Alonzo Ford Versus Darell Vannoy, Warden

ALONZO FORD NO. 25-KH-402

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

DARELL VANNOY, WARDEN COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

September 25, 2025

Linda Tran
First Deputy Clerk

IN RE ALONZO FORD

APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE JUNE B.
DARENSBURG, DIVISION "C", NUMBER 19-4350

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Marc E. Johnson, and Timothy S. Marcel

WRIT DENIED

Relator, Alonzo Ford, seeks review of the district court’s August 4, 2025
Order, which denied his Uniform Application for Post-Conviction Relief
(“APCR”). For the following reasons, we deny relator’s writ application.

Procedural Background

On November 30, 2023, a jury found relator guilty of two counts of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (counts two and four), two counts of
obstruction of justice (counts three and five), and two counts of second degree
murder (counts six and seven). The jury returned a not guilty verdict as to count
one, attempted second degree murder. On January 11, 2024, he was sentenced to
twenty years imprisonment at hard labor on each firearm count, forty years
imprisonment at hard labor on each obstruction count, and life imprisonment at
hard labor on each murder count. The trial court also ordered the sentences on
counts two, four, six, and seven to be served without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence; the sentences on counts two, three, four, and five to run
concurrently with each other; the sentence on count six to run consecutively to the
sentences on counts two, three, four, and five; and, the sentence on count seven to
run consecutively to the other sentences. This Court affirmed relator’s convictions
and sentences on February 26, 2025. State v. Ford, 24-197 (La. App. 5 Cir.
2/26/25), 406 So.3d 652. On May 20, 2025, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied
relator’s writ application. State v. Ford, 25-356 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 216.

Relator filed his APCR with the district court on June 28, 2025, asserting
five claims. In claim number one, relator asserts that he was denied his

25-KH-402 1

constitutional right to appellate review and to a complete transcript in violation of
the Sixth Amendment. In claim number two, relator asserts that he was denied the
right to a fair and impartial jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and his constitutional rights. In claim
number three, relator asserts that his convictions were obtained by the use of
prosecutorial misconduct during opening and closing arguments. Finally, in claims
numbered four and five, relator asserts that he was denied effective assistance of
trial and appellate counsel. On August 4, 2025, the district court denied relief,
finding that relator failed to meet his post-conviction relief burden of proof under
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.1

Analysis

In this writ application, relator argues the district court abused its discretion
in denying his APCR and re-urges the claims raised in his APCR filed in the
district court. We begin by addressing relator’s claim of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. Relator contends that the State used its peremptory strikes
to exclude Black jurors in violation of Batson, which held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits purposeful discrimination of jurors on the basis of race. The
Batson decision is codified in La. C.Cr.P. art. 795(C), which provides that no
peremptory challenge made by the State or the defendant shall be based solely
upon the race of the juror.

Relator argues that the “record specifically shows that the State used its only
three peremptory challenges to strike three Black jury venirepersons.” However,
he does not provide specific details or documentation in support of his assertion.
See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. In fact, relator states that “there may have been one
black juror amongst the jury of his peers.” Furthermore, in his writ application,
relator concedes that counsel did not make an objection on Batson grounds. In any
event, on review, the November 27, 2023 minute entry from relator’s trial, which
does not provide the racial makeup of the jurors, shows that the State exercised
more than three peremptory challenges. The minute entry further shows that
multiple potential jurors were also challenged by joint motion of the State and the
defense. Given that relator does not point to any specific instances of race-based
discrimination during the jury selection but rather relies on conclusory allegations,
we agree with the district court that relator does not meet his post-conviction
burden of proof under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2 for this claim.

Next, we address relator’s claim that the prosecutor went beyond the proper
scope of opening and closing argument in violation of La. C.Cr.P. art. 774. Relator
contends that the State’s closing argument improperly referred to him as a predator
and warned the jurors that if they did not find relator guilty, his next victim might
be someone close to them. Relator also claims that the prosecutor informed the
jury that the instant case was not relator’s “first time with a serious charge” and
suggested that relator would not have been arrested if he was not guilty.
Additionally, relator maintains that the prosecutor, during opening statement,
asked the jury to imagine how they “would feel if you lived on this street.”

1
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2 states: “The petitioner in an application for post-conviction relief shall have the
burden of proving that relief should be granted.”

2

As an initial matter, we note that relator fails to include a copy of the
transcript containing the alleged improper remarks.2 See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. In
fact, review of the writ application shows that relator concedes that his
recollections of the prosecutor’s unobjected to comments were not “exact
statements” but “relatively close to such.”

