State of Louisiana Versus Enyel Bello-Urbina

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KA-8

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ENYEL BELLO-URBINA COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 22-5168, DIVISION "I"
HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER, JUDGE PRESIDING

October 30, 2024

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Scott U. Schlegel

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
JGG
JJM
SUS

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Darren A. Allemand
Eric Cusimano

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
ENYEL BELLO-URBINA
Jane L. Beebe

GRAVOIS, J.

Defendant, Enyel Bello-Urbina, was convicted of felony carnal knowledge

of a juvenile, in violation of La. R.S. 14:80. He was sentenced to thirty months

imprisonment at the Department of Corrections and ordered to pay a fine of two

thousand dollars. On appeal, he challenges his conviction, arguing the State failed

to prove that the victim was thirteen years of age or older but less than seventeen

years of age at the time of the offense. For the reasons that follow, we affirm

defendant’s conviction and sentence, except that we vacate the portion of

defendant’s sentence that imposed a financial obligation and remand this matter to

the trial court for compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 21, 2022, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information alleging that defendant, on or between January 1, 2021 and January 3,

2022, violated La. R.S. 14:80, committing “carnal knowledge of a known juvenile,

DOB (08/03/2005).” Defendant was arraigned on December 8, 2022 and entered a

plea of not guilty.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Bill of Information on January 23,

2023, asserting that a birth certificate obtained by the defense on the alleged victim

indicates that the victim was born on August 3, 2002, thereby confirming that the

victim was at least eighteen years old at the time of the alleged offense, thus

requiring dismissal of the charge against defendant. The State responded to the

motion on May 11, 2023, asserting that the victim’s age was an issue to be decided

by the trier of fact at trial, rather than by the court pre-trial, and thus the Motion to

Dismiss should be denied. The court denied the Motion to Dismiss on June 22,

2023.

On September 18, 2023, the case proceeded to trial before a six-person jury,

and on the following day, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. On

24-KA-8 1

September 25, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to thirty months

imprisonment at the Department of Corrections. The court ordered defendant to

pay a fine of two thousand dollars.1

On October 9, 2023, defendant filed a motion for appeal, which the court

granted on October 11, 2023.

Defendant now argues on appeal that: 1) the court violated his right to

confront his accusers; and 2) the evidence was insufficient as to his carnal

knowledge of a juvenile conviction.

FACTS

The Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) responded to a complaint

concerning the whereabouts of the victim, A.J.R.2 A.J.R. was subsequently

located, found to be pregnant, and later gave birth to A.N.J. Defendant, Enyel

Bello-Urbina, who was thirty-one years old at the time, was identified as the father

of the baby. During trial, the State introduced evidence showing that A.J.R. was

born on August 3, 2005, making her thirteen years of age or older but less than

seventeen years of age during the date range of the alleged offense.3 Conversely,

the defense presented evidence indicating that A.J.R. was born on August 3, 2002,

making her older than seventeen during the date range of the alleged offense.

JPSO Detective Andrew Cook with the Special Victims Division arrived at

the scene on Houma Boulevard, where defendant and A.J.R. previously lived, and

communicated with T.J.R., the victim’s sister, using an interpreter. At the time,

the whereabouts of A.J.R. were unknown, and this was the focus of the

1
The court also ordered that defendant register as a sex offender for fifteen years upon
his release from custody.
2
This Court adheres to the policy that “this Court’s published work will use only initials
to identify the victim and any defendant or witness whose name can lead to the victim’s identity
(i.e., parent, sibling, or relative with the same last name as the victim).” See State v. E.J.M., III,
12-774, 12-732 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13), 119 So.3d 648, 652 n.1.
3
As indicated above, the bill of information alleged that the offense occurred between
January 1, 2021 and January 3, 2022.

24-KA-8 2

investigation. T.J.R. provided information about defendant and A.J.R.’s cell

phones, and Detective Cook attempted to locate the victim and defendant through

cell phone pings. During his investigation, Detective Cook found biographical

information on defendant, corroborating his birthdate of January 27, 1991.

