State of Louisiana Versus Scott T Surgi
State of Louisiana Versus Scott T Surgi, No. 24-KA-291 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2025).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Bradford 676 So. 2d 1108
- State v. Jyles 704 So. 2d 241
- State v. Benjamin 573 So. 2d 528
- State v. Reed 653 So. 2d 1176
- State v. Corzo 896 So. 2d 1101
- State v. Turner 47 So. 3d 455
- State v. McCoil 924 So. 2d 1120
- State v. Moore 958 So. 2d 36
- State v. Oliveaux 312 So. 2d 337
- State v. Weiland 556 So. 2d 175
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KA-291
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
SCOTT T SURGI COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 22-5343, DIVISION "O"
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING
February 26, 2025
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Timothy S. Marcel
AFFIRMED
JGG
JJM
TSM
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
SCOTT T. SURGI
Bertha M. Hillman
GRAVOIS, J.
Defendant, Scott T. Surgi, appeals his conviction and sentence for simple
burglary in violation of La. R.S. 14:62. Under the procedure adopted by this Court
in State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108, 1110-11,1
previously appointed appellate counsel filed a brief asserting that she thoroughly
reviewed the trial court record and could not find any non-frivolous issues to raise
on appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.
1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704
So.2d 241 (per curiam), previously appointed appellate counsel filed a Motion to
Withdraw as Attorney of Record for defendant. However, prior to submission of
this appeal for decision, previously appointed appellate counsel for defendant and
newly appointed appellate counsel for defendant filed a Motion to Substitute newly
appointed appellate counsel for defendant in place of previously appointed
appellate counsel for defendant. The Motion to Substitute was granted by this
Court. This Court then denied previously appointed appellate counsel’s Motion to
Withdraw as Attorney of Record for defendant as moot. Newly appointed
appellate counsel for defendant has filed neither a brief on behalf of defendant, nor
a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record for defendant.
For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 9, 2022, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of
information charging defendant, Scott T. Surgi, with simple burglary of a shed
1
In Bradford, this Court adopted the procedures outlined in State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d
528, 530 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), which were sanctioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
State v. Mouton, 95-981 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177 (per curiam).
24-KA-291 1
located at 6225 Hodgson Street belonging to K. Briscoe in violation of La. R.S.
14:62.2 Defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment on November 15, 2022.
On February 28, 2024, defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and pled
guilty as charged. On that same date, the trial court sentenced defendant to the
Department of Corrections for two years. The trial judge ordered the sentence to
run concurrently with the sentences in case numbers 23-4835, 24-52, and 24-53,
and with any other sentences defendant may be currently serving, including parole
revocation sentences. The trial judge further ordered defendant to pay fines, fees,
and costs as per the fines, fees, and sentencing provision probation requirement
form, as well as restitution to the victim in the amount of $300.00, as agreed to by
defendant. On March 14, 2024, defendant filed a timely pro se motion for an
appeal that was granted on April 8, 2024.3
FACTS
Defendant entered a guilty plea, and therefore, the underlying facts were not
developed at a trial. However, during the colloquy, the prosecutor stated that if the
case had proceeded to trial, the State would have proven that on or about October
9, 2022, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:62, in that he committed a simple burglary
of a shed located at 6225 Hudson Street4 belonging to “Kate Brisco.”
Additionally, defendant indicated that he committed the crime.
ANDERS BRIEF
In Anders, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated that appointed
appellate counsel may request permission to withdraw if counsel finds the appeal
2
Kasey Lynn Wallace was also charged with that same offense in the same bill of
information.
3
Defendant has two companion cases, 24-KA-292 and 24-KA-293, pending in this
Court. In all three cases, defendant pled guilty to simple burglary in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.
Also, in 24-KA-293, defendant stipulated to being a second-felony offender.
4
The State alleged in the bill of information that the shed was located on Hodgson Street.
