Ms. Kramer wrote to Traci Daigre at Acquisition Title: “Traci,
everyone’s told you how imperative it is to file the sale immediately?” Ms. Kramer testified that
it was her understanding that Mr. Tonti was aware that a lawsuit regarding the Renton
Agreement was coming, so he was happy to get the closing done soon. Mr. Tonti testified it was
in his mother’s best interest to close on the sale on Friday because of the pending lawsuit.
5
JodyCorp, LLC is a limited liability company that was formed by Charles Cannon.

23-CA-479 5

traveled to Mrs. Tonti in St. Tammany Parish and witnessed her sign the cash sale.6

At the time, Mrs. Tonti also signed a letter authorizing that the sale proceeds be

wired to the account of Ohio Management, LLC – another company owned by

Mrs. Tonti.7 The sale was recorded the same day at 12:01 p.m.8

In Renton’s petition, filed at 1:06 p.m. on the same day, Renton claimed that

Upland breached its obligation by refusing to accept its deposit and by attempting

to declare the contract null and void. Renton asserted it is entitled to damages in

the sum of $20,000.00, plus attorney’s fees and all costs. On February 6, 2018,

Renton filed its First Amended and Supplemental Verified Petition naming ten

additional defendants: Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, Ohio Management, Corporate Realty,

Ms. Carrone, Ms. Kramer, Mr. Cannon, JodyCorp, Mr. Friend, and Mr. McHenry.

In its amended petition, Renton alleged, in addition to seeking specific

performance, that defendants breached the Renton Agreement, were negligent,

committed fraud, and participated in unfair trade practices in violation of the

Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”), La. R.S. 51:1401, et seq.9

Prior to trial, Renton dropped its negligence claim. All claims against Mr.

McHenry were dismissed after this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment

denying his motion for summary judgment. See Renton Properties, LLC v. 213

Upland, LLC, 20-133 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/5/20), 304 So.3d 1083, writ denied, 20-

01395 (La. 1/26/21), 309 So.3d 345. Renton also settled with all but the following

defendants: Upland, Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, and Ohio Management.

6
The act of sale was notarized by Mr. McHenry, and Ms. Marshall signed the act of sale
as a witness. Both Ms. Riviere and Ms. Marshall testified that Mr. McHenry and Ms. Marshall
were not physically present when the act of sale was signed by Mrs. Tonti.
7
Mrs. Tonti testified that she is the sole owner of Ohio Management, the company that
runs Tonti Apartments. In 2017, Mr. Tonti became a co-manager of Ohio Management.
8
In an email exchange following the sale, Ms. Kramer wrote to Mr. Tonti and Ms.
Carrone: “How do we know they beat the lis pendens filing? Would Lewis be able to find out?”
Ms. Kramer then emailed Mr. McHenry to ask if he knew if they beat the lis pendens. At trial,
Ms. Kramer did not deny sending those emails.
9
Several cross-claims were also filed.

23-CA-479 6

A five-day jury trial ensued from August 8–12, 2022. Renton called the

following witnesses: Mr. Renton; Mr. Mullin; Mrs. Tonti; Ms. Kramer; Ms. Duffy;

Dr. Rodolfo Aguilar, an expert in the field of appraisals, performing valuation

services while not acting as an appraiser; Stephen Dwyer, an expert in real estate

transactions; Ms. Marshall, Ms. Riviere, Mr. Tonti, and Mr. McGoey. Defendants

called the following witnesses: David Vercher, an expert in commercial real estate;

Randy Opotowsky, an expert in the field of real estate law; and Baldwin Richard

Justice, an expert in real estate appraisals.

On August 12, 2022, the jury rendered the following verdict:

1. Did Renton Properties, LLC prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that 213 Upland, LLC breached the contract?

Yes __X___ No ___
If you answered yes, please proceed to question 2. If you answered
no, please skip question 2 and go to question 3.

2. Did Renton Properties, LLC prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that 213 Upland, LLC breached the contract in bad
faith?

Yes __X___ No ___
Please proceed to question 3.

3. Did 213 Upland, LLC prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Renton Properties, LLC breached the contract?
Yes ___ No __X___
If you answered yes to question 1, regardless of your answers to
questions 2 and 3, please proceed to question 4. If you answer no to
question 1, regardless of your answer to question 3 please do not
answer any more questions. Please skip all further questions, sign and
date this form and return to the courtroom.

4. Did Renton Properties, LLC prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that any of the defendants committed fraud that caused
damages to it?

Yes __X___ No ___
Please proceed to question 5.

5. Did Renton Properties, LLC prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that any of the defendants committed an act or practice
which constitutes an unfair trade practice under the Louisiana

23-CA-479 7

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act that caused
damages to it?

Yes __X___ No ___
If you answered yes to either questions 4 or 5, please proceed to
question 6. If you answered no to both 4 and 5, please skip questions
6 and 7 and proceed to question 8.

6. Do you find that the plaintiff, Renton Properties, LLC, proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant, 213 Upland,
LLC, is the alter ego of Margaret W. Tonti, such that Margaret
W. Tonti is personally liable for the debts, obligations, and
liabilities owed by 213 Upland, LLC?

Yes ___ No __X___
Please proceed to question 7.

7. Do you find that the plaintiff, Renton Properties, LLC, proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant, Ohio
Management, LLC, is the alter ego of either Margaret W. Tonti
or Robert J. Tonti, such that Margaret W. Tonti and/or Robert J.
Tonti is personally liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities
owed by Ohio Management, LLC? Answer separately for each
person.

Margaret W. Tonti Yes __X___ No ___

Robert J. Tonti Yes __X___ No ___
Please proceed to question 8.

8. Allocate the percentage of fault that caused damage to Renton
Properties among all actors in this case, with the percentages
totaling 100%. If you do not find any fault, or if you do not find
that any fault caused damage to Renton Properties you may enter
0.
__0__ % Ed Renton _0__ % JodyCorp, LLC

__0__ % 213 Upland, LLC _0__ % Charles Cannon
__0__ % Ohio Management, LLC _0__ % Duff Friend

__5__ % Margaret Tonti _10_ % Corporate Realty, LLC

__85_ % Robert Tonti _0__ % Mary “Meg” Carrone
_0__ % Emily Kramer
Please proceed to question 9.

9. What is the total amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by
Renton Properties, LLC? If you find that Renton Properties,
LLC failed to mitigate its damages, you should reduce the total by
the amount Renton could have mitigated.

23-CA-479 8

$_2,067,400.00____
Please proceed to question 10.

10.Do you find that the Purchase Agreement limited by contract the
amount that Renton Properties, LLC could recover as damages to
twice the amount of the deposit?

