Boudreaux's Collision Center, LLC & Boudreaux's Collision Nola Corp. Versus Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company, Progressive Security Insurance Company, Robert Chouest and Robert Lendle

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana

No. 26-C-289

BOUDREAUX’S COLLISION CENTER, LLC &
BOUDREAUX’S COLLISION NOLA CORP.

versus

PROGRESSIVE PALOVERDE INSURANCE COMPANY,
PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
ROBERT CHOUEST AND ROBERT LENDLE

IN RE BOUDREAUX’S COLLISION NOLA CORP. AND BOUDREAUX’S COLLISION CENTER,
LLC
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, PARISH OF ST CHARLES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE
ROCHELLE C. FAHRIG, DIVISION "D", No. 93,694

October 01, 2026

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Michael P. Mentz, Pro Tempore

WRIT DENIED

This case centers on a claim under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act

(“LUTPA”) filed by plaintiffs (a business entity consisting of two auto repair shops)

against defendants (an insurance company and affiliated parties). Defendants filed

an exception of no cause of action on the LUTPA claim, which the trial court

sustained. Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the ruling of the trial court.

FACTS

Boudreaux’s Collision Center, LLC is an automotive repair shop located in

Luling, Louisiana and Boudreaux’s Collision NOLA Corp. is an automotive repair

26-C-289

shop located in New Orleans, Louisiana (collectively, “Boudreaux’s” or

“plaintiffs”). Boudreaux’s is operated by Rodney and Tish Boudreaux. Much of

Boudreaux’s clientele are covered by Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company

(“Progressive”). Plaintiffs allege that over the course of several years, the

defendants—Progressive, Progressive Security Insurance Company, adjuster Robert

Chouset and his supervisor Robert Lindell—have steered Boudreaux’s’ customers

away from Boudreaux’s and to Progressive’s chosen automotive repair shops.

Plaintiffs alleged the following conduct on the part of defendants, and

specifically the conduct of one adjuster and his supervisor, which included: a)

Totaling vehicles that are otherwise repairable and then refusing to pay storage fees

and abandoning totaled vehicles at Boudreaux’s; b) Intentionally driving business

away from Boudreaux’s by telling customers that Boudreaux’s was “problematic”

and that the owners were “crooks,” advising Progressive insureds to have their

vehicles repaired elsewhere; c) Intentionally failing to adequately and fairly adjust

the insurance claims of Boudreaux’s customers in an effort to delay the repair of

customers’ vehicles to sow discord between the customer and Boudreaux’s; d)

Intentionally disregarding the opinion of its selected third-party umpire, further

delaying and interfering with Boudreaux’s operations; and, e) Sending letters to

Progressive insureds advising them that Boudreaux’s is overcharging and that the

insured may be responsible for out-of-pocket expenses.

As noted above, the trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action

on the LUTPA claim. However, plaintiffs also filed a claim of tortious interference,

which was dismissed without prejudice by the trial court. Plaintiffs have since filed

an amended petition.

In regards to the LUTPA claim, plaintiffs now argue that the statutes

governing the action under the purview of the insurance commissioner are

specifically conduct between: an insurer and its insured; an insurer and the public

2

for false and deceptive representations; and conduct between insurers, thus, the

conduct alleged does not fall under the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner.

La. R.S. 22:1964.

On the other hand, defendants argue that all of the complained-of conduct falls

within the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and, therefore, fall under the

exceptions to the LUTPA (and, therefore, do not constitute cognizable claim under

LUTPA).

LAW AND DISCUSSION

“Because it presents a question of law, the sustaining of an exception of no

cause of action is subject to de novo review.” Watson Mem’l Spiritual Temple of

Christ v. Korban, 24-00055 (La. 6/28/24), 387 So.3d 499, 506, reh’g denied, 24-

00055 (La. 8/2/24), 390 So.3d 277, and cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1169, 221 L. Ed. 2d

251 (2025), based solely on the sufficiency of the petition. The pertinent question is

whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in

plaintiff’s behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Ramey v.

DeCaire, 03-1299 (La. 03/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 119.

The core of LUTPA is contained in La. R.S. 51:1409 and its core prohibition

is stated in La. R.S. 51:1405(A): “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby

declared unlawful.” The statute broadly defines “trade or commerce” to encompass

the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any

property, corporeal or incorporeal, and any other article, commodity, or thing of

value, including any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of

the state. La. R.S. 51:1402.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the range of prohibited practices

under LUTPA is extremely narrow, prohibiting only fraud, misrepresentation, and

similar conduct—mere negligence is not sufficient. Quality Env’t Processes, Inc. v.

