State of Louisiana Versus Authur Johnson

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 23-KA-273

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

AUTHUR JOHNSON COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 22-5177, DIVISION "E"
HONORABLE FRANK A. BRINDISI, JUDGE PRESIDING

February 28, 2024

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, Stephen J. Windhorst, John J. Molaison, Jr., Scott U.
Schlegel, and Timothy S. Marcel

SENTENCE ON COUNT ONE VACATED; CONVICTION AND
SENTENCE ON COUNT TWO VACATED; JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A STOLEN THING
VALUED AT LESS THAN $1,000 ENTERED AS TO COUNT TWO;
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING ON COUNT ONE AND
SENTENCING ON COUNT TWO
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COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Darren A. Allemand
Gabrielle Hosli
Taylor Somerville

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
AUTHUR JOHNSON
James A. Williams
Kathrine E. Ellis

SCHLEGEL, J.

Defendant, Authur Johnson, appeals his conviction for illegal possession of

a stolen thing valued at $25,000 or more (count two), as well as the sentence

imposed for his conviction for aggravated flight from an officer (count one). The

State concedes that it did not prove the value of the stolen vehicle was $25,000 or

more with respect to count two. However, we agree with the State that the

evidence is sufficient to prove a lesser and included responsive verdict. Therefore,

we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence as to count two, modify the verdict

by rendering a judgment of conviction for illegal possession of a stolen thing

valued at less than $1,000, and remand to the trial court for sentencing. We also

vacate defendant’s sentence on his conviction for aggravated flight from an officer

(count one) because his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by

law and remand for resentencing in accordance with La. R.S. 14:108.1(E)(1).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 14, 2022, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information charging defendant, Authur Johnson, with aggravated flight from an

officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1(C), and obstruction of justice in violation

of La. R.S. 14:130.1. Defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment on December

19, 2022. On March 1, 2023, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a

superseding bill of information charging defendant with aggravated flight from an

officer (count one) and obstruction of justice (count three), as well as an additional

charge for illegal possession of a stolen thing valued at $25,000 or more in

violation of La. R.S. 14:69(B)(1) (count two). On March 2, 2023, defendant pled

not guilty to the new count two.

On that same day, a twelve-person jury trial commenced and unanimously

found defendant guilty as charged on all three counts. On March 27, 2023, the trial

court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of ten years imprisonment at

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hard labor on counts one and two and five years imprisonment at hard labor on

count three. Following sentencing, defendant filed a motion for appeal, which the

trial court granted on March 29, 2023.

FACTS

Deputy Devin Wirtz with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (JPSO)

testified that on October 18, 2022, he was in a fully marked unit, observing traffic

at 3300 Metairie Road. Around 3:50 p.m., he noticed a black Honda Civic without

a license plate and decided to conduct a traffic stop. He pulled out onto Airline

Highway and activated his emergency lights, which initiated the camera in his unit.

The Honda Civic signaled and turned onto Severn and Metairie Road, but then

rapidly accelerated. Deputy Wirtz advised headquarters that he was pursuing the

vehicle and provided his location. At trial, Deputy Wirtz narrated the camera

footage of the pursuit to the jury and pointed out instances where the Honda Civic

ignored red lights and stop signs, as well as the portions of the footage where he

was pursing the vehicle at speeds of over 80 miles per hour in a residential area.

JPSO Deputy Nicholas Songy joined the pursuit as the Honda Civic headed

north on North Causeway Boulevard and turned right onto West Napoleon

Avenue. He explained that he assumed the lead position behind the Honda Civic.

The pursuit continued through a residential area until the vehicle eventually sped

back onto Metairie Road. Deputy Songy testified that he never lost sight of the

vehicle. Eventually, the pursuit stopped at a dead end on Estes Street and the two

occupants ran from the vehicle. Deputy Songy and Deputy Wirtz pursued them on

foot with the assistance of other deputies.

Deputy Wirtz testified that he observed one of the occupants with an AR-15

and a Glock firearm, so he had his gun drawn while the pursuit continued on foot.

Deputy Wirtz found the passenger, later identified as Tyren Feilder, lying on the

ground next to an assault rifle and a Glock firearm. Deputy Labadie, who was

23-KA-273 2

assisting with the pursuit, had previously apprehended Mr. Feilder by deploying

his Taser. Deputy Wirtz then continued to search the area for the driver of the

vehicle.