Yes ___ No __X___
On September 7, 2022, the trial court signed a written judgment in

accordance with the jury verdict. The judgment states the following:

 Upland breached its contract with Renton;

 Upland breach its contract with Renton in bad faith;

 Renton did not breach its contract with Upland;

 Upland, Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, and Ohio Management committed
fraud that caused damages to Renton;

 Upland, Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, and Ohio Management committed an
act or practice which constitutes an unfair trade practice that caused
damages to Renton;

 Upland is not the alter ego of Mrs. Tonti, and Mrs. Tonti is not
personally liable for Upland’s debts, obligations, and liabilities;

 Ohio Management is the alter ego of Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti, and
they are personally liable for Ohio Management’s debts, obligations,
and liabilities;

 The allocation of fault is 5% to Mrs. Tonti, 85% to Mr. Tonti, and
10% to Corporate Realty;

 Renton sustained damages in the amount of $2,067,400.00 with legal
interest from date of judicial demand;

 The purchase agreement did not limit the amount that Renton could
recover as damages to twice the amount of the deposit; and

 The amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded shall be heard
and determined by the Court upon the filing of a motion. The Court
shall also determine, by motion, the amount of treble damages, if any,
that Renton is entitled to recover pursuant to LUTPA. The Court shall
also hear and determine any other post-judgment motions filed by the
parties.

Thereafter both Renton and defendants filed motions for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). On November 3, 2022, Renton also filed a

motion for treble damages and a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. These post-

23-CA-479 9

trial matters were heard by the trial court on January 13, 2023. A written judgment

was signed on February 17, 2023, wherein the trial court denied Renton’s JNOV

and defendants’ JNOV, granted Renton’s motion for treble damages, and granted

Renton’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court found that Renton

shall be awarded $233,703.00 in attorney’s fees; expert fees in the amount of

$26,683.33; deposition costs in the amount of $2,949.15; and court costs in the

amount of $18,324.61.

Renton moved to amend the February 17, 2023 judgment, arguing that it did

not contain the proper decretal language. On April 19, 2023, the trial court granted

the motion and amended the final judgment in the following particulars:

 There will be a 10% reduction in the portion of Renton’s damages
allotted by the jury to defendants in light of the jury’s allocation of
10% fault to Corporate Realty;

 Judgment is rendered in favor of Renton against Mrs. Tonti, Upland,
and Ohio Management solidarily for 5% of Renton’s actual damages
in the amount of $103,370.00 from date of judicial demand – which
date is August 25, 2017 for Upland and February 6, 2018 for Mrs.
Tonti and Ohio Management;

 Judgment is rendered in favor of Renton against Mrs. Tonti, Upland,
and Ohio Management solidarily for any additional penalty under
LUTPA for $206,740.00 with judicial interest from February 17,
2023;

 Judgment is rendered in favor of Renton against Mr. Tonti, Upland,
and Ohio Management solidarily for 85% of Renton’s actual damages
in the amount of $1,757,290.00 with judicial interest from the date of
judicial demand – which date is August 25, 2017 for Upland and
February 6, 2018 for Mr. Tonti and Ohio Management;

 Judgment is rendered in favor of Renton against Mr. Tonti, Upland,
and Ohio Management solidarily for an additional penalty under
LUTPA in the amount of $3,514,580.00 with judicial interest from
February 17, 2023;

 Judgment is rendered in favor of Renton against Upland, Mrs. Tonti,
Mr. Tonti, and Ohio Management solidarily for attorney’s fees in the
amount of $233,703.00 with judicial interest from February 17, 2023;
and

 Judgment in favor of Renton against Upland, Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti
and Ohio Management solidarily for $2,949.15 in deposition fees,

23-CA-479 10

$26,683.33 in expert costs; and $18,324.61 in court costs, all without
judicial interest.

Upland appealed, arguing the following assignments of error:

1. Pervasive errors prejudiced Upland and interdicted the jury’s findings
on key issues.

2. Upland did not breach the agreement; Renton failed to deliver the
deposit “immediately” and lost the right to buy the property.

3. Even if Upland breached the purchase agreement, the stipulated
damages clause caps all damages.

4. Lost profits must be proven with reasonable certainty; over $2 million
for speculative damages is unjustifiable.

5. The LUTPA award has both procedural and substantive errors.

Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, and Ohio Management raise the following

assignments of error on appeal:

1. The true nature of Renton’s claims is one for tortious interference
with a contract which can only be brought against corporate officers;
thus, the case should be dismissed.

2. The trial court erred in denying Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti’s motions
for summary judgment and by entering judgment against Mrs. Tonti
and Mr. Tonti for actions taken on behalf of an LLC.

3. The trial court erred in denying Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti’s motions
for summary judgment and JNOV and entering a judgment against
them on the fraud and LUTPA claims.
4. The trial court erred in casting Ohio Management in judgment when
the jury found Ohio Management free from fault and assigned it zero
percent.

5. Defendants adopt all assignments of error made by Upland.

Renton filed an answer to the appeal and assigns the following as errors:

1. The trial court erred by including all settled parties on the jury verdict
form and instructing the jury to allocate fault among all parties.

2. The trial court erred by reducing Renton’s award by 10% for the fault
allotted to Corporate Realty.

3. The trial court erred by holding Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti solidarily
liable for 100% of Renton’s actual and treble damages, attorney fees
and costs and failing to hold Upland liable for 100% of Renton’s
actual damages, attorney’s fees and cost for breach and bad faith
breach of contract.

4. The trial court erred in failing to grant Renton’s JNOV and finding
that Upland was Mrs. Tonti’s alter ego.

23-CA-479 11

5. Renton should be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs in this appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

UPLAND’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Did legal errors interdict the jury’s fact-finding function?
In its first assignment of error, Upland argues two legal errors interdicted the

jury’s fact-finding function, thus triggering a de novo review of the record.

Specifically, Upland contends Mr. McHenry was dismissed from the case after this

Court granted his motion for summary judgment. Under La. C.C.P. art. 966(G),

Renton could not then try to prove that Mr. McHenry was at fault. Upland argues

the trial court failed to enforce this when it allowed Renton to discuss Mr.

McHenry in its closing argument. Upland also argues the trial court erred when it

allowed Mr. McGoey, a lay witness, to testify regarding his legal expertise and to

testify on Louisiana law.

A reviewing court may not set aside a trial court or a jury’s finding of fact in

the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Hicks v. USAA

Gen. Indem. Co., 21-840 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d 1106, 1115, reh’g denied, 21-

840 (La. 5/10/22), 347 So.3d 735, citing Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98),

708 So.2d 731, 735. However, where the trial court makes a legal error that

interdicts the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer

applicable, and the appellate court may conduct a de novo review of the record. Id.

A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such

errors are prejudicial. Id. Errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the

outcome of the trial and deprive a party of substantial rights. Id. A de novo review

should be limited to consequential errors, which are those that have prejudiced or

tainted the verdict rendered. Succession of Gendron, 21-14 (La. App. 5 Cir.

6/23/21), 325 So.3d 584, 594, writ denied, 21-1075 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So.3d 79.

When such a prejudicial error of law skews the trial court’s finding of a material

23-CA-479 12

issue of fact and causes it to pretermit other issues, the appellate court is required,

if it can, to render judgment on the record by applying the correct law and

determining the essential material facts de novo. Hicks, supra.

References to Mr. McHenry during Renton’s closing argument

As to the first alleged error, Upland argues Renton violated La. C.C.P. art.

