Drema Cambre and Sandtrell Broden Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated Versus Riverlands Home Group, L.L.C. D/B/A Chateau St. James Rehab and Retirement and Priority Management Group, L.L.C.

DREMA CAMBRE AND SANDTRELL NO. 24-C-218
BRODEN INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED FIFTH CIRCUIT

VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL

RIVERLANDS HOME GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A STATE OF LOUISIANA
CHATEAU ST. JAMES REHAB AND
RETIREMENT AND PRIORITY
MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.L.C.

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. JAMES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 40,840 C/W 40,841, DIVISION "D"
HONORABLE STEVEN C. TUREAU, JUDGE PRESIDING

August 07, 2024

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Jude G. Gravois

WRIT GRANTED, JUDGMENT REVERSED, EXCEPTIONS OF NO
RIGHT AND NO CAUSE OF ACTION SUSTAINED, EXCEPTION OF
IMPROPER CUMULATION DEEMED MOOT, JUDGMENT
GRANTING DISCOVERY VACATED AS MOOT, CASE DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE
SMC
FHW
JGG

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
DREMA CAMBRE AND SANDTRELL BRODEN
Matthew M. Coman
Jordan M. Jeansonne
Stephen M. Huber
Christopher T. Whelen

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
RIVERLANDS HOME GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A CHATEAU ST. JAMES REHAB
AND RETIREMENT AND PRIORITY MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.L.C.
Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr.
Barbara B. Melton
Mary K. Price
Ronald E. Raney

CHEHARDY, C.J.

Relators/Defendants, Riverlands Home Group, L.L.C. d/b/a Chateau St.

James Rehab & Retirement and Priority Management Group, L.L.C. (collectively

“Chateau”), seek supervisory review of the trial court’s April 1, 2024 judgment (1)

overruling its peremptory exception of no right of action as to the request of

respondents/plaintiffs, Drema Cambre and Sandtrell Broden, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively “plaintiffs”), for injunctive relief

pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601, thereby allowing plaintiffs to maintain an action

for attorney’s fees and costs; (2) overruling its peremptory exceptions of no cause

of action as to plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages pursuant to La. C.C. arts.

2315, 1953, and 1958, and for civil contempt fines, arising from Chateau’s alleged

fraudulent misrepresentations to plaintiffs upon or before their decedent’s

admission to Chateau; and (3) overruling its exception of improper cumulation of

actions (i.e., allowing a summary proceeding (civil contempt) to be cumulated with

this ordinary proceeding). Chateau also seeks supervisory review of a separate

April 1, 2024 judgment granting plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery, ordering

Chateau to release the names of putative class members (nursing home residents)

prior to class certification, which Chateau claims would subject them to the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (‘HIPPA”) violations.

For the following reasons, we grant Chateau’s writ application, reverse the

trial court’s April 1, 2024 judgment, sustain Chateau’s peremptory exceptions of

no right of action and no cause of action, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against it,

with prejudice, and overrule Chateau’s dilatory exception of improper cumulation

of actions as moot by our ruling on the exception of no right of action. Further, we

reverse the trial court’s April 1, 2024 judgment, ordering Chateau to produce

discovery and present for a La. C.C.P. art. 1442 deposition, as moot.

24-C-218 1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Chateau St. James is a skilled nursing facility located in Lutcher, Louisiana.

Plaintiff, Drema Cambre, is the surviving child of Grace St. Pierre, and plaintiff,

Sandtrell Broden, is the surviving child of Russell Alexander, both former Chateau

residents.1 On April 25, 2022, plaintiffs, individually, and on behalf of all others

similarly situated, filed their original class action petition (“Class petition”) on

behalf of Grace St. Pierre and Russell Alexander,2 respectively, seeking monetary

damages pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2315, caused by Chateau’s breach of its duty to

provide accurate information to its residents during the admissions process, for

fraudulently misrepresenting to residents that it would meet its statutory

obligations, and for intentionally misrepresenting the quality and nature of the

services to be provided to its residents. Plaintiffs also prayed for injunctive relief

pursuant to the Nursing Home Residents’ Bill of Rights (“NHRBR”), La. R.S.

40:2010.8,3 including a claim for fines and statutory attorney’s fees, requiring

Chateau to provide adequate funding to ensure sufficient staffing so as to meet the

needs of all residents in adherence with the NHRBR and other state and federal

regulations. Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class action, which remains

pending.

