State of Louisiana Versus Sarah Tyner

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-K-350

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

SARAH TYNER COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY REVIEW FROM THE
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 24-6178, DIVISION "I"
HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 17, 2025

JUDE G. GRAVOIS
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Marc E. Johnson, and Scott U. Schlegel

WRIT GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART; RULING ON MOTION
TO QUASH AS TO GEORGIA CONVICTION REVERSED; STAY
DENIED
JGG
MEJ
SUS

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Thomas J. Butler
Darren A. Allemand

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR,
SARAH TYNER
Eugene P. Redmann

GRAVOIS, J.

Defendant/relator, Sarah Tyner, seeks this Court’s supervisory review of the

trial court’s July 16, 2025 ruling which denied her motion to quash predicate DWI

convictions. Defendant also requests that this Court stay the proceedings in this

matter pending a ruling on her writ application. For the following reasons, we

deny the writ application in part, as to the trial court’s denial of the motion to

quash the Alabama predicate conviction, and grant the writ application in part, as

to the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash the Georgia predicate conviction.

We reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motion to quash as to the Georgia

predicate conviction. We deny defendant’s request for a stay. We remand the

matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the writ application, defendant was charged with DWI, fourth

offense, a violation of La. R.S. 14:98 and R.S. 14:98.4, with the State charging

three out-of-state convictions as predicate offenses (guilty pleas from Alabama and

Georgia, and a conviction following a trial in Mississippi). In her motion to quash,

defendant asserted that the prior guilty pleas were unconstitutionally accepted and

requested that the DWI fourth-offense charge be quashed. Following a hearing on

July 10, 2025, the trial court denied the motion in a written judgment dated July

16, 2025. In this writ application, relator does not challenge the trial court’s

refusal to quash the Mississippi predicate conviction.

By this writ application, defendant argues that the records from the Alabama

and Georgia convictions show there is no waiver of rights form, no transcript of a

colloquy with the judge, and no minute entry reflecting that she was advised of and

waived her constitutional rights. Defendant contends that the only documents

produced are sentencing orders, which do not state that she was informed of her

rights or that she waived them.

25-K-350 1

On August 26, 2025, the State filed an Opposition to the writ application.

With its Opposition, the State included the July 10, 2025 hearing transcript and the

exhibits it attached to its Opposition to the motion to quash and admitted at the

motion to quash hearing. With the supplementation from the State, the writ

application is sufficient for this Court to address the merits thereof.1

Trial court proceedings

On May 23, 2025, defendant filed a motion to quash the three predicate

offenses. Defendant also filed a memorandum in support of the motion to quash,

arguing that none of the three predicate convictions were supported by waiver of

rights forms or colloquies. She asserted that the prior pleas were unconstitutionally

accepted and requested that the DWI fourth-offense charge be quashed.

On July 2, 2025, the State filed an opposition to the motion to quash and an

incorporated memorandum. The State argued that it would satisfy its initial burden

at the hearing by proving the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that defendant

was represented by counsel when the pleas were entered, whereupon the burden

would shift to defendant to produce affirmative evidence of a constitutional

violation or procedural irregularity. The State argued that defendant’s claim rested

merely on the absence of documentation, which does not amount to affirmative

evidence of a rights violation. The State attached certified documentation from the

three predicate cases which were formally introduced at the hearing. Additionally,

the State noted that the Mississippi conviction followed a trial, not a plea, and

therefore does not fall within the framework defendant relies on.

At the motion to quash hearing on July 10, 2025, defense counsel sought to

quash the two convictions from Alabama and Georgia. Counsel asserted there was

1
Defendant failed to include the bill of information with the writ application in violation
of Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rule 4-5(C)(8), which provides that the contents of the writ
application shall contain “a copy of the indictment or the bill of information in criminal cases.”

25-K-350 2

no Boykin2 form, colloquy, or minute entry that defendant was advised of her rights

and waived them. Counsel pointed out that although there were attorneys of record

in both cases, they did not sign anything, and it was unclear whether they were

present on the days the purported pleas took place. Counsel contended that the

exhibits provided by the State were sentencing orders and did not provide evidence

of a waiver of her rights. Counsel argued there was nothing to support the

convictions and that the two convictions should be quashed.

The State argued that Exhibits B and C established counsel represented

defendant when the Alabama and Georgia pleas were taken and that it had met its

initial burden, requiring defendant to show any infringement of rights or

irregularity. The State maintained that the defense offered no affirmative evidence

to the contrary.

