In Re: Interdiction of Gloria Lanasa Raspanti

IN RE: INTERDICTION OF GLORIA LANASA NO. 24-CA-166
RASPANTI
FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 839-194, DIVISION "B"
HONORABLE R. CHRISTOPHER COX, III, JUDGE PRESIDING

December 04, 2024

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Jude G. Gravois

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; AFFIRMED.
FHW
SMC
JGG

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
JOSEPH P. RASPANTI
Arthur D. Dupre, Jr.
Jerry W. Sullivan
Paul R. Solouki

COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR/APPELLEE,
JANINE M. RASPANTI
Albert J. Derbes, IV
Eric J. Derbes

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
GLORIA LANASA RASPANTI
Yvette A. D'Aunoy

WICKER, J.

In this interdiction proceeding, Gloria Raspanti (“Mrs. Raspanti”) filed this

appeal seeking review of the trial court’s judgment ordering an interdiction as to

her finances and healthcare needs. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment. We also deny the motion to dismiss appeal filed by Mrs.

Raspanti’s son.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 29, 2023, Joseph Raspanti (“Joseph”) filed a petition for

interdiction seeking a full interdiction of his mother, Gloria Raspanti. According

to Joseph, Mrs. Raspanti was suffering from diminished cognitive abilities,

showing signs of dementia, and unable to take care of her person and her estate.

Alternatively, Joseph requested a limited interdiction, asserting that Mrs. Raspanti

was “particularly vulnerable to the undue influence and manipulation” by her

daughter, Janine Raspanti (“Janine”), and this influence substantially impaired her

ability to make reasoned decisions about her finances and her estate.

On June 2, 2023, Mrs. Raspanti filed an answer objecting to the interdiction

and asserting she did not need a curator and wanted to make her own decisions.

Janine filed a petition for intervention on August 2, 2023, joining Mrs. Raspanti in

opposing the interdiction and arguing the allegations of the petition were made

solely for the purpose of bothering, annoying, and embarrassing Mrs. Raspanti and

Janine.

This matter proceeded to trial on January 25, 2024. Two witnesses testified,

including Dr. John Thompson, and several exhibits were admitted into evidence.

Prior to the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for Mrs. Raspanti indicated on the

record that the parties agreed to “a limited or partial interdiction of Gloria Lanasa

Raspanti over her finances and healthcare needs” and to the appointment of an

independent curator to handle these needs.

24-CA-166 1

On February 7, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment ordering an

interdiction of Mrs. Raspanti with regard to her finances and healthcare needs. The

second page of the judgment contains Mrs. Raspanti’s signature, as well as the

signatures of counsel for Mrs. Raspanti, Joseph, and Janine. That same day, the

trial court signed a separate judgment appointing a curator for Mrs. Raspanti and

specifying the terms of the curatorship. On February 29, 2024, Mrs. Raspanti filed

a motion for appeal of the interdiction judgment, which was granted.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Mrs. Raspanti filed her appellant brief on May 6, 2024, asking this Court to

reverse or revise the interdiction judgment because the trial court materially altered

it without the parties’ consent. She asserted that she submitted a written, consent

judgment signed by the parties providing for “a partial/limited interdiction” over

her finances and healthcare needs, as agreed to by all parties at trial, but the trial

court amended the judgment prior to signing it to provide for “an interdiction” over

Mrs. Raspanti’s finances and healthcare needs. Mrs. Raspanti argued that the trial

court’s removal of the words “partial/limited” effectively ordered a full

interdiction. Janine also filed a brief in this Court adopting Mrs. Raspanti’s

arguments.

Joseph filed an appellee brief asserting the trial court made a permissible,

clerical correction to the consent judgment by changing “a partial/limited

interdiction” over Mrs. Raspanti’s finances and healthcare needs, to “an

interdiction” over her finances and healthcare needs. He contends the language of

the judgment provides for a limited interdiction of Mrs. Raspanti, only as to her

finances and healthcare needs, not a full interdiction of her person. Therefore,

Joseph urges this Court to affirm the interdiction judgment.

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On June 12, 2024, Joseph filed a motion to dismiss the appeal with

prejudice, asserting that Mrs. Raspanti passed away on June 5, 2024.1 He argues

that because an interdiction terminates with death pursuant to La. C.C. art. 397, the

judgment at issue on appeal “has no further effect or consequence,” and the appeal

should be dismissed as moot. Mrs. Raspanti’s counsel and Janine filed memoranda

in opposition to the motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting the appeal is not moot

because there are collateral consequences to the judgment. They argue that one

collateral consequence is that there is a document in the public record which

purports to be a consent judgment when it is not. They further contend that the

question of whether the interdiction was full or limited affects other important

matters, such as Mrs. Raspanti’s capacity to contract.

It is well-settled that courts in Louisiana will not decide abstract,

hypothetical, or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to

such controversies. Ulrich v. Robinson, 18-0534 (La. 3/26/19), 282 So.3d 180,

186; In re Media Access to Virtual Zoom Courtroom, 23-172 (La. 5/16/23), 360

So.3d 474, 475. An issue is moot when a judgment on that issue has been

“deprived of practical significance,” “made abstract or purely academic,” or can

serve no useful purpose. Ulrich, 282 So.3d at 186; Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New

Orleans through Dept. of Finance, 98-601 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1193.