Chateau brought exceptions of no cause of action of action, lis pendens,

prematurity, and lack of procedural capacity as to plaintiffs’ original petition,

1
The record indicates that Grace St. Pierre and Russell Alexander were discharged from Chateau
(or died) prior to the filing of the present lawsuit and, therefore, are not residents as defined by the
NHRBR.
2
Separately, plaintiffs and other survivors of the decedents filed petitions for personal injuries
(“Personal Injury Petitions”) and medical malpractice complaints with the Louisiana Division of
Administration pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1231.8 (“Malpractice Complaints”).
3
According to La. R.S. 40:2010.8, any violation of the residents’ rights set forth in La. R.S.
40:2010.6, et seq., shall constitute grounds for appropriate action by the Louisiana Department of Health
and residents shall have a private right of action to enforce these rights as set forth in La. R.S. 40:2010.9.
Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:2010.9, an individual claim for civil enforcement “may be brought by the resident
or his curator, including a curator ad hoc.” La. R.S. 40:2010.1(6) defines resident as any person who is a
resident or client of a facility.

24-C-218 2

which were overruled in their entirety by the trial court. On June 27, 2023, this

Court granted writs, in part, in favor of Chateau, finding that plaintiffs’ decedents,

and any other former residents of Chateau, do not have a right of action for

injunctive relief under the NHRBR. Cambre v. Riverlands Home Grp., L.L.C., 23-

271 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/23), 2023 WL 4195827 (unpublished writ disposition).

As to Chateau’s remaining exceptions, “[i]n all other respects, on the showing

made,” including Chateau’s exception of no cause of action under La. C.C. art.

2315, this Court determined that the writ application should be denied.

Additionally, this Court allowed plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their petition.

Id. Defendants did not seek the Supreme Court’s review.

In response to this Court’s ruling, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class

Action petition for damages and injunctive relief, revising their claim for monetary

damages pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2315 for delictual fraud, and including claims

under La. C.C. arts. 1953 and 1958 for contractual fraud (claiming the NHRBR

creates an implied obligation to Chateau’s admission agreements) caused by (1)

Chateau’s fraudulent misrepresentations made to plaintiffs’ decedents, and others

similarly situated, upon or before their admission, as to the services and care

Chateau would provide, and (2) Chateau’s failure to comply with mandatory state

and federal regulations that obligate defendants to provide sufficient staffing of

licensed nurses and nurse’s aides to the residents, which Chateau allegedly

committed at any time within the ten years prior to the inception of this action.

Plaintiffs also replaced their claim for injunctive relief under the NHRBR with a

claim for a mandatory injunction pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601, requiring

Chateau to comply with the NHRBR’s obligation to provide adequate staffing and

to maintain actual nursing hours of 4.49 nursing hours per resident per day at

Chateau. Lastly, plaintiffs asserted a cause of action for civil contempt fines

(anticipatory) for a refusal to comply with an injunction entered by the trial court.

24-C-218 3

Specifically, in their amended petition, plaintiffs alleged that Chateau

fraudulently misrepresented to plaintiffs that, as residents, they would receive

adequate health care, or staffing, consistent with the mandatory requirements of the

NHRBR and other state and federal regulations. Plaintiffs alleged that Chateau’s

actions violated the residents’ right to live in a nursing home which provided

“sufficient” nursing service personnel, meeting the needs of each resident as

mandated by law, giving rise to an action for negligent or fraudulent

misrepresentation under La. C.C. arts. 2315 and 1953. See, e.g., La. Admin. Code

tit. 48 §§ I-9821(A) and I-9283(A)4 and 42 CFR § 483.35.5 Plaintiffs alleged that

Chateau’s “intentional underfunding” and “understaffing” of its skilled-nursing

facility resulted in increased profits for Chateau in lieu of ensuring the facility was

sufficiently funded with adequate resources and staffing to meet its residents’

specific needs as mandated by law. Plaintiffs sought monetary damages calculated

by the value of services that Chateau was obligated—but intentionally and

fraudulently failed—to provide.

