State of Louisiana in the Interest of S. A.

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST NO. 23-CA-491
OF S. A.
FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 15,381, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE CONNIE M. AUCOIN, JUDGE PRESIDING

January 31, 2024

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AFFIRMED
JGG
SMC
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PARENT/APPELLANT,
R. R.
Jane C. Hogan

COUNSEL FOR MINOR/APPELLEE,
S. A.
Mary R. Mustaller McMillan

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES
Benjamin R. McDonald

GRAVOIS, J.

Appellant, R.R., appeals the judgment of the district court terminating her

parental rights as to her minor daughter, S.A. On appeal, she argues two

assignments of error:

1. The juvenile court manifestly erred by finding that R.R. had not
substantially complied with her case plan, that the Department of
Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) provided reasonable efforts to
achieve reunification, and that there was no reasonable expectation of
significant improvement in the near future.

2. The juvenile court erred by finding that termination was in the best
interest of S.A.
For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment on appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The minor child, S.A.,1 a girl whose date of birth is September 11, 2017, was

removed from her mother R.R.’s home on December 30, 2019 after the granting of

an oral Instanter Order of the same date.2 S.A. lived with her mother, who was 34

at the time, her mother’s boyfriend E.B., III, her brother C.R., and her brother G.F.,

along with E.B., III’s father, in a house rented to him in Des Allemands,

Louisiana.3

The basis for the Instanter Order was a report of alleged physical abuse/bone

fractures received by DCFS on December 26, 2019 concerning S.A., in that she

had been seen by the hospital several times recently and R.R. was unable to

provide a sufficient explanation for the injuries, which included a broken arm that

was rebroken, and possible broken ribs. A Petition for Adjudication was filed by

1
To protect the minor’s identity and to ensure the confidentiality of a minor who is a
party to or whose interests are the subject matter in the proceedings listed in Rule 5-1(A) or (C)
of the Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, initials shall be used in all filings and in
opinions rendered by the Court of Appeal. Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule
5-2. A proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights is listed in Rule 5-1(A).
2
The oral order was confirmed by a written Instanter Order dated January 2, 2020.
3
C.R. was approximately six years older than S.A., and lived primarily with his paternal
aunt, but stayed with R.R. from time to time. G.F. was approximately 1 year older than S.A.
S.A. had both a legal father and a biological father who were contacted by DCFS in this case, but
who never participated in this case.

23-CA-491 1

the District Attorney on January 16, 2020, alleging that S.A. had been physically

abused by her caretakers (her mother and E.B., III). At the adjudication hearing on

February 14, 2020, S.A. was adjudicated to be a child in need of care. Custody

was granted to DCFS and the family’s assigned DCFS case worker, Natalie Grow-

Goudia, testified that the elements of R.R.’s case plan were to address her need for

permanent housing, parental education, and mental health, with the goal of

reunification. E.B., III was added to the case plan, but did not fully cooperate with

DCFS.

S.A. was placed with a foster parent. Shortly after her placement, S.A. was

hospitalized for several days for fluid in her lungs. When she was well, visitation

was allowed between S.A. and her mother for one hour a week on Fridays.

Review hearings were conducted on June 24, July 22, August 14, September 9, and

December 15, 2020. On February 3 and April 14, 2021, permanency/review

hearings were conducted. Review hearings also took place on June 23, August 25,

October 27, November 15, 2021, as well as on February 15, April 27, May 31, and

August 31, 2022. Permanency/review hearings also took place on January 12 and

February 22, 2023. At these hearings, the trial court heard testimony from the

DCFS case workers and the court-appointed special advocate volunteer (“CASA”),

and the agency progress reports were admitted into evidence. R.R. was present for

the hearings and testified on occasion.

