State of Louisiana Versus Jhonna D. Leonard

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 23-KA-103

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

JHONNA LEONARD COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20-6704, DIVISION "M"
HONORABLE SHAYNA BEEVERS MORVANT, JUDGE PRESIDING

November 08, 2023

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Robert A. Chaisson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF THE UNIFORM
COMMITMENT ORDER
JGG
RAC
JJM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Monique D. Nolan
Matthew Whitworth
Brittany Beckner

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
JHONNA D. LEONARD
Bertha M. Hillman

GRAVOIS, J.

Defendant, Jhonna D. Leonard, appeals his conviction and sentence for third

degree rape upon a known juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:43. On appeal, he

argues that the trial court committed a prejudicial error when it allowed the State to

admit his video-recorded statement to the police at trial. Finding no merit to

defendant’s argument, we affirm his conviction and sentence and remand for

correction of a patent error.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 10, 2020, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information charging defendant, Jhonna D. Leonard, with third degree rape upon a

known juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:43. Defendant pled not guilty at his

arraignment on March 8, 2021.

On April 7, 2021, defendant filed omnibus motions, including a motion for

discovery of defendant’s statement. On that same date, the State and the defense

filed a Discovery Receipt and Stipulation for Reciprocal Discovery. On June 16,

2022, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Use Confession or Statement. Following

a hearing on June 20, 2022, the trial court found that defendant’s video-recorded

statement would be admissible at trial over defense objections. That same day, the

matter proceeded to trial before a twelve-person jury, and on June 22, 2022, the

jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged.

On July 14, 2022, after a victim impact statement was presented, the trial

court sentenced defendant to twenty-two years’ imprisonment at hard labor without

the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentencing hearing

was held open and continued on July 20, 2022. At that hearing, the sex offender

23-KA-103 1

registration requirements were discussed, and a sex offender registration form was

signed.1 This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s admission of his video-

recorded statement to the police.

FACTS

J.W.,2 who was seventeen years old at the time of trial, testified that in

February of 2020, when she was fifteen years old, she lived in an apartment at 933

East Monterey Court with her grandmother, mother, and siblings. On February 25,

2020, after marching with her high school band in a Mardi Gras parade, J.W. was

dropped off at home, where she was alone with defendant. She explained that

defendant was her sister’s father who was visiting at the time. When she first came

inside, defendant asked her if “the weed man was outside.” After asking defendant

for a “cover” and lying on the couch, she played on her phone. Defendant then

asked her if she had had sex. They also talked about bed bugs in the home. She

relayed that he said, “Oh, I got bit by a bed bug, do you want to see where?” He

then pulled out his penis, and J.W. looked away. Defendant then went outside to

meet the “weed man,” after which he sat in a chair and smoked marijuana. J.W.

described that subsequently defendant sat near her on the couch and began rubbing

her legs. She pushed his hand off of her several times. Defendant then got on his

knees, placed his hand on her vagina, and put his mouth on her vagina. She

explained that her skirt was up and her underwear was pulled to the side.

Defendant then held her legs open and put his penis in her. She stated that it was

1
At the conclusion of sentencing, the State noticed its intent to file a habitual offender
bill of information against defendant. However, the record shows that on January 12, 2023, the
State informed the court that it would not pursue the habitual offender bill.
2
The initials of the victim and any defendant or witness whose name can lead to the
victim’s identity (i.e., parent, sibling, or relative with the same last name as the victim) are used
pursuant to La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(3), which allows the court to protect the identity of a crime
victim who is a minor or a victim of a sex offense by using his or her initials. State v. E.J.M., III,
12-774, 12-732 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13), 119 So.3d 648, 652 n.1.

23-KA-103 2

painful and she started crying. She testified that she did not feel like she could

leave or fight him. She was scared because he was a “big man.”

After he got off of her, defendant went to the bathroom and J.W. fixed her

clothes. She asked him, “What was that about?,” but could not recall his response.

She testified that she lay on the couch, and her mother returned home. At the time,

J.W. did not tell her mother about this incident with defendant because she

believed her mother would shoot him. After calling and telling a friend about what

happened, she told her sister, J.W.2, in the bathroom. She testified that the next

morning, she told her mother and grandmother what had happened with defendant.

The police were called and J.W. was taken to the hospital by ambulance and

examined by a doctor. She stated that she met with another individual at the Child

Advocacy Center (“CAC”) and recounted what happened.