A controversy is not moot if there are collateral consequences to one of the parties,

even where the primary subject of the dispute has become moot. Cat's Meow, 720

So.2d at 1196.

Louisiana Civil Code art. 397 provides that an interdiction terminates upon

the death of the interdict. Therefore, when Mrs. Raspanti died, the interdiction

ended. We must determine whether the termination of the interdiction rendered the

1
The appellate record does not contain evidence of Mrs. Raspanti’s death. However, her death is
admitted in the memoranda filed in this Court by the parties.

24-CA-166 3

appeal moot, or whether there are collateral consequences by virtue of which the

appeal should proceed.

Pursuant to La. C.C. art. 389, a court may order the full interdiction of a

person of the age of majority who, due to an infirmity, is consistently unable to

make reasoned decisions regarding the care of his person and property, or to

communicate those decisions, and whose interests cannot be protected by less

restrictive means. Interdiction of Constance, 23-318 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/22/24), 384

So.3d 1111, 1124. In accordance with La. C.C. art. 390, a court may order the

limited interdiction of a person of the age of majority who, due to an infirmity, is

unable consistently to make reasoned decisions regarding the care of his person or

property, or any aspect of either, or to communicate those decisions, and whose

interests cannot be protected by less restrictive means. Constance, 384 So.3d at

1124.

The effects of a full interdiction are more restrictive than a limited

interdiction. A full interdict lacks the capacity to make a juridical act, whereas a

limited interdict only lacks the capacity to make a juridical act pertaining to the

property or aspects of personal care that the judgment of limited interdiction places

under the authority of her curator. La. C.C. art. 395; See also La. C.C. art. 1482.2

Any right not specifically restricted in the judgment of limited interdiction is

2
La. C.C. art. 1482 provides:

A. A person who challenges the capacity of a donor must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the donor lacked capacity at the time the donor made
the donation inter vivos or executed the testament.

B. A full interdict lacks capacity to make or revoke a donation inter vivos or
disposition mortis causa.

C. A limited interdict, with respect to property under the authority of the
curator, lacks capacity to make or revoke a donation inter vivos and is
presumed to lack capacity to make or revoke a disposition mortis causa. With
respect to his other property, the limited interdict is presumed to have capacity
to make or revoke a donation inter vivos or disposition mortis causa. These
presumptions may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

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retained by the interdict. La. C.C. art. 390, cmt. (a); La. C.C.P. art. 4551(B);

Constance, 384 So.3d at 1124.

In the present case, the primary issue on appeal is whether the language of

the February 7, 2024 judgment provided for a full interdiction or a limited

interdiction. As a full interdict, Mrs. Raspanti would have lacked the capacity to

make any juridical act, including an act purporting to create, modify, transfer, or

extinguish rights and obligations, whether personal or real. See La. C.C. art. 395,

cmt (c). As a limited interdict, Mrs. Raspanti would have only lacked the capacity

to make a juridical act as to her finances and her healthcare.

Although Mrs. Raspanti’s interdiction abated upon her death, there are

collateral consequences to a determination of whether her interdiction was full or

limited while it was in effect. Therefore, we find the issues on appeal are not

moot, and it is incumbent upon this Court to address the merits of the appeal.

Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss appeal.

Turning to the merits of the appeal, Mrs. Raspanti and Janine have asserted

that the trial court’s February 7, 2024 judgment, which was apparently modified

after it was presented to the trial court for signature, orders a full interdiction of

Mrs. Raspanti, contrary to the consent judgment dictated into the record at trial.

Joseph responds that the language of the judgment does not provide for a full

interdiction of Mrs. Raspanti’s person, and he acknowledges that the parties’

agreement was for the interdiction to be limited or partial.

A consent judgment is a bilateral contract wherein the parties adjust their

differences by mutual consent and thereby put an end to a lawsuit with each party

balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss. La. C.C. art. 3071; Peeler v.

Dural, 06-936 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 958 So.2d 31, 35; Petition for

Nullification of Donation Cotaya, 22-539 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/23), 367 So.3d 806,

815. A consent judgment has qualities of both contracts and judicial decrees.

24-CA-166 5

Cotaya, 367 So.3d at 815. Consent judgments are governed by the same rules of

construction that apply to contracts. Rousset v. Rousset, 14-663 (La. App. 5 Cir.

4/15/15), 170 So.3d 253, 256; Randazza v. Giacona, 20-439 (La. App. 5 Cir.

3/24/21), 316 So.3d 564, 569; Nelson v. Nelson, 08-85 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/19/08),

985 So.2d 1285, 1290.

Louisiana Civil Code art. 3072 provides that “[a] compromise shall be made

in writing or recited in open court, in which case the recitation shall be susceptible

of being transcribed from the record of the proceedings.” The agreement recited in

open court confers upon each party the right of judicially enforcing its

performance, although its substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient

form. Cotaya, 367 So.3d at 815; Matchmaker Int'l of New Orleans, Inc. v.

