State of Louisiana Versus Don Raines

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KA-177

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

DON RAINES COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 21-5980, DIVISION "E"
HONORABLE FRANK A. BRINDISI, JUDGE PRESIDING

December 18, 2024

MARC E. JOHNSON
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson

CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
ENHANCED SENTENCE AMENDED
AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED;
REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF
THE UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER;
REMANDED WITH FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
MEJ
SMC
JGG

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Monique D. Nolan
Molly Love

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
DON RAINES
Holli A. Herrle-Castillo

JOHNSON, J.

Defendant/Appellant, Don Raines, appeals his conviction for conspiracy to

introduce or possess contraband in a correctional center rendered in the 24 th

Judicial District Court, Division “E”. For the following reasons, we affirm

Defendant’s conviction, amend his enhanced sentence and affirm the sentence as

amended, and remand the matter with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 3, 2022, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information charging Defendant with conspiracy to introduce or possess

contraband1 in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center on or between October 25,

2021 and November 1, 2021, in violation of “La. R.S. 14:26:402.”2, 3 Defendant

was arraigned on August 1, 2023, and entered a plea of not guilty. The case

proceeded to trial before a six-person jury on September 20, 2023.

At trial, Detective Philip Blitch of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office

(“JPSO”) testified that he formerly worked in the narcotics division. In October

2021, he participated in an investigation in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center

(“JPCC”), which ultimately resulted in the arrest of Defendant and Aaliyah Pryer.

Detective Blitch used the Securus system in the investigation. Securus

stored an inmate’s “PIN number ID,” which inmates used when making a phone

call. Through his investigation, Detective Blitch identified a jail call between

Defendant and Pryer.4 The call was discovered by searching for Defendant’s name

and PIN number. Detective Blitch testified that he was aware that other inmates

1
The listed contraband was Buprenorphine (Suboxone).
2
This citation format references both La. R.S. 14:26 and La. R.S. 14:402 as violations.
3
The bill of information also listed Aaliyah Pryer as the co-conspirator to the violation of La.
R.S. “14:26:402.”
4
Detective Blitch testified that the recorded call did not log the caller’s name. He explained that,
to his knowledge, this portion is left blank if the inmate chooses not to say a name when the inmate is
initially set up with the Securus system.

24-KA-177 1

would sometimes use other’s PIN numbers to make calls.5 He explained that

during the course of his investigation, he reviewed over 50 jail calls associated

with Defendant’s PIN and had no reason to expect that anyone other than

Defendant was making the calls. Detective Blitch testified that he was able to

identify the female on the call was Pryer by utilizing various databases. He was

able to find a link between Defendant and Pryer in a previous report that had been

conducted. Detective Blitch testified that all the calls made inside the correctional

center were prefaced by an automated recording stating that the call may be

monitored.

The jail call at issue was played for the jury. The State paused the call

multiple times to ask Detective Blitch questions about what was said. During the

call, Defendant told Pryer that he needed her to get the black phone and to give

“one of those dope fiends” “100” for “20 Suboxone, 20 subs.” Detective Blitch

testified that “subs” was a name for Suboxone sublingual strips. Defendant told

Pryer that “one of those dope fiends” would have the subs and to tell “Mall” that

she needed 20 of the pills. Detective Blitch testified that he confirmed that “Mall”

was a person and not a place.

Defendant then directed Pryer to go to the Dollar Store and get a birthday

card “that had a lot of pop outs on them.” He then stated that he would tell her

how to put it behind “sh*t” to hide it and that she cannot let it show. Defendant

then stated, “Do that for me Llah.” Pryer replied “okay” to Defendant’s directions.

Detective Blitch testified that he did not hear Pryer decline any of Defendant’s

directions at any point during the call. Defendant told Pryer that he needed her to

get this done “now” and as soon as possible. He stated that she would not have to

worry about anything “out there” and that he would make them rich from “back

5
Detective Blitch stated that Defendant was being housed in a “pod” or “annex” that housed
anywhere from 15 to 30 inmates.

