State of Louisiana Versus Larry St. Amant, Sr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-K-371

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

LARRY ST. AMANT, SR. COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

September 24, 2025

Linda Tran
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE LARRY ST. AMANT, SR.

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE DONALD A.
ROWAN, JR., DIVISION "L", NUMBER 24-2266

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Jude G. Gravois, and Scott U. Schlegel

WRIT DENIED

Relator, Larry St. Amant, Sr., seeks supervisory review of the trial court’s

July 9, 2025 ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence. For the following

reasons, the writ is denied.

On April 24, 2024, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information charging relator with possession of cocaine weighing less than 2 grams

in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C) (count two).1 Relator’s co-defendant, Larry St.

Amant, Jr., filed a motion to suppress evidence on October 10, 2024.2 Relator did

not file a separate motion to suppress evidence.3 The trial court permitted the

1
Larry St. Amant, Jr. was charged in count one in the same bill with intent to distribute
cocaine weighing 28 grams or greater in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A). The companion writ
application of St. Amant, Jr. is filed in Case Number 25-K-365.
2
Larry St. Amant, Jr. will be referred to as co-defendant.
3
Although relator did not file a separate motion to suppress evidence, his co-defendant’s
motion may be presumed to apply to relator. We note that relator’s counsel was present,
examined the witness, and presented argument at the hearing. La. C.Cr.P. art. 842, provides that

25-K-371

motion to be heard as to both defendants at the same time. Following a hearing on

July 9, 2025, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

At the July 9, 2025 suppression hearing, Detective Jeremy Budo of the

Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office testified that in early 2025, he received

information from a reliable confidential informant that St. Amant, Jr. was

trafficking cocaine in Jefferson Parish. Surveillance was conducted, and a

controlled buy was arranged, confirming the informant’s information. Sometime

thereafter, on March 5, 2024, detectives observed St. Amant, Jr. arrive at his

residence on Fig Street in a red Lexus SUV, exit the front passenger seat, go

inside, and return a short time later to the front passenger seat of that vehicle, after

which they followed the vehicle and stopped it for a traffic violation. Detective

Budo further testified that the confidential informant never mentioned relator and

had no information on relator.

Detective Budo testified that relator was in the back seat of the vehicle when

the vehicle was stopped, and that Detective Ronquille removed him from the back

seat. Detective Budo further testified:

A. And St. Amant, Sr. had a small bag of what we later learned was
cocaine rubber-banded to his – to his leg –

Q. Okay.

A. – underneath his pants.

***

Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned that there was a rubber band around
his ankle and something had fallen from his leg, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And who was the detective who claimed to have found that?

“[i]f an objection has been made when more than one defendant is on trial, it shall be presumed,
unless the contrary appears, that the objection has been made by all the defendants.” This article
applies, by analogy, to written motions. State v. Jefferson, 03-820 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/04), 866
So.2d 931, 937, writ denied, 04-727 (La. 9/24/04), 882 So.2d 1166.

2

A. I believe it was Detective Ronquille.

Q. Okay. Do you know if anyone took a photograph of this – of the
drug as it fell or after it fell or the rubber band?

A. No, sir. I don’t know.

Q. Okay. Would that be helpful to have a photograph of the rubber
band?

A. It would be, sir.

Q. Okay. And do you know – as far as you know, there is no
photograph of the rubber band?

A. Correct, sir.

Relator does not challenge the traffic stop of the vehicle. Instead, relator

argues that the search was conducted without probable cause and was not a search

incident to arrest.

The trial court is vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to

suppress. State v. McCarthy, 21-153 (La. 4/20/21), 313 So.3d 1234, 1236. The

trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly

erroneous standard. Id.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and

Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable

searches and seizures. State v. Roche, 05-237 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/25/06), 928 So.2d

761, 765, writ denied, 06-1566 (La. 1/8/07), 948 So.2d 120. Warrantless searches

and seizures are unreasonable per se unless justified by one of the specific

exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the

United States Supreme Court recognized the investigatory stop as an exception to

the warrant requirement. A police officer may stop an individual if he reasonably

suspects that criminal activity may be afoot. Id. “Once an officer conducts an

investigatory stop of a person pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(B), the officer may

3

conduct a limited pat-down frisk for weapons if he reasonably believes he is in

danger or that the suspect is armed.” State v. Gilbert, 23-121 (La. App. 5 Cir.

