25-KH-316 Nonprecedential Writ Denied Processed

State of Louisiana Versus Robyn Willard

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit · Filed August 6, 2025

The holding in the court’s own words

Thus, on the showing made, we conclude that the State is not entitled to the relief it seeks given the State’s own admission that the district court’s order met the requirements set forth in Article 897(B).

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-KH-316

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

ROBYN WILLARD COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

August 06, 2025

Linda Tran
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE STATE OF LOUISIANA

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE LAUREN D.
ROGERS, DIVISION "E", NUMBER 909193

Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois,
Marc E. Johnson, and Scott U. Schlegel

WRIT DENIED

Relator, the State of Louisiana, seeks review of the 29th Judicial District
Court’s June 18, 2025 ruling that granted Defendant, Robyn Willard’s, request for
early termination of probation.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, in June 2024, Defendant pled guilty to an
amended charge of driving while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of La. R.S.
14:98.1. Defendant was sentenced to a six-month term of imprisonment in the
parish jail, which was suspended, and placed on twenty-four months of supervised
probation. At the hearing on Defendant’s request for early termination a year later,
the State advised that its preference was to convert Defendant’s probation to
inactive probation, so that the early termination of her probation would not shorten
the cleansing period for prior convictions of driving while intoxicated (DWI). The
district court found that Defendant met the requirements for termination of
probation under La. C.Cr.P. art. 897, acknowledging that she had completed a year
of probation already, over the State’s objection.

The State argues that the district court erred by denying the State’s request to
preserve (the start date of) the ten-year cleansing period by stipulating that the ten-
year cleansing period would begin to run at the same time it would have if
Defendant had served the entirety of the previously agreed upon 24-month
probationary period, or by switching Defendant to inactive probation status for the
duration of the original sentence.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 897, which sets forth the requirements for the termination of
probation and discharge of a defendant, provides in relevant part:

B. In a misdemeanor case, other than for a conviction of
vehicular negligent injuring, the court may terminate the defendant’s
suspended sentence or probation and discharge him at any time when
all of the following conditions are met:

(1) The termination or discharge is ordered in open court.

(2) The state is present at the time the termination or discharge
is ordered and has been afforded an opportunity to
participate in a contradictory hearing on the matter.

In this case, the State “fully recognizes” the district court’s authority to
terminate Defendant’s probation pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 897 and that the
statute’s requirements to do so were met. The State avers that Defendant received
an added benefit of the acceleration of “the commencement of the ten-year
cleansing period by a full year,” which modified the plea bargain Defendant
entered into with the State.

The DWI statute provides for a so-called cleansing period for remote former
DWI offenses. State v. Henry, 12-KA-841, 2012 WL 6681849 (La. App. 1 Cir.
Dec. 12, 2012), writ denied, 13-110 (La. 6/21/13), 118 So.3d 406. La. R.S.
14:98(C)(3) provides in pertinent part:

For purposes of this Section, a prior conviction shall not include
a conviction for an offense under this Section…if committed more
than ten years prior to the commission of the crime for which the
defendant is being tried… However, periods of time during which the
offender was awaiting trial, under an order of attachment for failure to
appear, or on probation or parole for an offense described in this
Paragraph, or periods of time during which an offender was
incarcerated in a penal institution in this or any other state for any
offense, including an offense described in Paragraph (1) of this
Subsection, shall be excluded in computing the ten-year period.

In State v. Hoerner, 11-659 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/12), 88 So.3d 1128, 1130-
31, this Court explained that “the language of the statute indicates that the
cleansing period only accrues when a defendant is not under any legal restraints;
consequently, periods of time when a defendant is under legal restraints must be
excluded from the calculation of the cleansing period under the statute.” This Court
further stated that “[t]he purpose of cleansing periods … is to reward prior
offenders with the ‘cleansing’ of their prior convictions if they are able to refrain
from committing another offense within the statutory time frame.” Id. at 1131.

Upon review, on the showing made, we find that we cannot grant the relief
requested by the State. As discussed above, Defendant had complied with all of
the terms of her probation at the time of the June 18, 2025 termination hearing.
Once the trial court terminated Defendant’s probation as authorized pursuant to La.
C.Cr.P. art. 897(B), Defendant was no longer under “legal restraint” for the
purposes of the DWI cleansing period. This is not the result of a broken plea
bargain as the State suggests, but rather is a result of her early termination pursuant
to Article 897(B). Furthermore, the State concedes that there is no statutory
authority or case law to support its request for a stipulation effectively modifying

the terms of Article 897(B)’s provision for early termination of probation. Thus,
on the showing made, we conclude that the State is not entitled to the relief it seeks
given the State’s own admission that the district court’s order met the requirements
set forth in Article 897(B).

Accordingly, the writ is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 6th day of August, 2025.

MEJ
JGG
SUS

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 08/06/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-KH-316
E-NOTIFIED
29th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Lauren D. Rogers (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Louis G. Authement (Relator)

MAILED
Robyn Willard (Respondent) Honorable Joel T. Chaisson, II (Relator)
In Proper Person District Attorney
1 Avant Garde Circle Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court
Kenner, LA 70065 Post Office Box 680
Hahnville, LA 70057