Donsynia Riley Versus Acadian Companies

DONSYNIA RILEY NO. 25-C-308

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ACADIAN COMPANIES, ET AL. COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 835-671, DIVISION "G"
HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 03, 2025

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Timothy S. Marcel

WRIT DENIED
SMC
SJW
TSM

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
ARCH SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Lorraine P. McInnis
Jada C. Doucet

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
DONSYNIA RILEY
Robert J. Caluda

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., DANA SULLIVAN AND JUDSON
SMYLY
Parker W. Bradley

CHEHARDY, C.J.

Relator/defendant, Arch Specialty Insurance Company, seeks review of the

trial court’s March 26, 2025 judgment denying its peremptory exception of no right

of action, and the trial court’s June 17, 2025 judgment denying Arch Specialty

Insurance Company’s motion for new trial. For the reasons that follow, finding no

error in the trial court’s judgments, we deny this writ application.

Factual Background and Procedural History

This litigation arises out of a petition for damages filed on December 6,

2022, by respondent/plaintiff, Donsynia Riley, and against defendants, Acadian

Companies d/b/a Acadian Ambulance Services, Inc., Dana Sullivan, and Judson

Smyly, (collectively “Acadian”), and XYZ Insurance Company, as the

“unidentified insurance company, at all relevant times hereto the liability insurance

carrier for the defendant Acadian Companies d/b/a Acadian Ambulance Service,

Inc. on the date of the accident.” In her petition, Mrs. Riley alleges that on

December 30, 2021, she was a guest at Ochsner Medical Center–Westbank

Hospital when she was struck/side-swiped by an empty stretcher, causing her

physical and mental injuries. Mrs. Riley avers that the stretcher was being

maneuvered down the hallway by defendants, Ms. Sullivan and Mr. Smyly, who

are employees of Acadian.

On November 6, 2024, nearly two years after filing her original petition,

Mrs. Riley filed a first supplemental and amending petition, seeking to substitute

the name of XYZ Insurance Company, as named in her original petition, with the

name of Arch Specialty Insurance Company (“Arch Specialty”), as the actual

liability carrier for Acadian.1 On January 24, 2025, Arch Specialty filed a

peremptory exception of no right of action alleging that Mrs. Riley does not have a

1
In her opposition to Arch Specialty’s writ application, Mrs. Riley contends that the reason
defendants’ insurance company was named as XYZ Insurance Company in her original petition filed on
December 6, 2022, was “because the Acadian defendants refused to disclose the identity of their liability
insurer prior to litigation.”

right to sue Arch Specialty based upon the liability insurance agreement with

Acadian’s employees, Ms. Sullivan and Mr. Smyly, and also does not have a right

of action to sue Arch Specialty directly under the Direct Action Statute, La. R.S.

22:1269, as amended.

Prior to the filing of Mrs. Riley’s first supplemental and amending petition,

the Louisiana legislature amended the Direct Action Statute, thereby removing a

plaintiff’s right of action to assert a direct action against a tortfeasor’s liability

insurance company. The amendment went into effect on August 1, 2024.

According to Arch Specialty, the amendment to the Direct Action Statute

eliminated Mrs. Riley’s right to assert a direct action against Arch Specialty,

Acadian’s liability insurer. Arch Specialty avers that the Direct Action Statute

merely grants a procedural right of action against an insurer where the plaintiff has

a substantive cause of action against the insured. In other words, Arch Specialty

avers that the legislative amendment to the Direct Action Statute, effective August

1, 2024, prohibits a plaintiff from pursuing a direct action against an insurer, unless

certain circumstances are met and/or established, which circumstances are not at

issue herein. Arch Specialty contends that because Mrs. Riley did not amend her

original petition to add or name it as a defendant until after the effective date of the

amendment, her right to assert a direct action against it as Acadian’s liability

insurer was not timely vested or invoked prior to the effective date of the

amendment, and therefore, the amendment to the Direct Action Statute should be

applied retroactively to this litigation. Consequently, Arch Specialty argues the

trial court erred when it failed to grant Arch Specialty’s exception of no cause of

action, and dismiss Mrs. Riley’s claims filed against it.

