State of Louisiana Versus Joel J. Faucheux, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-K-343

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOEL J. FAUCHEUX, JR. COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 25,209, DIVISION "D"
HONORABLE ROCHELLE C. FAHRIG, JUDGE PRESIDING

August 27, 2025

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Marc E. Johnson, and Scott U. Schlegel

WRIT GRANTED
SUS
JGG
MEJ

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RELATOR,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Joel T. Chaisson, II
Louis G. Authement

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT,
JOEL J. FAUCHEUX, JR.
Maria M. Chaisson

SCHLEGEL, J.

Defendant, Joel J. Faucheux, Jr., is charged with third offense driving while

intoxicated. In this writ application, the State of Louisiana seeks review of the trial

court’s July 10, 2025 ruling, which granted defendant’s motion to quash one of the

predicate DWI convictions listed in the bill of information. For the following

reasons, we grant the State’s writ application and reverse the trial court’s decision

to grant the motion to quash.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2025, the District Attorney for St. Charles Parish filed a bill of

information charging defendant with a violation of La. R.S. 14:98, driving while

intoxicated, third offense. The State alleged that defendant had two prior

convictions for driving while intoxicated in St. Charles Parish – one in 2014 in

Case No. 718-486, and the other in 2019 in Case No. 835-736.

On May 21, 2025, defendant filed a motion to quash the 2014 predicate

offense on the grounds that it was not constitutionally valid for enhancement

purposes. Defendant argued that his waiver of counsel and guilty plea for this

conviction were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the

trial court did not make any inquiry into his age, education, or mental capacity to

understand the proceedings during the plea colloquy. He further asserted that the

trial court did not state on the record that he intelligently, knowingly, and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on July 10, 2025. At the hearing,

the State argued that the transcript of the Boykin1 colloquy for the 2014 guilty plea

demonstrated that the trial court explained and the defendant understood all of his

constitutional rights, including the waiver of his right to counsel. The State further

explained that prior to the plea, the trial court ordered a substance abuse evaluation

1
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

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and received a report containing information regarding defendant’s age, education,

and background. The transcript indicates that the trial court entered this evaluation

into the record as “Court 1.”

Following the July 10, 2025 hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s

motion to quash the 2014 predicate offense. The trial court recognized that

defendant was adequately advised of his right to counsel during the 2014 plea

colloquy. However, the trial court expressed concern that the prior court did not

inquire into defendant’s background and competency during the colloquy and did

not explicitly state on the record that defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing

and voluntary. As a result, the trial court granted the motion to quash. The State

objected and this writ application followed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In its writ application, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting

defendant’s motion to quash thereby finding that the 2014 predicate DWI plea was

not constitutionally valid for penalty enhancement purposes. The State contends

that the trial court reached this decision because it incorrectly relied upon a

mechanical formula requiring an inquiry into the background and educational

status of the defendant during the plea colloquy, rather than considering the totality

of the circumstances. We agree.

Generally, a presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions in

multiple offender DWI cases, and the burden is on the defendant to show the prior

guilty plea is constitutionally deficient. State v. Collins, 04-255 (La. App. 5 Cir.

10/12/04), 886 So.2d 1149, 1153, writ denied, 04-2798 (La. 3/11/05), 896 So.2d

62. In State v. Carlos, 98-1366 (La. 7/7/99),738 So.2d 556, 559, the Louisiana

Supreme Court adopted and applied a three-step burden shifting process to

determine the validity of prior DWI guilty pleas used in enhanced DWI

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proceedings.2 See also State v. Balsano, 09-735 (La. 6/19/09), 11 So.3d 475, 479.

When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a predicate guilty plea

involving the recidivist portion of the DWI statute, the State has the initial burden

to prove the existence of the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was

represented by counsel when the plea was taken. Carlos, 738 So.2d at 559. If the

State meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce

affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural

irregularity in the taking of the plea. Id.

If the defendant makes the required showing, then the burden shifts back to

the State to prove the constitutionality of the plea. Id. The State will meet this

burden by producing a “perfect” transcript of the guilty plea colloquy, which

reflects a voluntary, informed, and articulated waiver of the three specific rights

mentioned in Boykin, supra. Anything less than a perfect transcript, such as a

guilty plea form or minute entry, will require the trial judge to weigh the evidence

submitted by both sides and determine whether the defendant’s Boykin rights were

prejudiced. Id.

If the record reflects that the predicate plea was uncounseled, the State has

the burden of proving a valid waiver of counsel. State v. Domino, 10-661 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 1/25/11), 60 So.3d 659, 664-65. In order to use a conviction to

enhance a subsequent DWI offense, the State bears the burden of proving that an

unrepresented defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel

before pleading guilty to a misdemeanor DWI. State v. Bush, 03-1438 (La. App. 5

Cir. 4/27/04), 873 So.2d 795, 798. Thus, the issue in the present matter is whether

2
The Supreme Court first established this burden shifting scheme in State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La.
1993), which involved habitual offender proceedings. In Carlos, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court
extended this burden shifting scheme to the recidivist portions of the DWI statute.

