State of Louisiana Versus Michael Davis

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KA-252

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL DAVIS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 21-1827, DIVISION "N"
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

February 26, 2025

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
JJM
SMC
JGG

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
MICHAEL DAVIS
Katherine M. Franks

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Juliet L. Clark

MOLAISON, J.

After entering a Crosby plea, the defendant, Michael Davis, seeks our

review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash and asserts that the court

failed to rule on the State’s pending notices of intent before taking his pleas. We

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts1 underlying the charges in this case were not developed at trial

because the defendant pled guilty. The record shows that on October 12, 2023, a

Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned a true bill that charged the defendant with

seven felony counts.2 The defendant pled not guilty to all charges on May 21,

2021. Among the State’s pretrial filings in this case was a notice of its intent to

introduce evidence under La. C.E. arts. 412.2 and/or 404(B), filed on February 3,

2023, and supplemented on April 28, 2023. As will be discussed, both the

defendant and the State agree that the trial court did not rule on the evidentiary

motions before the defendant’s Crosby3 plea was taken on March 11, 2024. At the

time of his plea, the defendant expressly reserved his right to appeal the admission

of any evidence offered by the State under La. C.E. arts. 412.2 or 404(B).4 This

timely appeal followed.

1
The State recited a factual basis for all charges when the defendant’s guilty pleas were taken by
the trial court on March 11, 2024.
2
Counts one and two were for the first degree rape of N.G. in violation of La. R.S. 14:42; count
three was for the sexual battery of a known juvenile, T.D., under the age of thirteen in violation of La.
R.S. 14:43.1; count four was for indecent behavior with a juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:81; count
five was for indecent behavior with a juvenile, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81; count six was for
aggravated crime against nature upon T.D., in violation of La. R.S. 14:89.1, and count seven was for an
aggravated assault upon T.D., in violation of La. R.S. 14:37.4. (In the interest of protecting the minor
crime victim of sexual offenses as set forth in La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(3), we will use only initials to identify
the victims. See State v. E.J.M., III, 12-774, 12-732 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13), 119 So.3d 648, 652 n.1.
See also Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-2.)
3
State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976).
4
The defendant was thereafter sentenced as follows: life imprisonment with hard labor, without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for counts one and two; ninety-nine years
imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for count three; twenty-five
years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on
counts four and five; fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor for count six; and ten years imprisonment at
hard labor for count seven. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

24-KA-252 1

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
to suppress the statement.

2. The trial court erroneously allowed the defendant to enter a “Crosby
plea reserving him the right to appeal a ruling that was never
expressly made and was not objected to by counsel.”

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The defendant points out, and the State acknowledges, that the transcript of

June 13, 2023,5 does not reflect a ruling on the State’s notices of its intent to

introduce evidence under La. C.E. arts. 412.2 and/or 404(B), nor does it show an

objection by the defendant. However, at the time of the defendant’s Crosby plea,

defense counsel stated on the record that the defendant was preserving his

objection to the admission of any evidence offered by the State under those notices

of intent. The defendant and the State suggest that the proper procedural remedy is

for this Court to remand for a nunc pro tunc hearing at the trial court for a ruling

on the State’s notices of intent to introduce evidence. We agree.

In State v. Floyd, 07-0216 (La. 10/5/07), 965 So.2d 865, the Louisiana

Supreme Court set forth the procedure to follow when a reviewing court is unable

to consider the merits of a defendant's suppression claim because the trial court did

not rule on the admissibility. In that case, the appellate court had vacated the

defendant's guilty plea, where the trial court failed to complete the hearing and

issue a ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. After reversing the

ruling of the appellate court, the Supreme Court remanded the matter, stating:

This case is remanded to the district court for purposes of
completing the hearing on the motion to suppress and for a ruling on
the merits of the search issue. If the court rules favorably to the
defendant on the motions, it shall provide him with the opportunity of
withdrawing his guilty plea and pleading anew. In the event of an

5
The minute entry from that date erroneously indicates that the trial court granted the State’s
notice of intent and that the defendant did not object at that time.

24-KA-252 2

adverse ruling on his motion the trial court shall maintain the guilty
plea and defendant may again appeal his conviction and sentence to
the court of appeal on the basis of his original Crosby reservation.

Id. [citations omitted]. This Court has previously followed Floyd when

addressing issues such as the one raised in the instant appeal. See State v.

Murphy, 09-139 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/27/09), 28 So.3d 388.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court to rule on the

admissibility of evidence the State sought to introduce under La. C.E. arts. 412.2

and/or 404(B). If the trial court denies the State’s notices of intent, it shall allow

the defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas and plead again. If the court rules in the

State’s favor, the trial court shall maintain the defendant’s guilty pleas, and the

defendant may again appeal his convictions and sentences to this Court on the

basis of his original Crosby reservation. See Floyd, supra. We pretermit

discussion of the merits of the defendant’s assignment of error one concerning his

motion to suppress a statement.

DECREE

For the reasons discussed, we remand this matter for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

24-KA-252 3

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
FEBRUARY 26, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KA-252
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
KATHERINE M. FRANKS (APPELLANT) JULIET L. CLARK (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)

MAILED
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053