24-KA-177 2

here.” Defendant then directed Pryer to sign the birthday card so that it could look

real. He instructed her to put a fake return address on the bottom of the envelope

that she sends with the birthday card and to put the stamps on the top right. He

told her to put her real address at the top of the envelope that she sends with

pictures. Detective Blitch testified that he believed that Pryer intended to send

Defendant a “legitimate envelope” with photographs in it. He stated that he

believed that Defendant was instructing her to put her real information on this

envelope, and false information on the envelope with the card in it, so that

Defendant could establish which piece of mail contained the contraband.

Defendant asked Pryer if she would do what he asked of her, and she

responded that she would. He informed her that he could make “300” off one of

“them.” Detective Blitch testified that he interpreted this to mean that Defendant

could sell the Suboxone for $300 to other inmates. Defendant informed Pryer that,

if she did what he asked her to do, he would pay the rent and she could relax. He

instructed Pryer to start looking for the birthday cards and to make sure they had a

lot of “pop outs.” Pryer responded that she would go to Walgreens. Defendant

told her to do what he asked, and he would make them rich.

Detective Blitch testified that he contacted Pryer. She was initially

cooperative with the investigation and agreed to speak with him and other

investigators. However, Pryer changed her mind and ultimately refused to meet

with them. Pryer was later arrested, and a search incident to her arrest was

conducted. One Suboxone sublingual strip “inside its packaging” and three cell

phones were found inside Pryer’s purse. Detective Blitch identified a pink iPhone

that he believed had been personally used by Pryer. He then identified a black

iPhone with pictures on the back that he knew to be Defendant’s phone, which was

24-KA-177 3

given to Pryer prior to Defendant’s incarceration.6 He identified a flip phone that

was in pretty bad shape. He explained that he believed it was the phone referred to

by Defendant as his “little black phone” in the jail call. Detective Blitch testified

that these types of phones were referred to as “trap phones” and were commonly

used by individuals involved in narcotics trafficking.

Detective Blitch obtained a search warrant for the phones. He photographed

text message conversations that he discovered on the phones and submitted them

into evidence. Among the evidence was a photo of text messages on the pink cell

phone that Detective Blitch believed belonged to Pryer. The texts began on

Monday, October 25, 2021 at 6:46 p.m. He testified that the jail call took place a

few hours earlier at approximately 4:30 p.m. The first message said, “This Don

girl.” The next message from Pryer said, “If you can get the subs tonight, I’ll buy

them. Whatever she want for them. I need 20.”

Detective Blitch then testified to additional text messages between Pryer and

the same individual who previously communicated with her on the pink cell phone.

The exchange involved the individual asking Pryer if she still wanted the

Suboxones and Pryer responding affirmatively. Subsequently, they discussed the

price. Detective Blitch identified a photograph of text messages from the flip

phone. The messages were sent on October 30, 2021. He believed that Pryer was

operating the phone and communicating with other individuals regarding narcotics

transactions.

Detective Blitch identified a photograph of text messages from the black

iPhone that he believed to belong to Defendant. He testified that, in the text

6
The State questioned Detective Blitch about anything he noticed that was significant about the
iPhones. He stated that he believed the pink iPhone’s background screen was a photo of Defendant. As
to the black iPhone, he noticed the background screen photo of Defendant as well. He testified that one
of the phone cases was “collaged with photographs of individuals” and Defendant. He explained that he
viewed a photograph of Defendant before seizing the cell phones and believed the photographs were
consistent.

24-KA-177 4

messages, Pryer was conversing with “Mall”, and that was the person Defendant

instructed Pryer to contact to obtain the Suboxone. He testified that Mall referred

to Pryer as “Llah” in the text messages, which is a name he heard several times in

some of the jail calls. In the text messages, Mall stated he was outside and stated

“got that for you.” Detective Blitch interpreted this to mean that he was bringing

Pryer some narcotics. Detective Blitch then identified a photograph of text

messages that stated “20”, which was consistent with the 20 Suboxones Pryer was

instructed to retrieve. Mall told Pryer to “Hit me with the brick” and referred to it

as the “hard sh*t.” Detective Blitch explained that was how people referred to

heroin.