966(G) when it referenced Mr. McHenry in its closing argument.

When a party is dismissed by summary judgment, La. C.C.P. art. 966(G)

prohibits the dismissed party from being considered in any subsequent allocation

of fault, prohibits the admission of any evidence at trial to establish the fault of the

dismissed party, and prohibits direct or indirect reference to the fault of the

dismissed party at trial. This article serves to prohibit the shift of liability from a

defendant who is currently involved in litigation to another party who was

previously involved in litigation, but was dismissed by summary judgment.

Detillieu v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 23-226 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/24), 392

So.3d 918, 932, citing Amedee v. Aimbridge Hospitality LLC, 21-1906 (La.

10/21/22), 351 So.3d 321, 322. In Amedee, the Louisiana Supreme Court deduced

that with the addition of the language prohibiting reference to a dismissed party,

“the legislature intended to prevent potential jury confusion by expressly

prohibiting references to a dismissed defendant whose fault would never actually

be presented to the jury.” Id. at 334.

Mr. McHenry filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Renton

could not prove that he was a party to the allegedly breached contract, that he owed

any duty of care to Renton, or that he made any false misrepresentations. The

motion was denied by the trial court, but on supervisory review, this Court granted

Mr. McHenry’s writ application, reversed the trial court’s judgment, and rendered

judgment in favor of Mr. McHenry, dismissing all of Renton’s claims against him,

with prejudice. In doing so, this Court found:

23-CA-479 13

In summary, Renton has presented no evidence showing that
a genuine issue of material fact exist[s] and/or that it will be able to
carry its burden of proving at trial that McHenry can be held
personally liable for breach of the Renton Agreement to which he
was not a party; that McHenry can be personally liable to Renton
for malpractice or breach of a professional obligation; that
McHenry acted with specific malice or with an intent to personally
cause Renton harm for which he can be held personally
accountable for an intentional tort; that McHenry owed any duty to
Renton or its counsel to disclose information regarding Upland’s
confidential business dealings, or made any affirmative
misrepresentations to Renton or its counsel, during negotiations to
resolve the dispute between Renton and Upland that rise to the
level of fraud; or, that McHenry’s alleged actions on behalf of his
client fall under the protection of LUTPA.
Renton Properties, LLC, 304 So.3d at 1096-97.

On August 1, 2022, the trial court granted defendants’ motion in limine to

exclude direct and indirect testimony and evidence regarding any fault on the part

of Mr. McHenry. In its oral reasons for judgment, the trial court stated it agreed

that no direct or indirect reference to the fault of Mr. McHenry should be

discussed, but did not find that to mean all discussions of Mr. McHenry were to be

excluded, as that would prevent presenting the “full picture.”

During closing argument, Renton stated the following:

So, let’s, let’s do our own little acronym. Let’s say L. L is
for Lewis McHenry. There was no basis, no basis, and we can
look at PL33, please, there was no basis for Lewis’ statement that a
late deposit check made the contract null and void. You see where
he says in the bottom line null and void? We just went through
that agreement. And null and void is, in fact, in the agreement.
But it’s used at other locations relative to due diligence and
relative to the merchantability of title. Compare and contrast that
to the language that we’ve seen 100 times about the breach of the
failure to post a deposit.
He cites it here: The purchase agreement requires a deposit
to be delivered immediately, and failure to do shall be considered a
breach of the agreement. That’s our point. It’s a breach. It’s not
null and void. The breach can be fixed. A breach can be fixed.
Now, where was this, Mr. McHenry? Have y’all see him? He
hasn’t been around here. He didn’t testify. He could have paid his
lawyer of 30 years to come here and testify. I’ll leave it to you to
figure out why he wasn’t here. He didn’t come explain himself.
And I’m not sure he would have an explanation.

23-CA-479 14

Defendants objected, and a bench conference immediately followed, where

defendants requested that a cautionary instruction be given on Mr. McHenry’s

presence at trial. The trial court judge told defendants that the issue could be

addressed in their closing argument. In their closing argument, defendants

informed the jury that Mr. McHenry was sued and this Court found that he “did

nothing wrong” and was not at fault.

The following jury instruction was also presented to the jury:

In the course of this trial, you have heard R. Lewis McHenry
discussed. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal has made
factual findings with respect to R. Lewis McHenry and dismissed
him from this suit. No fault may be assessed to R. Lewis
McHenry.

Upon review, considering defendants’ clarification in their closing argument

and the jury instruction that Mr. McHenry was found free of fault, we find that any

error by Renton in its discussion of Mr. McHenry during its closing argument did

not taint the jury such that a de novo review is warranted.

Testimony by Mr. McGoey, a lay witness, as to his legal expertise and his
opinions as to the law
Upland also argues the trial court erred when it allowed Renton to allude to

Mr. McGoey’s legal expertise, education, and credentials during his trial testimony

as a lay witness. Further, Upland argues the trial court erred in allowing Mr.

McGoey to testify regarding Membreno v. Ponder, 417 So.2d 1257 (La. App. 1

Cir.), rehearing denied, 8/24/82, writ denied, 423 So.2d 1146 (La. 1982), and

regarding his legal position relative to the breach of the purchase agreement in this

case.

Mr. McGoey testified at trial as a lay witness. Louisiana Code of Evidence

article 701 allows a lay witness to provide opinion testimony if it is: (1) rationally

based on the perception of the witness; and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of

his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Also, this Court has

recognized that where an attorney is proffered to the trial court as an expert in a

23-CA-479 15

particular area of law, various Louisiana Courts of Appeal, including this Circuit,

have adopted a jurisprudential rule that experts may not provide opinions regarding

domestic (i.e., Louisiana) law. Par. of Jefferson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Par.,

17-272 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/17), 234 So.3d 207, 212.

The question of whether Article 701 was violated is a determination within

the discretion of the trial court. Thompson ex rel. Hernandez v. Bellow, 07-591

(La. App. 5 Cir. 2/6/08), 979 So.2d 531, 535. Also, a trial court has wide

discretion concerning the admissibility and relevancy of evidence, and a trial

court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Succession of Gendron, 325 So.3d at 595. The reviewing court must consider

whether the complained-of ruling was erroneous and whether the error affected a

substantial right of the complaining party. Id. If a party’s substantial right was not

affected by an evidentiary ruling, reversal is not warranted. The complainant has

the burden of proof. Id.

During trial, Mr. McGoey testified as to his conversations with Mr.

McHenry following receipt of Mr. McHenry’s letter.10 Mr. McGoey reviewed the

purchase agreement and disagreed with Mr. McHenry’s interpretation that it was

null and void since nothing in the deposit provision says the contract would be null

and void if the deposit was not paid immediately. He informed Mr. McHenry of

his “legal theory” which was “summed up” in the Louisiana Practice Series:

Louisiana Real Estate Transactions, § 9:48, which was admitted into evidence over

the objection of Upland. Mr. McGoey explained that according to the practice

series, a failure to pay a deposit will not void a purchase agreement and a seller

cannot refuse to deliver title on the grounds that the purchaser failed to make the

10
Prior to Mr. McGoey testifying, defendants moved to bar his testimony. The trial court
denied their request and allowed him to testify as to what his mindset was, but not what he
thought Mr. McHenry was thinking or what Mr. McHenry told him.

