Joseph Hamlin, Jr. Versus Shell USA, Inc., the Kansas City Southern Railway Company and Canadian Pacific Kansas City Limited
Joseph Hamlin, Jr. Versus Shell USA, Inc., the Kansas City Southern Railway Company and Canadian Pacific Kansas City Limited, No. 24-C-635 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2025).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 340 So. 3d 775 not in our corpus
- Boudreaux v. Bollinger Shipyard 197 So. 3d 761
Opinion text
JOSEPH HAMLIN, JR. NO. 24-C-635
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
SHELL USA, INC., THE KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEAL
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY AND
CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSAS CITY LIMITED STATE OF LOUISIANA
January 08, 2025
Linda Wiseman
First Deputy Clerk
IN RE SHELL USA, INC. AND THE KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE ROCHELLE C. FAHRIG,
DIVISION "D", NUMBER 92,346
Panel composed of Judges Stephen J. Windhorst,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Timothy S. Marcel
WRIT DENIED; STAY DENIED
Defenants/relators, Shell USA, Inc. and The Kansas City Southern Railway
Company, seek review of the trial court’s December 11, 2024 ruling granting the motion
to exclude expert testimony/Daubert motion of Douglas Morr filed by plaintiff, Joseph
Hamlin, Jr.1
In the motion to exclude expert testimony, plaintiff asserted the Mr. Morr’s
methodology was unreliable and does not satisfy the requirements of expert testimony set
forth in La. C.E. art. 702 or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). In opposition, relators argued that Mr. Morr, a
biomechanical engineer, was qualified to testify and his opinions were reliably based on
sufficient facts and data.
1 The trial court signed a written judgment relative to this ruling on December 20, 2024.
The trial court conducted a Daubert hearing on the motion to exclude Mr. Morr,
among other motions, and granted plaintiff’s motion. In granting the motion, the trial
court stated oral reasons on the record as follows:
At this point, I’m going to grant the request by the plaintiff to exclude
Mr. Morr’s testimony as an expert at the trial based upon, I think, failure
to meet the burden of proof incumbent upon the individual seeking to
introduce and to have that expert at trial based upon evidentiary matters.
Under 14:25 [sic], the Code requires me to note that that is part of the
basis of my denial. So as to the reasons for judgment, I’m going to say
that I don’t believe that the evidence presented at the hearing satisfied the
requirements under the Code for purposes of establishing that the witness
satisfies the Daubert test.
La. C.E. art. 702 states:
A. A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely
than not that:
(1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(4) The expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.
[Emphasis added.]
The trial court performs the important gatekeeping role of ensuring “that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Blair v.
Coney, 19-795 (La. 4/3/20), 340 So.3d 775, 781. A district court is afforded broad
discretion in determining whether expert testimony is admissible, and the court’s decision
relative thereto shall not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. In a Daubert
hearing, the proponents of the proposed expert testimony bear the burden of proving that
the proposed expert methodology employed by the proposed expert is generally accepted
in the appropriate or relevant scientific community. La. C.E. art. 702; Boudreaux v.
Bollinger Shipyard, 15-1345 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So.3d 761, 764.
In opposition to the motion to exclude Mr. Morr, relators did not attach an affidavit
from Mr. Morr or his deposition. In addition, relators did not call Mr. Morr as a witness
at the Daubert hearing. Although relators attempted to introduce Mr. Morr’s curriculum
vitae, expert report, and calculations into evidence at the hearing, the trial court declined
to admit them and relators did not proffer them into the record.2 Relators also have not
challenged the trial court’s refusal to admit these exhibits into evidence.
The transcript of the hearing also provides extensive discussion and explanation in
the form of argument of counsel to the trial court regarding methodology, reliability, and
the extent to which Mr. Morr’s testimony could assist the jury. According to counsel for
defendant/relator, there are extensive photographs of the interior of the locomotive, and
an interior video of the entire incident taken from four different camera angles which
show all of plaintiff’s body movements. The video will presumably be admitted and
viewed by the jury frame by frame to show how the alleged injury occurred.
Upon review of the limited record, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in finding relators failed to meet their burden of proof that Mr. Morr satisfied
the requirements set forth in La. C.E. art. 702 or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s granting of plaintiff’s
motion to exclude Mr. Morr’s testimony.
We therefore deny this writ and the request for a stay.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 8th day of January, 2025.
SJW
JJM
TSM
2 Plaintiff’s Opposition brief, page 3, quotes the trial memorandum in support of his motion to exclude the opinion
of Mr. Morr, which twice refers to “Mr. Morr’s proffered testimony.” Apparently this was anticipatory or hypothetical,
inasmuch as we can find no proffer of the excluded exhibits.
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 01/08/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
24-C-635
E-NOTIFIED
29th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Rochelle C. Fahrig (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Bristol A. Baxley (Respondent) Cherrell S. Taplin (Relator)
Alexander J. Baynham (Relator)
Joel T. Chaisson, II (Respondent)
Corey M. Oubre (Relator)