Building Specialties Company of Louisiana Versus Roadwrxx LLC and Paul Albert Bienvenu

BUILDING SPECIALTIES COMPANY OF NO. 24-CA-72
LOUISIANA
FIFTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS
COURT OF APPEAL
ROADWRXX LLC AND PAUL ALBERT
BIENVENU STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 837-161, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG, JUDGE PRESIDING

December 04, 2024

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Marc E. Johnson, and Stephen J. Windhorst

AFFIRMED; REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY’S FEES ON
APPEAL DENIED
JGG
MEJ
SJW

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
PAUL ALBERT BIENVENNU
Benjamin T. Sanders
F. Evans Schmidt

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
BUILDING SPECIALTIES COMPANY OF LOUISIANA
Paul S. Brennan
Bradley J. Chauvin

GRAVOIS, J.

Defendant, Paul Albert Bienvenu, appeals the trial court’s judgment which

granted a motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff, Building Specialties

Company of Louisiana, and resulted in a judgment against him personally for

$64,231.31, plus interest and attorney’s fees. Building Specialties answered the

appeal seeking additional attorney’s fees for defending the appeal. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the judgment and deny Building Specialties’ request for

additional attorney’s fees for defending the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 2, 2020, Roadwrxx, LLC completed an application for credit

with plaintiff, Building Specialties. The credit application contains a clause which

reads as follows:

IN CONSIDERATION OF AN OPEN ACCOUNT PRIVILEGE, I
HEREBY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE TO THE ABOVE
TERMS. SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY TO PLACE
THIS ACCOUNT FOR COLLECTION, I SHALL
PERSONALLY OBLIGATE MYSELF AND MY
CORPORATION, IF ANY, TO PAY THE ENTIRE AMOUNT
DUE INCLUDING SERVICE CHARGES (AS STATED
ABOVE), THIRTY-THREE AND ONE THIRD (33 1/3%)
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND ALL COSTS OF COLLECTION,
INCLUDING COURT COSTS.

SIGNED /s/Paul Bienvenu TITLE Managing Member

COMPANY NAME Roadwrxx, LLC DATE 11/2/2020

(Emphasis added.)
On January 27, 2023, Building Specialties sued Roadwrxx and Mr.

Bienvenu, alleging they owed $64,231.31, jointly and in solido, in overdue

payments, together with legal interest and attorney’s fees.

Thereafter, on June 21, 2023, Building Specialties filed a motion for

summary judgment. In support, Building Specialties submitted the affidavit of

Stephen Hecker, who attested that he was personally familiar with this matter and

reviewed the account to find that the balance due by defendants is $64,231.31, plus

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18% interest. Building Specialties attached a copy of its invoice, evidencing the

total amount due as $64,231.31.

In response, Mr. Bienvenu filed his own motion for partial summary

judgment, seeking a judgment declaring that he is not personally liable for any

amounts owed to Building Specialties. Mr. Bienvenu argued that he signed the

credit application only once and only on behalf of Roadwrxx in a representative

capacity as managing member. He made no separate personal guarantee.

Following a hearing, the trial court signed a written judgment on September

7, 2023 which granted Building Specialties’ motion for summary judgment and

rendered a judgment in favor of Building Specialties against defendants, jointly

and in solido, in the amount of $64,231.31, together with 18% interest from June 1,

2022 until paid, and for attorney’s fees in an amount not to exceed $3,500.00, plus

all costs of the proceeding. The judgment also denied Mr. Bienvenu’s motion for

partial summary judgment.

Thereafter, Mr. Bienvenu filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the

judgment was contrary to the law and the evidence since he presented evidence

that he signed the credit agreement solely in a representative capacity. Following a

hearing, on October 25, 2023, the trial court signed a written judgment denying the

motion for a new trial.

This appeal followed. On appeal, Mr. Bienvenu argues: 1) Building

Specialties failed to prove Mr. Bienvenu knowingly and intentionally consented to

being personally bound for Roadwrxx’s debts; 2) the trial court erred in not

interpreting the ambiguity in the standard form contract against Building

Specialties, who drafted the contract; and 3) the trial court erred in finding Mr.

Bienvenu personally liable when he executed the contract in his capacity as

managing member of Roadwrxx.

24-CA-72 2

Building Specialties filed an answer to the appeal seeking additional

attorney’s fees for defending the appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents

show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). “The burden of proof

rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof

at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment,

the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential

elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to

the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the

adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to

produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.