23-CA-479 16

required deposit. Mr. McGoey testified the court in Membreno found that even if a

purchase agreement is found to be null and void due to failure to timely pay a

deposit, the seller still had to give the purchaser a reasonable amount of time to

timely pay the deposit.

Upon review, we find the trial court erred in allowing Mr. McGoey to opine

on Louisiana law. Further, though he was discussing the facts surrounding what

occurred once he received Mr. McHenry’s letter, we find his testimony as a lay

witness went beyond being “helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.”

See Thompson, 979 So.2d at 535. Nonetheless, throughout the trial, other

witnesses testified as to the breach of the Renton Agreement and the effect of the

breach. Accordingly, we do not find that Upland has shown that Mr. McGoey’s

testimony prejudiced or tainted the jury verdict such that a de novo review is

warranted.

UPLAND’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

Did the jury manifestly err in its determination of
the meaning of “immediately”?
In its second assignment of error, Upland argues it did not breach the

purchase agreement. Instead, Renton failed to deliver the deposit “immediately,”

and therefore, Renton lost its right to buy the property. Nonetheless, Upland

argues it did not act in bad faith since it acted upon a reasonable belief based on its

counsel’s advice that Renton failed to tender the deposit immediately and the

purchase agreement was null and void.

In a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, they argued Renton

failed to immediately tender the deposit required by the contract, and in failing to

perform this suspensive condition, no contract was ever perfected. The trial court

denied the motion for summary judgment, and Upland sought supervisory review

of the judgment. On May 6, 2022, this Court denied the writ application. This

23-CA-479 17

Court found that the term “immediately” has been subject to different meanings,

depending on the circumstances of the case, and whether or not Renton’s attempted

delivery of the deposit “less than two full business days after Renton accepted the

counteroffer” was “immediate” as stated in the purchase agreement was a material

issue of fact in dispute. See Renton Properties v. 213 Upland, LLC, 22-87 (La.

App 5 Cir. 5/06/22) (unpublished writ disposition).

The Renton Agreement, entered into evidence, does not define the term

“immediately.” As Upland asserts, it does emphasize timeliness, noting “time is of

the essence” and “all deadlines are final except where modifications, changes, or

extensions are made in writing and signed by all parties to this agreement.”

At trial, Mr. Renton testified that once the Renton Agreement was signed on

Thursday afternoon, he was unsure as to whom to make the deposit check payable.

Mr. Mullin inquired and upon receipt of the answer, forwarded Mr. Renton the

email response he had received from Ms. Carrone. Mr. Renton was not at his

office when he received the email. He later spoke with Mr. Mullin and they agreed

that, because Mr. Renton was traveling to Port Fourchon on Friday and to

Kentucky on Monday, Mr. Renton would leave the check at his office over the

weekend for Mr. Mullin to pick up and deliver on Monday.

Mr. Mullin testified that he spoke with Mr. Renton on Thursday evening to

inquire when Mr. Renton would “cut the check.” They settled on Mr. Mullin

picking up the check from Mr. Renton’s office on Monday morning. As a real

estate agent, he testified that “immediately” meant within a reasonable amount of

time that is customary in New Orleans commercial marketplace transactions. He

believed one to five days was a normal amount of time, and in this case, the check

was delivered in less than two business days. He admitted there was no effort to

deliver the check sooner, but he thought they were responding properly to Ms.

Carrone’s instructions.

23-CA-479 18

Stephen Dwyer, a lawyer who primarily deals with real estate transactions,

testified as an expert for Renton in real estate transactions. In his opinion,

“immediately” in such a contract would have the meaning of “a reasonable time

frame within the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.” In his

opinion, delivering the deposit on Monday was reasonable given the facts and

circumstances of this case, specifically that the purchase agreement was signed on

Thursday afternoon, and there was an intervening weekend. He testified it is rare

to get a deposit at the same time you sign a purchase agreement.

The jury also heard testimony from Ms. Kramer, Upland’s real estate agent,

who stated that, in her opinion, immediately meant Thursday or Friday in this case,

and Ms. Duffy, the closing attorney, who testified that in her opinion, immediately

meant soon or the same day. Both witnesses testified that deposits are important in

real estate transactions.

David Vercher testified for defendants as an expert in commercial real

estate. He opined that immediately means “at once, promptly” and needs to be

reasonable by industry standards.11 In this case, in his opinion, the deposit was not

delivered immediately. Since both parties were in the same town, Thursday would

have been acceptable here, and the deposit was offered too late.

Randy Opotowsky, an expert in the field of real estate law, testified for

defendants. In his opinion, “immediately” means right now and without delay, and

the failure to pay the deposit that Thursday, or on Friday at the latest, was a breach

of the agreement. He is not aware that two or three business days was customary

in New Orleans.

11
Because Mr. Vercher does not practice real estate law in New Orleans, he stated he
cannot say whether he does or does not know the standard for what “immediately” means in the
New Orleans real estate industry.

23-CA-479 19

As noted, a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court or a jury’s finding

of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Hicks,

339 So.3d at 1115. To reverse a fact-finder’s determination, the appellate court

must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the

finding of the trial court, and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly

wrong. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La. 1987). Where there is a conflict in the

testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact

should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel its

own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable. Antill v. State Farm Mut. Ins.

Co., 20-131 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/2/20), 308 So.3d 388, 401. Where there are two

permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be

manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Id. While an appellate court must review

the trial court’s conclusions in light of the entire record, it “must be cautious not to

re-weigh the evidence or to substitute its own factual findings just because it would

have decided the case differently.” Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 09-1869 (La.

3/16/10), 31 So.3d 996, 1007.

Here, the jury was presented with two permissible views of the evidence,

including expert testimony with different opinions. We find the jury was

reasonable in its choice between the two opinions and find no manifest error in the

jury’s determination that Renton did deliver the check “immediately” under the

circumstances of the case. Therefore, Renton did not breach the agreement when it

attempted to deliver the deposit on Monday, and Upland did breach the agreement

when it failed to accept Renton’s deposit.

Did Upland breach the agreement in bad faith?

Upland argues that even if it is found to have breached the agreement, the

jury erred in finding it breached the contract in bad faith. Upland asserts it acted

with the reasonable belief, based on counsel’s advice, that Renton breached the

23-CA-479 20

agreement by failing to timely pay the deposit. Upland argues that it could not be

in bad faith when even this Court noted that “immediately” has different meanings.

Renton asserts that Upland knew by the terms of the contact that not

immediately paying the deposit was a breach of the contract, but did not render it

null and void; nonetheless, it still went forward with the sale to Cannon. Renton

argues that Upland knew it intended to file suit for lis pendens and it intentionally

accelerated the sale to Cannon.

Contracts in Louisiana must be performed in good faith. La. C.C. art. 1983.

An obligor who performs a contract in bad faith is liable for all the damages,

foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform. La. C.C.

art. 1997. The Official Comment to La. C.C. art. 1997(b) provides that an obligor

is in bad faith if he “intentionally and maliciously fails to perform his obligation.”