In response to plaintiffs’ first amended petition, Chateau filed a peremptory

exception of no right of action arguing that plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief

pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3601 must be denied because plaintiffs’ decedents are no

longer residents of Chateau and plaintiffs do not have a personal claim for

injunctive relief, thus, there is no irreparable harm to enjoin. Additionally,

Chateau filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action as to plaintiffs’ claims

4
Plaintiffs maintain that La. Admin Code tit. 48 §§ I-9821(A) and I-9283(A) require that Chateau
maintain staffing at levels sufficient to meet the needs of its residents, even if that required staffing level
is more than the bare minimum numeric ratio of 2.35 hours of care per patient per day required by Section
9823(A)(1). Citing federal case law, plaintiffs further maintain that Louisiana courts have held that the
staffing requirements under Section 9823(A)(1) are “minimum standards” only and do not equate to
providing “sufficient” nursing staff meeting residents’ needs as contemplated and required by relevant
state and federal staffing requirements.
5
42 CFR § 483.5 requires that a nursing home “have sufficient nursing staff to provide nursing and
related services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being
of each resident, as determined by resident assessments and individual plans of care and considering the
number, acuity and diagnoses of the facility’s resident population in accordance with the facility
assessment required at § 483.70(e).”

24-C-218 4

for monetary damages under La. C.C. arts. 2315, 1953, and 1958, alleging

plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to support all elements of their claims for

delictual and contractual fraud, and a dilatory exception of improper cumulation of

actions, claiming that plaintiff’s claim for civil contempt damages based on an

anticipated violation of an injunction is a summary proceeding improperly

cumulated in this ordinary proceeding. According to Chateau, plaintiffs have no

cause of action for contempt fines based on the anticipatory violation of an

injunction that does not (and cannot) exist in this case.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery propounded to Chateau

directed to class certification issues as authorized by La. C.C.P. art.

592(A)(3)(a)(ii). Plaintiffs also filed a motion to compel the La. C.C.P. 1442

deposition of Chateau seeking to discover information and documentation

specifically limited to class certification issues. Chateau objected to plaintiffs’

discovery and moved for a protective order.

Chateau’s peremptory and dilatory exceptions, and plaintiffs’ motion to

compel discovery, came for hearing on March 11, 2024. Thereafter, on April 1,

2024, the trial judge issued judgment, with written reasons, overruling each of

Chateau’s exceptions. In a separate April 1, 2024 judgment, with written reasons,

the trial judge granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel, ordering Chateau to provide

sufficient responses to the discovery requests propounded by plaintiffs within

twenty days of the order. Additionally, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to

compel the La. C.C.P. art. 1442 deposition of Chateau.

This timely writ application filed by Chateau followed.

DISCUSSION

Exception of No Right of Action

The exception of no right of action is a peremptory exception, the function

of which is to have an action declared legally nonexistent or barred by law and

24-C-218 5

tends to dismiss or defeat the action. La. C.C.P. arts. 923 and 927. An exception

of no right of action assumes that the petition states a valid cause of action and

tests whether the plaintiff has the capacity or legal interest in judicially enforcing

the right asserted. Kreb, Lasalle, Lemieux Consulatants, Inc. v. G.E.C., Inc., 16-24

(La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/16), 197 So.3d 829, 831; 328 Mag., L.L.C. v. Lloyds of

London, 08-727 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/25/09), 10 So.3d 242, 243, citing La. C.C.P. art.

927(A)(5). A party has an actionable right, and consequently standing, if it can be

said that the party has a legally protectable and tangible stake in the litigation. I E

C I, LLC v. S. Cent. Plan. & Dev. Comm’n, Inc., 21-382 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/23/22),

336 So.3d 601, 609.

Whether a plaintiff has a right of action is a question of law subject to de

novo review. Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Kerner, 21-664 (La. App. 5 Cir.

8/17/22), 348 So.3d 194, 199. The defendant raising the exception has the burden

of proving the exception. City of New Orleans v. Board of Directors of Louisiana

State Museum, 98-1170 (La. 3/2/99), 739 So.2d 748, 755. Evidence is admissible

in support of the exception of no right of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931.

A party seeking an injunction must have standing to sue, or more

comprehensively, the action presents a justiciable controversy. Howard v.

Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 07-2224 (La. 7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47,

54; Terrebonne Parish Police Jury v. Matherne, 405 So.2d 314, 318 (La. 1981).

To have standing, the plaintiff must assert an adequate interest in himself, which

the law recognizes, against a defendant having a substantial adverse interest.

