State of Louisiana Versus Alford Lyndell

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KH-376

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ALFORD LYNDELL COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

November 18, 2024

Linda Wiseman
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE ALFORD LYNDELL

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE DONALD L. FORET,
DIVISION "H", NUMBER 21-1093

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Marc E. Johnson

WRIT DENIED

Relator, Lyndell Alford, seeks review of the trial court’s June 7, 2024 denial

of his application for post-conviction relief (“APCR”). In his APCR, Relator alleged

his 20-year sentences were excessive, and his manslaughter and felon in possession

of a weapon pleas were uninformed and invalid. In denying the APCR, the trial

court found no merit to Relator’s arguments. The court reasoned that Relator’s

sentence was well below the maximum sentence for manslaughter, and the minute

entry and the “Waiver of Constitutional Rights” form show Relator was fully advised

of his constitutional rights to his highly favorable plea agreement.

Generally, when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all non-jurisdictional

defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea and precludes review of such

defects either by appeal or post-conviction relief. State v. Turner, 09-1079 (La. App.

5 Cir. 7/27/10), 47 So.3d 455, 459. Once a defendant has been sentenced, only those

guilty pleas which are constitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or post-

conviction relief. See State v. Gross, 95-621 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/96), 673 So.2d

1058, 1059-60.

In the instant case, Relator was originally charged with second degree murder,

in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, which the State amended to a charge of

manslaughter pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. As part of the plea

agreement, the State also agreed not to file a habitual offender bill of information.

In addition, Relator’s sentences for manslaughter and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon were ordered to run concurrently. Against that backdrop, we find

that Relator’s agreed-upon sentences foreclose his claim of an excessive sentence.

See La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2), which provides that a “defendant cannot appeal or

seek review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement which was

set forth in the record at the time of the plea.”

Next, Relator maintains that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial

court failed to inform him “that intent was an element of the crime” with respect to

the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. As an initial matter, we

find that relator’s claim of an involuntary guilty plea, without any supporting

documentation such as his guilty plea transcript, guilty plea form, or minute entry,

falls short of meeting his post-conviction burden of proof under La. C.Cr.P. art.

930.2.

In any event, the test for the validity of a guilty plea does not depend on

whether the trial court specifically informed the defendant of every element of the

offense. State v. Blunt, 20-171 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So.3d 384, 392.

When a defendant is represented by counsel, the trial court accepting his guilty plea

may presume that counsel has explained the nature of the charge in sufficient detail

that the defendant has notice of what his plea asks him to admit. Id. at 393 (quoting

State v. Dadney, 14-511 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 167 So.3d 55, 60, writ denied,

15-90 (La. 10/30/15), 179 So.3d 614). La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(A)(1) also provides

that the trial court, before accepting a guilty plea, must personally inform the

defendant of the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, any mandatory

minimum penalty, and the maximum possible penalty. However, “[a]ny variance

from the procedures required by this Article which does not affect substantial rights

of the accused shall not invalidate the plea.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(E). Violations

of La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 that do not rise to the level of Boykin1 violations are subject

to harmless error analysis. See State v. Craig, 10-854 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 66

So.3d 60, 64.

According to the official record, the minute entry from Relator’s guilty plea

and sentencing indicates that the trial court advised Relator of his Boykin rights, and

Relator, who was represented by counsel, waived those rights. Additionally, Relator

signed and initialed a waiver of rights form. Thus, even assuming the “intent”

element was omitted by the trial court, any error would be harmless, particularly

when Relator does not contend that knowledge of the intent element of the crime

would have been a material factor in his decision to plead guilty. In fact, as discussed

above, Relator received a substantial benefit from pleading guilty given that the State

agreed not to file a habitual offender bill. As such, we find that even on the merits,

Relator’s claim of involuntary guilty pleas do not warrant relief.

As part of his claim, Relator appears to argue that the State’s evidence was

insufficient based on misidentification and the absence of DNA evidence. However,

“a plea of guilty by its nature admits factual guilt and relieves the State of the

necessity to prove it by a contested trial.” See State v. Fisher, 19-488 (La. App. 5

Cir. 6/24/20), 299 So.3d 1238, 1243. Thus, we find that Relator is not entitled to

assert an insufficient evidence claim, as his unconditional guilty pleas waived all

non-jurisdictional defects. (See State ex rel. Kenny v. State, 15-1864 (La. 12/16/16),

1
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

207 So.3d 1053, 1054, finding that the defendant’s guilty plea waived all non-

jurisdictional defects, and therefore, the defendant was not entitled to assert

insufficient evidence claims in support of his APCR, citing State v. Crosby, 338

So.2d 584, 586 (La. 1976)). Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in

denying Relator’s APCR.

Accordingly, the writ application is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 18th day of November, 2024.

MEJ
SMC
FHW

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. WISEMAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 11/18/2024 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KH-376
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Donald L. Foret (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Thomas J. Butler (Respondent)

MAILED
Lyndell Alford #495943 (Relator)
Raymond Laborde Correctional Center
1630 Prison Road
Cottonport, LA 71327