Bad faith has been defined as involving actual or constructive fraud or a design to

mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some

contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or

duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. First Nat. Bank of Jefferson Par.

v. Dazet, 95-98 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/95), 656 So.2d 1110, 1113; 1100 S. Jefferson

Davis Parkway, LLC v. Williams, 14-1326 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/15), 165 So.3d

1211, 1217, writ denied, 15-1449 (La. 10/9/15), 178 So.3d 1005. Bad faith has

been characterized as “fraud, deception, or sinisterly-motivated nonfulfillment of

an obligation.” Id.

Mr. Tonti testified that he expected to receive the deposit by the end of the

day on Thursday. He did not ask about the deposit on Friday. When Ms. Kramer

informed him the deposit had not been paid on Monday, he called Mr. McHenry to

ask for his “opinion.”12 Mr. McHenry then sent the letter to notify Renton that the

12
Ms. Kramer testified that Mr. Tonti told her to call Mr. McHenry for his legal opinion
since he thought it sounded like “it’s null and void.”

23-CA-479 21

purchase agreement was null and void and without any force or effect. Given Mr.

McHenry’s advice, Mr. Tonti told Ms. Kramer not to accept the deposit when Mr.

Mullin attempted to deliver it on Monday. Mr. Tonti thought the requirement for

paying the deposit “immediately” was not satisfied by Monday. He testified he

understood that the contract was terminated because Mr. McHenry said it was

terminated. Once the contract was terminated, he believed he could do whatever

he wanted to do with the property. Mr. Tonti admitted at trial that he could have

accepted the deposit when it was delivered on Monday, but he did not because he

had a backup offer for $75,000.00 more and a faster closing. Upland, therefore,

moved forward with the Cannon backup offer.

Mr. McGoey testified that he informed Mr. McHenry that he believed the

contract was still in effect pursuant to the terms of the contract, and he and Mr.

McHenry went through the provisions of the contract together. He informed Mr.

McHenry that it was a breach for them to refuse to accept the deposit, but that did

not render the contract null and void. Mr. McGoey informed Mr. McHenry that if

the parties could not agree on a resolution by Friday, August 25, 2017, Mr.

McGoey would file a lawsuit and a notice of lis pendens. Mr. McGoey did not

speak with Mr. Tonti. Mr. Tonti testified he knew Renton was unhappy,

anticipated that it would be filing a lawsuit, and felt it was in his best interest to

close on the Cannon sale as soon as possible.

Upon review, we find there is no reasonable basis in the record to find that

Upland acted in bad faith in breaching the contract. There was no evidence that

Mr. Tonti acted maliciously when he refused to accept the deposit on Monday

morning. In his opinion and in the opinion of his counsel, Renton did not pay the

deposit “immediately.” His counsel informed him not to accept the deposit and

informed him that because Renton did not pay the deposit “immediately,” the

purchase agreement was null and void. Renton is correct that the purchase

23-CA-479 22

agreement does not say that a breach of the contract results in rendering it null and

void. However, we do not find Upland to be in bad faith by relying on counsel’s

advice and moving forward with the Cannon sale. “[R]elying on advice of counsel

is encouraged under the law and supported by our jurisprudence.” See Healthlogic

Partners, L.L.C. v. Owen, 22-47 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/2/22), 362 So.3d 824, 839,

writ denied, 22-01885 (La. 2/24/23), 356 So.3d 334, citing McClanahan v.

McClanahan, 11-284 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/11), 82 So.3d 530 (holding that a

defendant’s reliance on advice of counsel is a valid defense in a suit for damages

for malicious prosecution). Also, no evidence whatsoever was presented showing

that Mr. McGoey was prevented from filing Renton’s lawsuit sooner than when it

was filed on Friday. We do not find that the evidence showed that Upland’s

actions “involved actual or constructive fraud or a design to mislead or deceive

another.”

Accordingly, we find there is a reasonable basis in the record for the jury’s

finding that Renton did not breach the contract and that Upland did breach the

contract, but do not find there is a reasonable basis in the record for the jury’s

finding of a bad faith breach of the contract by Upland. Thus, the jury manifestly

erred and was clearly wrong in this regard.

UPLAND’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

Is Renton only entitled to stipulated damages?

Upland argues that even if it breached the purchase agreement, and whether

it was in bad faith or not, the stipulated damages clause in the purchase agreement

caps all damages at “the return of [Renton’s] deposit in full, plus an equal amount

to be paid as penalty.” Upland argues the trial court erred in denying its pretrial

motion for summary judgment on this issue.

Under Louisiana law, parties to a contract may stipulate the damages to be

recovered where there is a nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in

23-CA-479 23

performance of an obligation. La. C.C. art. 2005. That stipulation gives rise to a

secondary obligation for the purpose of enforcing the principal one. Id. A

stipulated damages clause is designed to fix the measure of damages in advance

and to help ease the burden of proving loss with certainty. Hussain v. Khan, 14-65,

(La. App. 5 Cir. 5/21/14), 142 So.3d 281, 283. No showing of pecuniary or other

actual damage is required to enforce the clause. Henderson v. Ayo, 11-1605 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 641, 646. Stipulated damages may not be modified

by the court unless they are so manifestly unreasonable as to be contrary to public

policy. La. C.C. art. 2012.

Upon an obligor’s failure to perform an obligation to execute an instrument,

the court shall grant specific performance, if demanded by the obligee. La. C.C.

art. 1986. There is “a right to specific performance for breach of contract except

when it is impossible, greatly disproportionate in cost to the actual damage caused,

no longer in the creditor’s interest, or of substantial negative effect upon the

interests of third parties.” Charter School of Pine Grove, Inc. v. St. Helena Parish

School Bd., 07-2238 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/09), 9 So.3d 209, 222; Bourgeois v.

Dunn, 01-1185 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 708, 711.

Regarding the stipulated damages, the Renton Agreement states:

BREACH OF AGREEMENT BY SELLER: In the event SELLER
fails to comply with this agreement, for any reason other than
inability to deliver a MERCHANTABLE title, within the time
specified, PURCHASER shall have the right to demand specific
performance; or, at PURCHASER’S option, PURCHASER shall
have the right to demand the return of his deposit in full, plus an
equal amount to be paid as penalty by SELLER. In either event,
PURCHASER shall have the right to recover any costs and/or fees,
including expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred as a
result of this agreement or breach thereof.

Renton argues in opposition that by the terms of the purchase agreement, it

had the choice between two alternate remedies: specific performance or stipulated

damages. Since Renton remained willing and able to buy the property prior to

23-CA-479 24

Upland’s closing with Cannon, it was solely Upland’s fault that specific

performance became impossible. Because of this, Renton asserts it is entitled to

actual damages pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1812.13

In the present case, there has been no argument that the stipulated damages

were unreasonable, nor do we find that any evidence was presented showing that

the stipulated damages were so manifestly unreasonable so as to be contrary to

public policy. As Renton admits and as the jury was informed, specific

performance was rendered impossible with the sale to Cannon.14 With specific

performance impractical, the purchase agreement then states that damages were

limited to “the return of his deposit in full, plus an equal amount to be paid as

penalty by SELLER … [and] … the right to recover any costs and/or fees,

including expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred as a result of this

agreement or breach thereof.” We find that Renton limited its own damages by

waiting to file its lawsuit and notice of lis pendens, seeking specific performance.