After taking the matter under advisement, on July 16, 2025, the trial court

issued a written judgment denying the motion to quash. Having reviewed the

memoranda, exhibits, and entire record, and considering State v. Carlos, 98-1366

(La. 7/7/99), 738 So.2d 556, and State v. Shelton, 92-3070 (La. 7/1/93), 621 So.2d

769, the court found that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish the

existence of the three predicate convictions listed in the bill of information. The

court noted that one of the predicates resulted from a conviction following a trial

by jury. As to the two guilty pleas, the court found that the defense failed to offer

any affirmative evidence demonstrating that the pleas were constitutionally

deficient.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A motion to quash can be employed to attack the constitutionality of prior

convictions used to enhance a DWI charge. State v. Boudreaux, 13-394 (La. App.

2
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

25-K-350 3

5 Cir. 12/12/13), 131 So.3d 342, 345, writ denied, 14-115 (La. 6/20/14), 141 So.3d

807. A trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash should not generally be reversed in

the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion. State v. Agregaard, No.

22-K-82, 2022 WL 819172 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/18/22), writs denied, 22-605 (La.

6/22/22), 339 So.3d 641, and 22-642 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 645.

A presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions in multiple

offender DWI cases, and the burden is on the defendant to show the prior guilty

plea is constitutionally deficient. State v. Collins, 04-255 (La. App. 5 Cir.

10/12/04), 886 So.2d 1149, 1153, writ denied, 04-2798 (La. 3/11/05), 896 So.2d

62.

In State v. Carlos, 738 So.2d 556, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court

extended the burden-shifting principles for habitual offender proceedings to the

recidivist provisions of the DWI statute. Thus, when a defendant challenges the

constitutional validity of a predicate DWI conviction resulting from a guilty plea,

the State bears the initial burden of proving: 1) the existence of the prior guilty

plea, and 2) that the defendant was represented by counsel when the plea was

taken. Id. at 559. If the State meets this initial burden, “the defendant must

produce affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural

irregularity in the taking of the plea.” Id. If the defendant makes the required

showing, the burden reverts to the State to produce a “perfect” Boykin transcript,

i.e., one “which reflects a voluntary, informed, and articulated waiver of the three

specific rights mentioned in Boykin.” Id. at 559 n.4. Anything less than a

“perfect” transcript, “such as a guilty plea form or minute entry, will require the

25-K-350 4

trial judge to weigh the evidence submitted by both sides and determine whether

the defendant’s Boykin rights were prejudiced.” Id. at 559.3

In State v. Balsano, 09-735 (La. 6/19/09), 11 So.3d 475, 479 (per curiam),

the Louisiana Supreme Court held that for guilty pleas entered in Louisiana before

December 8, 1971, and for all non-Louisiana guilty pleas used to enhance a

defendant’s sentence following a subsequent conviction, a defendant does not

satisfy his burden of proof on collateral attack merely by presenting

contemporaneous records revealing a violation of the three-right rule. Id. at 482.

Rather, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the defendant must show that his

guilty plea did not represent a knowing and voluntary choice among available

alternatives. Id. at 482 (citing State v. Harris, 97-1352 (La. 10/31/97), 702 So.2d

678, 679).4

Also, in State v. Morgan, 13-1495 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1160 (per

curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the State could use a prior non-

Louisiana guilty plea for enhancement purposes even though the State introduced a

waiver of rights form that did not contain the judge’s signature, and there was no

transcript of the plea proceedings or a minute entry showing a guilty plea colloquy

during which the defendant was informed of his rights. The court noted that the

defendant and his attorney signed the waiver of rights form which enumerated the

trial rights waived by a guilty plea. The Supreme Court further noted that the

defendant did not claim below that he was not informed of his Boykin rights by the

court or that he did not understand them, only that no proof existed in those

respects. Citing State v. Balsano, the court stated that the defendant “failed to

3
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, supra, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized three federal constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea: the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers.
4
Balsano also recognized that, in many cases, prior DWI convictions used to enhance
sentences are misdemeanor offenses in which the defendant does not have the right to a jury trial,
shrinking the three-right rule to two rights.

25-K-350 5

produce any affirmative evidence that the contemporaneous statements of counsel

on the waiver form did not reliably establish the knowing and voluntary [sic] of the

guilty plea as a waiver of the enumerated trial rights both he and counsel

acknowledged by signing the form.” Id. at 1161-62.