11/8/23), 377 So.3d 378, 387, writ denied, 23-1640 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 704.

It is not necessary that an officer establish that it was more probable than not that

the detained individual was armed and dangerous; it is sufficient that the officer

establishes a “substantial possibility” of “danger.” State v. Gresham, 97-1158 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 4/15/98), 712 So.2d 946, 952, writ denied, 98-2259 (La. 1/15/99), 736

So.2d 200.

In a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence seized without a warrant, the

State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement

applies. State v. Lane, 09-179 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/29/09), 24 So.3d 920, 923, writ

denied, 09-2360 (La. 5/21/10), 36 So.3d 226 (citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D)).

As discussed above, Detective Budo testified under oath that as lead

detective, he learned that relator had a bag of cocaine rubber banded around his

ankle and that it had fallen from relator’s leg at some point. While we recognize

that this testimony was undisputed and that arguments of counsel are not evidence,

we find that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient for this Court to

review the totality of the circumstances as it relates to relator.

Occasionally, this Court has vacated the denial of a defendant’s motion to

suppress and remanded the matter to the trial court to re-open the suppression

hearing to receive testimony and evidence from additional witnesses. See Bowman

v. State, 23-405 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/2/23), 2023 WL 6382100. But in this case,

such an order is unnecessary. Even assuming that relator would be able to

establish during a future hearing that the search of St. Amant, Sr. exceeded the

scope of Terry, suppression would still not be required due to the inevitable

discovery doctrine.

4

The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[e]xclusion of physical

evidence that would inevitably have been discovered adds nothing to either the

integrity or fairness of a criminal trial.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446, 104 S.

Ct. 2501, 2510, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984). In the case of State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La.

1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 127, the Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the

inevitable discovery doctrine as follows:

One of the theories courts use in addressing “fruit of the poisonous
tree” issues is the inevitable discovery rule. The inevitable discovery
doctrine “is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine:
Because the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered
through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would
have been discovered.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539, 108
S.Ct. 2529, 2534, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). A functional similarity exists
between the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines because
both seek to avoid excluding evidence the police “would have obtained ... if
no misconduct had taken place.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104
S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The State therefore bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that “the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means....”
Id.; State v. Vigne, 01–2940 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 533, 539. Application
of the inevitable discovery doctrine thus “involves no speculative elements
but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or
impeachment....” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509 n. 5;
State v. Vigne, 820 So.2d at 539.
Integral to the proper application of the inevitable discovery doctrine
is a finding that law enforcement would have inevitably secured the evidence
by lawful means, not simply that they could have.

Here, the detectives smelled marijuana and were told by the driver of the

vehicle that there were drugs in the vehicle. There is no reason to question the trial

court’s determination that the detectives smelled marijuana or that the driver

admitted to marijuana being in the vehicle, as the trial court is in the best position

to weigh the credibility of the witness. Further, the detectives eventually deployed

a K-9 unit, which discovered drugs in the vehicle, supporting Detective Budo’s

testimony. Ultimately, five separate bags of marijuana were found in a jar on the

floorboard of the backseat where relator was seated and a firearm was recovered in

the driver’s side door. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, this would

have resulted in the arrest of relator. And a search incident to that arrest, either at

5

the scene or prior to booking at the jail, would have inevitably resulted in the

discovery of the cocaine on his person.

Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the motion

to suppress. The writ is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 24th day of September, 2025.

SUS
FHW
JGG

6

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 09/24/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-K-371
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Donald A. Rowan, Jr. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Thomas J. Butler (Respondent) Thomas M. Calogero (Relator)

MAILED
Taylor Somerville (Respondent)
Assistant District Attorney
Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
200 Derbigny Street
Gretna, LA 70053