24-KA-73 Nonprecedential Affirmed; Remanded with Instructions Processed

State of Louisiana Versus Shyheem Tyje Love

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit · Filed October 30, 2024

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KA-73

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

SHYHEEM TYJE LOVE COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 22-1207, DIVISION "F"
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

October 30, 2024

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Timothy S. Marcel

CONVICTIONS, MULTIPLE OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND
SENTENCES AFFIRMED; MATTER REMANDED
JJM
FHW
TSM

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
SHYHEEM TYJE LOVE
Prentice L. White

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Monique D. Nolan
Molly Love
Leo M. Aaron

MOLAISON, J.

The defendant, Shyheem Tyje Love, appeals his convictions and sentences

for attempted second-degree murder, criminal damage to property, possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, and attempted obstruction of justice. He also

challenges his multiple offender adjudication and sentence. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2022, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information charging the defendant with attempted second-degree murder in

violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and La. R.S. 14:27 (count one), simple criminal

damage to property with the damage amounting to greater than $1,000 but less

than $50,000 in violation of La. R.S. 14:56(B)(2) (count two), and possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count three).1 The

defendant pled not guilty to all counts.

On July 7, 2023, the State filed a superseding bill of information charging

the defendant with obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (count

4), in addition to the original three counts. The defendant pled not guilty to all

counts. The case proceeded to trial, and on October 3, 2023, the jury unanimously

found the defendant guilty as charged on counts one, two, and three and guilty of

the lesser responsive verdict of attempted obstruction of justice on count four.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motions for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal and new trial, then sentenced the defendant to imprisonment at hard labor

for forty-five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence

on count one; imprisonment at hard labor for two years on count two;

imprisonment at hard labor for twenty years without benefit of parole, probation,

1
In count three, the State alleged that on or about February 22, 2018, the defendant violated La. R.S.
14:95.1 in that he had in his possession a firearm after having been previously convicted of second-degree
battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1 in case number 15-CR-98 in the 40th Judicial District Court.

24-KA-73 1

or suspension of sentence on count three; and imprisonment at hard labor for ten

years on count four, with the sentences to run concurrently. The State then notified

the defense that it intended to file a multiple offender bill of information on count

one.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence and

granted his motion for appeal on November 16, 2023. On January 29, 2024, the

State filed a multiple bill alleging the defendant to be a third-felony offender on

count one.

The trial court found the defendant to be a third felony offender on count

one after the multiple bill hearing held on January 29, 2024. Afterward, the trial

court vacated the sentence on count one and resentenced the defendant under the

multiple bill statute to imprisonment at hard labor for forty-five years without the

benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The trial court ordered the

enhanced sentence to run concurrently with the original sentences on counts two,

three, and four. This timely appeal follows.

FACTS

On December 22, 2021, police responded to reports of gunfire in Kenner.

The victim, Donald Buggage, told police that he dropped off his friend, Brittany

Lavigne, and her children at her residence located at 1620 Newport Place. In

doing so, he parked in an alley between 1620 Newport Place and 42nd Street. He

reported that Ms. Lavigne’s boyfriend, “Shyheem,” later identified as the

defendant, told him to step out of the vehicle, a Nissan van. Mr. Buggage refused,

and the defendant fired three shots at him, one of which struck him in the back.

Crime scene technicians examined the victim’s vehicle and photographed

the victim’s injuries and bullet holes in the vehicle. Officers found a projectile in

the driver’s seat of the vehicle that they believed struck the victim. The frame of

the vehicle had two more projectiles lodged in it. There were no shell casings or

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firearms inside the victim’s vehicle. There were no firearms on the victim’s

person, and there were no signs of a bullet exiting the vehicle. There was no

evidence that gunshots were fired from inside of the van. Officers found three

spent 9 mm casings in the area and a “live round” underneath the doormat by the

front door of Ms. Lavigne’s apartment.

Mr. Buggage, who was sixty-three years old, testified that he had known Ms.

Lavigne for approximately twenty years and helped her care for her three children.

The defendant and Ms. Lavigne had “been a couple” for approximately three or

four months before the shooting. On the day of the shooting, Mr. Buggage went to

work and took Ms. Lavigne’s children with him. Ms. Lavigne later called him,

stating that she was in jail, and asked him to come and pay her bond so she could

be released. Mr. Buggage complied and then brought her and the children sleeping

in the van to Ms. Lavigne’s residence. Mr. Buggage testified that when they

arrived, he saw the defendant walking up to the van and wondered “how the

defendant knew to be there.” Mr. Buggage testified that the defendant approached

the van, and he (Mr. Buggage) lowered the front passenger window; the defendant

told him to get out of the van because he wanted to talk to Mr. Buggage. Mr.

Buggage refused to exit the vehicle, explaining that he knew the defendant must be

“up to something.” During this time, Ms. Lavigne was bringing her children into

the residence one at a time. When Ms. Lavigne returned to get the last child, she

told the defendant to leave. Mr. Buggage testified that the defendant stood there,

raised his hand, pointed a gun at him, and shot at the van five or six times. When

he realized the defendant had shot him, he pulled off.