See 1100 S. Jefferson Davis Parkway, 165 So.3d at 1220. Mr. McGoey testified

that Renton’s lawsuit was drafted on Tuesday. As previously stated, no evidence

was presented showing that Mr. McGoey was prevented from filing Renton’s

lawsuit sooner than when it was filed on Friday.

Therefore, we find the jury erred in not finding that the purchase agreement

limited the amount that Renton could recover as stipulated damages to “the return

of [its] deposit in full, plus an equal amount to be paid as penalty.” However, in

13
Renton cites to La. C.C. art. 1812, which concerns “alternative obligations.” With an
alternative obligation, there is only one obligation and the obligor performs said obligation by
rendering performance with an object that he has chosen among at least two different ones. A
stipulated damages clause gives rise to one obligation that is secondary to a different principal
obligation. See 6 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Law of Obligations § 13.11 (2d ed.). We do not find La.
C.C. art. 1812 to be applicable here.
14
Following a hearing on July 20, 2022, the trial court signed a written judgment on the
same date finding that the Cannon Act of Sale is effective as an Act Under Private Signature.
In the jury instructions, the trial court informed the jury that “[s]pecific performance
awarding the property to Renton Properties LLC is not an available remedy.”

23-CA-479 25

this case, since the deposit of $20,000.00 was never paid, we find Renton is limited

to stipulated damages in the amount of $20,000.00 (an amount equal to the

deposit), plus “any costs and/or fees, including expenses and reasonable attorney’s

fees” incurred as a result of the agreement or the breach thereof.15

TONTI DEFENDANTS’ ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
NUMBERS TWO AND THREE

Did defendants commit fraud and violate LUTPA?

On appeal, defendants argue the trial court erred in finding Mrs. Tonti and

Mr. Tonti personally liable for actions taken on behalf of Upland, an LLC, and

entering a judgment against them for acts of fraud and violations of LUTPA.

Fraud

Defendants contest Renton’s assertion that they acted fraudulently by

omission – by failing to tell Renton about the backup offer and by selling the

property to Cannon without notice. Defendants contend they had no fiduciary duty

to Renton to support a claim of fraud by omission. Defendants argue that Mrs.

Tonti was not involved with any of the transactions, and she cannot be found

personally liable just because she is Upland’s sole owner. As to Mr. Tonti,

defendants argue he only moved forward with the Cannon sale once Mr. McHenry

informed him the Renton Agreement was null and void.

Renton argues there is ample evidence of a “tapestry of deception,” and the

reasonable conclusion is that Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti acted with the intention of

defeating Renton’s rights to purchase the property. Renton contends Mr. Tonti

was fraudulent when he did the following: misled Ms. Duffy by not giving her the

Cannon counter-offer; had Mr. McHenry send the letter stating that the contract

was null and void; informed the agents not to accept Renton’s check; had Mr.

15
The parties on appeal argued a finding of bad faith did not limit Renton to the
stipulated damages. Having found no bad faith, we pretermit any discussion on whether a bad
faith breach of contract limited the non-breaching party to the stipulated damages.

23-CA-479 26

McHenry mislead Mr. McGoey; had Mr. Cannon rush to close; and admitted he

knew a lawsuit was coming. Renton argues Mrs. Tonti committed acts of fraud

when she: executed a forged and false act of sale; violating two criminal statutes;

had the money from the sale go to Ohio Management to make Upland insolvent;

and was responsible for Mr. Tonti’s actions as he was her agent.

Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the

intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or

inconvenience to the other. La. C.C. art. 1953. Fraud does not vitiate consent

when the party against whom the fraud was directed could have ascertained the

truth without difficulty, inconvenience, or special skill. This exception does not

apply when a relation of confidence has reasonably induced a party to rely on the

other’s assertions or representations. La. C.C. art. 1954; Korrapati v. Augustino

Bros. Constr., LLC, 19-426 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/20), 302 So.3d 147, 154. Fraud

need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence and may be established by

circumstantial evidence. La. C.C. art. 1957.

The law considers an LLC and the member(s) comprising the LLC as being

wholly separate persons. See La. C.C. art. 24; Ogea v. Merritt, 13-1085 (La.

12/10/13), 130 So.3d 888, 894-95. In narrowly defined circumstances, when

individual member(s) of a juridical entity such as an LLC mismanage the entity or

otherwise thwart the public policies justifying treating the entity as a separate

juridical person, the individual member(s) have been subjected to personal liability

for obligations for which the LLC would otherwise be solely liable. Id. at 895.

The operation of limited liability companies in Louisiana is governed by La.

R.S. 12:1301, et seq. La. R.S. 12:1320(D) sets forth a statutory exception to the

general rule regarding an LLC member’s liability and states:

Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as being in derogation of
any rights which any person may by law have against a member,
manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company because of

23-CA-479 27

any fraud practiced upon him, because of any breach of professional
duty or other negligent or wrongful act by such person, or in
derogation of any right which the limited liability company may have
against any such person because of any fraud practiced upon it by
him.
Because La. R.S. 12:1320(D) does not define fraud, the Louisiana Civil

Code’s definition of fraud governs. Ogea, 130 So.3d at 897-98.

To find fraud from silence or suppression of the truth, there must exist a duty

to speak or to disclose information. Greene v. Gulf Coast Bank, 593 So.2d 630,

632 (La. 1992). Whether one party owes another a duty to speak depends on the

nature of the relationship between the parties and the nature of the information

allegedly suppressed. Louisiana State Univ. Sys. Research & Tech. Found. v.

Qyntessa Biologics, L.L.C., 14-0311 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/12/14), 168 So.3d 468,

474. It has long been held that the duty to disclose exists where the parties stand in

some confidential or fiduciary relation to one another.16 Id.

Considering the record before us, we find the jury manifestly erred and was

clearly wrong in finding Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti personally liable for fraud.

Mrs. Tonti testified at trial that she gave Mr. Tonti full authority to act on

her behalf. She did not participate in the negotiations and had no knowledge of the

purchase agreements. She admitted Ms. Riviere was the only one present when

she signed the act of sale. Though the act of sale was not signed in the presence of

Mr. McHenry, the notary, the trial court found that it was still effective as an Act

Under Private Signature. She also testified that the money was put into Ohio

Management’s account since it was a long-standing business.

Mr. Tonti stated that his mother asked him to help sell the property and he

acted on her behalf. When he was informed the deposit had not been delivered on

16
Louisiana courts have recognized that traditional fiduciary relationships exist (whether
or not the parties are contractually bound) between real estate brokers/agents and
sellers/purchasers, trustees and trusts, financial lenders and borrowers, attorneys and clients,
directors and shareholders, executors and estates, public officers and the public, and guardians
and wards. Price v. North, 21-0236 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/18/21), 331 So.3d 959, 972.

