Jared M. Clesi Versus Donice J. Rayford, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Xyz Hospice Company, Uvw Insurance Comp Any, and Geico Insurance Company

JARED M. CLESI NO. 24-CA-401

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

DONICE J. RAYFORD, ET AL. COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 807-028, DIVISION "N"
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

February 26, 2025

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Timothy S. Marcel

AFFIRMED
JJM
JGG
TSM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
JARED M. CLESI
James E. Cazalot, Jr.

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
H. Minor Pipes, III
Alexis P. Joachim
Deandra N. De Napoli

MOLAISON, J.

The plaintiff, Jared Clesi, appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of

the defendant, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company. For the following reasons,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts are not in dispute. On December 4, 2019, the plaintiff was

involved in a multi-vehicle accident when the tortfeasor rear-ended his vehicle

while driving. The plaintiff owned the vehicle he occupied. After settling with the

tortfeasors’ insurers, the plaintiff settled for the full policy limits of his own UM

insurer. On November 6, 2021, the plaintiff filed a supplemental and amending

petition, adding Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) as a

defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the policy issued by Liberty Mutual to his

employer provided UM coverage for this accident. Liberty Mutual answered the

petition, asserting numerous affirmative defenses, including that the anti-stacking

provisions of La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c) preclude the plaintiff’s recovery under this

UM policy.

Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that because

the plaintiff had already received payment from his personal UM carrier for

damages related to the December 4, 2019 accident, the law precluded him from

recovering additional payments under the UM policy issued by Liberty Mutual to

his employer. The plaintiff opposed the summary judgment, arguing that La. R.S.

22:1295 did not apply to the facts of this case.

The trial judge considered the plaintiff’s argument on the motion for

summary judgment at the hearing but granted the motion based on Boudoin v.

Safeco Ins. Co. of Oregon, 23-65 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/23), 375 So.3d 537, 541,

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reh’g denied (12/1/23), writ denied, 23-1712 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 706, and

writ denied, 24-7 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 710. This timely appeal followed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A court shall grant a motion for summary judgment if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue

regarding material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The mover’s burden on the motion is to point out

to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the

adverse party’s claim, action, or defense if the mover does not bear the burden of

proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary

judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The adverse party then has to produce

factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary

judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by the trial court, to determine

whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Simon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16-46

(La. App. 5 Cir. 9/8/16), 201 So.3d 1007, 1009. The court must decide a motion

for summary judgment referencing the substantive law that applies to the case.

Muller v. Carrier Corp., 07-770 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/15/08), 984 So.2d 883, 885.

In 1977, the Louisiana Legislature passed an anti-stacking law, La. R.S.

22:1295(1)(c), which prohibits insureds from combining or stacking UM benefits,

providing:

(c) If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a
policy of automobile liability insurance, in accordance with the terms
of Subparagraph (1)(a) of this Section, then such limits of liability
shall not be increased because of multiple motor vehicles covered
under such policy of insurance, and such limits of uninsured motorist
coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance
available to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage

24-CA-401 2

provision or policy; however, with respect to other insurance
available, the policy of insurance or endorsement shall provide the
following with respect to bodily injury to an injured party while
occupying an automobile not owned by said injured party, resident
spouse, or resident relative, and the following priorities of recovery
under uninsured motorist coverage shall apply:
(i) The uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle in which the
injured party was an occupant is primary.
(ii) Should that primary uninsured motorist coverage be exhausted due
to the extent of damages, then the injured occupant may recover as
excess from other uninsured motorist coverage available to him. In no
instance shall more than one coverage from more than one uninsured
motorist policy be available as excess over and above the primary
coverage available to the injured occupant.

In Boudoin, supra, Ms. Boudoin was injured in an accident while driving her

car. She brought an action against her personal insurer, her umbrella insurer, and

her employer’s excess insurers to recover UM benefits. Boudoin, 375 So.3d at

539-40. Specifically, at the time of the accident, Ms. Boudoin personally

maintained a policy with Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company that

provided $250,000 in UM coverage and a $1,000,000.00 personal umbrella policy

with RLI Insurance Company. Id. at 539. The plaintiff’s employer, Eatelcorp,

LLC, also maintained a commercial automobile policy through The Phoenix

Insurance Company, a Travelers Company with $1,000,000.00 in UM coverage, an

excess third-party liability policy with Continental Casualty Company with limits

of $25,000,000.00, and a commercial excess/umbrella policy with Rural Trust

Insurance Company providing $10,000,000.00 in coverage. Id. at 539-40. Ms.

Boudoin settled with Allstate for its UM policy limits; the court dismissed Allstate

with prejudice. Id. at 540. Thereafter, Continental filed a motion for summary

judgment claiming that the anti-stacking provision contained in La. R.S.