Deputy Steven Perez, also with the JPSO, testified that on October 18, 2022,

he received a request for assistance regarding a vehicle pursuit. After he arrived at

the scene, people at a nearby restaurant alerted him to a suspect, later identified as

defendant, who had run behind the building. Deputy Perez entered the alley and

noticed defendant hiding between two air conditioner units. Deputy Perez ordered

defendant to show his hands, and Detective Scott Williams with the Orleans Parish

Sheriff’s Office handcuffed defendant. A firearm was located approximately

twenty feet from where defendant was located. Deputy Perez identified defendant

in court and also identified a black glove with the brand “Bodyguard” that was on

defendant’s left hand at the time of his arrest.

After Deputy Wirtz returned to the Honda Civic, he explained that officers

located the vehicle identification number (VIN) and a search revealed that the

vehicle had been reported stolen in New Orleans. Officers also searched the

vehicle and located a right-handed black glove branded “Bodyguard” on the driver-

side floorboard, as well as a backpack behind the driver’s seat. The backpack

contained 32 pills, four foiled packets, $232, “sets of gloves,” a driver’s license,

and a debit card in Mr. Feilder’s name. Deputy Wirtz then transported Mr. Feilder

and defendant to the Gretna Correctional Center. The prisoner transport camera

recorded a conversation between Mr. Feilder and defendant. In the video, they

discussed firearms and fleeing from police in the stolen vehicle. Deputy Wirtz also

explained that he listened to a recording of a phone call defendant made while in

jail during which defendant admitted to riding in a stolen vehicle.

Theresa Reed testified that she owned the Honda Civic at issue and had

reported it stolen to the New Orleans Police Department. Ms. Reed testified that

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she did not know anyone by the name of “Arthur Johnson,” and she did not

recognize defendant. She testified that she did not give her keys to defendant, and

she did not give him permission to drive her vehicle.

DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, defendant asks this Court to vacate his

conviction on count two for illegal possession of a stolen thing valued at $25,000

or more (count two) and enter a verdict of not guilty due to insufficiency of the

evidence. Defendant argues that the value of the stolen property is an essential

element of the charge and that the State failed to offer any evidence to prove the

value of the vehicle at issue. In response, the State concedes that it did not prove

the value of the Honda Civic. Notwithstanding, the State contends that the correct

remedy is not an acquittal, but rather a conviction for a misdemeanor, illegal

possession of a stolen thing less than $1,000, because the vehicle has some value.

The State further contends that this Court should abrogate its decision in State v.

Norman, 20-142 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 310 So.3d 287, writ denied, 21-150

(La. 4/7/21), 313 So.3d 983, where this Court entered an acquittal in a similar

matter involving the sufficiency of evidence presented regarding the value of a

stolen vehicle, because it is inconsistent with binding jurisprudence from the

Louisiana Supreme Court.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must

determine if the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both,

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a

rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond

a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979); State v. Mickel, 09-953 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/11/10), 41 So.3d 532, 534,

writ denied, 10-1357 (La. 1/7/11), 52 So.3d 885. A review of the record

for sufficiency of the evidence does not require the court to ask whether it believes

23-KA-273 4

that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.

Jones, 08-20 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/15/08), 985 So.2d 234, 240. Rather, the reviewing

court is required to consider the whole record and determine whether any rational

trier of fact would have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gatson, 21-156, 21-157 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/29/21), 334 So.3d 1021, 1034; Jones, supra. The requirement that the evidence

be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution requires the reviewing

court to defer to “the actual trier of fact’s rational credibility calls, evidence

weighing and inference drawing.” State v. Caffrey, 08-717 (La. App. 5 Cir.

5/12/09), 15 So.3d 198, 202, writ denied, 09-1305 (La. 2/5/10), 27 So.3d 297.

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence

consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of

the main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience.

Gatson, supra. When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of

an offense, La. R.S. 15:438 provides, “assuming every fact to be proved that the

evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test from the Jackson standard,

but rather provides a helpful basis for determining the existence of reasonable

doubt. State v. Wooten, 99-181 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/1/99), 738 So.2d 672, 675, writ

denied, 99-2057 (La. 1/14/00), 753 So.2d 208.

Defendant was convicted of illegal possession of a stolen thing valued at

$25,000 or more. La. R.S. 14:69 provides in pertinent part:

A. Illegal possession of stolen things is the intentional possessing,
procuring, receiving, or concealing of anything of value which has
been the subject of any robbery or theft, under circumstances
which indicate that the offender knew or had good reason to
believe that the thing was the subject of one of these offenses.

B.(1) Whoever commits the crime of illegal possession of stolen
things, when the value of the things is twenty-five thousand
dollars or more, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more

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than twenty years, or may be fined not more than fifty thousand
dollars, or both.
***
(4) When the value of the stolen things is less than one thousand
dollars, the offender shall be imprisoned for not more than six
months or may be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or
both. [Emphasis added.]