Mr. Buggage thought the defendant was trying to kill him, but he did not

know why. He explained that one of the bullets came through the mirror, went

through his back, came out, and went through the seat. Mr. Buggage called the

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police and met with them; then, they transported him to the hospital for treatment

of the gunshot wound.

Mr. Buggage testified that he did not threaten the defendant and was not

carrying a gun when the defendant shot him. He paid $2,300 to repair the damage

to his van.

Mr. Buggage testified that after the defendant shot him, Ms. Lavigne called

him several times in an attempt to convince him to drop the charges against the

defendant. He also testified that Ms. Lavigne told him that the defendant was

offered a thirty-year plea agreement and that he (Mr. Buggage) was “throwing the

defendant’s life away.” Mr. Buggage explained that the defendant’s father asked

him, in a three-way call, if he would take $5,000 to drop the charges. This phone

call was recorded and played for the jury. Mr. Buggage stated that he declined the

offer, elaborating that if he dropped the charges, the defendant might try to kill him

again and succeed in doing so. Mr. Buggage testified that Ms. Lavigne called

again, stating that the defendant’s mother and brother offered an additional $5,000;

however, he refused again.

Detective Joann Gallagher of the Kenner Police Department testified that

she took a statement from Mr. Buggage. Mr. Buggage described the suspect,

whom he knew only as “Shyheem,” as a black male from LaPlace with a cross

tattoo on his forehead between his eyes, approximately six feet tall and twenty-six

years old. Police compiled a photographic lineup, and Mr. Buggage positively

identified2 the defendant as the perpetrator. Law enforcement arrested the

defendant at Ms. Lavigne’s residence.

Detective Gallagher testified that she later listened to the defendant’s phone

calls from jail. In one call, the defendant and a man, whom she believed was the

defendant’s father, spoke about going to a notary so Mr. Buggage could sign an

2
The administration of the lineup was audio recorded, and the audiotape was played for the jury.

24-KA-73 4

affidavit stating that the defendant did not shoot him and that they would pay him

money. Detective Gallagher subsequently listened to a phone call that Mr.

Buggage recorded, which included Ms. Lavigne, Mr. Buggage, and the same

gentleman, during which Mr. Buggage was asked again to drop the charges. She

heard Mr. Buggage explain that he could not do that because if he did so and the

defendant was released, the defendant might kill him. These calls were recorded

and played for the jury.

In support of count three, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the

State called Donna Quintanilla, who was accepted as an expert in latent print

processing and comparison, to establish defendant’s prior felony conviction. Ms.

Quintanilla testified that she fingerprinted the defendant in court one day prior and

identified State’s Exhibit 15 as that fingerprint card. She compared the prints on

this card with those in State’s Exhibit 16, the fingerprint cards from the

defendant’s prior arrest and conviction for second-degree battery. She testified

that both cards contained the same name (Shyheem Love), State ID number, and

AFIS number. She pointed out that the social security numbers differed by one

number but that the defendant had supplied the number at the time of his arrest.

Ms. Quintanilla testified that she compared the fingerprints in these exhibits

and found sufficient features in agreement to find the prints on both cards were

made by the same person, the defendant herein. She further testified that another

JPSO examiner, Jazmin Charles, also analyzed the fingerprint cards and verified

the results.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Defendant’s sole assignment of error addresses itself to his multiple bill

hearing, which occurred post-conviction and sentence on January 29, 2024. In his

assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the

State to present expert testimony at the multiple bill hearing from Jazmin Charles,

24-KA-73 5

a witness who had not been certified in fingerprint analysis, whose evaluations

needed to be reviewed by a certified analyst, and who indicated that this was her

first time testifying in court. For these reasons, the defendant seeks to reverse the

multiple bill adjudication and remand the case to the trial court.

The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

recognizing Ms. Charles as an expert in latent fingerprint analysis and allowing her

to testify at the multiple bill hearing. It further responds that Ms. Charles provided

the trial court with her curriculum vitae, establishing her training and education.

The State asserts that Ms. Charles testified to her experience working as an AFIS

technician and a latent print examiner for the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office

(JPSO). It points out that Ms. Charles offered testimony and opinion at the hearing

to assist the trier of fact on latent fingerprint analysis. The State maintains nothing

suggests that the trial court’s finding as to Ms. Charles’ competency as an expert

was an abuse of discretion, and there is no basis for reversing the defendant’s

adjudication as a third felony offender.

At the multiple bill hearing, the defense counsel stated that she had received

a notice of intent from the State to call an expert witness, Ms. Charles, from the

JPSO crime lab, including her two-page curriculum vitae. The defense counsel

objected to Ms. Charles’ testimony because of the late disclosure. The prosecutor

apologized, explaining that he was busy with a murder trial and gave defense

counsel the notice as soon as possible. The trial court overruled the defense

counsel’s objection.