22:1295(1)(c) prohibited Ms. Boudoin from recovering against multiple UM

policies because she owned the vehicle she was operating at the time of the

accident. Id. Continental argued that Ms. Boudoin could only recover from her

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personal UM policies issued by Allstate and RLI. Id. The trial court denied the

motion. Id. at 540.

In reversing the trial court’s ruling based on the anti-stacking provision of

La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c), this Court noted that Louisiana public policy strongly

favors UM coverage and liberal interpretation of statutes regarding UM coverage

but stated:

This anti-stacking law prohibits recovery against multiple UM
coverages available to the same insured, except under the limited
circumstances prescribed in the anti-stacking provision. See La. Civ.
L. Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice, McKenzie & Johnson, § 4.27,
Stacking of multiple coverages - The 1977 anti-stacking provision.
Under the first section of the statute, an insured seeking to recover
under multiple UM policies ‘is limited to recovery under only one
policy and may not combine or stack coverages.’ Boullt v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 99-942 (La. 10/19/99), 752 So.2d 739, 743. In
Boullt, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that under the second
part of the anti-stacking law, an exception to the stacking prohibition
is permitted if: (1) the injured party is occupying an automobile not
owned by the injured party, resident spouse, or resident relative; (2)
the UM coverage on the vehicle in which the injured party was an
occupant is primary; and (3) the primary UM coverage is exhausted
due to the extent of damages. Id.

Therefore, a person insured under the UM provisions of several
different policies, and occupying a vehicle owned by the insured at
the time of the accident, may recover under one, and only one, of the
policies. See Pitts v. Fitzgerald, 01-543 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02),
818 So.2d 847, 853. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute,
recovery under more than one policy is prohibited, except when the
injured party is ‘occupying an automobile not owned by the injured
party, resident spouse or resident relative.’ If the injured party is in a
non-owned vehicle, then the statutory exception permits the injured
party to recover under the UM coverage on the vehicle in which she is
riding (statutory primary coverage) and also under one of the other
UM policies available to her (statutory excess coverage). See La.
Civ. L. Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice, McKenzie & Johnson, §
4.27, Stacking of multiple coverages - The 1977 anti-stacking
provision.

Id. at 541-42.

This Court granted summary judgment in favor of Continental, finding that La.

R.S. 22:1295(1)(c), the anti-stacking provision, applied and Ms. Boudoin could

only recover under her personal line of coverage. Id. at 545-46.

24-CA-401 4

In this case, in opposing the motion for summary judgment and on appeal,

the plaintiff argues that La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c) is ambiguous. He contends the

proper reading requires substituting “named insured” for “insured” throughout the

statute. The plaintiff contends that this statute only excludes coverage when a

named insured attempts to increase the UM limits under the named insured’s

policy by having multiple vehicles or policies. This argument does not persuade

us.

The courts of Louisiana have held that an employee in the course and scope

of employment who is injured in an automobile accident while occupying a vehicle

owned by that employee is barred from recovery from the employer’s UM carrier

if they have already recovered under their personal UM policy because doing so

violates La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c). In Irvin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Co., 03-717 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/10/03), 867 So.2d 777, writ denied, 03-

3537 (La. 3/26/04), 871 So. 2d 347, the court did not need to address the coverage

question because, even if the employer’s policy provided UM coverage, the anti-

stacking law, La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(c), now redesignated as La. R.S.

22:1295(1)(c), prevented a plaintiff with her own UM insurance from receiving

UM benefits under her employer’s UM policy. Similarly, in Rowe v. Williams,

41,082 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1185, the court held that the anti-

stacking provision precluded an employee from recovering UM benefits under

both her employer’s policy and her policy because she was driving her vehicle at

the time of the accident.

In the case before us, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff, Mr. Clesi, was

operating his vehicle while allegedly in the course and scope of his employment.

At the time of the accident, GEICO insured the plaintiff under a personal

automobile liability insurance policy, providing $50,000.00 in UM coverage. At

the time of the accident, Liberty Mutual issued a policy to the plaintiff’s employer

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that included UM coverage. After the plaintiff recovered the policy limits from the

tortfeasors’ insurers, he recovered the UM policy limits from his own UM carrier.

Because the plaintiff was in his vehicle, which he owned, at the time of the

accident, La. R.S. 22:1295(c)(1) limits his recovery to his line of UM coverage.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted Liberty Mutual’s motion for

summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the preceding reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment granting

summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Liberty Mutual, dismissing the

claims of the plaintiff, Jared Clesi, with prejudice.

AFFIRMED

24-CA-401 6

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
FEBRUARY 26, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-CA-401
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JAMES E. CAZALOT, JR. (APPELLANT) ALEXIS P. JOACHIM (APPELLEE) H. MINOR PIPES, III (APPELLEE)

MAILED
DEANDRA N. DE NAPOLI (APPELLEE)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1100 POYDRAS STREET
SUITE 3300
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70163