As discussed at the review hearings on June 24 and July 22, 2020, R.R.

informed the DCFS caseworker that sometime in May of 2020, she had taken an

agency appeal of the finding of physical abuse concerning S.A.’s two broken arms

and broken ribs. According to the testimony of Ms. Grow-Goudia, the appeal was

returned in R.R.’s favor, overturning the finding of physical abuse.4 At the June

4
Khia Oden from DCFS testified at the review hearing on June 24, 2020 that although
doctors initially told DCFS that S.A. sustained a broken arm and a broken rib, upon further

23-CA-491 2

24, 2020 review hearing, Ms. Grow-Goudia testified that DCFS recommended

reunification at that time, with transfer of the case to Family Services. However,

the trial court declined at that point to return S.A. to R.R.’s custody, requiring

instead that DCFS produce more information regarding the medical findings about

the alleged physical abuse and some documentation regarding the appeal. At the

July 22, 2020 review hearing, DCFS again recommended returning custody to R.R.

and transferring the case to Family Services. The trial court, however, reviewed

S.A.’s medical records and noted that she had been hospitalized four times

between September of 2019 and January of 2020, and ruled that custody would be

maintained with DCFS.

R.R. was assessed in a psychological evaluation on January 13, 2021 by Dr.

Christine Powanda, a developmental psychologist, at the behest of DCFS. Dr.

Powanda found that R.R. met the criteria for developmental disability, with an IQ

in the mild range of intellectual disability. R.R. self reported difficulty with

reading. Among other things, Dr. Powanda found that R.R. had difficulty

understanding the motives of others, had limited insight into the causes of her

difficulties, made poor choices that potentially placed her at risk for exploitation,

and was unable to provide for her own economic needs independently. Dr.

Powanda recommended that R.R. be referred to the local Office for Citizens with

Developmental Disabilities (“OCDD”) for eligible services, and recommended that

R.R.’s compliance with such services be a prerequisite for reunification with S.A.

She also recommended that R.R. participate in regular parenting classes/counseling

related to parenting to assist her in retaining information and learning appropriate

skills as her children aged.

inspection, S.A. did not have a broken rib, and that the reinjury to the broken arm could have
happened while her arm was still in the cast.

23-CA-491 3

It is evident that R.R. had made measurable progress in her case plan by the

time of the review hearing held on October 27, 2021. At the June 23, 2021 review

hearing, it was reported that she had secured stable appropriate housing in New

Iberia. S.A.’s case was transferred to the New Iberia DCFS office and she received

a new case worker, Donyeill Lanceslin-Gray. By the October 27, 2021 review

hearing, R.R. had completed parenting classes with Creative Solutions, and she had

started receiving mental health care and medication for anxiety from a practitioner

in New Iberia. At this time, the court recommended that the case plan be changed

to reunification concurrent with adoption. The court ordered overnight visits every

other weekend in November, followed by every weekend in December, at R.R.’s

home, with the goal of reunification by January of 2022.

Ms. Lanceslin-Gray reported, however, at the November 15, 2021 review

hearing, that she discovered during an unscheduled visit that R.R. had allowed a

new boyfriend to move into her apartment without notifying DCFS. After the

boyfriend submitted fingerprints, it was discovered that he had a conviction from

2012 for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. DCFS required him to move

out of the apartment. The CASA volunteer testified at this hearing that she had

visited R.R. in New Iberia while S.A. was there. She noted that it appeared that the

boyfriend was gone, but R.R. indicated to her that once the case was closed, she

would allow him to move back in.

Further, following the weekend visit by S.A. to R.R.’s home on November

19-21, 2021, the foster mother reported to Ms. Lanceslin-Gray that S.A. had

exhibited sexually inappropriate behavior, allegedly trying to insert a toy shark in

her vagina at bath time. The foster mother also reported that S.A. told her that this

act was something that her brother C.R. had showed her. S.A. also reported to her

foster mother that C.R. had touched her inappropriately. This incident occurred at

R.R.’s house while R.R was in another room washing dishes, according to

23-CA-491 4

assertions in the record. According to the foster mother, S.A. also disclosed the

touching incident to her teacher. On December 2, 2021, the attorney for S.A. filed

a motion to suspend visitation with R.R., citing the above incidents, which was

granted by the trial judge that same day.

R.R. was evaluated a second time by Dr. Powanda in January of 2022.

