23-KH-382 Nonprecedential Writ Granted Processed

State of Louisiana Versus David Mayfield

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit · Filed August 9, 2023

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 23-KH-382

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

DAVID MAYFIELD COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

August 09, 2023

Linda Wiseman
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE DAVID MAYFIELD

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE CONNIE M.
AUCOIN, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 20-0556

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Marc E. Johnson, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

WRIT GRANTED; REMANDED

The relator, David Mayfield, seeks review of the trial court’s July 18, 2023
ruling which denied the return of firearms following the completion of his
probation for two misdemeanor convictions.

La. R.S. 15:41 details the procedure for disposition of property seized in
connection with criminal proceedings, and provides, in part:

A. If there is a specific statute concerning the disposition of the
seized property, the property shall be disposed of in accordance with
the provisions thereof.
B. If there is no such specific statute, the following governs the
disposition of property seized in connection with a criminal proceeding,
which is not to be used as evidence or is no longer needed as evidence:

(1) The seized property shall be returned to the owner, unless a
statute declares the property to be contraband, in which event the
court shall order the property destroyed if the court determines that its
destruction is in the public interest; otherwise, Paragraph (2) of this
Section shall apply.
. . .

C. Where the release of seized property is sought by a person
claiming to be the owner, it shall be released only upon motion
contradictorily with the clerk of court. In all other cases the court may
either render an ex parte order for the disposition of the property as
herein provided on motion of any interested person, or on its own
motion, or the court may require a motion contradictorily with the
apparent owner or the person in possession of the property at the time
of the seizure.

Accordingly, the statute requires two findings by the trial court at a
contradictory hearing with the Clerk of Court: ownership of an item by the
claimant, and a determination of whether an item is, in fact, contraband. La.
C.Cr.P. art. 167 states, in part, “[i]f seized property is not to be used as evidence or
is no longer needed as evidence, it shall be disposed of according to law, under the
direction of the judge.”

At the outset, the limited application before us indicates that the Clerk of
Court for the Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court Parish of St. Charles was not
represented at the contradictory hearing, as required by La. R.S. 15:41(C). While
this factor alone is a sufficient basis upon which to vacate the trial court’s ruling
and remand the matter, there are factual deficiencies which further support our
disposition.

The application is devoid of any evidence presented at the hearing regarding
the relator’s ownership of the firearms he sought to have returned. There is no
documentation to prove his claim by way of legal registration or bill of sale, no
sworn affidavit, and no testimony by the relator. In addition, there is no recitation
of a factual basis to indicate the circumstances under which the firearms were
initially seized, which would tend to show ownership. Also, there were allegations
by the State at the hearing concerning the relator’s prior convictions which, if true,
may have a bearing on the relator’s eligibility to possess firearms in this State, as
per La. R.S. 14:95.1.

The application also does not provide any evidence or finding by the trial
court of whether the firearms in this matter are contraband. As explained by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140, 144 (La. 1983):

It is generally recognized that there are two kinds of property
which may be classified as contraband. Things which intrinsically are
illegal to possess and are therefore insusceptible of ownership are
categorized as contraband per se. Such articles include illegal
narcotics, unregistered stills, unlawful alcohol, and illicit gambling
devices. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania supra; Brown
v. State, Etc., 392 So.2d 415 (La.1980). Things which may be
forfeited because they are the immediate instruments of a crime, but
which are not ordinarily illegal to possess, are classed as derivative
contraband. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra, U.S. v.
One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (1 Cir.1980). Derivative
contraband encompasses guns, automobiles, ships and other such
property when used to effectuate a proscribed activity. Id.

For the foregoing reasons,1 the writ application is granted, the trial court
ruling denying the relator’s motion is vacated, and we remand the matter for
further proceedings.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 9th day of August, 2023.

JJM
SMC
MEJ

1
Neither La. R.S. 15:41 or La. C.Cr.P. art. 167 expressly provide for the denial of a motion on a “public
policy” basis. Rather, these statutes compel the return of items, provided certain criteria are met. Although the trial
court’s stated considerations for denying the relator’s motion are not unreasonable, 1 the Louisiana Supreme Court
has held that it is not permissible for a judge to substitute his or her own policy considerations for those of the
legislature. As stated by the court in Soloco, Inc. v. Dupree, 97-1256 (La. 1/21/98), 707 So.2d 12, 16:

The district court erred in allowing its own policy determination to override the policy
determination made by the legislature. It is not the prerogative of the judiciary to disregard public
policy decisions underlying legislation or to reweigh balances of interests and policy
considerations already struck by the legislature. Daigle v. Clemco Industries, 613 So.2d 619 (La.
1993). It is not our role to consider the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the statute.

Id. citing Daigle v. Clemco Industries, 613 So.2d 619 (La. 1993). Similarly, this Court is constrained to uphold the
policy determinations of the legislature in enacting the law. If any change to the law is warranted in the interest of
public safety, it must originate from that body.

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
CORNELIUS E. REGAN, PRO TEM FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 08/09/2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-KH-382
E-NOTIFIED
29th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Connie M. Aucoin (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Maria M. Chaisson (Relator)

MAILED
Hon. Honorable Joel T. Chaisson, II
(Respondent)
District Attorney
Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court
Post Office Box 680
Hahnville, LA 70057