Anthony James Williamson Versus Nadia Nicole Bell

ANTHONY JAMES WILLIAMSON NO. 24-CA-6

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

NADIA NICOLE BELL COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 734-687, DIVISION "O"
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING

May 22, 2024

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Timothy S. Marcel

AFFIRMED
SMC
JGG
TSM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
ANTHONY WILLIAMSON
Tilton R. Hunter, Jr.

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
NADIA BELL
Renee L. Swanson

CHEHARDY, C.J.

In this child custody case, the father appeals the trial court’s July 5, 2023

judgment that, among other things, held it was in the best interest of the two minor

children that their mother be granted sole custody, and that the father be granted

visitation every other Saturday and Sunday. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Anthony James Williamson and Nadia Nicole Bell have never been married,

but began an intimate relationship when Mr. Williamson was 18 years old and Ms.

Bell was 15 years old. As a result of their intimate relationship, two children were

born: A.J.B. on July 13, 2011; and A.B. on May 13, 2013.1 Ms. Bell gave birth to

A.J.B. one month after her seventeenth birthday, and gave birth to A.B. when she

was eighteen. The parties terminated their relationship prior to the birth of A.B.,

when Ms. Bell discovered that Mr. Williamson was expecting a child with another

woman.

In 2014, Mr. Williamson filed a petition to establish joint custody. On April

24, 2014, the parties entered into a consent judgment, wherein they were awarded

joint custody of the boys, with Ms. Bell designated as the domiciliary parent.

Pursuant to the judgment, Mr. Williamson’s visitation was initially limited to

supervised visitation a couple hours a week, with a graduated schedule that ended

nine months later. By December 2014, Mr. Williamson had physical custody of

the boys every other weekend and one night per week.

On November 25, 2019, Mr. Williamson filed a rule to modify custody,

alleging that the boys were no longer residing with Ms. Bell, but were living with

her father, Douglas Bell, and paternal aunt, Crystal Bell. A hearing on Mr.

Williamson’s rule to modify custody was first heard on September 2, 2020, by

1
The initials of the children of the parties will be used to protect and maintain the privacy of the
minor children involved in this proceeding. Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 5–1 and 5–2.

24-CA-6 1

hearing officer Lisa Matthews. At that time, the parties were ordered to undergo a

custody evaluation by Shewayn Watson. Pending the outcome of the evaluation,

Ms. Bell was ordered to remain the domiciliary parent, with Mr. Williamson

exercising visitation every other weekend.

Ms. Watson completed her custody evaluation report on January 18, 2021,

recommending that Mr. Williamson be designated as the domiciliary parent, for the

boys to attend school in St. Tammany Parish, and that Ms. Bell exercise visitation

every other weekend. The parties returned to court before the hearing officer on

March 10, 2021, at which time hearing officer Lisa Matthews considered

“modifications in custody and physical custody/visitation” of the minor children.

The record reflects that the hearing officer considered the custody evaluation report

of Ms. Watson and found that her recommendations should be adopted. An

interim order adopting those findings was signed on March 17, 2021, and an

interim judgment was signed by the trial court on April 13, 2021. The parties were

awarded joint custody of the boys, and “effective immediately,” Mr. Williamson

was designated as the domiciliary parent, with a visitation schedule of the boys

gradually preparing them to move to the Northshore and attend school there. The

parties were ordered, among other things, to subscribe to Our Family Wizard for

future communications and to complete a 16-hour “Cooperative Parenting &

Divorce” course. Further, the children were ordered to participate in counseling to

assist them in transitioning from being primarily cared for by Ms. Bell and her

family to moving to the Northshore to be primarily cared for by Mr. Williamson.

Ms. Bell was ordered to undergo an updated mental health assessment. Ms. Bell

timely filed objections to the hearing officer’s recommendations and to the interim

judgment.

On May 5, 2021, Ms. Bell filed a motion for a Watermeier hearing

requesting that the trial judge meet with the boys, then ages 10 and 8, to discuss

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with them in chambers regarding pertinent facts relevant to custody, including the

reasonable preference of each child pursuant to La. C.C. art. 134, since Ms.

Watson did not consider the preference of the boys in her evaluation and

subsequent report. Mr. Williamson objected. After a hearing on June 2, 2021, the

trial court granted Ms. Bell’s motion for a Watermeier hearing and gave the parties

the opportunity to submit questions for the court to ask the boys.

Prior to a hearing on Ms. Bell’s objections to the hearing officer’s

recommendations and to the interim judgment, the parties entered into a consent

judgment on July 8, 2021, in lieu of adopting the custody evaluator’s

recommendations. In the consent judgment, the parties agreed that, on an interim

basis and without prejudice to either party, the parties would share joint custody of

the boys, with Ms. Bell being designated as the domiciliary parent, except that Mr.