Following this assessment, Dr. Powanda stated that reunification was not

recommended in that she was concerned for the safety of the children in R.R.’s

household because R.R. was not able to provide them with the supervision they

needed, nor could she ensure appropriate safety. Dr. Powanda also found that R.R.

demonstrated rigid thinking in refusing to believe that her son C.R. could have

touched S.A. inappropriately, which raised concerns that R.R. was minimizing the

safety issues for S.A.

R.R. was recommended to participate in the Extra Mile program of

additional parenting classes. She was also referred for services from OCDD, but

she never received those services. Initially, R.R. failed to timely send in

paperwork for her assessment, which delayed the initiation of services. An agency

backlog caused by the Covid-19 pandemic also combined with the delays

attributable to R.R. prevented her from receiving those services.

Visitation between R.R. and S.A. continued via FaceTime and/or Google

Duo. Progress reports through 2022 show that R.R. started the Extra Mile

program, but failed to complete it. Her case with Extra Mile was closed in July of

2022 due to her noncompliance. R.R. also started working part-time at

McDonald’s, which helped with her finances, but her work schedule interfered

with visitation with S.A. in May of 2022. Other visitation with S.A. was missed

because of illness to S.A. (April 19, 2022) and to G.F. (March 2, 2022).

In the latter part of 2022, DCFS discovered that R.R. had allowed another

individual, a woman named S.B., to move into her apartment. R.R. explained that

23-CA-491 5

she had known S.B. since middle school and that she would be living there only

until she received “her benefits.” R.R. said that S.B. watched G.F. while she was

at work. Initially, S.B. gave a false name to DCFS and lied about why she was

there. Fingerprinting and further investigation showed that S.B. had two children

who had been removed from her custody.

The reports from R.R.’s case worker shows that she missed scheduled

mental health appointments on October 14, October 25, November 9, and

November 23, 2022.

S.A. began having “absence” seizures as reported by her foster mother. She

was evaluated by a neurologist and started on medication to treat the seizures.

R.R. was informed about her daughter’s medical condition, but according to

testimony at a review hearing on August 31, 2022, she said that she did not need to

hear details about it from the caseworker or the foster mother because S.A. had had

seizures before she had been removed from R.R.’s custody and R.R. knew how to

handle them.

The State filed a petition for termination of parental rights on March 3, 2023.

The petition alleged several grounds for termination of parental rights, but at the

trial on July 10, 2023, the State orally amended the petition to withdraw the

grounds asserted under La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5)(b) and (c) and proceeded only with

the grounds asserted under La. Ch.C. art. 1015(6).5 Following testimony from

R.R., Ms. Lanceslin-Gray, Ms. Grow-Goudia, and the foster mother, the trial court

orally ruled that parental rights would be terminated as to S.A. regarding R.R, the

legal father C.R., and the alleged biological father B.F. A written judgment to this

5
In Acts 2023, No. 271, § 1, effective June 9, 2023, after the petition was filed, this
paragraph was renumbered as La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5).

23-CA-491 6

effect was signed by the trial court on July 12, 2023. This timely appeal by R.R.

followed.6

BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Permanent termination of the legal relationship existing between natural

parents and children is one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its

citizens. State in Interest of A.L.D., 18-1271 (La. 1/30/19), 263 So.3d 860, 863,

citing State ex rel. J.M., 02-2089 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1247, 1254. However,

the primary concern of the courts and the State remains to determine and ensure

the best interest of the child, which includes termination of parental rights if

justifiable statutory grounds exist and are proven by the State. Id. As this Court

stated in State in Int. of A.V., 14-465 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/14), 164 So.3d 853,

856, writ denied, 14-2489 (La. 2/27/15), 160 So.3d 963:

The Louisiana Supreme Court recognizes that in any case to
involuntarily terminate parental rights, there are two private interests
involved: those of the parents and those of the child. State ex rel. L.B.
v. G.B.B., 02-1715 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 918, 921; State ex rel.
J.A., 99-2905 (La. 1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806, 811. The United States
Supreme Court also recognizes that parents have a natural,
fundamental liberty interest to the continuing companionship, care,
custody and management of their children warranting great deference
and requiring vigilant due process protection under the law that fair
procedure be followed when the State seeks to terminate the parent-
child legal relationship. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102
S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).
Balanced against those protections is the child’s profound interest in
terminating parental rights which prevent adoption and inhibit the
establishment of secure, stable, long-term, and continuous
relationships found in a home with proper parental care. State ex rel.
J.A., supra, citing Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Serv.’s
Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982); see
also, State in the Interest of S.M., 98-0922 (La. 10/20/98), 719 So.2d
445, 452. In balancing the parents’ and the child’s interests,
Louisiana courts have consistently found “the interests of the child to
be paramount over those of the parents.” State ex rel. L.B., supra.
See also e.g., State in the Interest of S.M., supra; State in the Interest
of A.E., 448 So.2d 183, 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); State in the
Interest of Driscoll, 410 So.2d 255, 258 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).

6
Neither father participated in this case, though both were represented and appointed
curators. They did not appeal the termination of their parental rights.

23-CA-491 7

The statutory grounds by which a court may involuntarily terminate the

rights and privileges of parents are set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 1015. State in Int. of

H.M.R., 22-176 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/11/23), 356 So.3d 1179, 1183-84. In order to

terminate parental rights, the court must find that the State has established at least

one of the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence. La. Ch.C. art.

1035(A); Id., citing State in Interest of A.V., supra. “Clear and convincing”

evidence requires more than a “preponderance,” but less than “beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Under the “clear and convincing” standard, the existence of the disputed

fact must be highly probable or much more probable than its nonexistence. Id.,

citing State in Interest of A.L.D., 263 So.3d at 863.

Further, even upon finding that the State has met its evidentiary burden, a

court still must not terminate parental rights unless it determines that to do so is in

the child’s best interest. La. Ch.C. art. 1037; State in Interest of A.V., supra, 164

So.3d at 857.

In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the issues of parental

compliance with a case plan, the parent’s expected success of rehabilitation, and

the expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition and conduct

are questions of fact. State in Int. of H.M.R., supra, 356 So.3d at 1184. It is well

settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in the

absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. Id., citing

State in Interest of E.I.R., 13-450 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/13), 130 So.3d 360, 373.

Under this standard of review, an appellate court’s task is not to determine whether

the factfinder was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was

reasonable. If the conclusion is reasonable in light of the record viewed in its

entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been

sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.

23-CA-491 8

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In her first assignment of error, R.R. argues that the trial court manifestly

erred by finding that she had not substantially complied with her case plan, that

DCFS provided reasonable efforts to achieve reunification, and that there was no

reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the near future.

In this case, the State proceeded under the following specific grounds found

in La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5), which requires three findings:

(1) unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed
since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a
court order;

(2) there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan
for services which has been previously filed by the department
and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the
child; and

(3) despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of
significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in
the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for a safe,
stable, and permanent home.
La. Ch.C. art. 1036 provides, in pertinent part, the statutory criteria courts

use to determine lack of parental compliance with a case plan:

C. Under Article 1015(6),7 lack of parental compliance with a case
plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

***

(5) The parent’s repeated failure to comply with the required
program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in
the case plan.

(6) The parent’s lack of substantial improvement in redressing the
problems preventing reunification.
(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar
potentially harmful conditions.

***

7
As previously stated in footnote 5, Article 1015(6) was renumbered to Article 1015(5)
by Acts 2023, No. 271, § 1. It appears that La. Ch.C. art. 1036, paragraphs C and D, should also
have been amended to reflect this change, but apparently were not.

23-CA-491 9

D. Under Article 1015(6), lack of any reasonable expectation of
significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the near future
may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance
abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable
or incapable of exercising parental responsibilities without
exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm, based
upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of
behavior.

(2) A pattern of repeated incarceration of the parent that has
rendered the parent unable to care for the immediate and
continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for
extended periods of time.

(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that
the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate
permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or
based upon an established pattern of behavior.