Eventually, A.J.R. was located at 120 North Arnault in Metairie, where she had

been living with defendant for several weeks and was found to be several months

pregnant.

The parties stipulated to the admission of A.J.R.’s medical records from

Children’s Hospital and Touro Hospital. Detective Cook discussed A.J.R.’s

medical records from Children’s Hospital from December 30, 2021, which was a

few days after the initial complaint was made in this case. The records indicated

that defendant brought A.J.R. and T.J.R. to the United States from Nicaragua.

Defendant lived with them for the first six months after their arrival at the Houma

Boulevard address. The records confirmed that defendant is thirty-one years old

and is the father of A.J.R.’s child. In reviewing the medical records, Detective

Cook confirmed that they indicated A.J.R. presented to the emergency department

as four to five months pregnant. He stated that this was consistent with his

investigation and with the birth of A.J.R.’s child.

A.J.R. gave birth at Touro Hospital on May 6, 2022. Detective Cook

reviewed A.N.J.’s birth certificate, and confirmed that the birth certificate

indicated A.J.R.’s age at the time she gave birth as sixteen years old. He stated

that this finding was consistent with the biographical information and medical

records he obtained during his investigation. He then reviewed the medical records

regarding A.J.R.’s delivery of her child. Detective Cook testified that A.J.R.’s

birthdate, August 3, 2005, was consistent with the information in her child’s birth

certificate, medical records related to her pregnancy and delivery, and other

records obtained during his investigation.

24-KA-8 3

Detective Cook stated that the only information suggesting a different

birthdate than August 3, 2005 was an ID that he recovered. The photo ID, issued

from Nicaragua, listed the birthdate as August 3, 2002. He acknowledged that he

was not an expert in Nicaraguan documents and consulted an agent from the

United States Border Patrol who had better knowledge of similar IDs. He

indicated that the only documents he obtained from Border Patrol were the initial

documentation they obtained when A.J.R. and T.J.R. crossed the border.

Detective Cook explained that the date of birth he had for A.J.R. was based

on what her sister initially told him. Although he initially said A.J.R. did not

directly provide her date of birth but gave it to the hospital, he later stated he did

not know whether the hospital obtained the date of birth from A.J.R. or T.J.R. He

had not seen a copy of A.J.R.’s birth certificate or her passport. He testified that he

did not attempt to contact the Register of Persons in Nicaragua to validate A.J.R.’s

age and was unsure if anyone else had done so. Detective Cook requested the

Border Patrol Agency to contact the Consulate of Nicaragua on his behalf to obtain

information.

Following defendant’s arrest, Detective Cook informed him of his rights

using a form and obtained his statement on January 4, 2022, with the assistance of

another JPSO detective, Detective Castro, who served as an interpreter. He

testified that defendant spoke freely about his relationship with A.J.R., admitted to

a sexual relationship between them, and acknowledged that he was aware of the

pregnancy. Defendant told him A.J.R. was nineteen years old. Buccal swabs from

defendant, A.J.R., and her child confirmed that defendant was the child’s father.

Ana Osborne testified that she runs a business that does translations and

transcriptions for other parties. She transcribed defendant’s January 4, 2022

statement. According to the transcript, defendant acknowledged that his date of

birth was January 27, 1991 and he was thirty years old. He entered the United

24-KA-8 4

States from Nicaragua six years ago. Defendant stated that his brother informed

him that a girl named “Selena” is making the accusation against him.4 He went to

work in Washington and when he returned, he found that a “bunch of them” were

in his apartment, including T.J.R. and A.J.R. Defendant later indicated that he and

A.J.R. moved to their current address at “120 North Arnold” on December 13. He

said that he and A.J.R. last had intercourse on the twenty-sixth, the evening before

his arrest, in that apartment.

Defendant provided that A.J.R. is between nineteen and twenty-one years

old.5 He knew her older sister all of her life. He stated that T.J.R. and A.J.R.

arrived in the United States illegally and came to his house on Houma Boulevard

from immigration. He believed they arrived between March and May of 2021, and

he confirmed he first became intimate with A.J.R. during that time period.