Osborne, 94-920 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/15/95), 653 So.2d 686, 689. A signed consent

judgment reflects the mutual consent of the parties to the terms of the compromise,

but its binding force is derived from the consent of the parties rather than from a

judicial determination. Morris, Lee & Bayle, LLC v. Macquet, 14-1080 (La. App.

4 Cir. 3/23/16), 192 So.3d 198, 209.

At trial, counsel for Mrs. Raspanti indicated the parties reached an

agreement, stating on the record:

…the parties have consulted and have reached a consent. All
parties have agreed that in accordance with Dr. Thompson’s
recommendations that there will be a limited or partial
interdiction of Gloria Lanasa Raspanti over her finances and
her healthcare needs, with her healthcare needs understood to
include anything that involved her mental health and well-
being, including her social and interpersonal activities and
desires.

And the parties further agree that the Court may appoint or
shall appoint an independent curator to handle these needs for
Mrs. Raspanti.

The trial court then stated that it intended to call Louisiana Guardianship

Services, Inc. (“LGSI”) to ask if it would be willing to serve as curator in this case

24-CA-166 6

“since it is not a full interdiction.” The court indicated it had been informed that

LGSI might not be willing to handle the curatorship “because it’s not a full

interdiction.” Joseph and Janine were questioned by the trial court and indicated

that the terms of the agreement, as stated on the record, were acceptable to them.

Counsel for Mrs. Raspanti indicated that she would prepare a written judgment.

A review of the transcript shows that the parties clearly agreed to a limited

or partial interdiction of Mrs. Raspanti and specified that it would be over her

finances and healthcare needs. The trial court also acknowledged that the

interdiction would be limited, not a full interdiction of Mrs. Raspanti. The

compromise agreement recited on the record became binding and enforceable

when it was placed on the record of the proceedings.

Mrs. Raspanti and Janine have argued that the trial court was without

authority to modify the version of the judgment submitted to the court for

signature, where it had been signed by the parties. However, the law allows the

amendment of judgments to alter the phraseology, but not the substance, even after

the judgment is signed and final, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1951. Under La.

C.C.P. art. 1951, final judgments may be amended by the court where the

amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment. Denton

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 08-483 (La. 12/12/08), 998 So.2d 48, 52;

Bourgeois v. Kost, 02-2785 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 692, 695.

Our review reveals that the amendment did not take anything from or add

anything to the parties’ consent agreement recited on the record. The language of

the judgment provided to the trial court indicates that “a partial/limited interdiction

is granted over Gloria Lanasa Raspanti with regard to Gloria Lanasa Raspanti’s

finances and health care needs.” The judgment signed by the trial court on

February 7, 2024, provides that “an interdiction is granted over Gloria Lanasa

Raspanti with regard to Gloria Lanasa Raspanti’s finances and health care

24-CA-166 7

needs…” This minor modification of the written judgment provided to the court,

deleting the words “partial/limited,” does not change the meaning or substance of

the agreement.

Further, each provision in a contract is interpreted in light of the other

provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.

Rousset, 170 So.3d at 256; Randazza, 316 So.3d at 569. Here, the judgment

provides that Mrs. Raspanti “retains the capacity of a natural person except as

expressly limited by this Judgment,” and “the Court shall appoint an independent

curator, regarding Gloria Lanasa Raspanti’s finances, and healthcare needs as

defined above…” (Emphasis added.)

It is unclear why the trial court amended the language of the consent

judgment prior to signing it. However, the amendment is of no moment, as the

language of the judgment under either version provides for a limited interdiction of

Mrs. Raspanti, only as to her finances and healthcare needs.

Based on our review of the transcript of the proceedings, and comparing the

language recited on the record to the trial court's written judgment, we find the trial

court's judgment conforms to the provisions of the parties’ consent judgment

dictated on the record in open court. Even with the deletion of “partial, limited”

from the judgment, the terms remain the same and accurately reflect the parties’

actual consent agreement. Accordingly, we find no basis upon which to reverse,

revise, or amend the judgment.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, we deny Joseph’s motion to dismiss appeal.

We affirm the trial court’s February 7, 2024 judgment, ordering a limited

interdiction of Mrs. Raspanti, which applies only to her finances and healthcare.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED;
AFFIRMED.

24-CA-166 8

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 4, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-CA-166
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
R. CHRISTOPHER COX, III (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ARTHUR D. DUPRE, JR. (APPELLEE) JERRY W. SULLIVAN (APPELLEE) ALBERT J. DERBES, IV (APPELLEE)
ERIC J. DERBES (APPELLEE) JARED S. SCHEINUK (APPELLEE) BRETT M. DUPUY (APPELLANT)
YVETTE A. D'AUNOY (APPELLANT)

MAILED
PAUL R. SOLOUKI (APPELLEE) IRA J. MIDDLEBERG (APPELLANT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY AT LAW
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