In response to Arch Specialty’s exception, Mrs. Riley argued that the Direct

Action Statute provides a substantive right, not procedural, and, therefore, the trial

court properly determined that the amendment does not apply retroactively.

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Additionally, Mrs. Riley argued that at the moment she was injured in the accident

on December 30, 2021, she had a substantive right to bring a direct action under

the statute against Arch Specialty, which right was vested and timely invoked

when she filed her original petition on December 6, 2022, prior to the effective

date of the amendment. In support of her argument, Mrs. Riley urged the trial

court to rely on this Court’s decision in Riley v. Griffin, 24-537 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/20/24), 410 So.3d 890, wherein we determined that “[w]hile an amendment to

the Direct Action Statute may apply retroactively to a cause of action that arose

before the amended statute’s August 1, 2024 effective date, this retroactivity stands

only in reference to causes of action for which suit had not yet been filed, and thus

the plaintiff’s right had not yet vested.” Id. at 895. According to Mrs. Riley, when

she filed her original petition on December 6, 2022, Acadian’s liability carrier was

named, although improperly identified as XYZ Insurance Company, but only

because the actual identity of Acadian’s liability insurer was unknown at that time.

She argued that it was not until after the effective date of the amendment to the

Direct Action Statute, through discovery, that Acadian divulged the identity of

Arch Specialty as its liability insurer, such that it could be properly substituted for

XYZ Insurance Company. Therefore, because she had invoked her right against

Acadian’s liability insurer by filing suit prior to the effective date of the

amendment to the statute, Mrs. Riley argued that she had a vested right directly

against Arch Specialty that cannot be divested by retroactively applying the

amended statute to her claim.

Arch Specialty’s exception came for hearing on February 26, 2025, at the

close of which, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On March 26,

2025, the trial court issued judgment in favor of Mrs. Riley, and against Arch

Specialty, overruling its exception of no right of action. The trial court issued

written reasons for judgment on April 11, 2025, finding that Arch Specialty had

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“failed to meet the requisite burden and establish that the plaintiff, Mrs. Riley, does

not have a cause of action against it because Mrs. Riley’s right was vested on

December 30, 202[1] (date of incident) and it was timely invoked when she timely

filed suit, asserting her vested right, against the defendants, including the naming

XYZ Insurance Company, in the original Petition for Damages, filed on December

6, 2022[,]” in its “capacity as ‘unidentified insurance company’ as the liability

insurance carrier” for the defendant, Acadian, which petition was filed prior to the

effective date of the amendment to the Direct Action Statute.

On or about May 7, 2025, Arch Specialty filed a motion for new trial, which

came for hearing on May 19, 2025. After taking the matter under advisement, the

trial court issued judgment on June 17, 2025, denying Arch Specialty’s motion.

This writ application filed by Arch Specialty, seeking this Court’s supervisory

review of the trial court’s March 26, 2025, and June 17, 2025, judgments followed.

In its writ application, Arch Specialty contends the trial court erred in

holding that the Direct Action Statute does not apply retroactively to Mrs. Riley’s

action filed against it after the effective date of the amendment, and in concluding

that Mrs. Riley had a vested right against Arch Specialty.

Discussion

The question posed in this writ application is whether the Louisiana Direct

Action Statute, as amended by 2024 La. Acts. No. 275, § 1, effective August 1,

2024, is applicable to the facts of this case. Here, the conduct giving rise to this

suit occurred in 2021. On December 6, 2022, Mrs. Riley filed her petition for

damages against Acadian, Sullivan and Smyly, the tortfeasors, and XYZ Insurance

Company, as the “unidentified insurance company, at all relevant times hereto the

liability insurance carrier for the defendant Acadian Companies d/b/a Acadian

Ambulance Service, Inc. on the date of the accident.” Arch Specialty was not

specifically named in Mrs. Riley’s original petition. As amended in 2024 by Act

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275, La. R.S. 22:1269 now provides that no direct action lies against an insurer

except in limited circumstances, which are not at issue here. The effective date of

these amendments was August 1, 2024. On November 6, 2024, Mrs. Riley filed a

first supplemental and amending petition, substituting XYZ Insurance Company,

named in her original petition, with Arch Specialty, as liability carrier for Acadian.

