Kyron Gray Versus Ciera Rankins

KYRON GRAY NO. 24-C-445

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

CIERA RANKINS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE FORTIETH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 82,294, DIVISION "A"
HONORABLE VERCELL FIFFIE, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 26, 2024

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; PETITION FOR
EMERGENCY TEMPORARY CUSTODY GRANTED; MATTER
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
JGG
SMC
MEJ

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR,
KYRON GRAY
Jennifer G. Prescott

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
CIERA RANKINS
In Proper Person

GRAVOIS, J.

Relator, Kyron Gray, seeks this Court’s expedited supervisory review of the
trial court’s September 25, 2024 judgment which denied of his “Petition for
Emergency Temporary Custody, Civil Warrant for Return of the Child, and to
Establish Custody.” For the following reasons, we grant this writ application,
reverse the trial court’s ruling which denied Mr. Gray’s Petition for Emergency
Temporary Custody, grant Mr. Gray’s Petition for Emergency Temporary Custody,
and remand the matter with instructions and for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 8, 2024, plaintiff/relator Kyron Gray filed a “Petition for
Emergency Temporary Custody, Civil Warrant for Return of the Child, and to
Establish Custody” against defendant/respondent Ciera Rankins in the 40th Judicial
District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist, State of Louisiana. The trial court set
the matter for a hearing on September 17, 2024. Both parties appeared at the
hearing and testified. Ms. Rankins appeared in proper person. Evidence was
admitted in support of Mr. Gray’s petition.

By way of background, Mr. Gray and Ms. Rankins were in a relationship
and conceived a son, Kaiden Rankins (d.o.b. November 17, 2018), currently five
years old, who is the subject of this writ application. They never married, but
shared physical custody of the child. According to the petition and the testimony
elicited at the hearing, in August of 2022, Ms. Rankins decided to move to
Houston, Texas. Previously, the child lived primarily with her in New Orleans, but
had regular visitations with Mr. Gray in LaPlace. After Ms. Rankins moved to
Texas in August 2022, the parties agreed that the child would remain in LaPlace
with his father. On June 1, 2023, the parties executed an extrajudicial “Custody
Agreement,” giving Mr. Gray custody of the child. In the agreement, Ms. Rankins
further gave Mr. Gray permission “to care for my son in his home and apply for,
consent to, or otherwise obtain any medical treatment or any economical, social,
educational, or other services that my son may need.” The agreement was not
notarized, but both parties admitted at the hearing that they had freely entered into
the agreement, which was entered into evidence at the hearing. At the hearing, the
parties also acknowledged that they had a court date coming up in September in an
ancillary proceeding in St. John the Baptist Parish concerning child support.

24-C-445 1

The testimony elicited at the hearing reflected that Ms. Rankins exercised
very limited visitation with the child once she moved to Houston in 2022. Mr.
Gray testified that Ms. Rankins requested that the child spend the summer of 2024
with her in Houston, to which he agreed, with the understanding that the child
would be returned to him in advance of the child’s starting kindergarten at the end
of the summer. He testified that he communicated with Ms. Rankins that he would
pick the child up in Houston on July 26, 2024, but she replied that she would not
return the child to him and that the police would be called if he attempted to
retrieve the child. After no resolution of the matter, Mr. Gray filed this petition.

Mr. Gray additionally testified that he has enrolled the child in school in St.
John the Baptist Parish; however, because Ms. Rankins has refused to return the
child to him, the child had missed approximately six weeks of kindergarten as of
the date of the hearing. Ms. Rankins testified that in July 2024, she registered the
child for kindergarten in Texas.

After hearing testimony from the parties and receiving evidence, the court
denied Mr. Gray’s request for emergency temporary custody and for immediate
return of the child to Mr. Gray, orally finding that it was not in the child’s best
interest to be returned to Louisiana because, having missed six weeks of school, he
has “technically failed” school in the state of Louisiana. The court ordered,
however, visitation privileges in favor of Mr. Gray in Louisiana each day that the
child is not in school, excluding “regular” weekends, and that Mr. Gray be allowed
to have contact with the child each day via audio-visual communications. In oral
reasons for its ruling, the court questioned whether the relocation statutes were
applicable, since no judicial custody order was in place, and did not address
whether Ms. Rankins had complied with the notice requirements of the relocation
statutes. This timely writ application followed.

In his writ application, Mr. Gray argues that based on the testimony and
evidence admitted at the hearing, it is clear that he has custody of the child as a
result of the parties’ Custody Agreement, and that Louisiana is the “[p]rincipal
residence of the child,” as per La. R.S. 9:355.1. Further, he argues that if this is an
attempt by Ms. Rankin to relocate the principal residence of the child to Texas, she
has not complied with the relocation statutes, La. R.S. 9:355.1, et seq. Upon
review, we find merit to Mr. Gray’s arguments.

24-C-445 2

ANALYSIS

La. R.S. 9:355.1 provides:

As used in this Subpart:

(1) “Principal residence of a child” means:
(a) The location designated by a court to be the primary residence
of the child.

(b) In the absence of a court order, the location at which the
parties have expressly agreed that the child will primarily
reside.

(c) In the absence of a court order or an express agreement, the
location, if any, at which the child has spent the majority of
time during the prior six months.

(2) “Relocation” means a change in the principal residence of a child
for a period of sixty days or more, but does not include a
temporary absence from the principal residence.

Thus, in accordance with this statute, it is clear that the parties “expressly agreed,”
through their Custody Agreement, which they verbally acknowledged in open
court, that the child’s principal residence is LaPlace, Louisiana. Further, their
agreement that the child would spend this past summer with his mother in Houston
could only be considered as a “temporary absence” from his principal residence in
Louisiana under this statute.