R.R. argues in brief that the allegations of sexual abuse on S.A. were

deemed invalid. She argues that though she was intellectually disabled, she

demonstrated her ability to care for her son G.F. throughout the pendency of this

case. She argues that each time the case neared reunification, forces “outside of

her control” intervened and kept S.A. in foster care. She essentially argues that as

she neared reunification, the goalposts were moved against her without

justification.

Upon review, as set forth below, we find that the detailed record of this case,

which spanned more than three-and-one-half years, does not bear out R.R.’s

assertions.

Elapse of one year since the child was removed from the parent’s custody
pursuant to a court order
The first part of La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) was clearly met: S.A. was removed

from custody by an Instanter Order on December 30, 2019, over three years before

the petition for termination of parental rights was filed.

23-CA-491 10

Substantial compliance with case plan

The second requirement of La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) is that there has been no

substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been

previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the

safe return of the child.

Although the first priority in permanently placing a child is the return of the

child to the legal custody of the parents within a specified time, for reunification to

remain the permanent plan for the child, the parent must comply with the case plan

and make significant measurable progress toward achieving its goals and

correcting the conditions which necessitated the child to be in care. State in Int. of

K.W., 54,304 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/12/22), 332 So.3d 825, 831, citing State ex rel. J.B.

v. J.B., Jr., 35,846 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/02), 811 So.2d 179, 187, citing La. Ch.C.

art. 702(C)(1). Mere cooperation by a parent is not the sole focus of the evaluation

of a permanency plan. Rather, the courts must assess whether the parent has

exhibited significant improvement in the particulars that caused the State to

remove the children from the parent’s care and custody. Id., citing State in the

Interest of E.M., 51,511 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/2/17), 224 So.3d 1122, citing State in

the Interest of P.B., 49,668 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/17/14), 154 So.3d 806.

The record demonstrates that R.R. cooperated with DCFS and the case plan,

and made progress up until the time that transition visitation was suspended in

December of 2021. After that, her cooperation and progress noticeably decreased.

The record reflects that she had left her relationship with E.B., III, who was

noncompliant with his case plan, and had obtained secure appropriate housing in

New Iberia. She had obtained mental health services and was on medication that

she managed most of the time, and had completed the first parenting classes. She

also obtained a job, working part-time at a McDonald’s in New Iberia. The record

shows that R.R. accomplished these goals despite the challenges of her intellectual

23-CA-491 11

limitations, difficulty reading, dependence on Social Security disability payments

for income, and not having a vehicle. Further, the DCFS caseworkers and the

CASA volunteer all testified that G.F., the son who remained in R.R.’s custody,

always appeared clean and well cared for when they visited.

However, R.R. did not take the initial steps to register for an assessment

with OCDD, which delayed her receipt of services with that agency, and ultimately

never received eligible services due to a combination of her delays in contacting

OCDD and an agency backlog of cases due to the pandemic. Further, she enrolled

in the Extra Mile parenting classes in 2022 after transitional visitation was

suspended, but her case was closed due to non-completion of the course. On

February 14, 2023, the Agency advised R.R. that she had not been compliant in

meeting the mental health counseling and medication management requirements of

her case plan, due to her having not taken her medication as prescribed, and due to

her having missed scheduled mental health appointments on October 14, October

25, November 9, and November 23, 2022.

Upon review, we find that the record fully supports by clear and convincing

evidence the trial court’s factual findings that R.R. had not shown substantial

compliance with her case plan over the three-and-a-half-year duration of this case.

Reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or
conduct
The bulk of the evidence at the termination trial concerned the third

condition of La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5), that despite earlier intervention, there was no

reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or

conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and her need for a safe,

stable, and permanent home. R.R. demonstrated intellectual limitations that

impacted her ability to retain information, as noted by case workers who counseled

her after she participated in parenting classes. R.R. relies in brief upon State ex rel.

23-CA-491 12

Ardoin Children, 667 So.2d 1144 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1995), writ denied, 96-0796 (La.