The issue presented by these facts is res nova. That is, we must determine

whether Mrs. Riley’s right of action against Arch Specialty was vested and

invoked at the time she filed her original petition on December 6, 2022—prior to

the effective date of the amendment—or at the time she filed her amended petition

on November 6, 2024—after the effective date of the amendment—wherein she

substituted Arch Specialty, the actual liability insurer of Acadian, for XYZ

Insurance Company.

In its writ application, Arch Specialty maintains that the Direct Action

Statute, as amended, is procedural in nature rather than substantive, and therefore

must be applied retroactively as required by Article 6 of the Louisiana Civil Code.

Arch Specialty argues that Mrs. Riley, who did not add Arch Specialty as a

defendant until after the effective date of the amendment, has no right of action

against it, and thus, Mrs. Riley’s claims against Arch Specialty must be dismissed.

The amendment to the Direct Action Statute fundamentally changes the

conduct of most suits for damages in this state. Prior to its amendment, La. R.S.

22:1269(B)(1) provided as follows:

The injured person or his survivors or heirs mentioned in
Subsection A of this Section, at their option, shall have a
right of direct action against the insurer within the terms
and limits of the policy; and, such action may be brought
against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and
the insurer jointly and in solido, in the parish in which
the accident or injury occurred or in the parish in which
an action could be brought against either the insured or
the insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed by
Code of Civil Procedure Art. 42 only; however, such
action may be brought against the insurer alone only
when at least one of the following applies:
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(a) The insured has been adjudged bankrupt by a court of
competent jurisdiction or when proceedings to
adjudge an insured bankrupt have been commenced
before a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) The insured is insolvent.

(c) Service of citation or other process cannot be made on
the insured.

(d) When the cause of action is for damages as a result of
an offense or quasi-offense between children and their
parents or between married persons.

(e) When the insurer is an uninsured motorist carrier.

(f) The insured is deceased.

As the insurer was a party to most damage claims and was liable in solido

with the insured up to the limits of its policy, it participated directly in the

litigation, up to and including the rendition of judgment, as a party defendant. Act

275 amended La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) to prohibit direct actions against insurers

except under limited circumstances. The statute, as amended, provides:

The injured person or, if deceased, the persons identified
in Civil Code Articles 2315.1 and 2315.2, shall have no
right of action against the insurer unless at least one of
the following applies:

(a) The insured files for bankruptcy in a court of
competent jurisdiction or when proceedings to
adjudge an insured bankrupt have been commenced
before a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) The insured is insolvent.

(c) Service of citation and other process has been
attempted without success or the insured defendant
refuses to answer or otherwise defend the action
within one hundred eighty days of service.

(d) When the cause of action is for damages as a result of
an offense or quasi-offense between children and their
parents or between married persons.

(e) When the insurer is an uninsured motorist carrier.

(f) The insured is deceased.

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(g) When the insurer is defending the lawsuit under a
reservation of rights, or the insurer denies coverage to
the insured, but only for purposes of establishing
coverage.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1269, as amended, the insurer can no longer be a

party to the litigation and cannot be named in the final judgment unless certain

post-trial procedures are followed to add the insurer to the judgment, which the

insurer can contest via coverage defenses. La. R.S. 22:1269(D) and (E).

The Louisiana Direct Action Statute refers to a right of direct action, and a

defendant challenging a plaintiff’s right to proceed under the Louisiana Direct

Action statute should do so by means of an exception of no right of action.

“Without enabling legislation, the right to direct action does not exist.” Logan v.

Hollier, 424 So.2d 1279, 1281 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1982).

The peremptory exception of no right of action assumes that the petition

states a valid cause of action and functions as a test of whether the plaintiff has a

real and actual interest in the action or belongs to a particular class to which the

law grants a remedy for the particular harm alleged. See Lopez Languirand v.