24-KA-291 2
to be wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of it.5 The request must
be accompanied by “‘a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal’” so as to provide the reviewing court “with a basis for
determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support
their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court
“in making the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that
counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440
(1988).
In Jyles, 704 So.2d at 241, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that an
Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pretrial motion or objection
made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or objections lack
merit. The Supreme Court explained that an Anders brief must demonstrate by full
discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an advocate’s eye over the
trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the trial court, subject to
the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant, adverse impact on shaping
the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.” Id.
When conducting a review for compliance with Anders, an appellate court
must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal
is wholly frivolous. Bradford, 676 So.2d at 1110. If, after an independent review,
the reviewing court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant’s conviction and
sentence. However, if the court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it may
either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief arguing
5
The United States Supreme Court reiterated Anders in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,
120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).
24-KA-291 3
the legal point(s) identified by the court, or grant the motion and appoint substitute
appellate counsel. Id.
ANALYSIS
Defendant’s previously appointed appellate counsel asserted in the brief
filed on defendant’s behalf that after a detailed review of the record, she could find
no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Counsel stated that during the plea
colloquy, the trial judge explained to defendant each of the rights necessary to
ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. The trial judge explained to
defendant that he had the right to a jury trial, to remain silent, to confront
witnesses, and to the presumption of innocence. Counsel averred that the trial
judge informed defendant that the State would be required to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt and that by tendering his plea, he was waiving his right
to appeal. Counsel also averred that the trial judge told defendant that if he was
arrested and convicted of subsequent offenses, this plea could be used to enhance
the penalty under the habitual offender law.
Counsel provided that the trial judge determined that defendant was aware of
the nature of the crime and understood the consequences of his plea. Counsel also
provided that the trial judge agreed to sentence defendant to a term of two years.
Counsel asserted that the bill of information shows that defendant was properly
charged, that it plainly and concisely states the essential facts constituting the
offense charged, and that it sufficiently identified defendant and the crime charged.
Counsel maintained that the record reveals that there are no appealable issues
involving defendant’s presence, as he was present and represented by counsel at all
crucial stages of the proceedings, including his arraignment and sentencing.
Counsel submitted that the trial judge imposed the sentence in conformity with the
plea agreement. Accordingly, counsel acknowledged that defendant is now
restricted by law from appealing his conviction and sentence.
24-KA-291 4
In response, the State contends that appellate counsel correctly noted that
this case presents no non-frivolous issues for appellate review.
Previously appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as
attorney of record for defendant, which states that counsel notified defendant of the
filing of this motion and of his right to file a pro se brief in this appeal.
Additionally, this Court sent defendant a letter by certified mail informing him that
an Anders brief had been filed and that he had until August 2, 2024 to file a pro se
supplemental brief. Defendant did not file a pro se supplemental brief.
Our independent review of the record supports previously appointed
appellate counsel’s assertion that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on
appeal. The bill of information properly charged defendant and plainly and
concisely stated the essential facts constituting the charged offense. It sufficiently
identified defendant and the crime charged. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 464 and 466. As
reflected by the minute entries, defendant and his counsel appeared at all crucial
stages of the proceedings against him, including his arraignment, guilty plea
proceedings, and sentencing. As such, defendant’s presence did not present any
issues that would support an appeal.
The record also indicates that defense counsel filed omnibus motions, which
were not ruled upon by the trial court prior to the time defendant entered his guilty
plea. However, defendant did not object to the trial court’s failure to do so. When
a defendant does not object to the trial court’s failure to hear or rule on a pretrial
motion prior to pleading guilty, the motion is considered waived. See State v.
Corzo, 04-791 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05), 896 So.2d 1101, 1102.
Defendant pled guilty as charged to simple burglary. If a defendant pleads
guilty, he normally waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading
up to the guilty plea, which precludes review of such defects either by appeal or by
an application for post-conviction relief. State v. Turner, 09-1079 (La. App. 5 Cir.