The Suboxone found in Pryer’s purse was submitted to the crime lab for

analysis. A stipulation was entered that, if the forensic scientist was called, he

would testify consistent with his report that the substance was positive for

Buprenorphine.7 Based on the jail call, the arrest of Pryer, and the items recovered

from her, Detective Blitch obtained an arrest warrant for Defendant.

At the conclusion of the trial, the six-person jury found Defendant guilty as

charged. On September 25, 2023, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five years

imprisonment with the Department of Corrections without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentence was ordered to run

“consecutive with [D]efendant’s prior sentence.”

On December 14, 2023, the State filed a habitual offender bill of

information, alleging that Defendant was a second-felony offender, having

previously been convicted on November 4, 2021, of La. R.S. 40:967(A),

“[p]ossession with intent to distribute Fentanyl,” in case number 21-3044 in

Division “F” of the 24th Judicial District Court. On March 1, 2024, the State filed a

7
The trial court explained the stipulation to the jury and informed them that Buprenorphine was
the clinical name for Suboxone.

24-KA-177 5

subsequent habitual offender bill of information, alleging that Defendant was a

second-felony offender, having previously been convicted on November 4, 2021,

of La. R.S. 14:95.1, “Felon with a Firearm,” in case number 21-3044 in Division

“F” of the 24th Judicial District Court. Also on March 1, 2024, defense counsel

stated that Defendant wanted to stipulate to the habitual offender bill.

The State offered the stipulation that, if called to testify, the fingerprint

expert would testify that Defendant, who was found guilty of conspiracy to

introduce or possess contraband in a correctional center, was the same person who

pleaded guilty to “felon in possession of a firearm under Case Number 21-3044.”

The trial court asked the State if Defendant had “any other record,” and the State

responded that Defendant had “a theft of goods from 2002, a drug charge from

2006, a theft charge from 2011, and he has a felon in possession of a firearm and a

drug charge from 2021.” Defense counsel confirmed that Defendant was

stipulating that he was one and the same person, and he had a prior conviction in

“Division F, 21-3044.” The trial court stated it was vacating Defendant’s original

sentence. The trial court then stated that it was finding Defendant “guilty of the

multiple bill, double bill of information” and found that Defendant was “one and

the same person who’s got the prior conviction.” The trial court sentenced

Defendant to five years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence. On March 5, 2024, Defendant filed a motion

for appeal, which was granted by the trial court on March 7, 2024. The instant

appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On appeal, Defendant alleges there was insufficient evidence to uphold his

conviction for conspiracy to introduce or possess contraband at a correctional

24-KA-177 6

facility.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Before we address the merits of this appeal, we acknowledge that

Defendant’s motion for appeal is, in part, untimely. Defendant was convicted on

September 20, 2023 and sentenced on September 25, 2023. The State filed a

habitual offender bill on December 14, 2023. On March 1, 2024, the State filed a

subsequent habitual offender bill. On the same date, there was a stipulation, and

the trial court vacated the original sentence and resentenced defendant as a second-

felony offender. Defendant filed his motion for appeal on March 5, 2024, which

challenges the trial verdict rendered on September 20, 2023, the sentence imposed

on September 25, 2023, and the habitual offender adjudication and sentencing on

March 1, 2024. The motion for appeal was not filed within 30 days of the

September 20, 2023 verdict, in accordance with the requirements of La. C.Cr.P.

art. 914. However, we will consider Defendant’s appeal to avoid “further useless

delay.” See, State v. Gilbert, 23-121 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/8/23), 377 So.3d 378,

384, writ denied, 23-1640 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 704. See also, State v. Fair,

15-434 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 182 So.3d 1238, 1240 n.1, writ denied, 16-185

(La. 2/3/17), 215 So.3d 688.

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues that the State failed to

prove his identity and that he conspired with Pryer to commit the offense.

Defendant avers that Detective Blitch’s testimony regarding the cell phones and

the photos of him and Pryer on the phones only proved that they were acquainted.