Lopez, 18-245 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/12/18), 261 So.3d 1054, 1058; Rubion Shoring

Company, LLC v. Crescent Shoring, L.L.C., 16-540 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/17/17), 222

So.3d 921, 926. The exception of no right of action does not raise questions of the

plaintiff’s ability to prevail on the merits or whether the defendant may have a

valid defense. Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company v. Gupta, 24-264

(La. App. 5 Cir. 2/12/25), 407 So.3d 851, 867, writ denied, 25-411 (La. 6/3/25),

410 So.3d 788. In short, on an exception of no right of action, the question the

court must resolve is whether the plaintiff has a right to sue the defendant to

enforce the claim. McKinley v. McKinley, 24-850 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/21/25), 410

So.3d 375, 379.

The determination of whether a plaintiff has a right of action is a question of

law, thus, the standard of appellate review of the trial court’s ruling is de novo,
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such that the appellate court’s review “involves determining whether the trial court

was legally correct in sustaining such exception.” See Wallace v. Drennan, Inc. v.

Kerner, 21-664 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/17/22), 348 So.3d 194, 199; Hurel v. National

Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 25-49 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), --- So.3d ---,

2025 WL 762645, *3. The burden of proof of establishing the exception of no

right of action is on the exceptor. Rubion Shoring Company, LLC, 222 So.3d at

926. Any doubt regarding the appropriateness of an exception of no right of action

is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Lopez Languirand, 261 So.3d at 1058.

Arch Specialty argues that the amendments to La. R.S. 22:1269 are

procedural in nature and, thus, must be applied retroactively to causes of action

arising prior to its effective date. In contrast, Mrs. Riley argues that the

amendments are substantive in nature in that they affect vested rights as the cause

of action giving rise to the litigation occurred, and her original petition for

damages invoking those rights was filed, prior to the effective date of the

amendment.

In analyzing the issue presented, we first look to La. C.C.P. art. 6, providing

that “[i]n the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply

prospectively only” while “[p]rocedural and interpretive laws apply both

prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the

contrary.” As there is no legislative expression in Act 275, as to whether the

statute applies retroactively, we look to whether the law is procedural, interpretive,

or substantive. See Farque v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, 25-

22 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/18/25), --- So.3d ---, 2025 WL 1699750, *6.

This question was answered by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Soileau v.

Smith True Value & Rental, 12-1711 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So.3d 771, 775, wherein it

held that the Direct Action Statute provides a procedural right of action against an

insurer where the plaintiff has a substantive cause of action against the insured.

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See also Green v. Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co., 08-2868 (La. 10/28/09), 24 So.3d 182,

184. Substantive laws establish new rules, rights, and duties, or change existing

ones, while procedural laws prescribe a method for enforcing a substantive right

and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws. Church Mut.

Ins. Co., 13-2351 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So.3d 271, 281. In Church Mutual Ins. Co. v.

Dardar, 13-2351 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So.3d 271, 287, the Supreme Court explained

that “procedural statutes . . . become operative only when and if the remedy they

serve to facilitate is invoked.” Yet, “[i]f that remedy is invoked after the statute’s

enactment,” then “the statute operates in the future regardless of the time of the

events giving rise to the cause of action.”

In Blow v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 16-301 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/16), 193

So.3d 244, 254, the Fourth Circuit stated:

The [Direct Action] Statute “was enacted to give special
right to tort victims, not to insured with contract claims
against a defendant.” Cacamo v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
1999-3479, p. 3 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 41, 43. “In the
absence of the Direct Action Statute, a plaintiff would
have no right of action against an alleged tortfeasor’s
liability insurer because the obligation between the
plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor is delictual in nature,
and plaintiff has no contractual relationship with the
tortfeasor’s insurer.” Green v. Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co.,
2008-2868, p.3 (La. 10/28/09), 2 So.2d 182, 184.
Because it “provides the sole procedural right of action
against the insurer in this case, the Direct Action Statute
provides ‘the rules regulating the subject’ ...

