25-CA-76 Nonprecedential Reversed Processed

Joseph J. Bazile, Jr. and Barbara B. Mire Versus Gss Holdings La, LLC, Veterans Food Mart, LLC and Occupants at 1227 Veterans Memorial Boulevard in Kenner, Louisiana

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit · Filed September 24, 2025

The holding in the court’s own words

Consequently, we conclude that the trial court legally erred by granting the judgment of eviction and reverse the judgment. Applying a de novo standard of review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting an eviction without taking any evidence, without the introduction of any exhibits, or without placing any witnesses under oath.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

JOSEPH J. BAZILE, JR. AND BARBARA B. NO. 25-CA-76
MIRE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS
COURT OF APPEAL
GSS HOLDINGS LA, LLC, VETERANS FOOD
MART, LLC AND OCCUPANTS AT 1227 STATE OF LOUISIANA
VETERANS MEMORIAL BOULEVARD IN
KENNER, LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 856-247, DIVISION "P"
HONORABLE LEE V. FAULKNER, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

September 24, 2025

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Marc E. Johnson, and Scott U. Schlegel

REVERSED
SUS
FHW
MEJ

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
JOSEPH J. BAZILE, JR. AND BARBARA B. MIRE
Andrew T. Lilly

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
GSS HOLDINGS LA, LLC, AND VETERANS FOOD MART LLC
David J. Halpern
Georgia N. Ainsworth

SCHLEGEL, J.

Defendants/appellants, GSS Holdings LA, LLC (“GSS”) and Veterans Food

Mart LLC (“VFM”) seek review of the final judgment of November 8, 2024,

which granted plaintiffs/appellees Joseph J. Bazile, Jr. and Barbara B. Mire’s rule

to evict appellants from commercial property located at 1227 Veterans Memorial

Blvd. in Kenner, Louisiana. The plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence at the

hearing on the rule to evict. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court legally

erred by granting the judgment of eviction and reverse the judgment.

Factual Background and Procedural History

On July 17, 2024, Joseph J. Bazile, Jr. and Barbara B. Mire (collectively, the

“Owners”) filed the instant action as a verified rule for eviction in the 24th Judicial

District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. The rule sought to evict GSS, VFM, and

all “Occupants of 1227 Veterans Memorial Boulevard,” from the premises at 1227

Veterans Memorial Blvd. A hearing was scheduled for September 3, 2024.

On the morning of the hearing on September 3, 2024, GSS, individually and

on behalf of VFM, filed an answer and exceptions, attaching and adopting by

reference their pleadings filed in a previous action among the parties. The district

court continued the eviction hearing to November 7, 2024.

On November 5, 2024, GSS and VFM filed a verified answer with

affirmative defenses asserting their entitlement to remain in possession of the

property.

During oral argument at the hearing on November 7, 2024, the Owners

referred to exhibits and argued that they were entitled to evict GSS and VFM. But

they did not introduce the exhibits into evidence or present any witness testimony.

The trial court took the matter under advisement following the hearing. The

next day, on November 8, 2024, the trial court entered judgment and granted the

eviction. No written reasons were provided.

25-CA-76 1

Law and Analysis

GSS and VFM argue that the trial court erred in granting the rule for

eviction in favor of the Owners because the Owners did not present any testimony

or evidence at the eviction trial. They contend that the trial court improperly relied

solely on the pleadings and arguments of counsel, which do not constitute

evidence. GSS and VFM argue that the trial court’s decision was a legal error that

tainted the fact-finding process, such that this Court should apply a de novo

standard of review.

The Owners argue that the eviction of GSS, VFM, and other occupants of

the property, which they refer to as the “Holdovers,” was justified due to the

termination of the primary lease and sublease by a federal bankruptcy court order.

The Owners assert that the Holdovers have no legal right to remain on the property

as the leases were terminated during the bankruptcy proceedings of Mountain

Express Oil Company (“MEX”), which was the primary tenant. They assert that

the Holdovers have been operating without a valid lease, violating local and state

laws, and not paying rent since August 2023.

Generally, an appellate court reviews the factual findings of a lower court in

an eviction matter under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review.

Marlies Margot Cernicek Irrevocable Living Tr. v. Becnel, 22-62 (La. App. 5 Cir.

11/16/22), 353 So.3d 950, 953. However, when legal error interdicts the fact-

finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable and the

appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record.

Gonzalez v. Wricks, 23-298 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/8/24), 389 So.3d 218, 225–26.