23-CA-479 28

Monday morning, he sought Mr. McHenry’s opinion. He took Mr. McHenry’s

advice and did not accept the late deposit check. Further, based on Mr. McHenry’s

counsel, he understood the purchase agreement to be null and void. There is no

evidence that Mr. Tonti had Mr. McHenry send the letter stating the contract was

null and void. Nor is there any evidence that he had Mr. McHenry “mislead” or

make any misrepresentations to Mr. McGoey. Once he understood the purchase

agreement to be null and void, based on the advice of his counsel, he moved

forward with the Cannon sale. He testified he did not resign the Cannon purchase

agreement so that Ms. Duffy would not see the counter-offer; rather, Ms. Duffy did

not get the counter-offer because at that point there no longer was a counter-offer.

Mr. Tonti admitted he knew Renton was unhappy and a lawsuit would be

coming. However, there is no evidence that he rushed the closing or mislead

Renton from taking any action prior to the closing. Ms. Duffy testified she

handled many of Mr. Cannon’s previous closings and it was not unusual for him to

“rush” his closings. She testified it was Mr. Cannon who told her he wanted the

get the sale done as soon as possible. Mr. McGoey testified he had Renton’s suit

drafted on the Tuesday before the Cannon sale on Friday. Again, no evidence was

presented to indicate that Mr. McGoey was prevented from filing Renton’s suit and

the notice of lis pendens prior to when he did on Friday.

As to any fraud by silence by Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti, we find they did not

have a fiduciary relationship with Renton such that they owed a duty to tell Renton

about the sale to Cannon.

Accordingly, we find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not

exist for the jury’s finding of fraud, and thus, the jury manifestly erred and was

clearly wrong in this regard.

23-CA-479 29

Violations under LUTPA

Defendants also argue Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti acted within the bounds of a

normal business practice and their conduct was not a violation under LUTPA. La.

R.S. 51:1405(A) prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” The purpose

of LUTPA is to protect consumers and to foster competition by “halting unfair

business practices and sanctioning the businesses which commit them, preserving

and promoting effective and fair competition, and curbing business practices that

lead to a monopoly and unfair restraint of trade within a certain industry.” Quality

Envtl. Processes, Inc. v. I.P. Petroleum Co., 13-1582 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 1011,

1025. What Louisiana courts deem a violation of LUTPA is determined on a case-

by-case basis. Monroe v. McDaniel, 16-214 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 207 So.3d

1172, 1179.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “the range of prohibited

practices under LUTPA is extremely narrow,” as LUTPA prohibits only fraud,

misrepresentation, and similar conduct, and not mere negligence. Quality

Environmental, supra. Further, “conduct that offends established public policy and

is unethical is not necessarily a violation under LUTPA.” Id. “[O]nly egregious

actions involving elements of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or other

unethical conduct will be sanctioned based on LUTPA.” Cheramie Services, Inc.

v. Shell Deepwater Prod., 09-1633 (La. 4/23/10), 35 So.3d 1053, 1060. A

defendant’s motivation is a critical factor—his actions must have been taken with

the specific purpose of harming the competition. Creative Risk Controls, Inc. v.

Brechtel, 01-1150 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/03), 847 So.2d 20, 24, writ denied, 03-

1769 (La. 10/10/03), 855 So.2d 353.

For the same reasons we found the jury manifestly erred and was clearly

wrong in finding that Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti committed fraud, we find the jury

23-CA-479 30

manifestly erred and was clearly wrong in finding Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti’s

actions constituted a LUTPA violation. The record before us does not support a

finding that Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti’s conduct was egregious and that they acted

with the specific purpose of harming Renton. The record shows that Upland and

Mr. Tonti went forward with the Cannon sale, whom they had a valid backup offer

with, after counsel advised Mr. Tonti that the purchase agreement was null and

void. We find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the

jury’s finding that Renton proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mrs.

Tonti or Mr. Tonti committed an act or practice which constitutes an unfair trade

practice under LUTPA.

Having found both that damages are limited to $20,000.00, plus costs and

attorney’s fees, under the stipulated damages clause, and that there was insufficient

evidence to conclude Mrs. Tonti and Mr. Tonti committed fraud or an act or

practice which constitutes an unfair trade practice, we reduce the damages award

of $2,067,400.00 and the treble damage awards of $206,740.00 and $3,514,580.00,

to the stipulated damages amount of $20,000.00 against Upland, plus costs and

attorney’s fees.

RENTON’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER
FOUR IN ITS ANSWER TO THE APPEAL

Was Mrs. Tonti the alter ego of Upland?
Renton argues in its answer to the appeal that the trial court erred in failing

to grant its JNOV and failing to find that Upland is the alter ego of Mrs. Tonti,

such that Mrs. Tonti is personally liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities

owed by Upland. Renton asserts it proved Upland was the alter ego of Mrs. Tonti

since Upland is a single asset, single member LLC with no business or bank

accounts. The money from the sale went to Ohio Management, thereby rendering

Upland insolvent. Further, an individual member of an LLC can be personally

23-CA-479 31

liable in cases of fraud, and the jury found that Mrs. Tonti’s actions constituted

fraud.

Renton also argues in its answer that the trial court’s jury instruction on alter

ego was legally erroneous because it instructed the jury that members and LLCs

are not alter egos of each other and because it only included two Riggins factors.

A JNOV is warranted when the facts and reasonable inferences point so

strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that the court believes

that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict, not merely where there

is a preponderance of evidence for the mover. Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-

445 (La. 11/28/00), 774 So.2d 84, 89. When a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the appellate court simply reviews the record

to determine whether there is legal error or whether the trier of fact committed

manifest error. Barnett v. Woodburn, 20-0675 (La. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 324 So.3d 641,

650.

Trial courts are given broad discretion in formulating jury instructions.

Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 07-2110 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 798, 804. An appellate

court must exercise great restraint before it reverses a jury verdict because of

erroneous jury instructions. Id. But when a jury is erroneously instructed and the

error probably contributed to the verdict, an appellate court must set aside the

verdict. Id. In the assessment of an alleged erroneous jury instruction, it is the

duty of the reviewing court to assess such impropriety in light of the entire jury

charge to determine if the instructions adequately provide the correct principles of

law as applied to the issues framed in the pleadings and the evidence and whether

the instructions adequately guided the jury in its deliberation. Id. Ultimately, the

determinative question is whether the jury instructions misled the jury to the extent

that it was prevented from dispensing justice. Id.

23-CA-479 32

With regard to the jurisprudential doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil,”

Louisiana courts have allowed a piercing of the corporate veil under only two

exceptional circumstances, namely: where the corporation is an alter ego of the

shareholders and the shareholders have used the corporation to defraud a third

party (the “alter ego” doctrine); and where the shareholders have failed to conduct

a business on a “corporate footing” to such an extent that the corporation ceases to

be distinguishable from its shareholders. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590

So.2d 1164, 1168 (La. 1991). When a party seeks to pierce the corporate veil, the

totality of the circumstances is determinative. In order to properly disregard the

corporate entity, one of the primary components which justifies piercing the veil is

often present: to prevent the use of the corporate form in the defrauding of

creditors. Id. at 1169. Some of the relevant factors considered in determining

whether to apply the alter ego doctrine include: commingling of corporate and

shareholder funds; failing to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and

transacting corporate affairs; undercapitalization; failing to maintain separate bank

accounts and bookkeeping records; and failing to hold regular shareholder and

director meetings. Id. at 1168.