Williamson would preside over medical issues. The parties further agreed that, on

an interim basis, they would exercise a 7 days on/7 days off shared physical

custody schedule, and that the boys would continue attendance at Audubon

Elementary in Kenner. The consent judgment further provided that any and all

orders in the March 10, 2021 interim judgment (signed by the trial court on April

13, 2021), not in conflict with the consent judgment, were to remain in full force

and effect.

On November 30, 2021, Mr. Williamson filed a rule for contempt, alleging

that Ms. Bell had violated the July 8, 2021 consent judgment by refusing to allow

him to pick up the boys for his scheduled week of physical custody. At the time,

Hurricane Ida was approaching and, without Mr. Williamson’s consent, Ms. Bell

wanted the boys to evacuate with her to Houston despite it being Mr. Williamson’s

week to have physical custody of the boys. Mr. Williamson also alleged that Ms.

Bell violated the earlier March 17, 2021 interim order by failing to complete the

parenting course. The matter came before hearing officer, Lisa Matthews, on

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February 9, 2022, and Mr. Williamson’s rule for contempt was granted. The

parties agreed as to how evacuation planning should be handled in the future. The

hearing officer further found that Ms. Bell should have completed the parenting

course she was previously ordered to take, as the course is offered online and Ms.

Bell could have attended those classes from home. Ms. Bell was again ordered to

take the parenting class, and Mr. Williamson was ordered to re-attend the class so

that the parties could take the class together. An interim judgment was signed on

February 10, 2022. On February 15, 2022, Ms. Bell timely filed objections to the

interim judgment.

On March 30, 2022, a pivotal incident occurred, in which ten-year old A.J.B.

had an outburst at school, telling his teacher that he “wanted to die.” The school’s

mental health professional advised that during her assessment of A.J.B., he

reported that he had previously attempted suicide one month prior and that he

would attempt suicide again if he had to return to his father’s home. The school

reported the incident, as well as “physical abuse at dad’s house,” to the Department

of Children and Family Services. A.J.B. was brought to Children’s Hospital and

admitted for a psychological assessment. A.J.B. was ultimately discharged home

with instructions that he was to “stay in his mother’s home until all is cleared due

to child’s safety and risk of suicide.”

As a result of the March 30, 2022 incident involving A.J.B., on April 6,

2022, Ms. Bell filed a petition for sole custody and La. C.C.P. art. 3945 relief, to

suspend physical custody, and for an ex parte order pending a rule to show cause.

In addition to A.J.B.’s reported suicide attempt and his threat to commit suicide if

made to go to his father’s house, Ms. Bell alleged that Mr. Williamson was

spanking the boys to the point of bruising, walking around his home naked, and

allowing the minor children into his bedroom while Mr. Williamson and his wife

were unclothed. Ms. Bell’s petition also alleged that Mr. Williamson was

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instructing the boys to “stop telling people what goes on in his house, including but

not limited to the children’s therapist, Dr. Marvin Clifford.” On April 7, 2022, an

ex parte order was signed and issued pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945, granting Ms.

Bell temporary sole custody of A.J.B. and A.B. and suspending Mr. Williamson’s

physical custody of the boys, pending a hearing on Ms. Bell’s petition for sole

custody.

In response to Ms. Bell’s petition for sole custody and Article 3945 relief,

Mr. Williamson filed a second rule for contempt and motion to modify custody on

May 2, 2022, alleging that Ms. Bell had again violated the July 8, 2021 consent

judgment by failing to take the parenting course, for refusing to allow him to

exercise his physical custody of the boys from March 30-31, 2022, April 8-14,

2022, and April 22-28, 2022, and for her “attempt to alienate the children” from

him. Mr. Williamson further alleged that it was in the boys’ best interest to rescind

the July 8, 2021 consent judgment and to reinstate the March 10, 2021 interim

judgment (signed by the district court on April 13, 2021), wherein he was named

the domiciliary parent and Ms. Bell was granted visitation with the boys every

other weekend.

Commissioner Ruben Bailey conducted a three-day trial on Ms. Bell’s

petition for sole custody pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945 and to suspend Mr.

Williamson’s physical custody of the boys. The trial commenced on May 17,

2022, continued on May 31, 2022, and concluded on June 10, 2022, at which time

Commissioner Bailey modified the parties’ 7 days on/7 days off physical custody

schedule as previously set forth in the July 8, 2021 consent judgment.2

Specifically, Commissioner Bailey ordered that A.J.B. was to remain in the

2
Counsel for both parties submitted judgments for signature, and Commissioner Bailey mistakenly
signed both on the same day. After reviewing the transcript, the trial judge struck the June 21, 2022
judgment filed by Mr. Williamson’s counsel, finding that the judgment submitted by Ms. Bell’s counsel
on June 16, 2022, more accurately reflected the commissioner’s ruling.

24-CA-6 5

physical custody of Ms. Bell and ordered a temporary visitation schedule for

A.J.B. with Mr. Williamson, pending completion of a mental health evaluation by

Dr. Kristin Luscher regarding A.J.B.’s suicidal ideation. Commissioner Bailey

further ordered that Mr. Williamson was to resume physical custody of A.B.

pursuant to the schedule set forth in the July 8, 2021 consent judgment. Ms. Bell

timely filed objections to the commissioner’s ruling insofar as it permitted Mr.