Ms. Charles testified that she worked in the JPSO crime laboratory as a

latent print examiner and had been in that position for two years. She explained

that her duty as a latent print examiner was to compare unknown latent prints to

known prints and process pieces of evidence either chemically or physically to

develop latent prints. She testified that before becoming a latent print examiner,

24-KA-73 6

she was an AFIS technician for seven months and that her duties were to conduct

quality control of bookings involving fingerprints and palm prints from criminal

agencies. Ms. Charles stated that she had a Bachelor of Science degree in

biological sciences and completed a year and a half of external and internal

training. For her “internal training,” she shadowed her supervisor, Ms. Quintanilla,

a qualified and certified latent print examiner, in comparison and processing cases.

Ms. Charles testified that she assisted Ms. Quintanilla by fingerprinting

individuals and by viewing her testimony whenever Ms. Quintanilla was called to

testify at a multiple bill hearing or in a felon in possession of a firearm case. She

explained that whenever a latent print examiner analyzed fingerprints, the prints

were verified using a methodology called “ACE-V.” Ms. Charles maintained that

after being authorized to conduct comparison cases, she verified Ms. Quintanilla’s

cases. Ms. Charles elaborated that becoming a certified latent print examiner was

not a requirement of the JPSO crime lab but that it was considered a “level of

excellency.” She also testified that the certification entailed an eight-hour test that

included the history of fingerprinting and different subjects about processing and

comparison.

Ms. Charles averred that she was working toward that certification and that

in the next year, she planned on submitting the documents needed to take the test.

She provided the trial court with a copy of her curriculum vitae, and the court

admitted it into evidence over the objection of the defense counsel. During cross-

examination, Ms. Charles admitted that she had never testified as an expert in

court.

Although defense counsel indicated after questioning that she would not

stipulate to Ms. Charles’ qualifications, the trial court accepted Ms. Charles as an

expert in latent print processing and comparison over the defense’s objection.

24-KA-73 7

La. C.E. art. 702 provides that if scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge assists the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining

a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify to that in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

In reviewing a trial court’s decision in qualifying a witness as an expert,

courts typically place the burden on the party offering the witness as an expert.

State v. Craig, 95-2499 (La. 5/20/97), 699 So.2d 865, 870, cert. denied, 522 U.S.

935, 118 S.Ct. 343, 139 L.Ed.2d 266 (1997). The Louisiana Supreme Court has

consistently held that the competency of an expert witness is a question of fact

determined within the sound discretion of the trial judge. The trial court’s rulings

on the qualifications of expert witnesses will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion. State v. Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 8 (La. 1990).

Generally, an expert’s competency test is the expert’s knowledge of the

subject about which he is called upon to express an opinion. State v. Ferguson, 09-

1422 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/10), 54 So.3d 152, 166, writ denied, 11-135 (La.

6/3/11), 63 So.3d 1008. A combination of specialized training, work experience,

and practical application of the expert’s knowledge can establish that person as an

expert. Id. Courts can also consider the previous qualification of a witness as an

expert. Craig, supra.

The record indicates that the State presented sufficient evidence to support

the trial court’s acceptance of Ms. Charles’ competency to be qualified as an expert

based on her knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education in latent

fingerprint examinations and analysis. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by qualifying Ms. Charles as an expert.

24-KA-73 8

ERROR PATENT REVIEW

We reviewed the record for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920;

State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175

(La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The uniform commitment order (UCO) reflects that the adjudication date

was November 2, 2023; however, the record shows that the adjudication date was

October 3, 2023. In State v. Tillery, 14-429 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 167 So.3d

15, 22, writ denied, 15-106 (La. 11/6/15), 180 So.3d 306, this Court remanded the

matter for correction of the adjudication date in the UCO. Likewise, we remand

this case and order the trial court to correct the UCO to reflect the accurate

adjudication date. On remand, we order the Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial

District Court to transmit the original of the corrected UCO to the appropriate

authorities following La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2), and the Department of

Corrections’ legal department. See State v. Doucet, 17-200 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/27/17), 237 So.3d 598, writs denied, 18-77 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So.3d 789 and

18-196 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So.3d 1052, cert. denied, - - U.S. - - , 139 S.Ct. 2676,

204 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2019).

CONCLUSION

For the preceding reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions, multiple

offender adjudication, and sentences. We remand this matter with the instructions

stated above.

CONVICTIONS, MULTIPLE OFFENDER
ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCES
AFFIRMED; MATTER REMANDED

24-KA-73 9

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
OCTOBER 30, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KA-73
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ (DISTRICT JUDGE)
MATTHEW R. CLAUSS (APPELLEE) MONIQUE D. NOLAN (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)

MAILED
PRENTICE L. WHITE (APPELLANT) HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW (APPELLEE)
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
16731 CICERO AVENUE LEO M. AARON (APPELLEE)
BATON ROUGE, LA 70816 DISTRICT ATTORNEY
MOLLY LOVE (APPELLEE)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053