The jury instruction in the present case relating to alter egos and piercing the

corporate veil states as follows:

The following are the principles to consider when determining
whether to apply the alter ego or corporate-veil-piercing doctrine
to a member or agent of an LLC:
The limited liability attendant to being a member, manager,
employee or agent of an LLC should be disregarded only in
exceptional circumstances. In the absence of fraud, the plaintiff
bears a heavy burden of proving that a member, or an agent for
the LLC, disregarded the LLC entity to such an extent that it
ceased to become distinguishable from themselves. Some
factors to consider when determining whether to apply the alter
ego doctrine are: 1) failure to follow statutory formalities for
forming an LLC and transacting LLC affairs; 2) failure to
provide a separate bank account for the LLC. The fact that the

23-CA-479 33

LLC has only one individual member does not make that
individual liable for the debts of the LLC.

Louisiana courts are reluctant to hold a member or agent of an
LLC personally liable for obligations of the LLC in the absence
of fraud, malfeasance, or criminal wrongdoing.
Under the jury instruction on “Damages for Bad Faith Breach of

Contract,” the jury was instructed: “An LLC is considered to be a ‘juridical

person,’ which means that it is its own legal person. An LLC and its

members are wholly separate persons. A limited liability company and its

members are not alter egos for each other.”

Upon review of the subject jury instructions, we find no error in the trial

court’s broad discretion in formulating the jury instructions. Renton says the trial

court erred by not including the following Riggins factors: commingling of

corporate and shareholder funds; undercapitalization, causing insolvency; and

diversion of assets. However, we find Renton has failed to show how not

including these elements misled the jury to the extent that it was prevented from

dispensing justice. Further, though the trial court improperly stated in its jury

instruction on bad faith breach of contract that LLCs and its members “are not alter

egos for each other,” we find that this did not mislead the jury from dispensing

justice, as the jury made a finding that Ohio Management was the alter ego of Mrs.

Tonti and Mr. Tonti.

Additionally, we find the evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Upland

is not the alter ego of Mrs. Tonti. At trial, Mrs. Tonti confirmed she became the

sole owner of Upland following the death of her husband. Upland’s only asset was

the property in question. Mrs. Tonti asked Mr. Tonti to sell the property. She did

not participate in any of the negotiations and had no knowledge of the purchase

agreements. She admitted she signed a document on the day of the Cannon sale

allowing the sale proceeds to go to Ohio Management. She also testified the

money went to Ohio Management because it was a long-standing business. There

23-CA-479 34

was no evidence presented that she intended to defraud Renton with this action.

Further, having already found that Mrs. Tonti did not commit any acts of fraud, we

find no error in the jury’s finding that Upland is not Mrs. Tonti’s alter ego.

TONTI DEFENDANTS’ ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

Should Ohio Management have been cast in judgment?

Defendants argue the trial court erred by casting Ohio Management in

judgment when the jury found Ohio Management to be free from fault.17

Defendants argue that questions 4 and 5 on the jury verdict sheet only ask if “any

defendants” committed fraud or violated LUTPA; it did not specify which

defendants. Question 7 asked if Renton proved that Ohio Management is the alter

ego of either Mrs. Tonti or Mr. Tonti, such that they would be personally liable for

any debts owed by Ohio Management, and the jury responded yes to both.

However, in response to question 8, the jury only assigned a percentage of fault to

Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, and Corporate Realty (a previously settled party). Ohio

Management was not assigned any fault. Yet in the trial court’s written judgment,

it found all four defendants solidarily liable. Defendants assert that since Ohio

Management was found to be free from fault, Ohio Management owed no debts,

obligations, or liabilities to Renton.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1916(A) provides:

After a trial by jury, the court shall prepare and sign a judgment in
accordance with the verdict of the jury within ten days of the rendition
of the verdict, or the court may order counsel for a party in the case to
prepare and submit a judgment to the court for signature within ten
days of the rendition of the verdict, in accordance with the rules for
Louisiana district courts.
Additionally, La. C.C.P. art. 1812(D) regarding special verdicts states, “the court

shall then enter judgment in conformity with the jury’s answers to these special

questions and according to applicable law.”

17
Defendants did object to this matter in its JNOV, which the trial court denied.

23-CA-479 35

“[T]here is no provision for a jury’s verdict to be considered ‘advisory,’

thereby allowing the trial court to interpret the jury’s verdict or substitute its own

findings of fact.” Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 04-2095 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/7/07),

949 So.2d 1266, 1273, writ denied, 07-0662 (La. 1/7/08), 973 So.2d 740, and writ

denied, 07-0654 (La. 1/7/08).

In the present case, the jury found that “defendants” committed fraud and

violated LUTPA, but when assigning fault, the jury assigned “0” fault to Ohio

Management – meaning the jury did not find any fault by Ohio Management, or

the jury did not find that any fault by Ohio Management caused damage to Renton.

Therefore, the trial court failed to conform to the jury’s verdict as required by La.

C.C.P. arts. 1812 and 1916 when entering its judgment. As such, we reverse the

trial court’s erroneous judgment finding Ohio Management liable for Renton’s

damages.

REMAINING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Based on our holdings herein, the remaining assignments of error are

pretermitted.

RENTON’S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL
We decline to award Renton additional attorney’s fees on appeal.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the jury verdict finding that Upland breached its

contract with Renton is affirmed. The jury verdict finding that Upland breached

the contract with Renton in bad faith is reversed. The jury verdict and judgment

against Mrs. Tonti, Mr. Tonti, and Ohio Management are reversed. The jury’s

award of damages in favor of Renton against Upland is amended and reduced from

$2,067,400.00 to the stipulated damages amount of $20,000.00, plus legal interest

thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid. The award of attorney’s fees

23-CA-479 36

and costs to Renton as follows are affirmed:18 attorney’s fees in the amount of

$233,703.00, plus legal interest thereon from February 17, 2023 until paid; expert

witness fees in the amount of $26,683.33; deposition costs in the amount of

$2,949.15; and court costs in the amount of $18,324.61. Finally, the treble

damages award to Renton is reversed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART;
REVERSED IN PART

18
In a footnote in Upland’s brief, in the discussion surrounding the stipulated damages
clause, Upland objected to the attorney’s fee award in its entirety since the “prolonged litigation
was unnecessary based on the contracted-for stipulated damages clause.” However, defendants
did not assign as error or brief the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs in favor of
Renton.

23-CA-479 37

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
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GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 27, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-CA-479
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ANDREA V. TIMPA (APPELLEE) PATRICK S. MCGOEY (APPELLEE) ROBERT L. RAYMOND (APPELLEE)
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