Defendant stated they were boyfriend and girlfriend. When further questioned

about their marital status, defendant clarified that they were still getting to know

each other and they had no legal or formal ties. Defendant acknowledged A.J.R.

was pregnant, believing he was the father. He mentioned they were not always

together and denied she was seeing someone else. He told Detective Castro that

they learned she was pregnant when they visited a clinic, and she was four or five

months along.

Border Patrol Agent Josue Breban Robles testified that he speaks Spanish

and is knowledgeable about migration from Central American countries, including

Nicaragua. Agent Robles confirmed his familiarity with T.J.R. and A.J.R., who

initially entered the United States together on April 29, 2021. Agent Roble stated

4
Ms. Osborne explained that defendant called the person who accused him “Selena,” but
later referred to her by T.J.R.’s first name.
5
Detective Castro inquired about A.J.R.’s birthdate. Defendant responded vaguely,
saying it was either August 2nd or 3rd and mentioned a possible year of 2001 or 2002. When the
detective asked for clarification between the two years, defendant admitted he was not sure.

24-KA-8 5

that they submitted a report to the Border Patrol intake. He confirmed that A.J.R.

provided a birthdate of August 3, 2005, and that this birthdate matched later

investigation findings. He stated that A.J.R. and T.J.R. are currently in Georgia,

and A.J.R. expressed a lack of desire to participate in the prosecution. Agent

Robles testified about several documents, including the ID, a memorandum that he

prepared, and a birth certificate provided by the defense.

Agent Robles explained that A.J.R.’s ID would be referred to as an “alter” in

identification. Part of his training at the academy involved identifying common

mistakes when individuals falsify identifications, such as font type, size, and

misspellings. The mistake on this ID specifically pertained to A.J.R.’s reported

date of birth. The DOB on the ID says that she was born in 2002. He denied that

this was consistent with any information he had regarding A.J.R., stating that it did

not match. He explained that the Nicaraguan ID includes a bar code, “370-

096140-0005X.” Agent Robles testified, “the 370, this number, the 096140, it has

to match the DOB identified here, which is supposed to be 03/08/2002.” Based on

this barcode, A.J.R. was born in 1940, which was his “first red flag.” He testified

that no other indicators on the front of the card suggested it was fraudulent. On the

back of the ID, the “other red flag” was the misspelling of “domicilio.” He

explained that the “L” is capitalized when it is supposed to be lowercase.

Because discrepancies were identified, he contacted “Customs and Border

Protection attention” at the United States Embassy in Nicaragua. They were able

to confirm the information on this ID was false. He affirmed that this action

confirmed the date of birth as August 3, 2005. Thereafter, in January 2022, Agent

Robles prepared a memorandum regarding the validity of the ID and A.J.R.’s

birthdate. He stated that they create a memorandum any time they conduct

research involving another agency. He added that it is signed to ensure

documentation. Agent Robles testified that his research indicated a birthdate of

24-KA-8 6

August 3, 2005. He confirmed that there was no evidence suggesting a birthdate of

August 3, 2002, other than the fake ID. Agent Robles testified that he encounters

hundreds of individuals entering the country with fake documents. He stated that

A.J.R. was allowed to enter the country because she presented an ID indicating she

was an adult.

Agent Robles’ memorandum included a partial copy of a birth certificate

stating her date of birth was August 3, 2005. When asked if it was a copy of the

original, Agent Robles responded that the birth certificate was given to him by the

“CBP Aperture” in the United States Embassy in Nicaragua. He confirmed that

the information was obtained by someone who was “on the ground” and able to

retrieve the document.6 Agent Robles agreed that this partial copy of the birth

certificate did not resemble the birth certificate provided by defense counsel.