La. R.S. 14:2(A)(2) broadly defines “anything of value” as follows:

“Anything of value” must be given the broadest possible
construction, including any conceivable thing of the slightest value,
movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, public or private,
and including transportation, telephone and telegraph services, or
any other service available for hire. It must be construed in the
broad popular sense of the phrase, not necessarily as synonymous
with the traditional legal term “property.” [Emphasis added.]

Therefore, in order to prove illegal possession of a stolen thing valued at

$25,000 or more, the State must prove five essential elements beyond a reasonable

doubt: (1) defendant intentionally possessed, procured, received, or concealed; (2)

anything of value; (3) that was the subject of any robbery or theft; (4) where

circumstances indicate the defendant knew or had good reason to believe that the

thing was the subject of one of these offenses; and (5) the value of the stolen thing

was $25,000 or more. La. R.S. 14:69; State v. Warrick, 15-617 (La. App. 5 Cir.

2/24/16), 186 So.3d 1263, 1268. The value of the vehicle is an element of the

offense and must be proven because it determines the punishment. State in Interest

of B.J., 617 So.2d 238, 241 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1993).

The State does not deny that it failed to introduce evidence to prove that the

value of the vehicle was $25,000 or more. The State argues that instead of

acquitting defendant on count two, the Court should find defendant guilty of the

lesser included misdemeanor offense of illegal possession of a stolen thing valued

at less than $1,000. The State argues that pursuant to the broad definition of

“anything of value” set forth in La. R.S. 14:2(A)(2), it is undisputed that the

vehicle has some value.

23-KA-273 6

When an appellate court reverses a conviction for insufficiency of evidence,

La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(E) authorizes the court to enter a conviction for any lesser and

included responsive offense if supported by the evidence. Article 821(E)

provides:

If the appellate court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the state, supports only a conviction of a lesser included
responsive offense, the court, in lieu of granting a post verdict
judgment of acquittal, may modify the verdict and render a judgment
of conviction on the lesser included responsive offense.

Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that when the

evidence produced by the State is insufficient to support the conviction, but

sufficient to support a lesser included offense, the proper remedy, pursuant to La.

C.Cr.P. art. 821, is to enter a conviction for the lesser included offense rather than

an acquittal. See State v. Williams, 610 So.2d 129 (La. 1992); State v. Robertson,

06-1537 (La. 1/16/08), 988 So.2d 166, 171; see also State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248,

251-52 (La. 1980).

In Williams, supra, the defendant was similarly charged with felony

possession of a stolen property valued at $500 or more. The victim testified that

she purchased the vehicle at issue for $25,000 ten years before it was stolen. She

also testified the vehicle had maintenance problems and that she had intended to

replace it at the time it was stolen. The jury convicted the defendant of possession

of a stolen property valued at $500 or more, but the Fourth Circuit reversed the

conviction and entered an acquittal because the State did not introduce any

photographs of the vehicle into evidence and otherwise failed to provide

trustworthy evidence of the value of the vehicle at the time it was stolen. Id. at

129.

The State filed a writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court and

argued that the appellate court erred by entering an acquittal instead of entering a

conviction for a lesser and included offense supported by the evidence. The

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Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the State and reasoned as follows in

concluding that the trier of fact could have determined that the vehicle had “some

value:”

La.Rev.Stat. 14:69 proscribes the intentional possessing, receiving, or
concealing of ‘anything of value....’ The latter phrase ‘must be given
the broadest possible construction, including any conceivable thing of
the slightest value, movable or immovable....’ La.Rev.Stat. 14:2(2).
While the state’s case may have asked jurors to speculate on the range
of values for the Cadillac, a rational trier-of-fact could have
determined that the vehicle had some value, . . . .

Id.

As a result, the Williams court held that a verdict of guilty of a misdemeanor illegal

possession of stolen property valued less than $100 should be entered and

remanded the matter for resentencing. Id.

Furthermore, in State in Interest of B.J., supra, this Court similarly

concluded that despite the lack of direct evidence regarding the value of the stolen

vehicle, the appropriate remedy pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 821 and Williams,

supra, was to enter a conviction for a lesser included offense. The defendant in

State in Interest of B.J. was charged with illegal possession of a stolen vehicle

valued at $10,000, and convicted as charged. When the officer activated his lights

and sirens, a chase ensued, and eventually the defendant and the other occupants

fled from a stolen 1985 Cutlass. The owner of the Cutlass did not testify, and the

State did not offer any other evidence regarding the value of the vehicle.