Blow, 193 So.3d at 249.

Thus, the Direct Action Statute is a procedural statute, wherein a plaintiff’s

ability to name an insurer as a party to litigation is a procedural right where a

substantive cause of action against the insured already exists. In the absence of

legislative guidance within the amendment, it would typically be applied

retroactively. However, this finding does not end the inquiry into the retroactive

application of the amended statute, as a law will not be applied retroactively if its

9

effect would be to “impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights.” Segura

v. Frank, 93-1271 93-1401 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 721.

In Rogers v. Griffin, 24-537 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/24), 410 So.3d 890, this

Court denied an application for a supervisory writ filed by Louisiana Medical

Mutual Insurance Company (“LAMMICO”) in a suit where it had already been

named a party to a medical malpractice action prior to the effective date of La. R.S.

22:1269. There, we held that once a plaintiff has exercised his or her right by law

to pursue the insurer directly by naming it as a party to the litigation, the right has

been exercised and vested, and the law as amended cannot be applied retroactively.

In Farque v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, supra, the

plaintiffs filed suit against LAMMICO on September 11, 2024, after the effective

date of the amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269. LAMMICO sought to have the case

dismissed, arguing the Direct Action Statute, as amended, is procedural in nature

rather than substantive, and therefore, the plaintiffs had no cause of action against

it. The Third Circuit, treating LAMMICO’s exception as a no right of action rather

than a no cause of action, affirmed the trial court’s denial of LAMMICO’s

exception. The Third Circuit held that because the plaintiffs properly instituted

their medical malpractice action against LAMMICO by filing a claim with the

Division of Administration in January 2023—prior to the effective date of the

amendment to La. R.S. 22:1260—as they were legally required to do before filing

a medical malpractice action in the district court, they had a vested right or interest

in a direct action against LAMMICO. In so holding, the Third Circuit reasoned

that the plaintiff “exercised that right in the only way that they could, by requesting

a medical review panel via the filing of a complaint with the Division of

Administration. That right once exercised cannot be retroactively taken away.”

Farque, 2025 WL 1699750 at *16.

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In the instant case, Mrs. Riley did not amend her petition to substitute Arch

Specialty as the liability insurer for Acadian until November 6, 2024, after the

amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269 had become effective on August 1, 2024.

However, in her original petition filed on December 6, 2022, prior to the effective

date, Mrs. Riley did name as a defendant XYZ Insurance Company, as the

“unidentified insurance company […] at all times relevant hereto the liability

insurance carrier for the defendant Acadian Companies d/b/a Acadia Ambulance

Service, Inc., on the date of this incident.” In overruling Arch Specialty’s

exception of no right of action, the trial court determined that Arch Specialty failed

to meet its burden of establishing that the Direct Action Statute should be

retroactively applied, and it failed to establish that Mrs. Riley’s right against it had

not yet vested, stating:

…[A]s articulated by the Louisiana Fifth Circuit in
Rogers, while the amendment to the Direct Action
Statute may apply retroactively, such application is only
in reference to cause(s) of action for which a suit had not
yet been filed. Such is not the case, here, because the
plaintiff, Mrs. Riley, had already filed suit at the time the
August 1, 2024 amendment regarding the Direct Action
Statute became effective because Mrs. Riley[’s] original
Petition for Damages was filed on December 6, 2022.
This Court reasons that the plaintiff, Mrs. Riley,
invoke[d] her right of action against the
insurer/defendant, Arch Specialty Insurance Company,
when she filed her original Petition for Damages on
December 6, 2022, wherein she clearly noted her intent
to assert a cause(s) of action against the defendant’s
insurer by clearly asserting that the fourth (“D – XYZ
Insurance Company”) was the liability insurance carrier
of the defendant, Acadian Companies d/b/a Acadian
Ambulance Service, Inc. Based on the pleadings filed
and the exhibit[s] attached thereto (including Exhibit 3
attached to the plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum), it is
apparent to this Court that, at the time that the original
Petition for Damages was filed, the defendant’s insurer
(later identified as Arch Specialty Insurance Company)
was unknown to the plaintiff (or her counsel) at that time.
Stated differently, while the plaintiff did not know the
name/identity of the defendant’s liability carrier at the
time that the original Petition for Damages was filed,
Mrs. Riley clearly invoked her right of action against the
defendant’s insurer when she named XYZ Insurance
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Company, in its capacity as the defendant’s liability
carrier.

