State of Louisiana Versus McKinsey Bowman

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-K-475

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

MCKINSEY BOWMAN COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

October 14, 2025

Linda Tran
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE STATE OF LOUISIANA

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE FORTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST JOHN THE BAPTIST, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE
NGHANA LEWIS, DIVISION "B", NUMBER 19,413

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and John J. Molaison, Jr.

WRIT GRANTED

In this writ application, relator, the State of Louisiana, through the

Attorney General, Liz Murrill, seeks review of the district court’s August 25, 2025

ruling, which granted defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence and

Argument Regarding Enhanced Criminal Negligence Standards Based on Vehicle

Type. For the reasons that follow, finding the district court erred in granting

defendant’s motion, we grant the State’s writ application, reverse the district

court’s ruling, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Factual Background and Procedural History

On January 8, 2020, defendant, McKinsey Bowman, was driving a semi-

tractor trailer (18-wheeler), carrying a load of 80,000 pounds, when he ran a red

light and struck the victim’s vehicle, causing her death. As a result, defendant was

charged with negligent homicide, “… the killing of a human being by criminal

negligence,” a violation of La. R.S. 14:32.1 Criminal negligence is found from the

accused’s gross disregard for the consequences of his actions. State v. Rock, 571

So.2d 908 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So.2d 49 (La. 1991). At his

arraignment on February 10, 2020, defendant pled not guilty.

On April 21, 2025, defendant filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence

and Argument Regarding Enhanced Criminal Negligence Standards Based on

Vehicle Type, which the State opposed. The matter came for hearing on August

25, 2025, after which the district court granted defendant’s motion. In its oral

reasons for granting defendant’s motion, the district court stated:

I’m going to grant the Motion in Limine, finding that the
plain language of the statute for criminal negligence,
which is R.S. 14:12, does not provide for - - essentially
what the state would want is like a heightened - - a
heightened standard based on the type of vehicle that’s
being driven, and if the legislature anticipated that, then
the legislature would have addressed that by way of some
subsection to the statute itself by way of giving - - giving
us a broader like framework. The statute is narrowly
defined.
…[U]nder the facts presented by this case, the Court
finds that the four corners of the statute, it simply don’t
[sic] permit the state to place that extra - -that heightened
burden, and so therefore, I am going to grant the Motion
in Limine.

This writ application followed.

Discussion

In order to prove a defendant was criminally negligent, the State bears the

burden of establishing that a defendant’s conduct—in this case, running a red light

while driving a semi-tractor trailer—constitutes a gross deviation below the

standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like

1
“Criminal negligence” is defined in La. R.S. 14:12, which provides:
Criminal negligence exits when although specific nor general criminal
intent is present, there is such disregard of the interest of others that the
offender’s conduct amounts to gross deviation below the standard of care
expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like
circumstances.

circumstances. See La. R.S. 14:12; Rock, 571 So.2d at 909. In its writ application,

the State argues that, given its burden of proof, it is imperative that the State be

allowed to introduce evidence of the type of vehicle defendant was operating at the

time he caused the victim’s death, as well as evidence regarding defendant’s

familiarity and/or training driving the tractor trailer. It argues that such evidence is

relevant and necessary to prove defendant was criminally negligent, i.e., that his

“conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be

maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances.” La. R.S. 14:12.

In particular, the State avers that the type of vehicle defendant was operating at the

time he struck the victim’s vehicle is clearly “relevant,” because the collision

between his 80,000 pound semi-tractor trailer and the victim’s vehicle was the

direct cause of the victim’s demise. The State further contends that making an

argument that defendant failed to exercise reasonable care given the type of vehicle

he was driving, and was therefore criminally negligent when he ran the red light

and killed the victim, is the type of argument that falls squarely within the

permissible scope of an attorney’s argument under La. C.Cr.P. art. 774.2

In contrast, in support of its motion in limine, defendant argued that “had the

legislature intended to create a heightened criminal liability standard for

commercial drivers,” it would have done so. Rather than cite to any specific

statutory or jurisprudential authority for this proposition, however, defendant

focused on the effect of allowing such evidence and argument would potentially

have on “interstate commerce, conflict with federal and state regulatory schemes,

and/or create jurisdictional and/or enforcement problems.” Specifically, in bullet-

point form, defendant set forth a list of issues, including but not limited to,

2
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 774, which sets forth the permissible scope of an
attorney’s argument, provides in part:
The argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of
evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw
therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case.

“standards problem,” problems with “notice” regarding what standards apply and

when, commerce clause implications, due process problems, and conflicts with

existing federal and state regulations.

According to its oral reasons stated at the close of the hearing, the district

court granted defendant’s motion in limine on the basis that allowing the State to

make this argument would somehow place a “heightened burden” on defendant

“based solely on a defendant’s lawful choice of vehicle and occupation.” We

disagree.

In State v. Watson, 09-1387 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/09), 2009 WL 4981483,

which is factually on point, where evidence of the defendant driver’s familiarity

and experience of operating a 40,000-pound semitrailer that could not readily stop,

slow, or turn once the brakes were engaged, was admissible to prove that, under

the circumstances presented, the defendant’s conduct in running a red light

constituted criminal negligence. Id. at *6. As established by the First Circuit in

Watson, we find that if an appellate court can consider this type of evidence on

appeal in determining whether the State carried its burden of proving criminal

negligence beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury should be able to consider the same

facts at trial when determining defendant’s guilt or innocence in the present case;

i.e., whether defendant, “an experienced, trained, specifically licensed driver

operating a very dangerous piece of equipment,” was criminally negligent.

For the foregoing reasons, the State’s writ application is granted, the district

court’s ruling granting defendant’s motion in limine is reversed, and the matter is

remanded for further proceedings.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 14th day of October, 2025.

SMC
JGG
JJM

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 10/14/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-K-475
E-NOTIFIED
40th District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Nghana Lewis (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Irena Zajickova (Relator) Elizabeth B. Murrill (Relator)
J. Taylor Gray (Relator)

MAILED
Stephen D. London (Respondent) John W. Russell, IV (Relator)
Attorney at Law Assistant Attorney General
11 Catalpa Trace Louisiana Department of Justice
Covington, LA 70433 Post Office Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804