J.W.2, J.W.’s sister, who was fourteen years old at the time of trial, testified

that her family attended a parade on Mardi Gras Day in February 2020. After J.W.

finished marching in the parade, J.W. and defendant left early and were alone

together at the family residence. When J.W.2 and her remaining family members

returned home, J.W. dragged her into the bathroom. J.W.2 recalled that J.W. was

crying and told her that defendant had touched her. She instructed J.W. to tell their

mother what happened, but J.W. did not like this idea because she was afraid. She

stated that when she and J.W. walked out of the bathroom, they found their

grandmother and brought her back into the bathroom where they told her what had

happened.3 She stated that the police arrived the next morning.

F.W., the victim’s grandmother, testified that in February of 2020, she lived

in an apartment at 933 East Monterey Court in Terrytown with her daughter, N.W.,

and her grandchildren. During that time, F.W. allowed defendant to visit with his

3
It is noted, as stated above, that J.W. testified that she told her grandmother about this
incident the next morning.

23-KA-103 3

children in the family home for a few weeks. On Mardi Gras day, she went with

her grandchildren to a parade in which J.W. was marching as a member of her

school’s band. When they later returned home, defendant and J.W. were already

present. She stated that after they got home, everyone was getting “settled down

for the night.”

At “some point,” apparently the next day, J.W. came in her room and stated,

“[Defendant] touched me, and I didn’t like it, and it hurted [sic].” When asked

where J.W.’s mom was at this time, F.W. responded that she was in the kitchen

cooking breakfast for everyone. After that conversation, F.W. instructed defendant

to speak with her in the bathroom and she told him what he did was wrong.

Defendant denied knowing what she was talking about. F.W. testified that she was

upset, hurt, and crying. She then told defendant to get his stuff and leave her

house. While bringing defendant to the bus terminal, she told him that she was

disappointed in him, he could never come back, and he would never see his

children again. Defendant indicated he would go to Florida. After returning to her

residence, the police were called, and J.W.’s mother brought her to the hospital.

She confirmed that she gave a statement to the police on February 26, 2020.

On February 26, 2020, Deputy Rashard Boykin with the Jefferson Parish

Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) responded to a call at 933 East Monterey Court

concerning a rape. Upon his arrival, Deputy Boykin spoke with F.W. and J.W, and

J.W. was then transported by EMS to the hospital. He then turned the case over to

the personal violence department.

Nicolas Sanderson, formerly a detective with the JPSO, was notified by

Deputy Boykin regarding a third degree rape in this case. Detective Sanderson

was informed that defendant had already left the scene, after which he spoke with

23-KA-103 4

the victim at Children’s Hospital.4 J.W. relayed to him that on the previous day,

she and defendant were alone in the apartment, and he “performed oral sex on her

and penetrated her vaginally with his penis.” He recalled J.W. was visibly upset

and distraught. He stated that a rape kit was done. Detective Sanderson contacted

the CAC so J.W. could be forensically interviewed. He remotely monitored the

interview in a separate room. He said that J.W.’s statement at the CAC was

consistent with what J.W. had told him.5 He further testified that he interviewed

J.W.’s mother, grandmother, and two sisters.

As a result of his investigation, Detective Sanderson obtained an arrest

warrant for defendant, which went into the National Crime Information Center

(“NCIC”) system. Defendant was arrested approximately one year later in

Pensacola, Florida. Following his transport back to Louisiana, defendant was

advised of his rights and provided a video-recorded statement on March 5, 2021.

Detective Sanderson relayed that during that statement, defendant denied the

allegations against him and claimed an individual named “Kent,” whom he

described as a “potential boyfriend” of the victim’s mother, was responsible. The

detective explained that the victim’s family was unable to identify such a person.

He indicated that in defendant’s statement, he alleged that the victim saw him

masturbating to a pornographic film and brushed up against his shoulder or arm. 6

Detective Sanderson stated that the victim identified defendant as her rapist.

4
Detective Sanderson explained that items, like bedding sheets and clothing, were
collected during the investigation.
5
The recorded video, admitted into evidence, was similar to J.W.’s trial testimony.
6
In that recorded statement, defendant waived his Miranda rights. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He stated that his “baby momma”
had multiple children and that “OCS” had been called multiple times. He discussed a man who
“used to stay with the grandma” and explained that he was no longer staying with her when he
went to visit. Defendant identified “Kent” as the “boyfriend of the grandma.” He told the
detective that they were trying to give him someone else’s charge. Defendant explained that in
February, around Mardi Gras, he came down to help N.W. with the children, and he stayed at the
grandmother’s house for four or five days. He repeatedly denied raping J.W. He explained to
the detective that while he was alone in the house, he showered, lay on the couch, and watched a
“flick.” He confirmed that he was “cranking it.” He recalled that J.W. came home while
everyone was still at the parade. He said that she came in the room and he brushed past her

23-KA-103 5

Detective Sanderson obtained a search warrant for a DNA sample from

defendant and a buccal swab was subsequently collected. He confirmed that he

requested a DNA comparison be conducted on the buccal swab taken from

defendant and the victim’s rape kit.