Howard, 986 So.2d at 54. An action can only be brought by a person having a real

and actual interest, which he asserts. Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261

La. 1080, 1096-98, 262 So.2d 328, 334 (1972); La. C.C.P. art. 681. The Louisiana

Supreme Court has defined a justiciable controversy as follows:

24-C-218 6

A “justiciable controversy” connotes an existing actual
and substantial dispute, as distinguished from one that is
merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute which
involves the legal relations of the parties who have a real
adverse interest, and upon which the judgment of the
court may effectively operate through a decree of
conclusive character. [Citations omitted.]

When the facts alleged in the petition provide a remedy under the law to

someone, but the plaintiff who seeks the relief is not the person in whose favor the

law extends the remedy, the proper objection is no right of action, or want of

interest in the plaintiff to institute the suit. Howard, 986 So.2d at 59. If the

pleadings fail to disclose a right of action, the claim may be dismissed without

evidence, but the plaintiff should be permitted to amend to state a right of action if

he or she can do so. Id.

Here, plaintiffs allege they have the right to sue for injunctive relief,

individually, as survivors of former residents of Chateau, and on behalf of others

similarly situated (i.e., former and current Chateau residents). Notably, the named

plaintiffs have not alleged a personal relationship with Chateau other than that their

respective parents were former residents at the facility. The right to enforce the

state and federal mandatory staffing requirements in a nursing home under the

NHRBR is afforded to the current residents of the facility. See Cambre, supra;

Knight v. Jefferson Healthcare Center, L.L.C., 21-736 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/10/22)

(unpublished writ disposition); Heinrich v. Maison De’Ville Nursing Home of

Harvey, LLC, 21-240 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/20/21) (unpublished writ disposition).

The original and amended petitions of plaintiffs, who are survivors of former

residents of Chateau, fail to disclose a right of action or want of interest in the

plaintiffs to institute this suit seeking injunctive relief pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.

3601. Absent any current or ongoing connection or dealings with Chateau, the

plaintiffs do not have a real and actual interest in a suit against Chateau for

injunctive relief. Because plaintiffs’ respective parents are no longer residents at

24-C-218 7

Chateau, we conclude that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue a

claim for injunctive relief as alleged pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601.

We also note that the law provides that an injunction is a harsh, drastic, and

extraordinary remedy, and it should only be issued where the mover is threatened

with irreparable loss or injury without an adequate remedy at law. 5216

Operations, LLC v. Department of Revenue, Office of Alcohol and Tobacco

Control, 21-520 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/6/22), 339 So.3d 48, 52. “Irreparable injury”

means that money damages cannot adequately compensate for the injuries suffered

and that the injuries cannot be measured by pecuniary standards. Bernhard MCC,

LLC v. Zeringue, 18-533 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So.3d 537, 541. However,

the requisite showing of irreparable harm is dispensed with in cases where the

conduct sought to be restrained is unlawful, as when the conduct sought to be

enjoined constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law. See Jurisich v. Jenkins,

99-76 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So.2d 597, 599. A plaintiff is entitled to the exception

to the irreparable harm requirement when the injunction sought is prohibitory, not

mandatory. Saer v. New Orleans Regional Physician Hosp. Organization, 14-856

(La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So.3d 617, 620.

In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that because Chateau has violated the

mandatory requirements of the NHRBR, and because they are seeking to restrain

conduct, i.e., Chateau’s failure to hire sufficient staff to meet the needs of residents

in violation of state and federal law, they are not required to show irreparable harm

in order to pursue injunctive relief herein. We disagree. Application of the

jurisprudential rule allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the irreparable harm

requirement requires that a plaintiff show, not only that the conduct sought to be

enjoined violates a prohibitory law, but that “the injunction seeks to restrain

conduct, not order it,” and “that he is entitled to the relief sought.” 5216

Operations, LLC, 330 So.3d at 53. Here, despite plaintiffs’ contention that they

24-C-218 8

seek an injunction to restrain conduct by Chateau, reviewing the allegations of

their petition, it is clear that plaintiffs seek an injunction to mandate that Chateau

comply with state and federal staffing requirements, not to restrain Chateau from

conduct. Moreover, once plaintiffs’ decedents were no longer residents at

Chateau, no justiciable controversy existed and, consequently, as a matter of law,

they ceased to have standing to pursue a suit for injunctive relief against the

skilled-nursing facility. In other words, plaintiffs, on behalf of their deceased

parents, no longer had a real and actual interest in seeking to enjoin or force

Chateau to comply with the mandatory state and federal staffing requirements and,

thus, were not “entitled to the relief sought.”

