State of Louisiana Versus Noel Austin

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 25-KH-373

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

NOEL AUSTIN COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

September 12, 2025

Linda Tran
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE NOEL AUSTIN

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE FRANK A.
BRINDISI, DIVISION "E", NUMBER 03-6329

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Marc E. Johnson, and Stephen J. Windhorst

WRIT DENIED

On February 18, 2004, a jury found defendant-relator, Noel Austin, guilty of

two counts of attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery, and possession

with intent to distribute cocaine. On March 4, 2004, the trial court sentenced him to

concurrent terms of fifty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the attempted first degree murder

convictions, ten years imprisonment at hard labor for the aggravated battery

conviction, and thirty years imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years to

be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the

conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. After a habitual offender

hearing on May 18, 2004, the trial court found relator to be a third-felony offender,

vacated his original sentence on count one of attempted first degree murder, and

imposed a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

25-KH-373

This Court affirmed relator’s convictions and sentences, and the Louisiana

Supreme Court denied relator’s writ application. See State v. Austin, 04-993 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 3/1/05), 900 So.2d 867, writ denied, 05-830 (La. 11/28/05), 916 So.2d

143.

On July 9, 2025, relator filed a Motion to Correct an Invalid and Illegal

Habitual Offender Sentence, claiming that his habitual offender sentence was

illegal because the court, not a jury, “made a factual finding which had the effect of

increasing his punishment.” Relator relied on the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 144 S.Ct. 1840, 219 L.Ed.2d

451 (2024), which held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous

jury’s determination of facts essential to an enhanced sentence under the Armed

Career Criminal Act.1 On July 10, 2025, the trial court denied relief, finding that

relator’s claim “contest[ing] the constitutionality of his sentence pursuant to the

multiple bill” was not “cognizable in a motion to correct illegal sentence.” The trial

court further found “no illegality in the defendant’s sentences, as the terms of the

sentences imposed are clearly within the statutory parameters.”

On August 19, 2025, relator filed a writ application re-urging his claim that

his sentence is illegal.

Discussion

As an initial matter, we note that relator’s motion did not point to a claimed

illegal term in his habitual offender sentence, but instead challenged the

constitutionality of the trial court’s habitual offender finding. La. C.Cr.P. art.

882(A) states: “An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that

imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review.” Because relator does not

1
The Armed Criminal Career Act “imposes lengthy mandatory prison terms on certain
defendants who have previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on
separate occasions.” Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 825, 144 S.Ct. at 1846.

2

point to an illegal term of his sentence, the trial court correctly determined that

relator did not raise a claim cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Accordingly, the “at any time” language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 882 does not apply to

relator’s motion.

Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that courts should

“look through the caption of the pleadings in order to ascertain their substance and

to do substantial justice” (see State v. Moses, 05-787 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/9/06), 932

So.2d 701, 706 n.3, writ denied, 06-2171 (La. 4/5/07), 954 So.2d 140), a

constitutional challenge to the district court’s habitual offender determination and

sentence must be made in a timely fashion. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) provides, in

pertinent part: “No application for post-conviction relief including applications

which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two

years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final.” Relator’s

conviction and sentence became final in 2005. See State v. Austin, 05-830 (La.

11/28/05), 916 So.2d 143. Thus, relator’s challenge appears to be untimely.

However, La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(2) allows a defendant to file an

application for post-conviction relief (APCR) more than two years after his

conviction and sentence become final when “[t]he claim asserted in the petition is

based upon a final ruling of an appellate court establishing a theretofore unknown

interpretation of constitutional law and petitioner establishes that this interpretation

is retroactively applicable to his case, and the petition is filed within one year of

the finality of such ruling.” Erlinger, which relator relies upon to support his

motion, was decided on June 21, 2024 and became final on July 16, 2024,

following the expiration of the twenty-five-day time period for filing a petition for

rehearing.2 Relator filed his Motion to Correct an Invalid and Illegal Habitual

2
Supreme Court Rule 44 provides that a petition for rehearing of a judgment or decision on the
merits must be filed within twenty-five days of the entry of the judgment or decision.
3

Offender Sentence with the district court on July 9, 2025, within one year of the

finality of Erlinger. Nevertheless, we find Erlinger does not apply to relator’s case.

In Erlinger, the Supreme Court pointed out that the sentencing court’s

factual finding that the defendant’s offenses “occurred on at least three separate

occasions had the effect of increasing both the maximum and minimum sentences”

that the defendant faced. 602 U.S. at 835, 144 S.Ct. at 1852 (emphasis in original).

In that scenario, the Supreme Court determined that “the district court had to do

more than identify his previous convictions and the legal elements required to

sustain them.” 602 U.S. at 838, 144 S.Ct. at 1854. As such, the Supreme Court

ruled that the defendant was entitled under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to

have a jury unanimously determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether his past

offenses were committed on separate occasions for sentencing enhancement

purposes. 602 U.S. at. 849, 144 S.Ct. at 1860.

At the same time, however, Erlinger let stand the exception set forth in

Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d

350 (1998), where the Supreme Court held that the existence of a prior conviction

triggering enhanced penalties for a recidivist was a fact that could be found by a

judge, not an element of the crime that must be found by a jury. Specifically, in

Erlinger, the Supreme Court stated: “no one in this case has asked us to revisit

Almendarez-Torres. Nor is there need to do so today ... It persists as a ‘narrow

exception’ permitting judges to find only ‘the fact of a prior conviction[.]’” Id.,

602 U.S. at 1853-54, 144 S.Ct. at 1840 (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.

99, 111 n.1, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013)).

Furthermore, it is well settled that “[a] defendant is not convicted of being a

habitual offender. Rather, a defendant is adjudicated as a habitual offender as a

result of prior felony convictions. The sentence to be imposed following a habitual

offender adjudication is simply an enhanced penalty for the underlying

4

conviction.” See State v. Kennon, 19-998 (La. 9/1/20), 340 So.3d 881, 887 (citing

State v. Parker, 03-924 (La. 4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 325-26). As “a multiple

offender proceeding is not the trial of a criminal charge” but instead is “merely part

of sentencing and allows enhanced penalties for repeat offenders,” the trial court’s

adjudication of relator’s habitual offender status pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 does

not run afoul of Erlinger’s holding. See State v. Langendorfer, 389 So.2d 1271,

1276-77 (La. 1980).

Finally, the Erlinger decision does not state whether its holding is to be

applied retroactively,3 but other courts have concluded that “Erlinger did not

announce a new rule that is retroactively applicable on collateral review.” See, e.g.,

Johnson v. United States, No. 1:24-CV-831, 2025 WL 731966, at *11-12 (W.D.

Mich., Mar. 7, 2025) (collecting cases). Thus, on the showing made, relator has not

satisfied the requirement for reviewing a final ruling of an appellate court by

establishing an unknown interpretation of constitutional law, nor has he shown that

the interpretation is retroactively applicable to his case. See La. C.Cr.P. art.

930.8(A)(1). Consequently, for post-conviction purposes, relator’s claim is

untimely. Relator’s writ application is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 12th day of September, 2025.

SMC
MEJ
SJW

3
In Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent, he observed: “[f]or any case that is already final, the Teague [v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)] rule will presumably bar the
defendant from raising today’s new rule in collateral proceedings.” Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 859 n.3,
144 S.Ct. at 1866.
5

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 09/12/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-KH-373
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Frank A. Brindisi (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Thomas J. Butler (Respondent)

MAILED
Noel Austin #305854 (Relator)
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Angola, LA 70712