25-CA-143 3

the State met the second criteria of its initial burden, a knowing and intelligent

waiver of defendant’s right to counsel.

The right to counsel is a fundamental right guaranteed by the federal and

state constitutions. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; La. Const., art. 1, § 13. Before

accepting a misdemeanor guilty plea, the trial judge should expressly advise the

defendant of his right to counsel and to appointed counsel if he is indigent. Once

informed of the right to counsel, an accused may intentionally waive the right.

State v. Rodrigue, 01-377 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/28/01), 795 So.2d 488, 493. To

determine if the defendant’s waiver is knowing and intelligent, the trial judge

should consider factors such as the age, education, experience, background,

competency and conduct of the accused, as well as the gravity of the offense. State

v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 543-544 (La. 1991); Rodrigue, 795 So.2d at 493.

Defendant contends that pursuant to Strain, supra, the trial court was

required to inquire into the defendant’s age, education, and mental capacity to

understand the proceedings during the colloquy for the 2014 guilty plea in order to

determine that a waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary. This is not accurate.

First, La. C.Cr.P. art. 556, which governs uncounseled misdemeanor guilty

pleas and misdemeanor pleas that can be used to enhance subsequent offenses,

does not require an explicit inquiry into the age and background of the defendant

during the colloquy in order for the plea to be valid:

A. Except as otherwise provided in Paragraph B of this Article or in
R.S. 32:57 or in any other applicable law, in a misdemeanor case, if
the defendant is not represented by counsel of record, the court shall
not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first
determining that the plea is voluntary and is made with an
understanding of the nature of the charge and of his right to be
represented by counsel.

B. In a misdemeanor case in which the court determines that a
sentence of imprisonment will actually be imposed or in which the
conviction can be used to enhance the grade or statutory penalty for a
subsequent offense, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo

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contendere without first addressing the defendant personally in open
court and informing him of, and determining that he understands, all
of the following:

(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the
maximum possible penalty provided by law.

(2) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the
proceeding against him and, if financially unable to employ
counsel, one will be appointed to represent him.

(3) That he has the right to have a trial, and if the maximum penalty
provided for the offense exceeds imprisonment for six months or
a fine of one thousand dollars, a right to trial by a jury or by the
court, at his option.

(4) At that trial he has the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him and the right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself.

(5) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a
further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo
contendere he waives the right to a trial.

* * *

D. Any variance from the procedures required by this Article which
does not affect substantial rights of the defendant shall not invalidate
the plea.

Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that the factors

discussed in Strain are not an “inflexible criteria or a magic word formula” for

determining the validity of the defendant’s waiver of counsel. State v. Stevison,

97-3122 (La. 10/30/98), 721 So.2d 843, 844-45. Rather, “[w]hat the accused

understood is determined in terms of the entire record and not just by certain magic

words used by the judge.” Strain, 585 So.2d at 543. This is because a trial judge

who personally addresses the accused during the colloquy is in a position to assess

the extent of inquiry necessary to determine the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

nature of the waiver of counsel as well as of the guilty plea. State v. Simmons, 05-

1462 (La. 3/17/06), 924 So.2d 137, 138. Thus, the inquiry into the validity of the

accused’s waiver of counsel must take into account the totality of the

25-CA-143 5

circumstances in each case. Stevison, 721 So.2d at 845. The critical issue on

review of the waiver is whether the defendant understood the waiver. State v.

Nabak, 03-919 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/03), 864 So.2d 758, 762.

The determination of whether a defendant understood his waiver of counsel

prior to pleading guilty to an uncomplicated misdemeanor requires less judicial

inquiry than determining his understanding of his waiver of counsel for a felony

trial. State v. Kerwin, 02-103 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 28, 31. The

Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that crimes of driving while intoxicated

are non-complex crimes, and almost self-explanatory, thus requiring less judicial

inquiry to determine if defendant understood his waiver of counsel for a guilty

plea. Strain, 585 So.2d at 544; Nabak, 864 So.2d at 762. Further, in Kerwin,

supra, this Court reviewed numerous cases similar to this matter, where after

considering the totality of the circumstances, we found the defendants knowingly

and intelligently waived counsel in misdemeanor predicate DWI pleas despite the

fact that the court accepting the plea did not inquire into the background or

educational status of the defendant during the plea colloquy.

A ruling on a defendant’s motion to quash the bill of information is a

discretionary ruling and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Boudreaux, 13-394 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/12/13), 131 So.3d 342, 345, writ

denied, 14-115 (La. 6/20/14), 141 So.3d 807.