This Court determined that due to the lack of evidence, the State failed to

prove the vehicle was valued at $10,000, or even more than $500. Id. at 242.

However, this Court observed that the vehicle was drivable and found that the type,

condition, and age of the vehicle allowed it to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

that the value of the vehicle was worth more than $100. Id. at 242-43. Therefore,

this Court vacated the jury verdict and rendered a judgment of the lesser included

23-KA-273 8

offense of guilty of illegal possession of stolen things valued at more than $100

and less than $500. Id. at 243.

The State further argues in its appellee brief that this Court recently reached

an inconsistent result in State v. Norman, supra, and petitions this Court to

abrogate the decision. The defendant in Norman was charged with illegal

possession of stolen things valued between $5,000 and $24,999, and convicted by a

jury of the lesser included misdemeanor offense of illegal possession of stolen

things valued at less than $1,000. The stolen vehicle at issue was a 2002 Ford

Escape. The owner, who was a mechanic, testified that he paid between $1,500

and $2,000 for the vehicle, but that he purchased it for less than its value because it

needed some mechanical repairs. He estimated that the vehicle’s actual value was

more than $5,000. In entering an acquittal, the Norman court reasoned that the

owner only testified “generally that the vehicle was worth over $5,000,” and that

the State had failed to meet its burden to prove the vehicle was valued at $1,000 or

less at the time it was stolen. Id. at 298.

We agree with the State that the finding in Norman is contrary to the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s instructions in Williams, supra. Therefore, we

overrule the decision in Norman, supra, to the extent that it held that the proper

remedy is an acquittal when the State fails to introduce direct or specific evidence

to prove the value of the vehicle at the time of the offense. The circumstantial

evidence supported a finding that the stolen vehicle clearly had some value under

the broad interpretation set forth in La. R.S. 14:2(A)(2).

Defendant further infers that this Court’s only option is to enter an acquittal

on the charge because the only responsive verdicts discussed in the jury

instructions were guilty of possession of stolen property valued at $25,000 or

more, attempted possession of stolen property valued at $25,000 or more, and not

23-KA-273 9

guilty. 1 First, a review of the record does not reflect that defendant objected to the

jury instructions or verdict form. In order to preserve the right to seek appellate

review of an alleged trial court error, the party alleging the error must state an

objection contemporaneously with the occurrence of the alleged error, as well as

the grounds for that objection. La. C.Cr.P. art. 841; State v. Gaal, 01-376 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 10/17/01), 800 So.2d 938, 949, writ denied, 02-2335 (La. 10/3/03), 855

So.2d 294.

Furthermore, in State v. LeBlanc, 506 So.2d 1197 (La. 1987), the defendant

raised a similar argument where the trial court failed to include an instruction for a

lesser included offense and the defendant failed to object. The Louisiana Supreme

Court determined that the failure to instruct the jury of the lesser included offense

did not preclude the appellate court from entering a verdict on a lesser included

offense because by returning a guilty verdict on the greater offense, the jury

“necessarily found the existence of every essential element of the lesser and

included offense.” Id. at 1201. The supreme court concluded,

Moreover, the criteria for modifying a verdict under La. C.Cr.P. art.
821 is not whether the jury was instructed on the lesser and included
offense (since the relief for the judge’s failure to give such an
instruction in the face of a contemporaneous objection is a new trial),

1
The responsive verdicts for illegal possession of stolen things are not listed in the specially provided for
responsive verdicts in La. C.Cr.P. art. 814. La. C.Cr.P. art. 815 provides the responsive verdicts for all
offenses not listed in Article 814:

In all cases not provided for in Article 814, the following verdicts are responsive:

(1) Guilty;

(2) Guilty of a lesser and included grade of the offense even though the offense charged
is a felony, and the lesser offense a misdemeanor; or

(3) Not Guilty.

The responsive verdicts for La. R.S. 14:69, illegal possession of stolen things, at the time the offense
occurred in the present matter are: Guilty of illegal possession of stolen things valued at $25,000 or more,
Guilty of attempted illegal possession of stolen things valued at $25,000 or more; Guilty of illegal
possession of stolen things valued at $5,000 dollars or more, but less than $25,000; Guilty of attempted
illegal possession of stolen things valued at $5,000 dollars or more, but less than $25,000; Guilty of
illegal possession of stolen things valued at $1,000 dollars or more, but less than $5,000; Guilty of
attempted illegal possession of stolen things valued at $1,000 dollars or more, but less than $5,000; Guilty
of illegal possession of stolen things valued at less than $1,000 dollars; Guilty of attempted illegal
possession of stolen things valued at less than $1,000 dollars; and Not Guilty.