C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo using the same criteria

that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is

appropriate. Thus, appellate courts ask the same questions the trial court does in

determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any

genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Migliore v. Ambassador P’ship, LLC, 22-599 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/1/23), 376 So.3d 1178, 1182.

A decision as to the propriety of a grant of a motion for summary judgment

must be made with reference to the substantive law applicable to the case. Bach v.

Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 15-765 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/12/16), 193 So.3d 355,

362.

24-CA-72 3

A contract of guaranty is equivalent to a contract of suretyship, and the two

terms may be used interchangeably. DROR Int’l, L.P. v. Thundervision, L.L.C.,

11-215 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/11), 81 So.3d 182, 185, writ not considered, 12-

0127 (La. 3/23/12), 84 So.3d 560; Keller Indus., Inc. v. Deauville Consultants,

Inc., 459 So.2d 636, 638 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984). Suretyship is an accessory

contract by which a person binds himself to a creditor to fulfill the obligation of

another upon the failure of the latter to do so. La. C.C. art. 3035. An agreement of

suretyship must be express and in writing. La. C.C. art. 3038. “Although a

surety’s contract need not observe technical formalities, it must contain an absolute

expression of an intent to be bound.” Veterans Commercial Properties, LLC v.

Barry’s Flooring, Inc., 11-6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 67 So.3d 627, 629.

Contracts of suretyship are subject to the same rules of interpretation as

contracts in general. Eclipse Telecommunications Inc. v. Telnet Int’l Corp., 01-271

(La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/01), 800 So.2d 1009, 1011; Ferrell v. South Central Bell

Tel. Co., 403 So.2d 698, 700 (La. 1981). Contracts are interpreted according to the

true intent of the parties. La. C.C. art. 2045; N.E.N.H., L.L.C. v. Broussard-Baehr

Holdings, L.L.C., 13-893 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/14/14), 142 So.3d 91, 94, writ denied,

14-1183 (La. 9/19/14), 149 So.3d 247. When the words of the contract are clear,

unambiguous, and lead to no absurd consequence, no further interpretation may be

made or consideration of extrinsic evidence be had in search of the parties’ intent

and the contract must be enforced as written. La. C.C. art. 2046; N.E.N.H., L.L.C.,

supra. When a contract can be construed from the four corners of the instrument,

interpretation of the contract presents a question of law that can be decided on

summary judgment. Id. at 94-95. A contract provision that is susceptible to

different meanings must be interpreted with a meaning that renders it effective and

not with one that renders it ineffective. La. C.C. art. 2049. Each provision in a

24-CA-72 4

contract must be interpreted in light of other provisions so that each is given the

meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. C.C. art. 2050.

Although parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written

contract, if the terms are susceptible of more than one interpretation, or there is

uncertainty or ambiguity as to its provisions, or the intent of the parties cannot be

ascertained from the language employed, parol evidence is admissible to clarify the

ambiguity and show the intent of the parties. Marrero Land & Improvement Ass’n,

Ltd. v. Paradigm Inv. Grp., LLC., 19-487 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/16/20), 297 So.3d 170,

177. In interpreting provisions of an agreement about which there exists some

doubt, a court must seek the true intention of the parties, even if to do so

necessitates departure from the literal meaning of the terms. Id.

On appeal, Mr. Bienvenu asserts he signed the contract solely in his capacity

as a managing member of Roadwrxx as evidenced by the title “Managing

Member” appearing next to his signature. Additionally, he contends the credit

agreement did not contain a personal guarantee section, and Mr. Bienvenu did not

provide any personal information consistent with personal guarantee applications.

Further, the contract was a standard form contract that should be interpreted

against Building Specialties who had provided the contract.

In Veterans Commercial Properties, LLC v. Barry’s Flooring, Inc., 67 So.3d

at 628, the plaintiff sued the defendant, Barry’s Flooring, for damages caused when

Barry’s Flooring prematurely broke the parties’ lease. The plaintiff subsequently

amended the petition to add Barry Wilbert as a defendant and alleged Mr. Wilbert

bound himself personally and in solido to the guarantee. On a motion for summary

judgment, the trial court found Mr. Wilbert not to be liable in solido with Barry’s

Flooring. Id. at 629. On appeal, this Court reversed. This Court considered the

language of the lease agreement, which provided:

24-CA-72 5

For value received and in induce [sic] the granting of the above
lease, the undersigned make themselves party to this lease and bind
themselves in solido with Tenant for the faithful execution of and
compliance with all of the obligations, conditions and stipulations
assumed or agreed to by Tenant, guaranteeing to Lessor, its
successors and assigns, the payment of the rent and all other sums
provided for in the above lease and the performance by Tenant of
the covenants therein contained without requiring any notice of
non-payment, demand, dishonor or non-performance.