Defendant argues that Detective Blitch identified him as the caller on the jail call

based only on his PIN and testified that it was common for other inmates to use

someone else’s PIN. He also points out that he testified that there were 30 or more

inmates housed with him in his dorm. Defendant points out that, although Pryer

was found to be in possession of a single Suboxone sheet, the drug cannot be

24-KA-177 7

attributed to him without establishing an “adequate connection” between him, the

cell phones, and the jail calls. Defendant argues that because the evidence was

circumstantial, the State was required to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of

innocence, which in this matter included the possibility that another inmate could

have used his PIN number to call Pryer.

The State responds that it set forth sufficient evidence to prove that

Defendant was the individual who conspired with Pryer to introduce Suboxone into

JPCC. The State also posits that it presented sufficient testimony and evidence to

prove the elements of Defendant’s conviction. As to Defendant’s identity, the

State argues that Detective Blitch testified he discovered the jail call between

Defendant and Pryer using Defendant’s PIN number, and he had no reason to

believe that anyone other than Defendant used his PIN number to make the call.

The State avers that one of the cell phones found in Pryer’s purse at the time of her

arrest was a flip phone, which appeared to be the phone Defendant referred to as

his “little black phone.” The State also points to Detective Blitch’s testimony that

the iPhones had background photos and photos on the case of Defendant and Pryer,

further linking the pair.

As to the other elements of the conviction, the State asserts that the call

between Defendant and Pryer, along with Detective Blitch’s testimony, established

an agreement between the two. The State argues that other elements of the offense

were met through the evidence of the text messages on the cell phones. In the text

messages, Pryer referred to herself as “Don girl” and “Llah.” The State argues that

Defendant referred to Pryer as “Llah” during the call. The State points out that

Pryer had a Suboxone strip in her purse at the time of her arrest. The State avers

that this proves that Pryer did an act in furtherance of the pair’s objective to

introduce Suboxone into JPCC. The State argues that the jury heard Detective

Blitch’s testimony and reviewed the evidence set forth by the State. The State

24-KA-177 8

asserts that the jury’s determination was rational under Jackson8 and should not be

re-evaluated on appeal. The State contends that Defendant’s claim is without

merit.

The question of sufficiency of the evidence is properly raised in the trial

court by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art.

821. State v. Williams, 20-46 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 308 So.3d 791, 816, writ

denied, 21-316 (La. 5/25/21), 316 So.3d 2. In the instant matter, Defendant did not

file such a motion; however, the failure to file a motion for post-verdict judgment

of acquittal does not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence.

See State v. Faciane, 17-224 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/17), 233 So.3d 195, 205, writ

denied, 17-69 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So.3d 797.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must

determine that the evidence, whether direct, circumstantial, or a mixture of both,

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a

rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond

a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979); State v. Lane, 20-181 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/21), 310 So.3d 794, 804.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances

from which the existence of the main fact can be inferred according to reason and

common experience. State v. Gatson, 21-156 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/21), 334

So.3d 1021, 1034. When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission

of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 provides, “[A]ssuming every fact to be proved that

the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence.” State v. Woods, 23-41 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/23), 376

So.3d 1144, 1155, writ denied, 23-1615 (La. 5/29/04), 385 So.3d 700. This is not a

separate test from the Jackson standard but rather provides a helpful basis for

8
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

24-KA-177 9

determining the existence of reasonable doubt. Id. The reviewing court is not

required to determine whether another possible hypothesis of innocence suggested

by the defendant offers an exculpatory explanation of events. Rather, the

reviewing court must determine whether the possible alternative hypothesis is

sufficiently reasonable that a rational trier of fact could not have found proof of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. King, 22-371 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/23),

365 So.3d 897, 907, writ denied, 23-790 (La. 1/17/24), 377 So.3d 242, cert.

denied, 144 S.Ct. 2694 (2024).

The directive that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution requires the reviewing court to defer to the actual trier of fact’s rational

credibility calls, evidence weighing, and inference drawing. State v. Clifton, 17-

538 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 691, 702. This deference to the fact-

finder does not permit a reviewing court to decide whether it believes a witness or

whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v.

McKinney, 20-19 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/4/20), 304 So.3d 1097, 1102. As a result,

under the Jackson standard, a review of the record for sufficiency of the evidence

does not require the reviewing court to determine whether the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but whether, upon review of the whole

record, any rational trier of fact would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 1103.