Following this Court’s de novo review, we conclude that plaintiffs,

individually, or on behalf of others similarly situated, have no right of action to

injunctive relief against Chateau pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601. Because no

class has been certified, and plaintiffs herein have no claim in their own right to

pursue injunctive relief, they cannot pursue claims as representatives of a putative

class. See Brantley v. City of Gretna, 21-574 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/5/22), 347 So.3d

1147, 1157, writ denied, 22-1345 (La. 12/20/22), 352 So.3d 86, writ denied, 22-

1413 (La. 12/20/22, 352 So.3d 87. The law requires that a class representative

have a personal claim at the time of certification. Id.; see also Sosna v. Iowa, 419

U.S. 393, 402, 95 S.Ct. 553, 559, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). We further conclude that

no amendment to plaintiffs’ petition could establish a right on their own behalf, or

on behalf of others, to injunctive relief. For these reasons, we find the trial court

erred in overruling Chateau’s exception of no right of action.

Exception of No Cause of Action

The exception of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the petition

by determining whether the law affords a remedy against the defendant to anyone

under the factual allegations of the petition. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v.

24-C-218 9

Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1235 (La. 1993). No evidence may be

introduced to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a

cause of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931. If the petition alleges sufficient facts to

establish a case cognizable in law, an exception of no cause of action must fail.

Allied Chemical Corp. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 426 So.2d 1336, 1338 (La.

1983). The exception is triable on the face of the petition, and for the purpose of

determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the

petition must be accepted as true, and all inferences drawn in favor of the non-

moving party. Fink v. Bryant, 01-987 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349; City of

New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-690 (La. 7/5/94), 640

So.2d 237, 253. Simply stated, a petition should not be dismissed for failure to

state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief. Fink, 801

So.3d at 349.

In reviewing a trial court's ruling overruling an exception of no cause of

action, the appellate court should review the case de novo because the exception

raises a question of law and the lower court's decision is based only on the

sufficiency of the petition and a determination as to whether the plaintiff is legally

entitled to the relief sought. Id. The pertinent inquiry is whether, in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, the

petition states any valid cause of action for relief. I E C I, LLC v. South Central

Planning and Development Commission, Inc., 21-382 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/23/22),

336 So.3d 601, 611. To defeat an exception of no cause of action, the petition on

its face must contain allegations, which, if proven, state a cause of action.

1. Civil Contempt Fines

Plaintiffs seek the “imposition of fines associated with any violations of the

permanent injunction sought.” According to plaintiffs, in their amended petition,

24-C-218 10

pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601(D), they pray for an injunction to prevent Chateau

from further violations of mandatory staffing requirements and to require Chateau

to maintain a nursing staff that meets the needs of its residents consistent with

those requirements. As a component of the injunctive relief sought, plaintiff

request the imposition of a fine for any violations of the permanent injunction,

should one be ordered. See La. C.C.P. art. 3605.

As this Court has already determined that plaintiffs have no right of action to

seek injunctive relief pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601, we likewise find that

plaintiffs have no cause of action for the imposition of fines resulting from any

anticipatory violations of such an injunction in the future. The trial court erred in

concluding otherwise.

2. Delictual Fraudulent Misrepresentation Pursuant to La. C.C. art.
2315

In this case, plaintiffs’ petition sets forth a claim for pecuniary damages, as

opposed to personal injury damages, incidental to the intentional or fraudulent

misrepresentations by Chateau to its current and former residents regarding a duty

imposed by the NHRBR and other federal regulations upon Chateau to deliver

care. Plaintiffs’ claim for pecuniary damages center on Chateau’s alleged failure

to provide adequate staffing to all current and former residents as promised under

the NHRBR, and in doing so, wrongfully diverted residents’ payments to profits

rather than services. Plaintiffs seek an award of damages for all current and former

residents calculated by the value of the services that were not provided and the

profits Chateau gained.

Plaintiffs contend that this Court in Cambre, 2023 WL 4195827, at *1, has

already denied review of the trial court’s overruling of Chateau’s original

exception of no cause of action based on delictual fraud and that, consequently, we

should likewise deny review of plaintiffs’ amended and “restated fraud

24-C-218 11

allegations” contained in their amended petition. We disagree. It is well-settled

that the denial of a writ application has no precedential value, and does not bar

reconsideration of the same issue in a re-urged motion or exception. Guilbeaux v.