Sitara Shirwani, an expert in the field of forensic DNA analysis, provided

that she authored a report in relation to the instant case. She analyzed the

specimens from J.W.’s “pediatric physical evidence recovery kit” and a reference

sample from defendant. Ms. Shirwani found the swabs taken from J.W.’s inner

thigh, genitalia, perineum swab, and anal swab to be negative for seminal fluid and

semen. She determined the vaginal swab from J.W. tested positive for sperm.

With respect to the “epithelial or skin fraction” of the vaginal swab, Ms. Shirwani

determined that the DNA profile obtained was a mixture of DNA from two

contributors, and she could not make a conclusion regarding the contributor status

of defendant. The DNA profile obtained from the “sperm fraction” of the vaginal

swab was at least a hundred billion times more likely to have DNA originated from

J.W. and defendant than from her and an unknown contributor.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In his only assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in

allowing the State to introduce defendant’s video-recorded statement to police

since it was prejudicially disclosed beyond the discovery deadline for no good

cause show. Defendant contends that the video of his statement was only provided

to him four days prior to the start of trial. Although it is undisputed that the State

did not intentionally withhold this information, he argues that it has no effect on

when he exited the room. He then put his clothes back on. He stated that he went to Florida
afterwards.
It is noted that defendant identified “Kent” as the boyfriend of the victim’s grandmother
in his statement, but the detective testified at trial that “Kent” was the boyfriend of the victim’s
mother.

23-KA-103 6

the “prejudicial effect of the late disclosure.” Defendant claims that the recorded

statement was highly prejudicial because he admitted to knowing and staying with

the victim’s grandmother when the rape occurred. He asserts that because

defendant suggested in his recorded statement that someone else may have raped

the victim, the jury was “left to wonder why he did not call” that individual to

testify. Defendant concludes that the trial court should have excluded the recorded

statement or granted a continuance to allow the defense to locate and subpoena the

witness.

In the present case, on April 7, 2021, defendant filed omnibus motions,

which included a motion for discovery of defendant’s statement. On that same

date, the State and the defense filed a Discovery Receipt and Stipulation for

Reciprocal Discovery. On June 16, 2022, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Use

Confession or Statement pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 767 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 768.

Specifically, the State sought to introduce the following: 1) any and all statements

made by defendant to the victim/witnesses on or about February 25, 2020,

regarding JPSO item no. B-20814-20 and provided to defense counsel in open file

discovery; and 2) any and all statements made by defendant to officers on or about

February 24, 2021, regarding JPSO item no. B-20814-20 and provided to defense

counsel in open file discovery.

On June 20, 2022, prior to the start of trial, the State informed the court that

defense counsel previously waived motions. The State explained that the week

before the hearing, the State learned of its intention to introduce defendant’s

statement. The State called Detective Sanderson to the stand. He testified that

prior to speaking with defendant, he advised defendant of his Miranda rights

utilizing a standard JPSO waiver of rights form. He asserted that he neither offered

defendant anything in exchange for making a statement, nor forced or coerced

defendant in any way to make a statement.

23-KA-103 7

Following the detective’s testimony, defendant indicated that he did not seek

to exclude the statement on constitutional grounds. He asserted that after the

State’s discovery of the statement, he was informed of its existence “late last

week.” He requested that the court prohibit the prosecution from using the

statement at trial pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 729.5.

In response, the State explained that it was unaware of the statement made

by defendant to Detective Sanderson, as well as the corresponding police report

and waiver of rights form, because the statement occurred a year after the incident

occurred. The State further explained that the “screener and/or trial attorney” was

not alerted when the detective uploaded the statement and police report into the

system called “VeriPic.” Rather, the State became aware of the statement when

the physical disc of the recorded statement “came up in evidence.” The State

maintained there was not a reference in the State’s file or documentation of the

statement’s existence. On Wednesday of the previous week, the State alerted

defense counsel of this statement and provided it to him.7 The State also confirmed

the statement was an hour in length. The State claimed that defendant’s statement

was not inculpatory in that he did not admit he committed the offense with which

he was charged. The State acknowledged that it was inculpatory to the extent that

defendant admitted he knew the victim and was present at the scene of the crime in

the time frame alleged.