In making this determination, a reviewing court will not re-evaluate the

credibility of witnesses or re-weigh the evidence. Lane, supra. Thus, in the

absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence,

the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support

a conviction. McKinney, supra.

Encompassed within proving the elements of an offense is the necessity of

proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. Where the key issue is the

24-KA-177 10

identification, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of

misidentification to carry its burden of proof. State v. Smith, 20-177 (La. App. 5

Cir. 4/28/21), 325 So.3d 482, 488, writ denied, 21-975 (La. 11/17/21), 327 So.3d

992. Identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. In

the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to

support a requisite factual finding. Id.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to introduce or possess contraband

into a correctional facility. At the time the offense was committed,9 La. R.S.

14:26(E) provided,

Criminal conspiracy is the agreement or combination of two or more
persons for the specific purpose of committing any crime; provided
that an agreement or combination to commit a crime shall not amount
to a criminal conspiracy unless, in addition to such agreement or
combination, one or more of such parties does an act in furtherance of
the object of the agreement or combination.

At the time the offense was committed La. R.S. 14:402 provided, in

pertinent part,

E. It shall be unlawful to possess or to introduce or attempt to
introduce into or upon the premises of any municipal or parish prison
or jail or to take or send or attempt to take or send therefrom, or to
give or to attempt to give to an inmate of any municipal or parish
prison or jail, any of the following articles which are hereby declared
to be contraband for the purpose of this Section, to wit:

***
(5) Any narcotic or hypnotic or excitive drug or any drugs of whatever
kind or nature, including nasal inhalators of any variety, sleeping pills
or barbiturates of any variety that create or may create a hypnotic
effect if taken internally, or any other controlled dangerous substance
as defined in R.S. 40:961 et seq. The introduction by a person of any
controlled dangerous substance as defined in R.S. 40:961 et seq., upon
the grounds of any municipal or parish prison or jail shall constitute
distribution of that controlled dangerous substance and shall be
subject to the penalties provided in R.S. 40:961 et seq.

La. R.S. 40:964 lists Buprenorphine as a Schedule III controlled dangerous

9
See State v. Sugasti, 01-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, 520.

24-KA-177 11

substance.

On appeal, Defendant does not argue that the State failed to prove any

specified essential statutory element of La. R.S. 14:26 and La. R.S. 14:402.

Rather, Defendant argues that the State failed to prove his identity as the person

who conspired with Pryer to introduce drugs into JPCC.

We find that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the identity of

Defendant. The State introduced evidence of the jail call between Defendant and

Pryer. Detective Blitch testified that he located the call between the two using

Defendant’s PIN number. While he explained that he was aware that inmates

would use other inmates’ PIN numbers, Detective Blitch testified that he reviewed

over 50 jail calls associated with Defendant’s PIN, and he had no reason to believe

that anyone other than Defendant made the calls. The State also presented

evidence of three cell phones that were found in Pryer’s purse when she was

arrested. Detective Blitch testified that photographs of Pryer and Defendant

together were found on the background of one of the iPhones and a collage of their

photos was on the cover of the phone. The other phone found in Pryer’s purse was

a flip phone that Detective Blitch testified was the phone that Defendant referenced

as his “little black phone” on the jail call. Text messages from the cell phones

were introduced into evidence. In one test message, Pryer referred to herself as

“Don girl.” In another message, the sender referred to Pryer as “Llah.” During the

recorded jail call, Defendant is heard referring to Pryer as “Llah.”

Defendant argues that the evidence provided by the State did not exclude the

hypothesis that someone else could have used his PIN number to make the call.

The jury was presented with the State’s evidence in this case, including Detective

Blitch’s testimony, the cell phones, and text messages. The jury also heard the jail

call in question. This Court should not re-evaluate the credibility of a witness or

re-weigh evidence. See Lane, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that a rational

24-KA-177 12

trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was sufficient to

find that Defendant committed the offense under the standard set forth in Jackson.

Errors Patent Review

The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920;

State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175

(La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). The following errors require corrective action.