23-KA-273 10

but rather whether the jury which returned a verdict of guilty of the
greater offense necessarily found all of the essential elements of the
lesser offense.

Id.; see also State v. Temple, 572 So.2d 662, 664 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

We find that even though the jury instructions for count two did not include

the responsive verdicts pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 815, there was no error because

when the jury found defendant guilty of the greater offense, it necessarily found

sufficient evidence for every essential element of the lesser and included offense.

Accordingly, in the instant case, we find that the State failed to prove the

value of the stolen Honda Civic was $25,000 or more, and therefore, we vacate

defendant’s conviction and sentence for count two. However, we find that the

video depicting defendant operating the vehicle in excess of 80 miles per hour at

the time of the offense is sufficient evidence to find that the vehicle had some

value under the broadest possible construction in accordance with La. R.S.

14:2(A)(2). Therefore, we find that pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 821, the evidence,

viewed in a light most favorable to the State, supports a conviction for the lesser

included misdemeanor offense of illegal possession of a stolen thing less than

$1,000 in violation of La. R.S. 14:69(B)(4).

Illegal Sentence – Aggravated Flight from an Officer (Count One)

In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the ten-year

sentence imposed by the trial court for his aggravated flight from an officer

conviction is illegal because the maximum sentence allowed is five years. La. R.S.

14:108.1(E) provides the following sentencing ranges for a charge of aggravated

flight from an officer:

E.(1) Whoever commits aggravated flight from an officer shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not more than five years and may be
fined not more than two thousand dollars.

(2)(a) Whoever commits the crime of aggravated flight from an
officer that results in serious bodily injury shall be imprisoned at hard

23-KA-273 11

labor for not more than ten years and may be fined not more than two
thousand dollars.

As conceded by the State, it did not charge defendant with causing serious

bodily injury on this count and the State did not introduce any evidence of serious

bodily injury. As such, defendant received an illegal sentence above the maximum

of five years imprisonment allowed under La. R.S. 14:108.1(E)(1). La. C.Cr.P. art.

882 authorizes this Court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. However, an

appellate court is only authorized to impose a new sentence when the exercise of

sentencing discretion is not involved. State v. Brown, 22-562 (La. App. 5 Cir.

6/21/23), 368 So.3d 218, 222. Because La. R.S. 14:108.1(E)(1) involves

sentencing discretion, we vacate defendant’s sentence for his conviction for

aggravated flight from an officer and remand for resentencing.

ERRORS PATENT DISCUSSION

The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920;

State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175

(La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The sentencing transcript reflects that the trial court failed to advise

defendant of the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, which states in pertinent part,

“[n]o application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an

out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the

judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of

Article 914 or 922.” If a trial court fails to advise, or provides an incomplete

advisal, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the appellate court may correct this error

by informing the defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for post-

conviction relief by means of its opinion. State v. Mouton, 22-444 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/29/22), 358 So.3d 106, 122-23. Therefore, we hereby advise defendant that no

application for post-conviction relief, including applications that seek an out-of-

23-KA-273 12

time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the

judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La.

C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922.

DECREE

For reasons explained above, we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence

as to count two, illegal possession of a stolen thing valued at $25,000 or more,

modify the verdict by rendering a judgment of conviction for illegal possession of

a stolen thing valued at less than $1,000, and remand to the trial court for

sentencing. We also vacate defendant’s sentence imposed for his conviction for

aggravated flight from an officer (count one) because his sentence exceeded the

maximum sentence authorized by law and remand for resentencing in accordance

with La. R.S. 14:108.1(E)(1).

SENTENCE ON COUNT ONE VACATED;
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE ON COUNT TWO
VACATED; JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A STOLEN THING
VALUED AT LESS THAN $1,000 ENTERED AS TO
COUNT TWO; REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING ON COUNT ONE AND
SENTENCING ON COUNT TWO

23-KA-273 13

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
FEBRUARY 28, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-KA-273
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE FRANK A. BRINDISI (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DARREN A. ALLEMAND (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) KATHRINE E. ELLIS (APPELLANT)
TIMOTHY T. YAZBECK (APPELLANT)

MAILED
JAMES A. WILLIAMS (APPELLANT) HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW (APPELLEE)
706 DERBIGNY STREET DISTRICT ATTORNEY
GRETNA, LA 70053 GABRIELLE HOSLI (APPELLEE)
TAYLOR SOMERVILLE (APPELLEE)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053