Williamson to resume physical custody of A.B. in accordance with the parties’

July 8, 2021 consent judgment.3

Mr. Williamson’s previously filed rule for contempt and to modify custody

came for hearing before hearing officer Lisa Matthews on August 8, 2022. At that

time, the parties entered into a consent judgment wherein Dr. Karen van Buyer was

appointed to conduct a custody evaluation, to include designation of a domiciliary

parent and school placement for the boys.4 The consent judgment also ordered the

parties and the children to attend family re-unification therapy with Martha

Bujanda. Mr. Williamson’s rule for contempt and to modify custody was reserved

and continued to be reset pending the custody evaluation.

On September 8, 2022, a pre-trial conference with the trial court judge was

held. At that time, the trial judge ordered that A.J.B. and A.B. continue the

visitation schedule with Mr. Williamson in accordance with Commissioner

Bailey’s June 10, 2022 interim judgment, and advised that she would not disturb

the commissioner’s ruling without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

On June 22, June 23, and June 28, 2023, the trial court conducted a de novo

hearing on the following: (1) Ms. Bell’s April 6, 2022 petition for sole custody, to

3
In Garcia v. Hernandez, 21-338 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/22), 339 So.3d 61, this Court held that “it
is clear that if either party files an objection, the ‘interim order’ of the domestic commissioners remains
interim until the district court renders its judgment.”
4
Hearing Officer Matthews determined that, because Ms. Shewayn Watson, who had rendered the
prior January 18, 2021 custody evaluation report, “recently retired … an updated evaluation [was]
needed.”

24-CA-6 6

suspend physical custody, and for an ex parte order pending rule to show cause, (2)

Ms. Bell’s objection to Commissioner Bailey’s June 10, 2022 interim judgment,

returning A.B. to the July 8, 2021 consent judgment schedule, (3) Mr.

Williamson’s May 2, 2022 rule for contempt and to modify custody, and (4) Mr.

Williamson’s motion to declare all orders and judgments stemming from Ms.

Bell’s petition for sole custody and La. C.C.P. art. 3945 relief to be null and void.

Thus, before the trial court were the parties’ competing actions to modify custody.

The trial court took the matter under advisement.

On July 5, 2023, the trial court issued judgment, with extensive written

reasons: (1) granting Ms. Bell sole custody of A.J.B. and A.B., (2) granting Ms.

Bell’s objection to Commissioner Bailey’s interim order, (3) denying Mr.

Williamson’s motion to modify custody and rule for contempt, (4) denying Mr.

Williamson’s motion to declare all orders and judgments stemming from Bell’s

petition for sole custody null and void, and (5) limiting Mr. Williamson’s visitation

with A.J.B. and A.B. to every other Saturday and Sunday from 12:00 p.m. to 6:00

p.m.

Upon de novo review, the trial court found that Dr. van Beyer’s custody

evaluation was based on a faulty premise. Specifically, the trial court found that

when conducting her custody evaluation, Dr. van Beyer was not provided a copy of

Ms. Bell’s petition for sole custody and La. C.C.P. art. 3945 relief, nor a copy of

Commissioner Bailey’s June 21, 2022 interim judgment following the three-day

hearing on Ms. Bell’s petition. Further, the trial court noted that Dr. van Beyer’s

opinion, as stated in her report, that “the issues in the present updated evaluation

remain the same as in the evaluation conducted by Ms. Watson,” was erroneous,

because the parties entered into the July 8, 2021 consent judgment in lieu of

adopting Ms. Watson’s recommendations (i.e. that the parties have joint custody,

with Mr. Williamson designated as the domiciliary parent and the boys attending

24-CA-6 7

school in St. Tammany Parish), and because Ms. Watson had never testified in this

matter. Moreover, the trial court found that several things had changed since Ms.

Watson conducted her custody evaluation, most notably, the circumstances of

A.J.B.’s threat of suicide, which prompted Ms. Bell to file the petition for sole

custody and La. C.C.P. art. 3945 relief, and the fact that the parties have been

sharing equal custody of the boys. Consequently, the trial court determined that,

because Dr. van Beyer’s report was based on a faulty premise, her conclusions and

recommendations were of limited use in determining custody of the minor

children.

Mr. Williamson’s timely appeal followed.

ASSSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Mr. Williamson contends the trial court committed legal error:

(1) by ruling that Commissioner Bailey’s June 10, 2022 interim judgment modified

the July 8, 2021 consent judgment: (2) by modifying the July 8, 2021 consent

judgment in chambers during a status conference, without first conducting a

contradictory hearing; (3) by deciding Ms. Bell’s objection to the commissioner’s

ruling without considering the record and evidence from the proceedings

conducted by Commissioner Bailey; and (4) by ruling that the Bergeron standard

applied to Mr. Williamson’s motion to modify custody of a stipulated custody

decree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In most child custody cases, the trial court’s rulings are based heavily on its

factual findings. Wilson v. Wilson, 15-74 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/15), 170 So.3d 340,

344. The trial judge is in the best position to ascertain the best interest of the child

based on the particular circumstances in each individual case, and therefore, the

trial court’s custody determination is entitled to great weight. Id. Appellate courts

24-CA-6 8

will not disturb a trial court’s custody award absent manifest error or abuse of

discretion. Id.