5/17/96), 673 So.2d 609, 610, in support of her argument that her intellectual

limitations should not prevent reunification. In that case, the Third Circuit

reversed a termination of parental rights of a woman deemed unfit due to mental

deficiencies. Ardoin, however, was decided under a previous version of La. Ch.C.

art. 1015(5). Further, in that case, there was expert testimony that the mother

could possibly experience improvement with intensive help. This expert testimony

and evidence are lacking in the instant case.

Moreover, La. Ch.C. art. 1036(D)(1) specifically allows the court to consider

evidence of “[a]ny physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse,

or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of exercising

parental responsibilities without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious

harm, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of

behavior.” There is no evidence that R.R.’s parental rights were terminated solely

because she had intellectual limitations, as she charges in brief. Dr. Powanda

conducted two evaluations of R.R. in the course of this case. R.R. underwent a

thorough battery of testing both times, which results were largely consistent that

she experienced some intellectual limitations. However, nowhere does Dr.

Powanda state in her expert reports that R.R.’s intellectual limitations formed the

sole basis for her recommendation against reunification. Dr. Powanda’s two

evaluations provided expert opinions supporting the trial court’s factual

conclusions that there was little or no reasonable expectation of significant

improvement in R.R.’s conduct. The testimony and reports of the two DCFS

caseworkers, the CASA volunteer, and R.R. herself showed the established

patterns of behavior that exposed S.A. to a substantial risk of serious harm that

provided the reason she was removed from R.R.’s home in the first place and

prevented reunification. These patterns, as noted above, were R.R.’s history of

23-CA-491 13

failing to exercising protective behavior towards S.A., and included living with a

violent or abusive partner (E.B., III), taking little accountability for her actions or

situations, being secretive and not forthcoming about other persons living in her

home (boyfriend E. in New Iberia; friend S.B.), and her lack of compliance with

her mental health counseling and medication management requirements of her case

plan (as noted above).

The record reflects that R.R. had a history, both before and throughout this

case, of living with people who were not safe or appropriate. She testified at the

termination hearing that her boyfriend at the time this case opened, E.B., III, had

been violent towards her. Moreover, he was implicated in the injuries that formed

a basis for S.A. originally being taken into foster care. After R.R. moved to New

Iberia, she met another man whom she allowed to move into her apartment with

her other child and did not tell DCFS of his presence in her apartment. When

DCFS learned of this other man and obtained his fingerprints, which revealed a

past conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, R.R. expressed that

he had taken the charge for someone else and was innocent. Further, R.R. told her

caseworker that as soon as the case was closed (presumably with reunification),

she would allow him to move back into her apartment. R.R. also allowed S.B., a

woman whom she had known since middle school, to move into her apartment and

watch her son G.F. while she was at work, again failing to notify DCFS that she

had allowed her to move in. Subsequent investigation of S.B. by DCFS showed

that she previously had two children removed from her care.

Most concerning was R.R.’s resistance to any belief that S.A. had been

touched inappropriately by her brother C.R., and moreover that she believed that

S.A. had lied about it. At the outset, the DCFS caseworker testified that the

allegations of sexual abuse could not be validated because the reported perpetrator,

R.R.’s son C.R., was a minor and did not live in the home with R.R. She explained

23-CA-491 14

that this was not the same as a finding that the incident did not occur. DCFS and

Dr. Powanda expressed serious concern regarding R.R.’s refusal to believe in the

possibility that C.R. could have touched S.A., which they testified indicated that

R.R. would not be able to adequately protect S.A. from future potential abuse or

other abusers.

The court was also troubled by R.R.’s apparent lack of concern of the

seriousness of S.A.’s seizure disorder. R.R. claimed that S.A. had had seizures

when she lived with her, and that she knew what to do about them. The record

suggests that before S.A. had been removed from R.R.’s home, she had suffered

febrile seizures, which were not the same as the recent seizures. R.R. displayed

little interest in learning about S.A.’s seizure disorder or her medication from her

foster mother.

Upon review, we find that R.R.’s contention that her parental rights were

terminated due to her intellectual limitations are without merit. Rather, her

parental rights were terminated because of clear and convincing evidence of the

lack of reasonable expectation of significant improvement in her conduct in the

near future. The trial court properly considered evidence of her intellectual

limitations as a factor in this conclusion.