Here, the State provided Exhibit B for the Alabama conviction and Exhibit C

for the Georgia conviction, and both were admitted into evidence at the hearing on

motion to quash.

The Alabama conviction

Exhibit B introduced by the State consists of an Order from the Municipal

Court for the City of Aliceville, Alabama. The Order indicates that defendant

appeared in open court and was represented by a Scott Foster. It further provides

that the court accepted a plea of guilty to “DUI & RECKLESS DRIVING.” The

Order is dated July 12, 2018, and contains the signatures of both defendant and the

judge. The State also attached a second page, but the title of the document appears

to be cut off. It contains a visible stamp reading “Court Action and Disposition.”

This page includes the same date of July 12, 2018; the signature of the judge or

magistrate; Scott Foster listed in the section titled, “Attorney for Defendant”; and a

checkmark in the “Plea of Defendant” section indicating “Guilty as charged.”

In State v. Clark, 22-1305, 2023 WL 6158164 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/23), the

First Circuit reiterated that pre-printed forms such as the one introduced by the

State here have been found sufficient to meet the State’s initial burden under

Shelton and Carlos. Id.

Based on these documents, it appears that defendant pled guilty on July 12,

2018, and was represented by counsel, Scott Foster. Accordingly, the State

satisfied its initial burden under Carlos of establishing the existence of the

Alabama guilty plea and that the plea was counseled.

25-K-350 6

Having met that initial burden, the burden then shifted to defendant to

produce affirmative evidence showing an infringement of her rights or a procedural

irregularity in the taking of the plea. See Carlos, 738 So.2d 556. In her motion to

quash and memorandum in support thereof, defendant argued that the predicate

convictions were not supported by waiver of rights forms or colloquies. She

asserted that the prior pleas were unconstitutionally accepted. At the hearing, the

defense argued that the Alabama and Georgia convictions should be quashed

because there was no Boykin form, colloquy, or minute entry showing a waiver of

rights, the attorneys of record had not signed anything and may not have been

present, and the State’s exhibits were merely sentencing orders insufficient to

establish valid pleas.

In Collins, 886 So.2d at 1155, this Court noted that at the hearing on the

motion to quash, the defendant simply argued, “We also feel that … the First

Parish Court of Jefferson also inadequately performed the Boykinization.” The

defendant further asserted that the State’s use of the waiver form alone without the

plea colloquy transcript was insufficient to prove a knowing and intelligent plea.

Id. This Court found that under Carlos, the State was not required to submit

transcripts of the guilty pleas in its initial burden of proof. This Court held that the

defendant failed to show any constitutional deficiency in the plea, and therefore,

the burden never shifted back to the State to prove the constitutionality of the plea.

This Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion

to quash the predicate conviction. Id.

In Clark, 2023 WL 6158164, after determining the State met its initial

burden, this Court stated that the burden shifted to the defendant to show that the

guilty plea was not voluntary as a constitutional matter, meaning that it did not

represent a knowing and voluntary choice among available alternatives. This

Court found that the defendant did not present any evidence in this regard, and

25-K-350 7

there was nothing in the forms presented by the State, in meeting its initial burden,

to show such defect. This Court held because the defendant failed to meet his

burden of proof, the burden never shifted back to prove the constitutionality of the

plea. Therefore, this Court found no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

denial of the defendant’s motion to quash the predicate guilty plea. Id. at *3.

In State v. Bush, 20-259 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 318 So.3d 151, the First

Circuit held that under the burden shifting principals of Shelton and Carlos, the

defendant may not simply rely on the absence of a recitation of his Boykin rights in

the documentation presented by the State. The court held that as the defendant

failed to meet his burden of proof, the burden never shifted back to the State to

prove the constitutionality of the plea. Id.

In State v. Montoya, 07-734, 2007 WL 3407777 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07),

the State introduced certified copies of the Uniform Complaint and Summons; the

Misdemeanor Information; the Judge’s Judgment, Orders, Minutes, and Docket

Sheet; and the Circuit Court Criminal Docket Sheet as proof of each of the

Missouri guilty pleas alleged as a predicate. Id. at *3. The burden then shifted to

the defendant to produce affirmative evidence of constitutional violations as to

either of the Missouri predicates. Instead, at the hearing on the motion to quash,

counsel for the defendant failed to produce any evidence and only argued that the

State failed to produce evidence the Missouri judge explained that a subsequent

conviction of DWI would result in harsher penalties for a felony. The First Circuit

held that because the defendant failed to produce affirmative evidence showing an

infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the pleas, the

burden never shifted back to the State to prove the constitutionality of the prior

guilty pleas. Id.