Afterwards, the trial judge stated the following:

The Court having heard the testimony and the argument believes this
actually goes to the heart of Brady and also Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 729.3. There is a continuing duty to disclose upon
learning of it Wednesday, so that was five days ago the State
immediately disclosed that this existed. In accordance with 729.5,
they are to comply sanctions. The Court has options to—“It may
order a party to permit the discovery or inspection. It may grant a
7
The prosecutor concluded that as an officer of the court, he in good faith did “attempt to
remedy the situation as quickly as I could, and I have no one to blame but myself for not having
known about it, but there was no reason for me to know about it under the way the system is set
up.”

23-KA-103 8

continuance, or it may order a mistrial on the motion of the
Defendant, or it may prohibit the party from introducing into evidence
a subject matter not disclosed or enter such other order other than
dismissal as may be appropriate.”

The Court finds that considering that this entire video is less than one
hour and there was a two-page report, there is no prejudice. There is
ample time to review a one hour video or less and to proceed today.
For that reason, the Court does not believe a sanction is appropriate.
Again, it was not as though we got to trial this morning, and it was
disclosed. It was a statement that the Court does find is appropriate
for introduction based on officer’s testimony and the reasons given by
the State.

The court noted the defense’s objection. Thereafter, during Detective

Sanderson’s trial testimony, defendant’s statement and a redacted recording were

admitted into evidence.

Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 716(C), upon motion of the defendant, the court shall

require the State to inform the defendant of the substance of any oral statement

made by the defendant or any codefendant which the State intends to offer in its

case in chief at trial, whether before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by

any person then known to the defendant or the codefendant to be a law

enforcement officer.

The State is under a continuing obligation to promptly disclose additional

evidence that may be discovered or that it decides to use as evidence at trial. See

La. C.Cr.P. art. 729.3.8 In the event that the State does not timely disclose

evidence, La. C.Cr.P. art. 729.5(A) provides that the trial judge “may order such

party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, order a mistrial on

motion of the defendant, prohibit the party from introducing into evidence the

8
La. C.Cr.P. art. 729.3 provides:
If, subsequent to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this Chapter and
prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or decides to use
additional evidence and such evidence is or may be, subject to discovery or
inspection under the order issued, he shall promptly notify the other party and the
court of the existence of the additional evidence, so that the court may modify its
previous order or allow the other party to make an appropriate motion for
additional discovery or inspection.

23-KA-103 9

subject matter not disclosed, or enter such other order, other than dismissal, as may

be appropriate.” It is within the trial court’s discretion to choose an appropriate

remedy for a discovery violation that will offset any possible prejudice. State v.

Williams, 12-305 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13), 119 So.3d 131, 145, writ denied, 13-

1338 (La. 12/6/13), 129 So.3d 529 (citing State v. Chaplain, 03-338 (La. App. 5

Cir. 7/29/03), 852 So.2d 1088, 1089).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has previously held that discovery rules are

intended to eliminate unwarranted prejudice arising from surprise testimony to

permit the defense to meet the State’s case and to allow proper assessment of the

strength of its evidence in preparing a defense. State v. Bradstreet, 16-80 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 6/30/16), 196 So.3d 876, 892, writ denied, 16-1567 (La. 6/5/17), 220

So.3d 752. The State’s failure to comply with discovery procedures does not

automatically require reversal. The appellate court must examine the

circumstances of the case to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced and

whether any prejudice resulting from the State’s non-compliance with discovery

procedure caused the trier of fact to reach the wrong conclusion. Williams, supra.

A conviction is only reversible when the defendant is prejudiced as a result of the

discovery violation. State v. Lestrick, 13-289 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/09/13), 128

So.3d 421, 431, writ denied, 13-2643 (La. 4/25/14), 138 So.3d 643.

Upon review, in light of the following, we find that the trial court did not err

by admitting the video-recorded statement in question into evidence at trial.

In State v. Fisher, 380 So.2d 1340 (La. 1980), on the day of trial, the district

attorney informed the defendant of a prior statement made to a police officer. The

Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the State complied with discovery

because notice was given immediately upon coming into possession of it. The

court held that it was convinced from the evidence that the district attorney was in

good faith and had no knowledge of the statement prior to the time it was fully

23-KA-103 10

disclosed to the defendant. The court indicated that the disclosure of the statement

was made prior to the opening statements. Under these circumstances, the court

considered that the State substantially complied with La. C.Cr.P. arts. 716(C) and