At trial, both the State and the defense questioned Agent Robles about a

birth certificate originally provided by the defense. Agent Robles explained that

this document indicated a change to A.J.R.’s birth year from 2005 to 2002. He

stated that this document was produced on January 10, 2023. He acknowledged

that this birth certificate appears to be legitimate to him, but noted that he is not a

custodian of records for the government of Nicaragua. He stated that this

document was filed after he was initially consulted in this case about A.J.R.’s

birthdate in January 2022.

6
In the memorandum, it is stated that it is from “Josue Breban-Robles Border Patrol
Agent-Intelligence New Orleans Sector Intelligence Unit.” The subject line reads: “Requesting
Nicaraguan identification for [A.J.R.] (H/F/, 08/03/2005).” Below this, there is a paragraph that
states:
On January 6, 2022, I, Border Patrol Agent-Intelligence Josue Breban-
Robles, from the New Orleans Border Patrol Sector, requested assistance to the
Office of International Affairs-Latin America and Caribbean Division to acquire a
Nicaraguan identification for [A.J.R.]. The Office of International Affairs
directed my request to the U.S. Embassy, Managua, Nicaragua. On January 14,
2022, the government of Nicaragua confirmed the date of birth as August 3, 2005
for [A.J.R.]. The Nicaraguan government provided an official copy of the
Nicaraguan identification (birth certificate).

24-KA-8 7

Agent Robles was questioned regarding the apostille attached to the birth

certificate. He explained that such documents are not commonly encountered at

the border, he had not encountered a document with an attached apostille at the

border, and this was the first time he had seen this type of document. He was

unfamiliar with its purpose and had not received training on this type of document.

He stated that he is not an expert in identifying Nicaraguan documents and his

expertise lies in what he encounters regularly. In reviewing the document, he

indicated that Nicaragua issued the apostille; it was signed by the registrar, the

head of external persons, and it matched the birth certificate. Defense counsel

directed him to the seal of the Nicaraguan Department of Foreign Relations, and

Agent Robles relayed that it stated underneath the seal, “certificado nacimiento,”

which means birth certificate. He stated that the name on the document was

A.J.R.’s.

When asked if he could determine if it was a copy of the original birth

certificate, Agent Robles responded, “It is highly possible it is a copy of the

original.” He asserted that he could declare the ID as fake, but he could not

definitively state the same for the defense’s birth certificate. He pointed out that he

could “see a discrepancy” in that birth certificate, but mentioned needing to request

assistance from their past intelligence center. He agreed that “everything seems to

have been done legally” and explained that “[e]verything matches the typical

document that a government would provide as a birth certificate.”

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the

jury’s verdict as to the actual year of A.J.R.’s birth.7 Defendant asserts that the

7
When the issues on appeal relate to both sufficiency of the evidence and one or more
trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence by
considering the entirety of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992).

24-KA-8 8

central question in this case is whether the victim was born in 2002 or 2005 and

contends that it was the State’s burden to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt.

The question of sufficiency of the evidence is properly raised in the trial

court by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art.

821. State v. Williams, 20-46 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 308 So.3d 791, 816, writ

denied, 21-316 (La. 5/25/21), 316 So.3d 2. In the instant matter, defendant did not

file such a motion; however, the failure to file a motion for post-verdict judgment

of acquittal does not preclude appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence. See

State v. Faciane, 17-224 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/17), 233 So.3d 195, 205, writ

denied, 17-2069 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So.3d 797.

In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine

if the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational

trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979); State v. Lane, 20-181 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/21), 310 So.3d 794, 804.

The directive that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution requires the reviewing court to defer to the actual trier of fact’s rational

credibility calls, evidence weighing, and inference drawing. State v. Clifton, 17-

538 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 691, 702. This deference to the fact-

finder does not permit a reviewing court to decide whether it believes a witness or

whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v.

McKinney, 20-19 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/4/20), 304 So.3d 1097, 1102. As a result,

under the Jackson standard, a review of the record for sufficiency of the evidence

does not require the reviewing court to determine whether the evidence at the trial

Therefore, defendant’s assigned error concerning sufficiency of the evidence will be addressed
first.