Lupo Enterprises, L.L.C., 21-53 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/19/21), 321 So.3d 447, 453.

In Louisiana, negligent misrepresentation cases are evaluated using the duty-

risk analysis. Daye v. General Motors Corp., 97-1653 (La. 9/9/98), 720 So.2d 654,

659. Specifically, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform

his conduct to a specific standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his

conduct to the appropriate standard; (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a

cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; (4) the substandard conduct was a legal

cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) actual damages. In order for liability to

attach, a plaintiff must be able to prove every element of the duty-risk analysis.

Wiltz v. Brothers Petroleum, L.L.C., 13-332 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/23/14), 140 So.3d

758, 766, writs denied, 14-1252 (La. 10/10/14), 151 So.3d 581, and 14-1298 (La.

10/10/14), 151 So.3d 583.

Here, plaintiffs allege that Chateau owed a duty to its residents to ensure

adequate staffing and funding in order to provide sufficient nursing services to

meet the needs of the residents; that Chateau breached the duties by chronically

understaffing its facility, contrary to their promise to adhere to the NHRBR, which

promise Chateau knew was false when made;6 that Chateau’s breach was a cause-

in-fact of damages sustained by plaintiffs, in their being deprived of services that

they paid and were promised to receive, resulting in personal pecuniary losses; that

under the NHRBR and/or regulations, Chateau was responsible for making staffing

and budgeting decisions, and thus, their dereliction of duties was the legal cause of

plaintiffs’ harm because they were within the scope of persons the NHRBR and

6
Plaintiffs specifically allege, in part, that “Each of the residents, including Grace St. Pierre,
Russell Alexander, and others similarly situated ... paid, or had paid on their behalf, monies to [Chateau]
anticipating this promised compliance with [the NHRBR].”

24-C-218 12

applicable regulations were designed to protect; and that they suffered “actual

pecuniary damages” as a result of Chateau’s fraudulent misrepresentations,

measured by the loss of services not rendered and the profits gained by Chateau by

not providing those services.

According to Chateau, plaintiffs’ tort claims under La. C.C. art. 2315,

although touted to be based on both NHRBR and other state and federal

regulations, are actually rooted solely in the NHRBR. However, the NHRBR no

longer allows for the recovery of damages when that duty—i.e., to provide certain

information to residents regarding its services and to assure that residents receive

such services—is breached; the exclusive remedy is injunctive relief. See

Heinrich v. Maison De’Ville Nursing Home of Harvey, LLC, 21-240 (La. App. 5

Cir. 6/30/21) (unpublished writ disposition); Knight v. Jefferson Healthcare

Center, 21-736 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/10/22). Chateau argues that if the NHRBR does

not allow for the recovery of damages directly—which is firmly established—it

cannot provide a source for the recovery of damages indirectly through La. C.C.

art. 2315.

The issue here is whether the scope of the duty Chateau owed includes a

claim for damages based on the value of services promised but not delivered. We

conclude that it does not. While we agree with plaintiffs that Louisiana law

recognizes that La. C.C. art. 2315 can serve as the basis for a cause of action for

fraud, we find that plaintiffs’ petition, as amended, fails to state such a cause of

action, because it does not include the elements required for a cause of action

based on fraud under Article 2315. In particular, we find that plaintiffs cannot rely

on the NHRBR to establish the duty element for a claim to damages under La. C.C.

art. 2315, because the scope of the duty established by the legislature does not

encompass the recovery of damages based on the value of services promised but

not delivered. Moreover, even if the NHRBR, or other state or federal regulations,

24-C-218 13

allowed for damages caused by Chateau’s failure to comply with its statutory duty

to provide sufficient nursing staff to meet the needs of its residents, under Article

2315, plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to support an award for damages, an

essential element of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.

Here, a de novo review of plaintiffs’ petition, as amended, shows that

plaintiffs do not set forth sufficient facts to support a claim for damages, based on

a percentage of the cost of services not provided by Chateau to every former and

current resident across the board. Notably, plaintiffs do not allege that Grace St.

Pierre, Russell Alexander, and/or any former or current resident, suffered actual

harm attached to actual payments made and actual services that were not provided.

It is axiomatic that without actual damages, there can be no cause of action, for

without it, there is nothing for the law to repair. See Bourgeois v. A.P. Green

Industries, Inc., 97-3188 (La. 7/8/98), 716 So.2d 355, 357-358 (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that they suffered actual harm resulting in actual

damages as a result of Chateau’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentations is fatal to

their claim. In short, the allegations set forth in plaintiffs’ petition, as amended,

fail to state a cause of action for damages pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2315; the trial

court erred in failing to sustain Chateau’s exception.