In the instant case, we find that considering the totality of the circumstances,

the State proved that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to

counsel before entering the guilty plea in 2014, and therefore, the trial judge

abused her discretion by granting the motion to quash. The transcript from the

2014 guilty plea colloquy indicates that prior to the colloquy, the prosecutor

announced that he was dropping charges for aggravated assault against defendant

and that defendant would plead guilty to “DWI under 894.” The trial court then

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advised defendant that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to a trial by a

judge and his right to file a writ if convicted. The trial judge also advised

defendant that he had a right to be represented by an attorney, who would be

required to represent him at trial and on the writ application. She further advised

defendant that if he could not afford the services of an attorney, one would be

appointed to represent him at no charge. Defendant indicated he understood those

rights and that by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right to an attorney. He also

indicated that he talked to the district attorney and wished to plead guilty “with the

agreement that I have with him.”

The trial judge also advised defendant that he had the right to confront and

cross-examine witnesses and his right against self-incrimination, which he

indicated he understood. The trial court advised defendant regarding the maximum

penalty for DWI first offense and explained that he could receive a more severe

sentence if he was convicted of another DWI offense in the future. When the trial

court began to explain that the defendant had the right to compel the court to

subpoena witnesses on his behalf, defendant indicated that he did not understand

what it meant to waive his right to compulsory process. The trial judge thereafter

provided him with an additional explanation, and defendant indicated that he

understood. Following the plea colloquy, the trial court indicated “I’m convinced,

based on the report, that there is a factual basis for your plea, and that it’s freely,

knowingly, and voluntarily made.” Defendant received a deferred sentence

pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.

Because defendant questioned the judge when he failed to understand the

implications relative to compulsory process, asserted that he had reached an

agreement with the State, and answered affirmatively regarding his understanding

of his other constitutional rights, it is reasonable to infer that defendant understood

the waiver of all of his constitutional rights, including the right to counsel. See

25-CA-143 7

Kerwin, 821 So.2d at 33 (finding it could be reasonably inferred that the defendant

understood the waiver of his right to counsel, when he asked questions about a

right he did not understand and answered in the affirmative when asked if he

understood his rights regarding the waiver of counsel and other constitutional

rights).

Further, while the trial court did not engage in a colloquy with defendant

regarding his age, background, and mental competency, the substance abuse

evaluation ordered by the court prior to the guilty plea contained information

regarding all of these factors. Defendant argued at the evidentiary hearing that

there is no way to determine whether the trial court reviewed the evaluation.

However, the transcript indicates that the trial court ordered defendant to complete

a substance abuse evaluation and prior to the start of the colloquy, the trial court

placed the evaluation into the record as “Court 1.” The evaluation lists defendant’s

date of birth as February 22, 1960, making him fifty-four years old at the time of

the 2014 plea. It also includes background information indicating that defendant

completed high school and graduated from trade school. The evaluator also noted

that defendant’s general appearance, behavior, and attitude were within normal

limits, and his thought processes were linear and goal-directed. Defendant’s

mental capacity was further demonstrated by the fact that he negotiated with the

prosecutor to receive the benefit of pleading under La. C.Cr.P. art. 894 and the

dismissal of other charges pending against him. See State v. Theriot, 00-870 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 1/30/21), 728 So.2d 1078, 1085 (considered the benefits negotiated by

defendant in determining whether a valid waiver of counsel existed under the

totality of the circumstances).

After considering the colloquy and the other information, the trial judge who

accepted the 2014 guilty plea properly concluded that defendant had knowingly,

intelligently, freely, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when she accepted

25-CA-143 8

his guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge. This judge was in the best position to

assess the extent of the inquiry necessary to determine the knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary nature of the waiver of counsel for a misdemeanor DWI conviction.

Based on the foregoing, we find that under the totality of the circumstances, the

State proved that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel

before entering into his 2014 misdemeanor DWI guilty plea. As such, we find that

the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to quash.

Accordingly, we grant the State’s writ application and reverse the trial

court’s ruling which granted the motion to quash the 2014 predicate offense filed

by defendant, Joel J. Faucheux, Jr.

WRIT GRANTED

25-CA-143 9

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
AUGUST 27, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-K-343
E-NOTIFIED
29TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE ROCHELLE C. FAHRIG (DISTRICT JUDGE)
MARIA M. CHAISSON (RESPONDENT)

MAILED
LOUIS G. AUTHEMENT (RELATOR) HONORABLE JOEL T. CHAISSON, II
ATTORNEY AT LAW (RELATOR)
13919 RIVER ROAD DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SUITE 300 TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LULING, LA 70070 COURT
POST OFFICE BOX 680
HAHNVILLE, LA 70057