This 23 day of October, 2007

s/Barry’s Flooring

s/Barry M. Wilbert

Barry’s Flooring

Id. at 630.
This Court found that the language clearly and unambiguously states that Mr.

Wilbert guarantees payment of the tenant’s obligation to the lessor. Considering

the entirety of the lease agreement, this Court found that the company’s name by

Mr. Wilbert’s signature does not “obviate the fact that the clear and unambiguous

language created a suretyship agreement in which Mr. Wilbert personally

guaranteed Barry’s Flooring’s obligation to the lessor.” Id. at 631. This Court

found that the notation of a corporate position or of the company’s name is

“merely a title identification” instead of a signature in a representative capacity,

and to construe the contract otherwise would render the guaranty worthless since

Barry’s Flooring was already obligated to abide by the terms of the agreement.1 Id.

Upon de novo review, considering the entirety of the contract, we similarly

find that the language contained in the present guarantee—“… I SHALL

PERSONALLY OBLIGATE MYSELF AND MY CORPORATION, IF ANY, TO

1
In Veterans Commercial Properties, this Court considered its prior opinion in Pelican
Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. J.O.H. Const. Co., Inc., 94-991 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/28/95), 653 So.2d
699, but found it turned “on a different issue.” In Pelican Plumbing, the credit application
contained nearly identical language to that in the present credit application. However, in Pelican
Plumbing, the trial court considered parol evidence to ascertain the true intent of the guarantor.
In the present case, though Mr. Bienvenu argued at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment that he would attest in an affidavit that he had no intention to personally bind himself,
no affidavit was provided in support of his motion for partial summary judgment and no parol
evidence was considered by the trial court.

24-CA-72 6

PAY THE ENTIRE AMOUNT DUE …”—clearly and unambiguously created a

suretyship agreement in which Mr. Bienvenu personally guaranteed and obligated

himself to pay any debts Roadwrxx owed to Building Specialties. These words of

the contract are clear, unambiguous, and lead to no absurd consequence.

Therefore, no further interpretation of the contract may be made, nor consideration

of extrinsic evidence be had, in search of the parties’ intent. The contract must be

enforced as plainly written. La. C.C. art. 2046; N.E.N.H., L.L.C., supra. Further,

this language clearly demonstrates Mr. Bienvenu’s “absolute expression of an

intent to be bound” for the debts of Roadwrxx. See Veterans Commercial

Properties, 67 So.3d at 629.

Also, as per this Court’s opinion in Veterans Commercial Properties, we

find that the notation of “Managing Member” next to Mr. Bienvenu’s name is

“merely a title identification” and does not “obviate” the clear and unambiguous

language of the suretyship agreement created in the contract. Consistent with this

Court’s opinion in Veterans Commercial Properties, to construe the contract

otherwise would render the guaranty worthless, since Roadwrxx was already

obligated to abide by the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, we find no error in

the trial court’s judgment which granted Building Specialties’ motion for summary

judgment on the merits of the claim.

ANSWER TO THE APPEAL

Attorney’s Fees for Defending the Appeal

In its answer to this appeal, Building Specialties seeks additional attorney’s

fees for defending the appeal. Upon review, we deny Building Specialties’

request.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment which granted Building

Specialties’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment against Mr.

24-CA-72 7

Bienvenu personally is affirmed. Building Specialties’ request for additional

attorney’s fees for defending the appeal in its answer to the appeal is denied.

AFFIRMED; REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL DENIED

24-CA-72 8

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 4, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-CA-72
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG (DISTRICT JUDGE)
BENJAMIN T. SANDERS (APPELLANT) F. EVANS SCHMIDT (APPELLANT) BENJAMIN LAMBERT (APPELLEE)
PAUL S. BRENNAN (APPELLEE)

MAILED
BRADLEY J. CHAUVIN (APPELLEE)
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