24-KA-8 9

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether, upon review of the

whole record, any rational trier of fact would have found guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. at 1103.

In making this determination, a reviewing court will not re-evaluate the

credibility of witnesses or re-weigh the evidence. State v. Cuza, 18-187 (La. App.

5 Cir. 11/28/18), 260 So.3d 754, 758, writ denied, 19-17 (La. 11/12/19), 282 So.3d

232. Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflicts with

physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient to support a conviction. McKinney, supra.

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence

consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of

the main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v.

Gatson, 21-156 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/21), 334 So.3d 1021, 1034. When

circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of an offense, La. R.S.

15:438 provides that assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to

prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence. State v. Becnel, 17-591 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/18), 250 So.3d 1207,

1225. This is not a separate test from the Jackson standard, but rather provides a

helpful basis for determining the existence of reasonable doubt. All evidence, both

direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Defendant was convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvenile in violation of

La. R.S. 14:80. Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when a person

who is seventeen years of age or older has sexual intercourse, with consent, with a

person who is thirteen years of age or older but less than seventeen years of age,

when the victim is not the spouse of the offender and when the difference between

the age of the victim and the age of the offender is four years or greater. See La.

24-KA-8 10

R.S. 14:80(A)(1). Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is a general intent crime.

Thus, the only intent necessary to sustain a conviction is established by the very

doing of the proscribed act. See La. R.S. 14:11; State v. Granier, 99-3511 (La.

7/6/00), 765 So.2d 998, 1000; State v. Boudreaux, 23-993 (La. App. 1 Cir.

4/19/24), 390 So.3d 345, 356.

Defendant challenges his conviction on the basis that the State did not

present sufficient evidence of A.J.R.’s age to support a conviction in this case. The

bill of information alleged that the date range of the offense was between January

1, 2021 and January 3, 2022. At trial, Detective Cook testified that defendant’s

birthdate was January 27, 1991, and that defendant confirmed this information

during his recorded statement. Defendant was, therefore, twenty-nine years old

and thirty years old during the date range of the offense. Detective Cook also

testified that A.J.R.’s child was born on May 6, 2022, as reflected in the medical

records. Additionally, Detective Cook testified that a DNA analysis confirmed that

defendant was the father of A.J.R.’s child. This was supported by testimony and

the DNA report presented by Dr. Marcela Zozaya. Thus, we find the jury could

have deduced that defendant, being over the age required in the statute, engaged in

sexual intercourse with A.J.R., who was not his spouse.

Furthermore, in order to prove defendant’s guilt, the State was required to

prove that the victim, A.J.R., was thirteen years of age or older but less than

seventeen years of age. Neither A.J.R., nor her sister, T.J.R., testified at trial. To

show that A.J.R. was born on August 3, 2005, thereby making her between fifteen

and sixteen years old during the date range of the offense, the State presented

multiple medical records, the testimony of Detective Cook, and both the testimony

and a prepared memorandum from Agent Robles, which included the partial birth

certificate.

24-KA-8 11

At trial, the parties agreed to admit A.J.R.’s medical records, including those

from Children’s Hospital and Touro Hospital. Detective Cook testified that the

records from Children’s Hospital, which were published to the jury, indicated that

A.J.R., born on “08/03/05 (16 yrs),” was four to five months pregnant when she

arrived at the emergency department on December 30, 2021. He also reviewed the

medical records related to the delivery of A.J.R.’s child, which were also published

to the jury. Detective Cook confirmed that A.J.R.’s birthdate was listed as August

3, 2005 in these records and this was consistent with the records obtained during

his investigation. He explained that the date of birth he had for A.J.R. was based

on what her sister initially told him. Although he initially said A.J.R. did not

directly provide her date of birth but gave it to the hospital, he later stated he did

not know whether the hospital obtained the date of birth from A.J.R. or T.J.R.