Here, nothing in the Alabama documents establishes, or even suggests, that

defendant’s plea of guilty did not represent a knowing and voluntary choice among

25-K-350 8

available alternatives. Further, defendant offered no evidence on the issue, instead

arguing that the State’s documentation failed to reveal a Boykin colloquy or that

she was represented by counsel, which as noted above appears inaccurate. As

defendant failed to meet her burden, the burden never shifted back to the State to

prove the constitutionality of the Alabama plea. See Clark, 2023 WL 6158164.

Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash as to the

Alabama predicate guilty plea.

The Georgia conviction

As to the Georgia conviction, the State introduced two documents in

defendant’s case from the Municipal Court for the City of Summerville, Georgia,

both dated June 21, 2019. The first is a Waiver of Arraignment reflecting

defendant’s waiver of formal arraignment, and the second is a Notice of

Appearance, both indicating Steven A. Miller’s representation of defendant. The

State also provided what appears to be an Order on a pre-printed form from the

Municipal Court of the City of Summerville. In case numbers 19T501 and

19T502, the Order reflects that defendant was charged with “DUI Child

Endangerment” (offenses 4 and 5). The Order includes a checkmark next to

“Negotiated Plea Accepted by the Court,” and a checkmark next to “Guilty on

Counts,” with “1, 4, & 5” handwritten beside it. The Order further sets forth the

misdemeanor sentence and conditions of probation, is dated July 23, 2019, and

bears the judge’s signature. Additionally, the certificate of service section appears

to be signed by both a probation officer and defendant on that same date.

As discussed above, the fact that the Order is on a pre-printed form does not

in and of itself render the State’s evidence inadequate to meet its initial burden.

See Clark, 2023 WL 6158164. As such, based on the documents provided, we find

that the State met its initial burden of proving the existence of the Georgia

predicate offense. However, although the Waiver of Arraignment and Notice of

25-K-350 9

Appearance reflect that defendant was represented by counsel approximately a

month earlier on June 21, 2019, nothing in the July 23, 2019 Order references

counsel or otherwise confirms in any way that defendant was represented by

counsel when the plea was taken on July 23, 2019. As such, the State’s evidence

does not establish that defendant was represented by counsel at the time the

Georgia predicate guilty plea was taken. See State v. Carlos, supra, 738 So.2d at

559. Generally, when the record does not establish representation, the State is

required to show a valid waiver of counsel before the burden may be shifted to the

defendant.5 Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by shifting the burden

to defendant to produce affirmative evidence showing an infringement of her rights

or a procedural irregularity in the taking of that plea.6

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash as to the

Alabama predicate conviction. However, the trial court erred in denying

defendant’s motion to quash as to the Georgia predicate conviction.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the writ application is denied in part, as to the

trial court’s denial of the motion to quash the Alabama predicate conviction, and

granted in part, as to the trial court’s denial of the motion to quash the Georgia

predicate conviction. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling on the motion to quash

5
Generally, if the record reflects that a predicate plea was uncounseled, the State has the
burden of proving a valid waiver of counsel. State v. Domino, 10-661 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/25/11),
60 So.3d 659, 664-65. The right to counsel is a fundamental right guaranteed by both the federal
and state constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; La. Const. of 1974, art. 1, § 13. An uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, absent a valid waiver of counsel, may not serve as a predicate for
enhancement of a subsequent DWI offense. State v. Dillon, 12-67 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/11/12), 101
So.3d 970, 975. The State bears the burden of proving that an unrepresented defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel before pleading guilty to a predicate
misdemeanor DWI conviction used to enhance a subsequent DWI offense. Id.
6
The Georgia plea documents contain no reference to defendant’s Boykin rights.

25-K-350 10

as to the Georgia predicate conviction is reversed. Defendant’s request for a stay is

denied. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

WRIT GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN
PART; RULING ON MOTION TO QUASH
AS TO GEORGIA CONVICTION
REVERSED; STAY DENIED

25-K-350 11

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
SEPTEMBER 17, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL
PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-K-350
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER (DISTRICT JUDGE)
DARREN A. ALLEMAND (RESPONDENT) THOMAS J. BUTLER (RESPONDENT) EUGENE P. REDMANN (RELATOR)

MAILED
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(RESPONDENT)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053