It is well-established that each child custody case must be viewed in light of

its own particular set of facts and circumstances, with the paramount goal of

reaching a decision that is in the best interest of the children. McFall v.

Armstrong, 10-1041 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/13/11), 75 So.3d 30, 38. The issue to be

resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong,

but whether the fact finder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Main v. Main, 19-

503 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/19/20), 292 So.3d 135, 142, writ denied, 20-545 (La.

6/12/20), 307 So.3d 1036, reconsideration not considered, 20-545 (La. 7/2/20),

298 So.3d 180. An appellate court may not reverse reasonable findings merely

because it would have weighed the evidence differently, but an appellate court

must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis

does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes

that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Silbernagel v.

Silbernagel, 06-879 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 958 So.2d 13, 17; see also Salvant

v. State, 05-2126 (La. 7/6/06), 935 So.2d 646, 658.

Where one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process,

however, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and, if the record is

otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo

review of the record and determine a preponderance of the evidence. Ferrell v.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, rev’d in part, on

other grounds, 96-3028 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 569, reh’g denied, 96-3028 (La.

9/19/97), 698 So.2d 1388. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect

principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La.

2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially

affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. Id. When such a

24-CA-6 9

prejudicial error of law skews the trial court’s finding of a material issue of fact

and causes it to pretermit other issues, the appellate court is required, if it can, to

render judgment on the record by applying the correct law and determining the

essential material facts de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

In the instant case, Mr. Williamson argues the trial court made a series of

legal errors, which materially affected the outcome of this case and has deprived

him of substantial rights. We disagree.

1. Ms. Bell’s Petition for Sole Custody

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Williamson avers the trial judge legally

erred when she determined that Ms. Bell’s petition for sole custody, which also

sought emergency relief pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945, was a motion to modify

custody. At the time Ms. Bell filed her petition on April 6, 2022, entitled “Petition

for Sole Custody, to Suspend Physical Custody, and for Ex Parte Order Pending

Rule to Show Cause,” the parties were operating under the July 8, 2021 consent

judgment, which granted the parties joint physical custody of the boys on a 7 days

on/7 days off schedule. In her petition for sole custody, Ms. Bell also sought

emergency relief because of A.J.B.’s threat to kill himself if forced to return to his

father’s home. Recognizing that irreparable harm could result pending a hearing

on the merits of Ms. Bell’s request for sole custody, the court granted a temporary

ex parte order suspending Mr. Williamson’s physical custody.

Relying on Commissioner Bailey’s statement made during the hearing on

Ms. Bell’s petition that, “I believe … that this is not a petition to modify custody,

this is a petition for temporary sole custody under the emergency provisions of [La.

C.C.P. art. 3945],” Mr. Williamson contends that Ms. Bell never filed a motion to

modify custody in conjunction with her request for emergency temporary custody.

To the contrary, after considering the prayer of Ms. Bell’s petition and the

24-CA-6 10

provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 3945(D), the trial judge determined that Ms. Bell’s

petition, which included a request for an ex parte order of temporary custody of the

boys, was also an action requesting the court to modify the custody arrangement

set forth in the parties’ prior July 8, 2021 consent judgment by granting Ms. Bell

sole custody of A.J.B. and A.B. The prayer of Ms. Bell’s petition stated:

Based upon the above facts and circumstances, mover,
Nadia Bell, has serious concerns about the children’s
health, welfare, and safety if she is not granted sole
custody of the minor children and if the defendant-in-rule
continues to have physical custody of the minor children,
and Petitioner-in-Rule further avers that it is in the best
interests of the minor children for her to be awarded sole
custody of the minor children and for Anthony
Williamson’s physical custody of the children to be
suspended immediately.

La. C.C.P. art. 3945(D) provides that the rule to show cause why the

respondent should not be awarded custody shall be assigned for hearing not more

than thirty days after signing of the ex parte order of temporary custody. The trial

judge determined that the express language of the Article contemplates a request

for a modification of custody in addition to the request for an order of emergency

temporary custody pending the hearing on a request for modification. Specifically,

the trial judge stated that “the ex parte order of temporary custody is one part of

3945 ... . The other part is that if filed in conjunction with a request under 3945[,

it] is always a request changing custody because of whatever the exigent

circumstances are, that naturally follows. And so I’m gonna [sic] disagree with

what [the commissioner] said on the record[.] I think it’s wrong.” We agree.