La. R.S. 9:355.2(B)(1) provides that the relocation statutes shall apply when
“[t]here is intent to establish the principal residence of a child at any location
outside the state.” (Emphasis added.) Under such circumstances, there is no
requirement that there first be a court order awarding custody. All that is required
is that there be a desire or attempt to change the principal residence of the child for
a period of sixty days or more (not including a temporary absence from the
principal residence) to “any location outside the state.” See La. R.S. 9:355.1(2),
supra. It is clear from her testimony that Ms. Rankins is now attempting to
relocate the child’s principal residence to outside the state of Louisiana for a period
of sixty days or more. She was thus required to comply with the relocation
requirements established by La. R.S. 9:355.1, et seq.

La. R.S. 9:355.4(A), provides: “A person proposing relocation of a child’s
principal residence shall notify any person recognized as a parent and any other
person awarded custody or visitation under a court decree as required by R.S.

24-C-445 3

9:355.5.” La. R.S. 9:355.5 provides notice requirements of a proposed relocation
of the principal residence of a child as follows:

A. Notice of a proposed relocation of the principal residence of a
child shall be given by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, or delivered by commercial courier as defined in R.S.
13:3204(D), to the last known address of the person entitled to
notice under R.S. 9:355.4 no later than any of the following:

(1) The sixtieth day before the date of the proposed relocation.

(2) The tenth day after the date that the person proposing
relocation knows the information required to be furnished by
Subsection B of this Section, if the person did not know and
could not reasonably have known the information in sufficient
time to provide the sixty-day notice, and it is not reasonably
possible to extend the time for relocation of the child.

B. The following information shall be included with the notice of
intended relocation of the child:

(1) The current mailing address of the person proposing
relocation.

(2) The intended new residence, including the specific physical
address, if known.

(3) The intended new mailing address, if not the same.
(4) The home and cellular telephone numbers of the person
proposing relocation, if known.
(5) The date of the proposed relocation.

(6) A brief statement of the specific reasons for the proposed
relocation of a child.
(7) A proposal for a revised schedule of physical custody or
visitation with the child.

(8) A statement that the person entitled to object shall make any
objection to the proposed relocation in writing by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, within thirty days of
receipt of the notice and should seek legal advice
immediately.

C. A person required to give notice of a proposed relocation shall
have a continuing duty to provide the information required by this
Section as that information becomes known.

At the hearing, the parties admitted that they entered into the Custody
Agreement giving Mr. Gray custody of the child, with the child to live with Mr.
Gray at his home in St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana. The agreement listed
Ms. Rankins’s address as being in Houston. Ms. Rankins admitted that she refused

24-C-445 4

to return the child to Mr. Gray following the child’s visitation with her this past
summer, in violation of the parties’ Custody Agreement. Importantly, at the
hearing, Ms. Rankins readily admitted that she did not give Mr. Gray any written
notice whatsoever of her proposed relocation of the principal residence of the child
to Houston. Accordingly, it is undisputed that Ms. Rankins failed to comply with
the notice requirements of the relocation statutes.

Upon review, based on the evidence admitted at the hearing, we conclude
that the trial court erred in denying Mr. Gray’s Petition for Expedited Temporary
Custody of the minor child, Kaiden Rankins. Considering the evidence presented
at the hearing, the testimony of the parties, and the express language of the statutes,
we find that the relocation statutes clearly apply in this case. The evidence
established that St. John the Baptist Parish is the principal residence of the child,
and that Ms. Rankins, who admittedly is not the custodial parent of the child, did
not comply with the notice requirements of the relocation statutes in her attempt to
relocate the principal residence of the child to Houston. Accordingly, the court
erred in denying Mr. Gray’s request for emergency temporary custody of the child
and in not ordering the immediate return of the child to Mr. Gray. We further
conclude that Mr. Gray bore his burden of proof that he is entitled to an expedited
incidental order of temporary child custody, in accordance with La. C.C.P. art.
3945.

DECREE

Considering the foregoing, the trial court’s judgment of September 25, 2024
denying Mr. Gray’s Petition for Expedited Temporary Custody of the minor child,
Kaiden Rankins (d.o.b. November 17, 2018), is HEREBY REVERSED. Mr.
Gray’s Petition for Expedited Temporary Custody of the minor child, Kaiden
Rankins is HEREBY GRANTED. THE TRIAL COURT IS HEREBY
ORDERED to immediately issue a civil warrant, in accordance with La. R.S.
9:343, directed to law enforcement authorities in Houston, Texas (or wherever the
minor child, Kaiden Rankins (d.o.b. November 17, 2018), may be found), to seize
and return the child to the custodial parent, Kyron Gray, pending further order of
the court having jurisdiction over the matter, in accordance with the parties’
Custody Agreement of June 1, 2023.1

1
This ruling shall not prohibit Ms. Rankins from petitioning the court for a relocation of
the principal residence of the minor child, Kaiden Rankins, to Houston, Texas, in accordance
with the procedures set forth in La. R.S. 9:355.1, et seq., should she choose to do so in the future.

24-C-445 5

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Gray’s Petition to Establish
Custody of the minor child, Kaiden Rankins, shall be heard before the trial court
on November 25, 2024, as previously scheduled.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED;
PETITION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY
CUSTODY GRANTED; MATTER REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS

24-C-445 6

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
SEPTEMBER 26, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL
PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-C-445
E-NOTIFIED
40TH DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE VERCELL FIFFIE (DISTRICT JUDGE)
VERCELL FIFFIE (RELATOR) JENNIFER G. PRESCOTT (RELATOR)

MAILED
CIERA RANKINS (RESPONDENT)
8727 POINT PARK DRIVE
APARTMENT 611
HOUSTON, TX 77095