In an eviction proceeding against an occupant, the petitioner is required to

make a prima facie showing of title to the property, prove that the defendant is an

occupant as defined in La. C.C.P. art. 4704, and show that the purpose of the

25-CA-76 2

occupancy has ceased. Marlies Margot Cernicek Irrevocable Living Tr., 353

So.3d at 953.

Applying a de novo standard of review of the record, we conclude that the

trial court erred as a matter of law by granting an eviction without taking any

evidence, without the introduction of any exhibits, or without placing any

witnesses under oath. See Kenneth & Allicen Caluda Realty Tr. v. Fifth Bus.

L.L.C., 06-608 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/06), 948 So.2d 1137, 1138 (holding the trial

court erred as a matter of law by granting an eviction without taking any evidence).

The arguments of counsel in appellate briefs and references to facts and issues not

currently before the court are not evidence. Keiger v. NGM Ins. Co., 24-94 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 1227, 1229. Because the Owners did not

introduce any evidence in support of their rule for eviction, they did not prove a

prima facie case for eviction, and, therefore, the trial court erred.

Alternatively, the Owners argue that this Court can take judicial notice of the

ownership documents, the recorded lease, and the federal bankruptcy court order,

which support their claim for eviction. Specifically, the Owners argue that this

Court can take judicial notice of ownership documents that are filed with the

Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court, including an Extract of Judgment of Possession

and a lease recorded in the public records. The Owners submit that this Court can

take judicial notice of the Assessor’s website, which also reveals ownership. The

Owners further argue that this Court may take judicial notice of a bankruptcy court

order filed into the MEX bankruptcy case, which can be accessed on a government

website and requires the tenants to immediately turn over the property to the

Owners.

Judicial notice in Louisiana is governed by La. C.E. arts. 201 and 202. La.

C.E. art. 201(B), involving judicial notice of adjudicative facts, provides:

25-CA-76 3

B. Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either:

(1) Generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or

(2) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

Many of the documents that the Owners refer to are attached as exhibits to

pleadings that were filed in the district court. In Bufkin v. Motwani, 23-412 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 3/27/24), 385 So.3d 368, 370-71, a commercial lease, a petition,

pleadings from another case, judgments, and a notice of lease termination were

attached to a memorandum in support of exceptions, but were not formally

admitted into evidence. This Court held that these “are not the type of matters of

which the trial court could take judicial notice thereof pursuant to La. C.E. art. 201

(pertaining to judicial notice of adjudicative facts generally), and La. C.E. art. 202

(pertaining to judicial notice of legal matters).” Bufkin, 385 So.3d at 372. See also

Dufresne v. Dufresne, 10-963 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/11), 65 So.3d 749, 753-54

(declaring alleged real estate transactions and values are not matters about which

judicial notice may be taken).

As to the Owners’ contention that this Court may take judicial notice of a

bankruptcy court order, in Bufkin we cited the Louisiana First Circuit case of

Shannon v. Vannoy, 17-1722 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/1/18), 251 So.3d 442, 450, with

approval, which held that “[a]lthough a court may take judicial notice of its own

proceedings, Article 202 does not allow, nor has it ever been interpreted to allow,

courts to take judicial notice of suit records in other courts. Documentation of

other courts’ proceedings must be offered into evidence in the usual manner.”

Bufkin, 385 So.3d at 372 n. 6. See also United Gen. Title Ins. Co. v. Casey Title,

Ltd., 01-600 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/01), 800 So.2d 1061, 1065 (finding the Court

25-CA-76 4

could not take judicial notice of proceedings in a district court case that had no

effect except in the specific case in which the rulings were made).

Attachments to memoranda or briefs are not evidence, are not matters of

which judicial notice may be taken, and cannot be considered on appeal unless

they were properly introduced and admitted at trial. Bufkin, 385 So.3d at 372. An

appellate court is precluded from considering evidence that is not part of the

record. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 800 So.2d at 1065. The bankruptcy court order

is a court order from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District

of Texas, which is not a proper subject of judicial notice in this proceeding.

Similarly, the Jefferson Parish land records and lease, while public, are not

“generally known.” The district court legally erred by granting the judgment of

eviction and considering evidence that was not admitted into the record.

Accordingly, we reverse the November 8, 2024 judgment of the trial court.

REVERSED

25-CA-76 5

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
SEPTEMBER 24, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL
PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-CA-76
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HON. LEE V. FAULKNER, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
ANDREW T. LILLY (APPELLEE) GEORGIA N. AINSWORTH (APPELLANT)

MAILED
DAVID J. HALPERN (APPELLANT)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
909 POYDRAS STREET
SUITE 3600
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70112