Simply because Ms. Bell’s petition for sole custody contained an additional request

for emergency relief pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945 does not alter the fact that her

action was for a modification of the 7 days on/7 days off custody arrangement to a

sole custody arrangement.

24-CA-6 11

Mr. Williamson also argues the trial court legally erred in determining that

Commissioner Bailey’s June 10, 2022 interim judgment (signed on June 16, 2022)

was a considered decree. The record shows that Ms. Bell’s petition was heard by

Commissioner Bailey over the course of three days, and on June 10, 2022, he

rendered a judgment modifying the parties’ July 8, 2021 consent judgment, which

provided for a 7 days on/7 days off schedule, by ordering that A.J.B. remain in the

physical custody of Ms. Bell and that A.J.B. visit with Mr. Williamson two to four

hours per week. On June 14, 2022, Ms. Bell timely filed an objection to the

commissioner’s ruling insofar as it ordered that Mr. Williamson be permitted to

resume having physical custody of A.B. according to the 7 days on/7 days off

schedule set forth in the July 8, 2021 consent judgment.

The trial court then held a three-day contradictory hearing on both Ms.

Bell’s and Mr. Williamson’s competing motions to modify custody, Mr.

Williamson’s rules for contempt, and Mr. Williamson’s objection to a Watermeier

hearing. There is no indication in the record, or in the trial judge’s reasons for

judgment, that she ever considered the commissioner’s June 10, 2022 judgment

(signed June 16, 2022), or any of the prior judgments, a considered decree. Rather,

the trial judge expressly stated that the commissioner’s “ruling doesn’t become

final by operation of law unless someone does not file an objection, at which point

his judgment becomes a final judgment. ... But because there were objections filed

his judgment is not really a final judgment. It is a ruling and an order and a

judgment but it is not treated by law as a final judgment because an objection was

filed.” Clearly, the trial judge did not consider the commissioner’s interim order to

be a “considered decree” of child custody.

Moreover, on numerous occasions throughout the trial, the trial judge

explained to Mr. Williamson’s counsel that she was trying all of the matters before

the court de novo. In particular, the trial judge stated to the parties:

24-CA-6 12

Again you have to understand once you’re up here we’re
trying all of these rules De Novo. I do it De Novo. I
don’t read [the commissioner’s] reasons and rubber
stamp it. That’s not what I consider to be De Novo
hearing. Nor do I consider myself bound by any of the
factual determinations that he made or any statements
that he made in his reasoning or in fact what his actual
rulings were. So none of those [rulings or orders] are
binding here. So I want to say that for the record so
everybody understands it’s as if we are starting from a
new slate.

La. R.S. 13:717(F)(4) provides that a commissioner’s orders shall be

interim:

F. The powers of the commissioners hearing
domestic matters shall include but not be limited to
the power to:

***

(4) Implement interim child support and custody

orders. [Emphasis added.]

As this Court has previously stated, “[i]t is clear that if either party files an

objection, the ‘interim orders’ of the domestic commissioners remain interim until

the district court renders its judgment. Considering that a domestic

commissioner’s interim order to which a timely objection has been filed remains

interim and is not a judgment of the court, and that the admission of new evidence

during the district court hearing is contemplated by law, the hearing in the district

court on the domestic commissioner’s interim order of custody and visitation

should be de novo, as is the district court’s consideration of the interim orders of

domestic hearing officers.” Garcia v. Hernandez, 21-338 (La. App. 5 Cir.

4/11/22), 339 So.3d 61, 68).5

5
See also Dugue v. Dugue, 17-525 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/18), 250 So.3d 1174, 1177-78, where this
Court held that because the appellant had objected timely to the hearing officer’s recommendations, the
recommendations did not become a final judgment and that appellant was clearly entitled to a de novo
review of the hearing officer’s findings by the district court. This Court reiterated this holding in
Fairbanks v. Beninate, 20-206 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 308 So.3d 1222, 1236, writ denied, 21-250 (La.
3/23/21), 313 So.3d 272. Additionally, in Ariatti v. Plaisance, 18-84 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/13/18), 255 So.3d
1239, 1249, we recognized a litigant’s right to a district court’s de novo consideration of a domestic
commissioner’s interim judgment.

24-CA-6 13

A timely filed objection to a commissioner’s interim judgment, even if that

judgment “modifies” a prior custody arrangement, does not become a final

judgment, and thus, is not a “considered decree.” Here, we find the record clearly

shows that the trial judge did not consider the commissioner’s interim judgment,

which did modify the custody arrangement the parties’ exercised under the July 8,

2021 consent judgment, to be a “considered decree.” After considering all of the

testimony and evidence de novo, the trial judge determined that the evidence

supported a finding of a change in circumstances materially affecting the children’s

well-being had occurred since the prior order of custody. Further, after her de

novo review of the evidence, the trial judge concluded that it was in the best

interest of the minor children for sole custody to be awarded to Ms. Bell.

This assignment of error is without merit.

2. Custody Modifications made without Conducting a Contradictory
Hearing

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Williamson contends the trial judge

improperly modified the July 8, 2021 consent judgment in chambers, without first

conducting a contradictory hearing. The record does not support this contention.