The trial court sentenced Defendant as a second-felony offender to five years

at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

The habitual offender sentencing minute entry and the Louisiana Uniform

Commitment Order (“UCO”) reflect the same restrictions. While La. R.S.

15:529.1(G) requires all enhanced sentences to be imposed without benefit of

probation or suspension of sentence, it does not impose a parole restriction.

Rather, when a defendant is sentenced as a habitual offender, it is the penalty

provision of the underlying offense that imposes a parole restriction. State v.

Luckett, 17-432 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 236 So.3d 1278, 1280. The underlying

offense in the reference statute does not impose a parole restriction. See La. R.S.

14:26; La. R.S. 14:402; and La. R.S. 40:968(B). As such, we find Defendant’s

enhanced sentence should not have been imposed with a parole restriction.

When a sentencing error involves the imposition of restrictions beyond what

the legislature has authorized in the sentencing statute, the Louisiana Supreme

Court has ruled that the appellate courts should not rely on La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) to

correct the error as a matter of law but should correct the sentence on its own

authority under La. C.Cr.P. art. 882 to correct an illegal sentence at any time. See

State v. Payne, 17-12 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/17/17), 220 So.3d 882, 888. Therefore,

we amend the enhanced sentence to delete the restriction on parole. See State v.

Simmons, 17-385 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 237 So.3d 610, 613. We also order

24-KA-177 13

the 24th Judicial District Court Clerk of Court to transmit notice of the amended

sentence to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art.

892(B)(2) and to the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See State v.

Thompson, 18-273 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/28/18), 259 So.3d 1257, 1273, writ denied,

18-2077 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So.3d 372.

Next, there is a discrepancy between the habitual offender sentencing minute

entry, the UCO, and the transcript. The transcript reflects that Defendant’s

enhanced sentence was ordered to “run concurrent[sic] with the time he’s doing

now.” The habitual offender sentencing minute entry and the habitual offender

UCO do not indicate that Defendant’s sentence is to run concurrently with the

sentence he is currently serving. This Court has previously remanded a case for

correction of the minute entry and the UCO in its error patent review under similar

circumstances. See State v. Lyons, 13-564 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/31/14), 134 So.3d 36,

writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Lyons v. State, 14-481 (La. 11/7/14), 152 So.3d

170 (citing State v. Long, 12-184, (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/12), 106 So.3d 1136,

1142). Accordingly, to ensure accuracy in the record, we remand this matter and

order the trial court to correct the minute entry and UCO to reflect that Defendant’s

sentence was to run concurrently with the sentence he is currently serving. We

further order the Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the

corrected UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art.

892(B)(2) and the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See Lyons, supra;

State v. Maize, 16-575 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/15/17), 223 So.3d 633, 656, writ denied,

17-1265 (La. 4/27/18), 241 So.3d 306.

Additionally, there is another discrepancy between the habitual offender

minute entry and transcript. The transcript indicates that there was a stipulation to

the habitual offender bill, while the minute entry provides that “Defendant was

found GUILTY under R.S. 15:529.1 as a 2nd Offender.” The transcript prevails.

24-KA-177 14

State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). This Court has previously

remanded a case for correction of the minute entry to conform to the transcript for

a similar issue. See State v. Ballew, 11-401 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 78 So.3d

249, 255 (where this Court remanded the case for correction of the minute entry,

which indicated the defendant pleaded guilty and that he was found guilty by the

jury, but the transcript reflected only that the defendant was found guilty by a

jury). Accordingly, to ensure accuracy in the record, we remand the matter to the

trial court and order it to correct the minute entry to conform to the transcript.

Ballew, supra.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction. We amend

Defendant’s enhanced sentence to delete the parole restriction and affirm his

sentence, as amended. We remand the matter to the trial court with instructions, as

provided in this opinion.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
ENHANCED SENTENCE AMENDED
AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED;
REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF
THE UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER;
REMANDED WITH FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS

24-KA-177 15

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 18, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KA-177
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE FRANK A. BRINDISI (DISTRICT JUDGE)
MONIQUE D. NOLAN (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) HOLLI A. HERRLE-CASTILLO
(APPELLANT)

MAILED
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
MOLLY LOVE (APPELLEE)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053