Reshonda Brown A/K/A Reshonda Miller Versus State of Louisiana

RESHONDA BROWN A/K/A NO. 23-KH-91
RESHONDA MILLER
FIFTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS
COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
STATE OF LOUISIANA

December 22, 2023

Linda Wiseman
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE RESHONDA BROWN A/K/A RESHONDA MILLER

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLESHAYNA BEEVERS
MORVANT, DIVISION "M", NUMBER 14-450

Panel composed of Judges Marc E. Johnson,
Robert A. Chaisson, and Stephen J. Windhorst

WRIT GRANTED; MATTER REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Relator, Reshonda Brown a/k/a Reshonda Miller, seeks review of the district

court’s ruling denying her motion for expungement. For the following reasons, we

find merit to relator’s arguments and accordingly grant her writ application and

remand the matter to the district court with instruction as set forth herein.

On October 30, 2017, relator pled guilty under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 to one

count of theft over $1,500.00, in violation of La. R.S. 14:67. The trial court

deferred imposition of relator’s sentence, placed her on active probation for three

years, and ordered her to pay restitution in the amount of $19,061.56 as a special

condition of probation. On November 8, 2018, the restitution was converted into a

civil money judgment based on relator’s failure to pay. According to the

assessment made by the collections officer for the 24th Judicial District Court,

relator owed a balance of $17, 915.50. On June 24, 2019, relator’s probation was

terminated as compliant.
1

On August 16, 2022, relator filed her original motion for expungement but

subsequently amended her motion to include an arrest number that was omitted

from the original motion. On January 3, 2023, the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s

Office, the arresting law enforcement agency, filed an affidavit of response with

the district court, stating “no opposition,” and consented to a waiver of a

contradictory hearing on the expungement motion. On January 13, 2023, the

Louisiana State Police filed an affidavit of response with the district court stating

that they took no position on relator’s expungement motion.

On January 19, 2023, the district court held a hearing on relator’s motion for

expungement. At the hearing, the prosecutor stated that the Jefferson Parish

District Attorney’s Office had no opposition to the expungement motion,

“notwithstanding the outstanding restitution issue.” Jan Arabie, the collections

officer for the 24th Judicial District Court, also appeared at the hearing, voicing

concern over the department’s ability to collect restitution if the expungement

motion was granted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied

relator’s motion for expungement, stating as follows:

[T]he Court does not find in its discretion that that is appropriate to
grant the expungement, especially in light of the fact that Collections
would no longer be able to continue collecting this if the Court were
to grant the expungement. For that reason and the fact that the victim
needs to be made whole, the Court does deny the expungement.

Relator now contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for

expungement based on the outstanding restitution amount owed to the victim. She

asserts that she is entitled to have her theft conviction expunged based on her first

offender pardon status and the absence of opposition to her expungement motion.

We agree.1

1
Whether a trial court was legally correct in its interpretation and application of the felony expungement statute is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo, affording no deference to the trial court’s decision. State v. Dempster, 20-
67 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/29/20), 301 So.3d 1203.
2

La. C.Cr.P. art. 978(A)(3) provides that a person may file a motion to

expunge a record of arrest and conviction of a felony offense if “[t]he person is

entitled to a first offender pardon for the offense pursuant to Article IV, Section

5(E)(1) of the Constitution of Louisiana, provided that the offense is not defined as

a crime of violence pursuant to R.S. 14:2(B) or a sex offense pursuant to R.S.

15:541.” Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 979, the clerk of court is required to serve

notice of the motion for expungement on the district attorney of the parish of

conviction, the Louisiana Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information, and

the arresting law enforcement agency. These entities may object to the granting of

a motion to expunge a record or may expressly waive its time period to object by

filing a formal “No Opposition” into the record. La. C.Cr.P. art. 980(A) and (G).

La. C.Cr.P. art. 980(F) provides: “If no objection is filed by an agency listed under

Article 979 of this Code, the defendant may waive the contradictory hearing, and

the court shall grant the motion to expunge the record if the court determines that

the mover is entitled to the expungement in accordance with law.” Furthermore,

since the purpose of La. C.Cr.P. art. 978 is remedial, rather than penal, it is to be

liberally construed to make the statutory rule apply in more situations than would

be the case under strict construction. State v. A.R.W., 17-1162 (La. App. 1 Cir.

2/16/18), 242 So.3d 648, 654.

In the present case, as part of her expungement motion filed with the district

court, relator submitted a document, dated July 25, 2022, from the Department of

Public Safety and Corrections captioned as a “First Offender Certification Letter,”

indicating that she completed her sentence on May 2, 2019, and met the

requirements to receive a first offender pardon pursuant to Article IV, § 5(E)(1) of

the Louisiana Constitution. In addition, none of the entities set forth in La. C.Cr.P.

art. 979 objected to relator’s motion for expungement. As relator met the

3

requirements of the expungement provisions, we find that the trial court erred in

denying her motion for expungement.

The district court’s basis for denying relator’s motion focused on “the fact

that Collections would no longer be able to continue collecting this if the Court

were to grant the expungement.” However, payment of restitution is not a

requirement for expungement under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 978.

Furthermore, the remainder of the restitution owed can still be collected as it was

converted into a civil money judgment. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 886(A). Additionally,

relator’s verification letter of her first offender pardon status states: “This pardon

does not constitute a waiver of any unpaid court costs, restitution or past probation

and parole fees.”

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s denial of relator’s motion for

expungement and remand the matter to the district court with direction to grant

relator’s motion for expungement pursuant to the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art.