729.3. Id. at 1343-45.

In State v. Johnson, 380 So.2d 32, 33 (La. 1980), the defendant argued that

the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction of an inculpatory

statement into evidence, which was made by him to an officer at the time of his

arrest, on the ground that the State did not inform him of the statement in its

answer to his motion for discovery and erred in refusing to order a mistrial on the

same ground. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that it was satisfied that the

assistant district attorney was in good faith and had no knowledge of the statement

prior to Friday, March 30, 1979. The disclosure of the statement was made that

same day, and though the defendant did not actually receive it until Monday, April

2, 1979, the defendant had actual notice two days before commencement of the

trial. The court pointed out that the defendant did not seek a continuance as a

result of not receiving notice of the statement earlier. Under the circumstances, the

court found that the State substantially complied with La. C.Cr.P. arts. 716(C) and

729.3. Thus, the court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in

overruling the defendant’s objection to the introduction of the statement in

evidence or in failing to order a mistrial. Id. at 33-34.

In the present case, defendant was given notice of the statement five days

before the start of trial. As the State only became aware of the statement days

before trial, it could not have given notice of the same to defendant any earlier.

Defendant does not dispute that the State gave notice of the statement promptly

upon its discovery or that the State acted in good faith. Under these circumstances,

like in Fisher, supra, and Johnson, supra, we find that the State substantially

complied with La. C.Cr.P. arts. 716(C) and 729.3. Additionally, had defendant

23-KA-103 11

needed more time to prepare a defense based on the discovery of the statement, he

could have requested a continuance, which he did not. See State v. Humbles, 14-

643 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/15), 169 So.3d 547, 557, writ denied, 15-725 (La.

3/24/16) 190 So.3d 1195.

Additionally, defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the

fact that he did not receive the recorded statement until five days before trial. At

the hearing, defendant generally argued that the statement should be excluded due

to the untimely disclosure and did not assert any specific prejudice he suffered

from the timing of the notice. Now, on appeal, defendant asserts that he was

prejudiced because he did not have time to locate and secure a witness, “Kent,”

whom he suggested in his statement raped the victim.

As pointed out by the State, since defendant waived his rights and agreed to

give a recorded statement to the detective, defendant arguably knew the statement

existed and knew the substance of the statement prior to trial. The defense was

also given notice of the recorded statement by the State five days before trial. As

such, defendant was not “surprised” by the recorded statement or lulled into a

misapprehension of the State’s case by actions of the State. Additionally, as

previously mentioned, defendant did not seek a continuance as a result of not

receiving earlier notice of the statement. Further, the information included in the

statement, concerning defendant’s admission that he knew the victim and was

present at the residence at the time of the incident, was corroborated by the State’s

witnesses, including the victim, her sister, and her grandmother. We find that

defendant has not shown how the introduction of the evidence in question—the

video-recorded statement—caused the trier of fact to reach the wrong conclusion.

Based on the foregoing, we find that defendant has not presented proof of any

prejudice suffered as a result of the trial court’s admission of the video-recorded

statement at trial. This assignment of error is without merit.

23-KA-103 12

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920,

State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175

(La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The State of Louisiana Uniform Commitment Order (“UCO”)9 fails to

include as a “Sentence Condition” pre-printed on the form that defendant shall

comply with the sex offender registration statute under the provisions of La.

C.Cr.P. art. 895 and La. R.S. 15:541, et seq. The UCO specifically contains an

unchecked box next to a statement that defendant shall comply with these

requirements. The record reflects that the trial court informed defendant that he

was required to comply with the sex offender notification/registration

requirements, and a written copy thereof is included in the record. The advisal is

also included in the sentencing minute entry. To ensure accuracy in the record, we

remand this matter for the trial court to correct the UCO to reflect that defendant

shall comply with the sex offender registration statute. We further direct the Clerk

of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the corrected UCO to the

appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and the

Department of Corrections’ legal department.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned above, defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed and this matter is remanded for correction of the UCO as set forth above.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR
CORRECTION OF THE UNIFORM
COMMITMENT ORDER

9
A June 25, 2022 Nunc Pro Tunc minute entry corrects the original June 14, 2022
sentencing minute entry with respect to the sentencing being held open and a status hearing set
on the habitual bill. The record contains multiple UCOs dated June 25, 2022, two of which are
stamped as “Denied.” The UCO dated June 25, 2022, which was not stamped as denied, is used
for purposes of this errors patent review.

23-KA-103 13

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
NOVEMBER 8, 2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-KA-103
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE SHAYNA BEEVERS MORVANT (DISTRICT JUDGE)
MONIQUE D. NOLAN (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) BERTHA M. HILLMAN (APPELLANT)

MAILED
BRITTANY BECKNER (APPELLEE)
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
MATTHEW WHITWORTH (APPELLEE)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053