24-KA-291 5
7/27/10), 47 So.3d 455, 459. Once a defendant is sentenced, only those guilty
pleas that are unconstitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or by an
application for post-conviction relief. State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La. App. 5 Cir.
2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124. A guilty plea is unconstitutionally infirm if it is
not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin6 colloquy is inadequate, or when a
defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain, or what he justifiably
believes was a plea bargain, and that bargain is not kept. Id.
Our independent review of the record reveals no unconstitutional infirmity
or any irregularity in defendant’s guilty plea that would render it invalid. The
record reflects that on February 28, 2024, defense counsel advised the trial judge
that defendant was going to plead guilty that day to simple burglary. The trial
judge stated that the offense had a maximum sentence of twelve years. The State
said that it would not file a habitual offender bill in this matter. During the
colloquy, defendant indicated that he was pleading guilty to simple burglary. The
trial judge advised defendant that by pleading guilty, he was giving up many rights,
including the right to a trial by jury. The trial judge informed defendant that he
had the right to require that the State prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
the right to confront accusers, to cross-examine witnesses, and to compel testimony
on his own behalf. She also informed defendant that he had the right to remain
silent and not testify and that his silence would not be an inference of guilt. The
trial judge advised defendant that he had the right to appeal any adverse verdict
and the right to the assistance of an attorney. She stated that if defendant could not
afford an attorney, a free court attorney would be appointed. When asked if
defendant understood that he was waiving and giving up these rights if he entered
into a guilty plea, defendant replied affirmatively.
6
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
24-KA-291 6
Defendant also indicated he understood that by pleading guilty, he was
authorizing the trial court to impose a penalty without having a trial. He
understood that if he was arrested and convicted of any subsequent offense, his
guilty plea could be used to enhance the penalty for that offense. Defendant
indicated that no one had made any promises or threats and that no one had
coerced him into entering a guilty plea. The prosecutor then provided a factual
basis for the offense, and defendant admitted that he had committed the crime to
which he was pleading guilty. The prosecutor added that defendant would have to
pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $300.00, and defense counsel
responded that was indicated on the Boykin form.
The trial judge then stated that she was satisfied that defendant was aware of
the nature of the crime to which he was pleading guilty, that defendant did in fact
commit the crime, that he understood the consequences of his plea, that he was
voluntarily pleading guilty, and that there was a factual basis for the plea.
Therefore, the trial judge accepted defendant’s guilty plea.
Further, the waiver of rights form reflects that defendant was advised of his
rights, including his right to a jury trial, his right to confrontation, and his privilege
against self-incrimination; that defendant placed his initials next to the individual
advisals of his rights; and that he placed his signature at the end of the waiver of
rights form, thus indicating that he understood he was waiving those rights. The
waiver of rights form also reflects that defendant understood that he was pleading
guilty to simple burglary, and it set forth the actual sentence defendant would
receive if he pled guilty. The trial judge found that defendant made a knowing,
intelligent, free, and voluntary act of pleading guilty.
Further, defendant’s sentence falls within the sentencing range prescribed by
the applicable statute. See La. R.S. 14:62. Also, the sentence was imposed
pursuant to, and in conformity with, the plea agreement. In this regard, La. C.Cr.P.
24-KA-291 7
art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking review of a sentence that was
imposed in conformity with a plea agreement, which was set forth in the record at
the time of the plea. State v. Moore, 06-875 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 958 So.2d
36, 46.
We find previously appointed appellate counsel’s brief adequately
demonstrated by full discussion and analysis that counsel reviewed the trial court
proceedings and could not identify any basis for a non-frivolous appeal, and our
independent review of the record supports counsel’s assertion.
ERRORS PATENT REVIEW
The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920,
State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). Our review of the record reveals no errors patent.
DECREE
Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED
24-KA-291 8
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
FEBRUARY 26, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
24-KA-291
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE)
THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) BERTHA M. HILLMAN (APPELLANT) CHRISTOPHER A. ABERLE (APPELLANT)
MAILED
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053