According to Mr. Williamson, during a pre-trial conference held on

September 8, 2022, the trial judge “ordered” that Mr. Williamson continue the

custody schedule set forth in the commissioner’s June 10, 2022 judgment, which

modified the July 8, 2021 consent judgment. Mr. Williamson contends that there

had been no contradictory hearing held to modify custody since the July 8, 2021

judgment. Thus, according to Mr. Williamson, the trial judge “modified custody”

without first holding a contradictory hearing, violating his substantial rights to

A.J.B. and A.B.

Mr. Williamson’s argument, however, is based on the false premise that Ms.

Bell’s petition for sole custody, which also asked for temporary emergency relief

24-CA-6 14

under La. C.C.P. art. 3945, was not a request for a modification of custody. Thus,

according to Mr. Williamson, the three-day hearing held by Commissioner Bailey,

which resulted in the June 10, 2022 interim judgment6 modifying the parties’

physical custody of the boys as set forth in the July 8, 2021 consent judgment, was

not a contradictory hearing to modify custody, but rather a hearing solely on Ms.

Bell’s request for emergency temporary sole custody of the boys pursuant to La.

C.C.P. art. 3945. Therefore, Mr. Williamson argues, that when the trial judge

“ordered” that the parties were to continue the schedule in Commissioner Bailey’s

June 10, 2022 interim judgment, she modified custody without holding a

contradictory hearing.

The minute entry for September 8, 2022, indicates that before the trial court

for hearing that day were: (1) the parties’ objections to the commissioner’s June

10, 2022 interim judgment; (2) Mr. Williamson’s motion to nullify all ex parte

orders and judgments granting Ms. Bell sole custody of the minor children and

suspending Mr. Williamson’s physical custody pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945;

(3) Ms. Bell’s exceptions to Mr. Williamson’s motion to nullify: and (4) Ms. Bell’s

motion for a Watermeier hearing. The minute entry also reflects that “after having

an extensive pre-trial conference with the court,” the matters were continued to

another date. Later, in her March 21, 2023 reasons for judgment, which granted a

subsequent motion to again continue trial of the matters set forth above, the trial

judge specifically stated that “the Court would not disturb the Commissioner’s

ruling without an evidentiary hearing.” The trial judge’s decision to continue the

custody schedule set forth in Commissioner Bailey’s June 10, 2022 judgment until

she could try the matter de novo, was not, as Mr. Williamson suggests, a “change

of custody without conducting a contradictory hearing.” As previously stated, “if

either party files an objection, the ‘interim orders’ of the domestic commissioners

6
This interim judgment was not signed by Commissioner Bailey until June 21, 2022.

24-CA-6 15

remain interim until the district court renders its judgment.” See Garcia, 339

So.3d at 68. At the time of the pre-trial conference held in chambers on September

8, 2022, the commissioner’s June 10, 2022 interim judgment, which returned A.B.

to the 7 days on/7 days off custody arrangement in the July 8, 2021 consent

judgment, remained in effect—and continued to be in effect—until July 5, 2023,

when the trial court issued its final judgment awarding sole custody of the boys to

Ms. Bell and visitation with Mr. Williamson every other Saturday and Sunday.

This assignment of error is without merit.

3. Trial of Objections in District Court

In his third assignment of error, Mr. Williamson avers the trial court

committed legal error by failing to decide Ms. Bell’s objection to the

commissioner’s interim judgment de novo. He contends that by failing to include

consideration of the record, evidence, and testimony from the hearing before

Commissioner Bailey as part of her de novo review, the trial judge violated his

“substantial rights to a fair, just, and impartial trial that considers all relevant

evidence.” We disagree.

Mr. Williamson argues that, when reviewing an objection to a domestic

commissioner’s interim judgment, the trial judge may only (1) decide the objection

based on the record of the proceeding before the commissioner or (2) receive

further evidence and rule based on that evidence, together with the prior evidence,

or (3) recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions. See La. R.S.

13:717(F)(4)(c). He further argues that de novo review of an objection to the

domestic commissioner’s ruling is mandatory, and that “de novo” means that the

district court may consider both new evidence and evidence previously admitted in

the domestic commissioner’s hearing, weighing together the evidence as a whole.

See Garcia, supra, 339 So.3d at 68.

24-CA-6 16

According to Mr. Williamson, in conducting her de novo review, the trial

judge failed to review the record of the hearing before Commissioner Bailey and

refused to allow any discussion of any evidence and testimony from that hearing.

Instead, he claims the trial judge erroneously decided Ms. Bell’s objection strictly

on the evidence that she received at trial, in violation of La. R.S. 13:717.