The State also presented the testimony of Agent Robles, who confirmed

knowing T.J.R. and A.J.R., who entered the United States together on April 29,

2021. He confirmed A.J.R.’s birthdate as August 3, 2005 and stated such was

consistent with his investigation findings. Agent Robles discussed an ID issued in

Nicaragua, which listed A.J.R.’s birthdate as August 3, 2002. He identified

discrepancies in the ID and concluded it was falsified. He indicated that he had

received only initial border-crossing documents from Border Patrol. In addition,

Agent Robles also testified about his memorandum, which confirmed A.J.R.’s

birthdate as August 3, 2005, based on his investigation. He explained that the

memorandum had a partial copy of a birth certificate stating A.J.R.’s date of birth

was August 3, 2005.

Conversely, the defense presented a birth certificate stating that A.J.R. was

born on August 3, 2002, suggesting she was between eighteen and nineteen years

old during the date range of the offense.

24-KA-8 12

During trial, Agent Robles was questioned about the birth certificate

provided by the defense. He explained that it showed an alteration of A.J.R.’s

birth year from August 3, 2005 to August 3, 2002, and was dated January 10, 2023.

Although Agent Robles acknowledged that the document appeared legitimate, he

admitted his lack of expertise in Nicaraguan records and stated that he was

unfamiliar with documents of this type. He confirmed that prior to the change, the

document stated A.J.R.’s birthdate was August 3, 2005. He testified that he could

not definitively determine its authenticity or if it was a copy of the original birth

certificate. Agent Robles explained that he has not encountered documents with an

apostille at the border and had not been trained to verify such documents. While

he could confirm that the ID was fake, he could not definitively determine the

authenticity of the birth certificate presented by the defense. He explained that he

observed a discrepancy in the birth certificate, but indicated that resolving this

would require additional assistance from past intelligence. He acknowledged that

the birth certificate appeared to match the typical format of a government-issued

birth certificate. The defense did not provide further testimony or additional

evidence to confirm the authenticity of the birth certificate.

In this matter, the jury reviewed all the conflicting evidence concerning

A.J.R.’s birthdate presented at trial. The credibility of a witness is within the

sound discretion of the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part,

the testimony of any witness. State v. Gonzalez, 15-26 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/25/15),

173 So.3d 1227, 1233. It is not the function of the appellate court to assess

credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661

So.2d 442, 443; State v. Chester, 19-363 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 314 So.3d 914,

944, writ denied, 21-350 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 321.

In the present matter, the jury heard all the testimony, viewed all of the

evidence presented at trial, and found defendant guilty. Upon review, we conclude

24-KA-8 13

that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was

sufficient under the standard set forth in Jackson to support defendant’s conviction.

As such, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Right of Confrontation

In this assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying

his right to confront his accusers by allowing into evidence medical records and

Border Patrol documents containing information communicated between two

people who did not testify at trial. Defendant provides that before the trial, the

court ruled against the “Motion to Quash/Dismiss,” and during the trial, when

presented before a different judge, the issue was raised again and also denied. He

contends that he objected to the medical records and border entry report as proof of

A.J.R.’s age, emphasizing they were hearsay as neither Detective Cook nor the

Border Patrol agent were present when A.J.R. and T.J.R. allegedly stated the birth

year as 2005. He argues it was improper for them to testify about the birth year.

Additionally, he claims neither A.J.R. nor T.J.R. testified at trial, yet Detective

Cook and Agent Robles testified based on these records, despite not being present

during the communication or being custodians of the records. Defendant

emphasizes that whoever entered the birth year on these documents did not testify,

yet the State relied solely on these documents as evidence of the victim’s age.

Additionally, defendant explains that he obtained a copy of A.J.R.’s birth

certificate, not the State. He asserts that the birth certificate he obtained indicated

A.J.R.’s year of birth as 2002. He argues that he was denied the opportunity to

cross-examine anyone with direct knowledge of A.J.R.’s birth year or how it was

recorded as 2005 in the medical and Border Patrol documents. He argues that the

reports were testified to and entered into evidence by witnesses who lacked

24-KA-8 14

personal knowledge of A.J.R.’s birthdate. This, he contends, violated his right to

cross-examine accusers and deprived him of his right to present a defense.