Argument at trial shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of
evidence, to conclusions of fact that the State or defendant may draw therefrom,
and to the law applicable to the case. La. C.Cr.P. art. 774. While the trial judge
has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, prosecutors
enjoy wide latitude in choosing closing argument tactics. State v. Flores, 14-642
(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 167 So.3d 801, 808. Even where a prosecutor exceeds
his wide latitude, the reviewing court will not reverse a conviction unless
thoroughly convinced that the argument influenced the jury and contributed to the
guilty verdict. Id. Moreover, even if the complained-of remarks by the prosecutor
were improper, a conviction should not be reversed absent a showing that the
argument influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Id.

We note that on direct appeal this Court found there was ample evidence in
support of relator’s convictions apart from the alleged commentary made by the
State. See Ford, 24-197, 406 So.3d at 667-74 (this Court found that the State’s
evidence, per the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979) standard, was sufficient to support relator’s convictions for two counts of
second degree murder, two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
and two counts of obstruction of justice). As to relator’s claim in this APCR, we
find that relator fails to show how the prosecutor’s remarks influenced the jury or
contributed to the guilty verdict. Accordingly, we conclude that relator does not
meet his post-conviction burden of proof under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2 for this
claim.

Next, relator maintains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing: (1) to object to the State’s Batson violation during voir dire; (2) to impeach
the State’s witnesses; and (3) to object to the State’s improper remarks during its
opening statement and closing argument.

Under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Const. Art. I, § 13 of the Louisiana
Constitution, a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. State v.
Casimer, 12-678 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/13), 113 So.3d 1129, 1141. To prove
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). Id. Under the Strickland test, the defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s
performance was deficient, that is, that the performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id.

2
The district court’s ruling denying relator’s APCR stated that on appeal, this Court “addressed this
complaint.” Thus, the district court found relator’s claim was barred from post-conviction review by La. C.Cr.P. art.
930.4(A), which provides: “any claim for relief which was fully litigated in an appeal from the proceedings leading
to the judgment of conviction and sentence shall not be considered.” However, because relator’s prior claim on
appeal rested on different grounds than the argument raised here, we find that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A)’s procedural
default does not apply. At any rate, the district court also found that relator’s claim “fail[ed] to state with any
reasonable particularity the factual basis, as mandated by La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.” We agree.

3

It is absolutely essential that both prongs of the Strickland test be established
before relief will be granted by a reviewing court. State ex rel. Sparkman v. State,
15-1726 (La. 10/17/16), 202 So.3d 488, 491. Satisfaction of the first prong on
post-conviction requires proof that counsel did not function as counsel within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Id. The second prong requires proof of actual
prejudice to the point that the results of the trial cannot be trusted. Id. An error is
considered prejudicial if it was so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
or “a trial whose result is reliable.” Casimer, 113 So.3d at 1141. To prove
prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
conduct, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. In order to
prevail, the accused must also overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
specifically, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.

In the present matter, relator’s ineffective assistance claims are based on
counsel’s decisions regarding voir dire, cross-examination of witnesses, and the
raising of objections. Decisions of this nature are strategic and tactical decisions
and squarely fall within the ambit of trial strategy. See Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d
1167, 1172 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The attorney’s actions during voir dire are considered
to be a matter of trial strategy.”); State v. Brooks, 94-2438 (La. 10/16/95), 661
So.2d 1333, 1337 (in which the supreme court found that counsel’s choices of
which questions to ask on cross-examination fall well within the ambit of trial
strategy); and State v. Moore, 16-644 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/15/17), 215 So.3d 951,
968 (“The time and manner of making objections is part of the trial strategy
decision-making of the trial attorney.”). An alleged error that is within the ambit
of trial strategy does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel because
opinions may differ on the advisability of such a tactic. State v. McKinney, 19-380
(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/19), 289 So.3d 153, 162. Upon review, we find relator has
failed to demonstrate how counsel’s trial strategy was unsound. Consequently,
relator has not “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
[counsel’s decisions] ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76
S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). This claim is without merit.

Relator also faults appellate counsel for only raising two assignments of
error on appeal and further failing to request an error patent review. However, an
attorney need not advance every argument, regardless of merit, urged by appellant.
State v. Castillo, 13-552 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/14), 167 So.3d 624, 653, writ
denied sub nom. State ex rel. Castillo v. State, 14-587 (La. 11/7/14), 152 So.3d
172, and writ denied, 14-2567 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So.3d 145. Experienced
advocates have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments
on appeal and focusing on one central issue, if possible, or at most, on a few key
issues. Castillo, 167 So.3d at 653 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52,
103 S.Ct. 3308, 3313, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)).