…[W]hile the defendant’s insurer, Arch Specialty
Insurance Company, was not specifically named as a
defendant when the original Petition for Damages was
filed on December 6, 2022, the plaintiff did name XYZ
Insurance Company, as “unidentified insurance company
[…] at all times relevant hereto the liability insurance
carrier for the defendant Acadian Companies d/b/a
Acadia[n] Ambulance Service, Inc., on the date of this
incident.” Here, the Court finds that based on the
jurisprudence articulated by and relied on by the parties,
the plaintiff, Mrs. Riley, did in fact have a vested right
against the defendant insurer, Arch Specialty Casualty
Insurance [sic], at the time she filed suit on December 6,
2022. Importantly, this Court recognizes that the
plaintiff, Mrs. Riley, had a vested right against the
defendant’s insurer, Arch Specialty Casualty Insurance,
and had a right to name it as a defendant when she filed
her original Petition for Damages (i.e. suit) on December
6, 2022. Furthermore, such vested right against Arch
Specialty Insurance Company was asserted and
recognized by the plaintiff, Mrs. Riley, when she named
XYZ Insurance Company in the original Petition for
Damages; however, she was unable to properly name
Arch Specialty Insurance Company because she (or her
counsel) was not aware of the identity of the insurer at
the time that the suit was filed. It is undisputed that all of
the foregoing information was include in Mrs. Riley’s
original Petition for Damages which was filed prior to
the August 1, 2024 effective date of the amendment to
the Direct Action Statute.
***

Additionally, this Court has considered the fact that
plaintiff’s counsel (or his firm), sought to ascertain
information as it related to the identity of the defendant’s
insurer such that the insurer can be properly substituted
for XYZ Insurance Company, prior to the August 1,
2024 effective date of the amendment to the Direct
Action Statute. Based on Exhibit 3 (September 4, 2024
e-mail) and the representations made by the parties
during the hearing, it appears plaintiff’s counsel did not
ascertain the name of the defendant’s insurer in sufficient
time such that he could have substituted the insurer for
XYZ Insurance Company, in a reasonable amount of
time prior to the August 1, 2024 effective date.
[Emphasis supplied.]

We agree with the trial court that this is not a situation in which Mrs. Riley

sought to add a wholly new defendant when she filed her amended petition on

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November 6, 2024. To the contrary, here, Mrs. Riley sought to substitute Arch

Specialty as Acadian’s liability insurer, for XYZ Insurance Company, at which

time her right of action had already been vested and invoked when she filed her

original petition for damages on December 6, 2022, prior to the effective date of

the amendment to the Direct Action Statute. In other words, because Mrs. Riley

did not know the identity of Acadian’s actual liability insurer when she filed her

original petition, she exercised her right of action against Acadian’s liability

insurer in the only way that she could, by naming XYZ Insurance Company as the

liability insurer for Acadian on the date of the accident. See Farque, supra. We

also consider that, in Mrs. Riley’s opposition to Arch Specialty’s writ application,

she avers that she would have been able to properly name the liability insurer in

her original petition had Acadian not refused to divulge its insurer’s identity until

after suit was filed and the amendment to the Direct Action Statute took effect.

For the foregoing reasons, finding no error in the trial court’s March 26,

2025 judgment overruling Arch Specialty Insurance Company’s exception of no

right of action, or its June 17, 2025 judgment denying Arch Specialty’s motion for

new trial, this writ application is denied.

WRIT DENIED

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
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SEPTEMBER 3, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
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25-C-308
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JADA C. DOUCET (RELATOR) LORRAINE P. MCINNIS (RELATOR) ROBERT J. CALUDA (RESPONDENT)

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