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying

at the present trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

La. C.E. art. 801(C). Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as otherwise

specified in the Code of Evidence or other legislation. La. C.E. art. 802. Hearsay

is excluded because the value of the statement rests on the credibility of the out-of-

court asserter, who is not subject to cross-examination and other safeguards of

reliability. State v. Martin, 458 So.2d 454, 460 (La. 1984). Although a statement

may constitute inadmissible hearsay, if the statement is merely cumulative or

corroborative of other evidence, the admission of the evidence is harmless error.

State v. Hester, 99-426 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/28/99), 746 So.2d 95, 107, writ denied

sub nom. State v. Patterson, 99-3217 (La. 4/20/00), 760 So.2d 342.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16

of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee an accused in a criminal prosecution the

right to confront witnesses against him. State v. Jackson, 03-883 (La. App. 5 Cir.

4/27/04), 880 So.2d 841, 852, writ denied, 04-1399 (La. 11/8/04), 885 So.2d 1118.

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1365, 158

L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation

Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear

at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior

opportunity for cross-examination.”

Before trial, defense counsel argued that the defendant’s right to confront

A.J.R. was compromised by her absence, impacting the defense’s ability to

represent the defendant. After the State rested, counsel reiterated this concern and

criticized the use of medical records and non-testifying doctors to establish

A.J.R.’s age, claiming it violated the Confrontation Clause. On appeal, the focus

24-KA-8 15

shifted to whether the trial court erred by admitting the medical records and Border

Patrol documentation as hearsay.

Regarding the medical records, the parties agreed on redactions before trial,

and the court admitted the redacted medical records as State’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 4

into evidence without objection from the defense. The defense only raised

objections when Detective Cook was questioned about the birthdate’s consistency

in State’s Exhibit 3, A.N.J.’s birth certificate, and the medical records related to

A.J.R.’s delivery, State’s Exhibit 4. The defense alluded to the medical records as

hearsay after the State rested. Similarly, as for the Border Patrol documentation,

State’s Exhibit 12 was a memorandum prepared by Agent Robles confirming

A.J.R.’s ID and birthdate. During Agent Robles testimony, the defense objected to

the exhibit, arguing that it did not resemble a birth certificate as he understood it

and appeared to have been produced by Border Patrol. The judge overruled the

objection, and the document was admitted into evidence. The defense did not raise

objections based on hearsay or confrontation issues related to this document at

trial.

A defendant must make a contemporaneous objection “to a claimed

confrontation violation” in order to preserve it for appellate review. State v.

Harris, 17-303 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/17), 235 So.3d 1354, 1368, writ denied, 18-

160 (La. 6/15/18), 257 So.3d 675. The contemporaneous objection rule, La.

C.Cr.P. art. 841(A), not only provides that “[a]n irregularity or error cannot be

availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence,” but the

rule also requires that a defendant state the grounds for the objection. State v.

Smith, 11-638 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/12), 90 So.3d 1114, 1123. Further, a

defendant is limited on appeal to those grounds articulated at trial. State v. Snyder,

12-896 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/9/13), 128 So.3d 370, 377, writ denied, 13-2647 (La.

24-KA-8 16

4/25/14), 138 So.3d 643. Thus, we find that defendant cannot raise these

arguments on appeal regarding the Border Patrol documentation.

As to the medical records, the defense stipulated to the admission of State’s

Exhibits 1, 2, and 4, which are the medical records in this case. During trial, the

defense did not object when the Children’s Hospital records (State’s Exhibit 1) and

the Touro Hospital records (State’s Exhibit 2) were admitted and published to the

jury. See State v. Simmons, 00-35 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/25/00), 767 So.2d 860, 861-

62 (finding the defendant acquiesced to the admission of a police report based on

the defendant’s stipulation. “A stipulation has the effect of withdrawing a fact

from issue and disposing wholly with the need for proof of that fact”). Afterwards,

the defense only objected to A.N.J.’s birth certificate (State’s Exhibit 3) and the

medical records related to A.J.R.’s delivery (State’s Exhibit 4) when Detective

Cook was asked if the birthdate, August 3, 2005, was consistent across the records.