Reasonable efforts of DCFS

R.R. also argues in brief that DCFS did not make reasonable efforts to

reunify her and S.A. The record evidences the contrary. DCFS maintained close

and regular contact with R.R. throughout the entire pendency of the case. DCFS

provided her with transportation to in person visitations, her other appointments

(such as mental health counseling and parenting classes), and to court hearings,

because R.R. did not have a vehicle. The delays in R.R.’s securing stable housing

did not inure to DCFS, nor did the initial delays in being accepted for services with

OCDD. In both instances, R.R. had tasks that required her personal completion in

23-CA-491 15

order to start or continue the application processes, which she did not do timely.

The progress reports entered into evidence show regular contact between R.R. and

her case workers and their support of her efforts.

Regarding R.R.’s ability to care for her son G.F., who was a year older than

S.A. and who lived with her full time, the trial judge explained at the trial of the

petition to terminate parental rights that the matter of G.F. was not before her; the

only child before her in this proceeding was S.A.

Thus, the record amply demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

R.R. had not exhibited significant improvement in the particulars that caused the

State to remove the child from her care and custody. The trial judge was extremely

familiar with the case, as she noted, and the record demonstrates regular, frequent,

and thorough review hearings and several permanency hearings where the judge

actively participated. We find that the trial judge’s conclusions that the State

proved the grounds of La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) by clear and convincing evidence are

not manifestly erroneous.

This assignment of error is without merit.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

R.R. next argues herein that the trial court erred by finding that termination

was in the best interest of S.A. Upon review, we find that the trial court’s

conclusion that termination was in S.A’s best interest was not manifestly

erroneous.

As set forth above, Louisiana courts recognize a child’s profound interest in

terminating parental rights, as the presence of parental rights prevent adoption and

inhibit the establishment of secure, stable, long-term, and continuous relationships

found in a home with proper parental care. In balancing the parents’ and the

child’s interests, the interests of the child are paramount over those of the parents.

State in Int. of A.V., supra, 164 So.3d at 862.

23-CA-491 16

R.R. argues that this is not a case with a parent who cannot or will not

provide a normal family home for her children, and, to the contrary, that she has

consistently provided a stable home for G.F. for the past three years and nearly

reunified with S.A. on three separate occasions.8 We note, however, as did the trial

court, that G.F. is not the child before the court in this proceeding. And we also

note that there are no allegations that G.F. was touched inappropriately by his

brother, nor evidence that he has serious medical issues like S.A.’s seizure disorder

that require parental attention.

S.A. has been in the care of a foster family for more than three-and-a-half

years. The record fully reflects the conditions that existed upon S.A. entering State

custody. The testimony and evidence show that S.A. is thriving in her placement

in her foster home with a parent who can provide a safe home and meet all of

S.A.’s medical and emotional needs. The child’s foster mother testified at the

hearing that she and her partner wish to adopt S.A. if she were available for

adoption. As the trial court noted, S.A. has been in foster care most of her young

life, and deserves the permanency and safety that adoption will provide.

Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s conclusion that it is in

S.A.’s best interest that parental rights be terminated.

This assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment on appeal.

AFFIRMED

8
The record demonstrates that at the review hearings on June 24 and July 22, 2020,
DCFS recommended that S.A. be returned to R.R.’s custody and that the case be staffed by
Family Services. Both times, however, the trial judge rejected DCFS’s recommendation and
maintained custody with DCFS. It cannot be said, therefore, that these two occasions constituted
“near” reunifications.

23-CA-491 17

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
JANUARY 31, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-CA-491
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE CONNIE M. AUCOIN (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JANE C. HOGAN (APPELLANT) MELISSA W. BERNIARD (APPELLANT) MARY R. MUSTALLER MCMILLAN
JEROME W. MATTHEWS, JR. (APPELLEE) BENJAMIN R. MCDONALD (APPELLEE) (APPELLEE)

MAILED
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