3. Contractual Fraud and Recovery of Fees Pursuant to La. C.C. arts.
1953 and 1958, respectively

Plaintiffs’ amended petition asserts new claims of contractual fraud pursuant

to La. C.C. arts. 1953, including fees under La. C.C. art. 1958. Louisiana law

recognizes causes of action for contractual fraud by alleging fraud in the formation

of a contract. Stutts v. Melton, 13-557 (La. 10/15/13), 130 So.3d 808, 813-815.

The essential elements of “intentional” or “fraudulent misrepresentation” in the

formation of a contract are (1) misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) made with

the intent to deceive, (3) causing justifiable reliance with resulting injury.

24-C-218 14

[Emphasis added.] See McGaha v. Franklin Homes, Inc., 21-244 (La. App. 4 Cir.

2/4/22), 335 So.3d 842, 865.

Here, in their amended petition, plaintiffs allege that Chateau committed

fraud in the formation of a contract, i.e., in the admission agreement, due to its

“misrepresentation, suppression, or omission of true information to [plaintiffs];

[Chateau’s] intent to deceive or obtain an unjust advantage over [plaintiffs],

knowing [plaintiffs] would be relying upon [Chateau’s] misrepresentations in

becoming a resident of the facility; and [plaintiffs’] justifiable reliance with

resulting pecuniary harm[,]” measured by the loss of services not rendered and the

profits gained by Chateau by not providing those services.

For the reason that we found plaintiffs’ petition, as amended, failed to state a

cause of action for intentional misrepresentation pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2315—

i.e., that plaintiffs failed to set forth sufficient facts to support a claim for pecuniary

damages—we find that plaintiffs’ petition, as amended, fails to state a cause of

action under La. C.C. arts. 1953 contractual fraud, because plaintiffs have failed to

set forth sufficient facts to support a finding of actual pecuniary harm, an essential

element of a claim for fraud in the formation of a contract.

After de novo review, for the foregoing reasons, we find that plaintiffs have

no right of action against Chateau to seek injunctive relief pursuant to La. C.C.P.

art. 3601, and that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action against Chateau

for civil contempt damages or for damages pursuant to La. C.C. arts. 2315, 1953 or

1958. We further find that because plaintiffs’ claims will not improve with time or

amendment, we dispense with allowing plaintiffs further opportunity to amend

their petition.

Accordingly, we grant Chateau’s application for supervisory writs, reverse

the trial court’s April 1, 2024 judgment, and sustain Chateau’s (1) exception of no

right of action for injunctive relief under La. C.C. art. 3601, (2) exception of no

24-C-218 15

cause of action for civil contempt fines, (3) exception of no cause of action for

delictual fraud pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2315, and (4) exception of no cause of

action for contractual fraud and the recovery of fees pursuant to La. C.C. arts. 1953

and 1958, respectively, thereby dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against Chateau with

prejudice. Because of our grant of Chateau’s foregoing exceptions, Chateau’s writ

application as it pertains to the trial court’s April 1, 2024 judgment overruling

Chateau’s exception of improper cumulation of actions is moot, and as it pertains

to the trial court’s separate April 1, 2024 judgment granting plaintiffs’ motion to

compel discovery and La. C.C.P. art. 1442 deposition, Chateau’s exception is also

moot; and the judgment granting plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery is vacated.

WRIT GRANTED, JUDGMENT REVERSED, EXCEPTIONS OF NO
RIGHT AND NO CAUSE OF ACTION SUSTAINED, EXCEPTION OF
IMPROPER CUMULATION DEEMED MOOT, JUDGMENT GRANTING
DISCOVERY VACATED AS MOOT, CASE DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE

24-C-218 16

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
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JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
AUGUST 7, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-C-218
E-NOTIFIED
23RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE STEVEN C. TUREAU (DISTRICT JUDGE)
CHRISTOPHER T. WHELEN (RESPONDENT) JORDAN M. JEANSONNE (RESPONDENT) STEPHEN M. HUBER (RESPONDENT)
BARBARA B. MELTON (RELATOR) JIMMY R. FAIRCLOTH, JR. (RELATOR) MARY K. PRICE (RELATOR)

MAILED
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