Detective Cook’s testimony was merely cumulative of the birthdate included in the

medical records that were already admitted without objection. See Hester, supra.

In any event, even assuming that Detective Cook’s testimony was properly

objected to and did not meet an exception to the hearsay rule, we find that it was

cumulative and corroborative of other uncontested evidence, and any error in

admitting it was harmless. We consider that the medical records, State’s Exhibits 1

and 2, were published to the jury. State’s Exhibit 1 reflects A.J.R.’s date of birth

of “08/03/05 (16 yrs),” and State’s Exhibit 2 indicates that she is sixteen years old.

Therefore, the jury was free to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. In

light of the foregoing, we conclude that this assignment of error is without merit.8

8
See State v. Diggs, 19-956 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/18), 294 So.3d 487, 493, 495-96, writ
denied, 20-181 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So.3d 69, where the defendant argued that the trial court erred
in allowing the State to elicit testimony regarding his Facebook messages. The First Circuit
mentioned the defendant did not object when the Facebook messages were admitted into
evidence prior to the detective’s testimony. The court found that the detective’s testimony was
merely cumulative of the statements that were already admitted without objection. It further
found that even assuming that this testimony contained hearsay, it was cumulative and

24-KA-8 17

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

The record was reviewed for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920,

State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175

(La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

Financial Hardship Hearing

As a part of defendant’s sentence under La. R.S. 14:80,9 the trial court

ordered defendant to pay a fine of $2,000. The sentencing minute entry reflects the

same information. La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1 requires the court to conduct a hearing to

determine whether payment of any fine, fee, cost, restitution, or monetary

obligation would cause substantial financial hardship to defendant or his

dependents. Upon review of the record, there is no indication that the trial court

conducted such a hearing or that the judicial determination was waived.

Accordingly, due to the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1, we vacate the

financial obligation imposed on defendant as part of his sentence and remand this

case for compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1. See State v. Smith, 23-308 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 2/28/24), 382 So.3d 1121, 1128 (citing State v. Douglas, 22-752 (La.

App. 3 Cir. 2/23/23), 358 So.3d 580).

Advisal of Post-Conviction Relief

The sentencing transcript and minute entry do not reflect that the trial court

advised defendant of the two-year prescriptive period for filing an application for

post-conviction relief. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 provides that a defendant shall have

two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final to seek

corroborative of other uncontested evidence, and any error in admitting it was harmless. Also,
the court pointed out that the members of the jury were allowed to read the statements and could
draw their own reasonable inferences therefrom. Considering this, the court found no merit to
the assignments of error.
9
At the time of the offense, La. R.S. 14:80(D)(1) provided, in pertinent part: “Whoever
commits the crime of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile shall be fined not more than five
thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or
both[.]”

24-KA-8 18

post-conviction relief. If the trial court fails to advise, or provides an incomplete

advisal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the appellate court may correct this error

by informing the defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for post-

conviction relief by means of its opinion. See State v. Becnel, 18-549 (La. App. 5

Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 1017, 1022. Accordingly, we advise by way of this

opinion, that no application for post-conviction relief, including an application

which seeks an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two

years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the

provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. See State v. Barnett, 18-254 (La. App. 5

Cir. 4/3/19), 267 So.3d 209, 235.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed,

except that the portion of defendant’s sentence that imposed a financial obligation

is vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court for compliance with La.

C.Cr.P. art. 875.1.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED IN PART; REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS

24-KA-8 19

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
OCTOBER 30, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KA-8
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DARREN A. ALLEMAND (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) JANE L. BEEBE (APPELLANT)

MAILED
ERIC CUSIMANO (APPELLEE)
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053