A review of the record suggests otherwise. La. R.S. 13:717(F)(4)(c)

provides that the trial “judge may decide the objection based on the record of the

proceedings before the commissioner or may receive further evidence and rule

based on that evidence, together with the prior evidence, or may recommit the

matter to the commissioner with instructions.” [Emphasis added.] What deference

or weight a trial judge gives to the record of a hearing before the domestic

commissioner is within the trial court’s discretion. See Garcia, 339 So.3d at 68. A

trial court, in its de novo review, is not bound by the rulings of the domestic

commissioner. Contrary to Ms. Williamson’s assertions, under La. R.S.

13:717(F)(4)(c), the trial court, if it so chooses, can simply conduct an entirely new

hearing on the matters before it without regard to any of the evidence considered or

rulings made by the commissioner.

The appellate record further indicates the trial judge did, in fact, consider

both new evidence as well as evidence that was previously presented to the

commissioner. Specifically, the record shows the trial judge considered the

transcript testimony of Dr. Marvin Clifford and his medical records for both A.J.B.

and A.B. from Ochsner hospital;7 the Children’s Hospital records from March 30,

2022; and, the school’s records regarding the March 30, 2022 incident involving

A.J.B. In addition to this evidence introduced at the hearing before Commissioner

Bailey, the trial judge also considered new evidence, including the psychological

evaluation of Dr. Kristen Luscher; the trial testimony and custody evaluation report

7
Dr. Clifford was A.J.B. and A.B.’s therapist for over a year, but was deceased at the time of trial.

24-CA-6 17

of Dr. Karen van Beyer; the trial testimony and records of Martha Bujana; and, the

trial testimony of both A.J.B. and A.B. The trial judge further considered the trial

testimony of Ms. Bell and Mr. Williamson, who had both previously testified

before the commissioner.

Based on our review of the record before us, we find the trial judge properly

conducted a trial de novo on the objections to Commissioner Bailey’s interim

judgment in accordance with La. R.S. 13:717(F)(4)(c), and this Court’s decision in

Garcia. We conclude that this assignment of error is without merit.

4. Standard Applied to Mr. Williamson’s Motion to Modify Custody

In his final assignment of error, Mr. Williamson avers the trial court

committed legal error by applying the standard set forth in Bergeron v. Bergeron,

492 So.2d 1193 (La. 1986), to his motion to modify custody, thereby depriving

him of his substantial right to raise A.J.B. and A.B., even though he proved at trial

that there had been a change in circumstances since the July 8, 2021 consent

judgment, and that it was in the best interest of A.J.B. and A.B. to live with him.

Once again, the record before us refutes Mr. Williamson’s contention. As

previously stated, before the trial court were, among other exceptions and motions,

the parties’ competing motions to modify custody. Specifically, before the trial

court was Ms. Bell’s petition for sole custody, to suspend physical custody, and ex

parte order pending a trial on the merits, which she filed on April 6, 2022, in

response to the school incident involving A.J.B. and his threat to commit suicide if

he was forced to go to his father’s home. Ms. Bell’s petition included a request for

emergency relief under La. C.C.P. art. 3945 to suspend Mr. Williamson’s physical

custody of both boys pending a hearing on the merits of her motion for sole

custody. Also before the trial court was Mr. Williamson’s motion for contempt

and to modify custody, which he filed on May 2, 2022, alleging a change of

circumstances based on Ms. Bell’s refusal to allow him physical custody of the

24-CA-6 18

boys on March 30-31, 2022, April 8-14, 2022, and April 22-28, 2022. Mr.

Williamson also alleged that a modification was warranted due to Ms. Bell’s

“discontent” for the trial court’s orders and her attempt to alienate the boys from

him.

Contrary to Mr. Williamson’s contention that the trial court erroneously

applied the Bergeron standard when considering his motion to modify custody, the

transcript from the hearing, as well as the trial court’s extensive written reasons for

judgment, show that the reason the trial court denied his motion to modify custody

was because Mr. Williamson failed to show a change in circumstances. In

particular, the trial court found that Mr. Williamson’s motion to modify custody

was based on Ms. Bell’s alleged contemptuous behavior in denying him physical

custody of the boys, despite the fact that there was a doctor’s order releasing A.J.B.

from the hospital with the restriction that he was to remain in the physical custody

of his mother, as well as an April 8, 2022 order suspending Mr. Williamson’s

physical custody of the boys pending a hearing on Ms. Bell’s petition for sole

custody. In short, Mr. Williamson posited that the granting of emergency relief to

Ms. Bell pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945, which suspended his physical custody of

the boys, constituted a material change in circumstance warranting a change of

custody in his favor.8 At trial, Mr. Williamson’s counsel confirmed on the record

that this was the sole basis for Mr. Williamson’s filing a motion to modify custody.

In denying the motion, the trial court determined that Mr. Williamson was

not entitled to a modification of custody based merely upon the fact that custody

was modified in a prior judgment. The trial court “disagree[d] that a judgment

modifying custody is a change of circumstances warranting its own reversal,”

8
In essence, Mr. Williamson contends that Ms. Bell’s compliance with Dr. Grace Banuchi’s March
30, 2022 discharge instructions from Children’s Hospital’s that A.J.B. remain in the care of his mother
“until all is cleared due to child’s safety and risk of suicide,” the April 7, 2022 ex parte award of
temporary sole custody of A.J.B. and A.B. to Ms. Bell, and the commissioner’s June 10, 2022 interim
judgment (signed on June 21, 2022) that modified custody, constituted a “change in circumstances” that
warranted a modification of custody.

