State of Louisiana Versus Arthur Williams

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KH-11

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ARTHUR WILLIAMS COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE FORTIETH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 19,136, DIVISION "C"
HONORABLE J. STERLING SNOWDY, JUDGE PRESIDING

April 10, 2024

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Timothy S. Marcel

AFFIRMED
SJW
JGG
TSM

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Bridget A. Dinvaut

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
ARTHUR WILLIAMS
Arthur Williams

WINDHORST, J.

Relator/defendant, Arthur Williams, seeks review of the trial court’s

December 5, 2023 ruling denying his application for post-conviction relief

(“APCR”).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Relator was convicted of aggravated second degree battery and was

subsequently adjudicated a second-felony offender. Relator was sentenced to

twenty-four years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or

suspension of sentence. Relator’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. State v.

Williams, 20-428 (La. App. 5 Cir. 04/28/21), 347 So.3d 1023, writ denied, 21-717

(La. 10/01/21), 324 So.3d 1059.

Relator filed an APCR, alleging counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing (1) to request a sanity commission; and (2) to allow relator to testify on his

own behalf. Relator also alleged a claim of vindictive prosecution based on the State

filing a habitual offender bill of information after relator refused the State’s plea

offer. On December 5, 2023, the trial court denied relator’s APCR. Relator filed

the instant writ application.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Initially, we find relator’s writ application is deficient. Relator failed to

include a copy of his APCR, and any exhibits attached thereto, in violation of La.

U.R.C.A., Rule 4-5 C(8).

Claims one and two – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first claim, relator contends counsel was ineffective because counsel did

not request a sanity commission despite “seeing signs that [relator] should have been

evaluated.”

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1) that

counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, that the performance fell below an

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objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2)

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 641, “mental incapacity to proceed exists when, as a

result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to

understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.” The two-fold

test of capacity to stand trial is whether the defendant: (1) understands the

consequences of the proceedings; and (2) has the ability to assist in his defense by

consultation with counsel. State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La. 01/15/02), 823 So.2d

877, 892, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003).

In support of his claim, relator refers to the possibility of post-traumatic stress

disorder resulting from his prior incarceration for twenty years, his prior treatment

for depression, and the stress of the instant trial as evidence of his mental incapacity.

Relator also contends the trial court failed to consider the victim’s affidavit in which

she believed relator needed “mental help.”

Relator did not include any medical records or the victim’s affidavit in this

writ application to support his conclusory assertions. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

Additionally, relator did not point to any specific instances of his alleged mental

incapacity either before or during trial.

On the showing made, relator failed to establish counsel was ineffective

because counsel did not raise the issue of relator’s competency. See State v.

Williams, 613 So.2d 252, 256-57 (La. 1992). Therefore, we find no error in the trial

court’s ruling.

In his second claim, relator contends his attorney prevented him from

testifying.

A defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to

testify in his own defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708,

24-KH-11 2

97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987); State v. Dauzart, 99-3471 (La. 10/30/00), 769 So.2d 1206,

1207 (per curiam). In State v. Hampton, 00-522, (La. 03/22/02), 818 So.2d 720,

729-30, the Louisiana Supreme Court, quoting Passos-Paternina v. United States, 12

F. Supp. 2d 231, 239-40 (D.P.R. 1998) (internal citations omitted), established the

following guidelines to be utilized by the courts in determining whether a criminal

defendant’s right to testify has been violated or waived by his silence during trial:

(1) absent extraordinary circumstances that should alert the trial court
to a conflict between attorney and client, the court should not inquire
into a criminal defendant’s right to testify. The court should assume,
that a criminal defendant, by not ‘attempting to take the stand,’ has
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right;

(2) the court must consider whether the petitioner has waived his right
to testify.... [The defendant can only] rebut that presumption ... by
showing that his attorney caused him to forego his right to testify [(a)
by alleging specific facts, including an affidavit by the defendant’s trial
counsel] from which the court could reasonably find that trial counsel
‘told [the defendant] that he was legally forbidden to testify or in some
similar way compelled him to remain silent ...’ [(b) by demonstrating
from the record] that those ‘specific factual allegations would be
credible[.]’