978(A)(3).

Gretna, Louisiana, this 22nd day of December, 2023.

RAC
MEJ

4

RESHONDA BROWN A/K/A RESHONDA NO. 23-KH-91

MILLER FIFTH CIRCUIT

VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA STATE OF LOUISIANA

WINDHORST, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
I respectfully disagree with the grant of this writ, and would deny.

Pursuant to relator’s plea agreement, the imposition of her sentence was

deferred, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 E(1)(a), which states:

When it appears that the best interest of the public and of the
defendant will be served, the court may defer, in whole or in part, the
imposition of a sentence after conviction of a first offense noncapital
felony under the conditions set forth in this Paragraph. When a
conviction is entered under this Paragraph, the court may defer the
imposition of sentence and place the defendant on probation under
the supervision of the division of probation and parole.

As a result, the district court did not sentence relator, but placed her on pre-

sentence probation. In other words, execution of relator’s sentence was not

suspended subject to her compliance with conditions of probation; instead, relator

was provided with the conditions of the pre-sentence probation, and her motive for

compliance therewith was earning eligibility for the benefits of La. C.Cr.P. art. 893

E(2) and possible subsequent expungement of her conviction (as opposed to serving

a previously suspended sentence). State v. Stiller, 16-659 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/26/17),

225 So.3d 1154, 1159-1160 (Windhorst, J., dissenting).

Further, La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 E(2) provides:
Upon motion of the defendant, if the court finds at the conclusion
of the probationary period that the probation of the defendant has
been satisfactory, the court may set the conviction aside and
dismiss the prosecution. * * * [Emphasis added.]

Thus, depending on relator’s compliance with and her performance while on this

pre-sentence probation, the district court has the discretion to either dismiss the
1

prosecution or impose an appropriate sentence. Here, the district court still has that

discretion.

Louisiana case law has distinguished between a deferred sentence and a

suspended sentence. Id. In cases involving a suspended sentence, this court has

found that a defendant is entitled to expungement of her criminal record. State v.

Green, No. 08–KA–273 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2008), 997 So.2d 42, citing State v.

Comardelle, 942 So.2d 1126 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/26/06).

In the case before us, the district court followed La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 E(1)(a)

and did not sentence relator, but deferred sentencing. Because relator has not yet

been sentenced, the district court still has the authority to determine whether relator

has or has not satisfactorily complied with the conditions of her La. C.Cr.P. art. 893

E(1)(a) probation, and may then either set aside the conviction and dismiss the

prosecution, or it may sentence relator. Therefore, relator’s motion for expungement

is premature. Consequently, I find no error in the district court’s refusal to grant

relator’s motion for expungement at this time.

Furthermore, it is clear that none of the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 978 A

have been met. Article 978 A provides that a person may file a motion to expunge

his record of arrest and conviction of a felony offense if any of the following apply:

(1) The conviction was set aside and the prosecution was dismissed
pursuant to Article 893(E).
(2) More than ten years have elapsed since the person completed any
sentence, deferred adjudication, or period of probation or parole
based on the felony conviction, and the person has not been
convicted of any other criminal offense during the ten-year period,
and has no criminal charge pending against him. The motion filed
pursuant to this Subparagraph shall include a certification obtained
from the district attorney which verifies that, to his knowledge, the
applicant has no convictions during the ten-year period and no
pending charges under a bill of information or indictment.
(3) The person is entitled to a first offender pardon for the offense
pursuant to Article IV, Section 5(E)(1) of the Constitution of Louisiana,
provided that the offense is not defined as a crime of violence
pursuant to R.S. 14:2(B) or a sex offense pursuant to R.S. 15:541.

2

First, with regard to La. C.Cr.P. art. 978 A(1), relator’s conviction has not

been set aside, and the prosecution has not been dismissed, which is within the

district court’s discretion. See, La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 E(1)(a). Second, ten years have

not elapsed since relator completed her period of probation, as required by La.

C.Cr.P. art. 978 A(2). Third, the district court found that there was “no

documentation of any pardon,” in order to satisfy La. C.Cr.P. art. 978 A(3).2 As a

result, relator has not established entitlement to expungement under La. C.Cr.P. art.

978.

CONCLUSION

In sum, relator/defendant has not been sentenced. The district court deferred

sentencing pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 E(1)(a), and placed relator on probation

with conditions. The district court still has the authority under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893

E(2) to determine whether relator has satisfactorily completed probation, and further,

whether to set aside the conviction and dismiss the prosecution, and may still do so.

Relator was not entitled to file a motion for expungement because none of the

prerequisites of La. C.Cr.P. art. 978 A have been met. I therefore find no error in the

district court’s denial of expungement. Accordingly, I would deny this writ and

would permit the trial judge to sentence the defendant, as is her prerogative.

SJW

2 Relator asserts that she filed a copy of her first offender pardon letter with her motion for expungement.

Thus, it is unclear whether the letter was presented to the district court or whether the district court found the
letter invalid or insufficient. Relator failed to introduce the letter into evidence as an exhibit at the proceeding
on her motion. Even if the alleged first offender pardon letter had been introduced, it mistakenly states that
the defendant was sentenced, which she was not.
3

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 12/22/2023 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

23-KH-91
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Shayna Beevers Morvant (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Thomas J. Butler (Respondent) John J. Radziewicz (Relator)

MAILED
Lauren T. Kirichkow (Relator)
Attorney at Law
935 Gravier Street
Suite 850
New Orleans, LA 70112