24-CA-6 19

stating that “[t]his contention is nonsensical and without merit.” There is

absolutely no mention of Bergeron in relation to the trial court’s denial of Mr.

Williamson’s motion to modify, thus there is no indication that the trial court

applied the Bergeron standard in denying his motion.

Mr. Williamson again avers the trial court erroneously treated Commissioner

Bailey’s June 10, 2022 interim judgment as a considered decree, and thus her

application of the Bergeron standard in this matter was improper and constituted

legal error. We disagree. As previously stated in our discussion of Mr.

Williamson’s first assignment of error, the trial court did not consider the June 10,

2022 interim judgment (signed on June 21, 2022), a considered decree and

specifically acknowledged that it was not a final judgment based on the parties’

objections to that interim judgment.

In addition, Mr. Williamson argues the trial judge “ignored the court

appointed expert custody evaluators, and other evidence supporting [his] motion to

modify custody,” and concluded that he “had not met the burden of proof

necessary to modify custody, applying Bergeron.” The appellate record simply

does not support this contention.

It is well-settled in Louisiana that the trier of fact is not bound by the

testimony of an expert, but such testimony is to be weighed the same as any other

evidence. McCaffery v. McCaffery, 13-692 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So.3d

105-116-17. Thus, the effect and weight to be given expert testimony is within the

broad discretion of the trial court, who may accept or reject in whole or in part the

opinion expressed by an expert. Id. The decision reached by the trial court

regarding expert testimony will not be disturbed on appeal absent a finding that the

trial court abused its broad discretion. Allensworth v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc.,

15-257 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/15), 178 So.3d 191, 197. The factual basis for an

expert opinion determines the credibility of the testimony. Id. at 868.

24-CA-6 20

In the trial court’s written reasons for judgment, which we acknowledge

form no part of the judgment,9 and after reviewing the testimony given at trial, it is

clear that, while the trial judge considered the testimony and report of Dr. van

Beyer, she evidently rejected both, finding that Dr. van Beyer’s opinions were

based on a faulty premise, and not based on all of the evidence. In particular, Dr.

van Beyer’s trial testimony reveals that she was not provided with a copy of Ms.

Bell’s petition for sole custody and emergency relief pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.

3945, nor a copy of Commissioner Bailey’s June 10, 2022 interim judgment

(signed on June 21, 2022). Additionally, Dr. van Beyer’s report stated her opinion

that “the issues in the present updated evaluation remain the same as in the

evaluation conducted by Ms. [Shewayn] Watson.” Because the parties entered into

the July 8, 2021 consent judgment in lieu of adopting Ms. Watson’s

recommendations, coupled with A.J.B.’s recent threat of suicide, the circumstances

and issues were clearly not “the same” as opined by Dr. van Beyer. Thus, the trial

judge concluded that Dr. van Beyer’s opinions and report were not credible and

were of limited use.

At trial, Dr. van Beyer was adamant in her belief that A.J.B. was “making

up” his accusations, or at the very least exaggerating them, including his threat of

suicide and physical abuse by his father, in order that he could accompany his great

aunt and grandfather on a cruise that was scheduled for several months later. In

her written reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated that “[i]t shocks the senses

that Dr. van Beyer would ignore the complaints of physical and emotional abuse

[A.J.B.] has reported to multiple mental health professionals, and dismiss it as

being untruthful especially considering Dr. van Beyer was present in the courtroom

9
We note the well-settled rule that a trial court’s oral or written reasons for judgment form no part
of the judgment, and that appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment. E.R. v. T.S., 18-
286 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/11/18), 256 So.3d 551, 563, writ denied, 18-1843 (La. 2/18/19), 264 So.3d 451.
Nevertheless, a court of appeal may review the lower court’s reasons “to gain insight” into the court’s
judgment. Id.

24-CA-6 21

during Ms. Bujanda’s testimony wherein she stated that [Mr. Williamson] admitted

to some of these behaviors in their therapy sessions.” Additionally, the trial court

denied admission or consideration of the former custody evaluator’s report

prepared by Ms. Watson, which Mr. Williamson claimed reached the same

recommendations and conclusions as Dr. van Beyer, on the basis that Ms.

Watson’s recommendations were never implemented and because she never

testified under oath at any hearing. We find no abuse of the trial court’s decision

to reject this evidence and testimony.

This assignment of error is also without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit to Mr. Williamson’s

assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding sole custody of

the minor children to Nadia Bell, and awarding visitation to Anthony Williamson

every other Saturday and Sunday, from 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.

AFFIRMED

24-CA-6 22

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
MAY 22, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
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24-CA-6
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE)
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