In this writ application, relator only provided general allegations his attorney

prevented him from testifying. Relator did not provide any evidence or

documentation that would show there were extraordinary circumstances that should

have alerted the trial court to a conflict between counsel and relator regarding his

right to testify. Relator also did not allege specific facts that he was legally forbidden

to testify or which compelled him to remain silent to rebut the presumption that he

waived his right to testify. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2; Hampton, supra. Accordingly, on

the showing made, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling.

Claim three – Vindictive Prosecution

In his third claim, relator contends the State’s decision to file an habitual

offender bill of information against him was based on his refusal of the State’s plea

offer. Relator also avers the victim requested the State to drop the charges against

him, but the State denied this request without any reason.

24-KH-11 3

A vindictive prosecution is one in which the prosecutor seeks to punish the

defendant for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right and thereby

violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process. United States v.

Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). The defendant

bears the burden of proving prosecutorial vindictiveness. State v. Dauzart, 07-15

(La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/07), 960 So.2d 1079, 1084, writ denied, 07-1269 (La.

12/14/07), 970 So.2d 532. In determining whether there has been prosecutorial

vindictiveness, the court examines the State’s actions in the context of the entire

proceeding. If, to a reasonable mind, the filing of the habitual offender bill can only

be explained by a desire to deter or punish the defendant’s exercise of legal rights,

the events in the case will create a presumption of vindictiveness. Id. Where the

government’s conduct is equally attributable to legitimate reasons, a defendant must

prove actual vindictiveness because a presumption will not apply. State v. Poche,

05-1042 (La. App. 3 Cir. 03/01/06), 924 So.2d 1225, 1235. A mere opportunity for

vindictiveness does not suffice. Id.

Here, the victim was relator’s girlfriend, who he beat with a metal pipe and a

belt with a metal buckle and burned her with an iron. Williams, 347 So.3d at 1026.

At trial, the victim admitted she initially requested that the State drop the charges

against relator; however, she changed her mind because she did not want this “to

happen to [her] again.” At defendant’s sentencing, the victim made the following

victim impact statement:

So whatever he get, he deserve it, and I think you should give him the
max because he needs it because cause what he done to me, I would
never be the same in my life again.
He don’t deserve leniency. He don’t at all because he didn’t have
leniency for me when he was breaking my fingers and burning me with
that iron. He didn’t have any for me. So whatever you give him, your
Honor, he deserve it.

Thus, relator is hard-pressed to show how the victim’s initial consideration to drop

the charge bolsters his claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

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Regardless, the district attorney has discretionary power to charge a defendant

under the habitual offender law. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1279 (La. 1993);

see also La. C.Cr.P. art. 61. The district attorney’s use of the habitual offender law

“provides an ancillary sentencing factor designed to serve important and legitimate

societal purposes.” Dauzart, 960 So.2d at 1085. The use of the habitual offender

law alone does not create a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id.

In the instant case, relator had a prior conviction for armed robbery, and thus,

was a second-felony offender under the habitual offender law. As the trial court

pointed out, the State and relator engaged in plea negotiations but were unable to

reach an agreement. Therefore, on the showing made, we find no error in the trial

court’s denial of this claim.

DECREE

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, relator’s writ application is

denied and the trial court’s December 5, 2023 ruling is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

24-KH-11 5

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
APRIL 10, 2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KH-11
E-NOTIFIED
40TH DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE J. STERLING SNOWDY (DISTRICT JUDGE)
HONORABLE BRIDGET A. DINVAUT
(RESPONDENT)

MAILED
ARTHUR WILLIAMS #192153 (RELATOR)
LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY
ANGOLA, LA 70712