Our review shows that appellate counsel challenged the sufficiency of the
State’s evidence and the denial of the defense motion to sever the offenses. See
Ford, 24-197, 406 So.3d at 667. While the claims were ultimately unsuccessful,
relator fails to describe with any specificity what additional claims appellate
counsel should have raised. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. Furthermore, despite
relator’s claim to the contrary, this Court conducted a full review of the record and

4

found only one error patent requiring correction with respect to the trial court’s
incorrect advisal of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8’s prescriptive period. See Ford, 24-197,
406 So.3d at 683. Therefore, on the showing made, we find relator has not
demonstrated that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Finally, relator claims that he was denied his constitutional right to appellate
review because he was unable to obtain a copy of his complete trial record.3 In
doing so, he appears to argue that he is now entitled to a free copy of his trial
transcript based on the claims he has raised in the instant application.

Generally, an incarcerated indigent must demonstrate a particularized need
before receiving a copy of a court document free of charge. State ex rel. Simmons
v. State, 93-275 (La. 12/16/94), 647 So.2d 1094, 1095 (per curiam).4 In State ex
rel. Bernard v. Criminal Dist. Court Section J., 94-2247 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d
1174, the supreme court held that an indigent inmate cannot make a showing of
particularized need absent a properly filed APCR that sets forth the specific claims
of constitutional errors which required the requested documentation for support.
As this Court recently found in State v. Patton, 25-152, 2025 WL 2331332, at *2
(La. App. 5 Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), “[t]he mere filing of an APCR, however, does not
per se satisfy the required ‘particularized need[.]’” This Court further explained:

The requirement of specific allegations of factual bases stated with
reasonable particularity is not only a statutory requirement; it is clear
in our constitutional jurisprudence. Access [to transcripts free of
charge] does not require the state to underwrite the inmate’s efforts to
overturn his conviction and sentence by providing him generally with
documents “to comb the record for errors.” Bernard, 653 So.2d at
1175; State ex rel. Payton v. Thiel, 315 So.2d 40 (La. 1975). An
inmate cannot make a showing of a particularized need absent a
properly filed application for post-conviction relief which sets out
specific claims of constitutional errors requiring the requested
documentation for support. Id. Due process and equal protection
surely do not require the providing of transcripts to make petitioner
aware in the first instance of events or occurrences which constitute
grounds for [post-conviction relief]. Bernard, supra, citing State v.
Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330, 569 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 1977). [Emphasis
added.]

“Particularized needs” requires that the applicant allege the “events or
occurrences,” or some actions taken or omitted, which support or
establish the existence of the ground(s) in La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3, and
would be relevant to the court in determining the appropriate
disposition of the application under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 928 or 929, or to
show genuine questions of relevant facts sufficient to conduct an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.

3
We note that on appeal, relator filed a pro se brief in which he raised four assignments of error. See Ford,
24-197, 406 So.3d at 676-82.
4
Under State ex rel. Simmons v. State, 647 So.2d at 1095, indigent inmates are generally entitled to the
following documents free of charge: (1) transcripts of their guilty plea colloquies; (2) copies of the bill of
information or grand jury indictment charging them with a crime; (3) copies of the district court minutes for
sentencing; (4) copies of transcripts of evidentiary hearings held on their applications for post-conviction relief; and
(5) copies of the documents committing them into custody.

5

Patton, 25-152, 2025 WL 2331332, at *3.

Here, relator’s request for a free copy of the entire trial record resembles a
quest to find potential post-conviction claims based solely on speculative
assertions rather than factual specificity. However, “[a]s stated in Bernard, free
transcripts are not provided for the applicant to comb through, searching for
unalleged errors, events, or occurrences.” Patton, 25-152, 2025 WL 2331332, at
*4. Under these circumstances, we find that relator has failed to demonstrate a
particularized need for the requested copy of the trial record.

Accordingly, relator’s writ application is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 25th day of September, 2025.

TSM
SMC
MEJ

6

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 09/25/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-KH-402
E-NOTIFIED
24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable June B. Darensburg (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Thomas J. Butler (Respondent)

MAILED
Alonzo Ford #337463 (Relator)
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Angola, LA 70712