3

I.P. Petroleum Co., 13-1582 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 1011. To state a claim under

LUTPA, the plaintiff must show that the alleged conduct offends established public

policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially

injurious. To sustain a cause of action under LUTPA, the Louisiana Supreme Court

has promulgated a two-part test: 1) the person must suffer an ascertainable loss; and

2) the loss must result from another’s use of unfair methods of competition and

unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Cheramie Servs., Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Prod.,

Inc., 09-1633, p. 10 (La. 4/23/10), 35 So.3d 1053, 1059.

However, businesses remain “free to pursue profit, even at the expense of

competitors, so long as the means used are not egregious.” Reel Pipe, LLC v. USA

Comserv, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 3d 786 (E.D. La. 2019). For example, negotiating

restrictive covenants and normal competitive solicitation of employees do not violate

LUTPA. Carbon Six Barrels, L.L.C. v. Proof Rsch., Inc., 83 F.4th 320 (5th Cir.

2023). LUTPA is essentially penal in nature and is therefore subject to reasonably

strict construction. Harp v. Autrey, 47,749 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/21/13), 121 So.3d

1260.

A critical threshold issue for Boudreaux’s LUTPA claim is contained in La.

R.S. 51:1406(1), which provides that LUTPA “shall not apply to . . . actions or

transactions subject to the jurisdiction of . . . the insurance commissioner.” Louisiana

courts have applied this exemption broadly to insurer conduct involving

misrepresentation, false advertising, or false information relating to the business of

insurance, finding such conduct falls within the enumerated practices regulated by

the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner under La. R.S. 22:1964. Taxicab Ins. Store,

LLC v. Am. Serv. Ins. Co., Inc., 17-0004 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/12/17), 224 So.3d 451.

In this matter, the alleged conduct falls within the jurisdiction of the insurance

commissioner: “The commissioner of insurance shall have power to examine and

investigate the affairs of every person engaged in the business of insurance,

4

including violations of R.S. 22:1902 et seq., in order to determine whether such

person has been or is engaged in any unfair method of competition or in any unfair

or deceptive act or practice prohibited by this Part.” La. R.S. 22:1967. Furthermore,

La. R.S. 22:1663 requires people engaged in claims adjustment be registered, and

licensed, and, as such, are governed by the Insurance Code. Clearly, the conduct that

was allegedly committed by defendants’ insurance adjuster and his supervisor falls

under the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner. Additionally, La. R.S.

22:1968 outlines the procedures for resolving disputes within matters involving the

insurance commissioner, including a hearing.

In light of this, the trial court was correct in sustaining the exception of no

cause of action on the LUTPA claim: under these facts, the facts being allegedly

unfair conduct of two insurance adjusters who share business with Boudreaux’s,

plaintiffs cannot amend the petition to make the LUTPA claim viable.

For these reasons, plaintiffs’ writ is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 1st day of October, 2026.

MPM
FHW

5

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana

NO. 26-C-289

BOUDREAUX’S COLLISION CENTER, LLC & BOUDREAUX’S
COLLISION NOLA CORP.

versus

PROGRESSIVE PALOVERDE INSURANCE COMPANY,
PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
ROBERT CHOUEST AND ROBERT LENDLE

WINDHORST, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I disagree with

the majority position that plaintiffs’ LUTPA claim falls under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner pursuant to La.

R.S. 52:1406(1). That exclusive jurisdiction of the commissioner is

pursuant to the enumerated purposes in R.S. 22:1901:

§1901. Purpose; necessity for regulation
This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes which include:
(1) Protecting persons seeking insurance in this state.
(2) Permitting surplus lines insurance to be placed with reputable and
financially sound unauthorized insurers under the provisions of this Part.
(3) Establishing a system of regulation which will permit orderly
access to surplus lines insurance in this state and encourage authorized
insurers to provide new and innovative types of insurance available to
consumers in this state.
(4) Providing a system through which persons may purchase insurance,
other than surplus lines insurance, from unauthorized insurers pursuant
to this Part.
(5) Protecting revenues of this state.
(6) Providing a system pursuant to this Part which subjects
unauthorized insurance activities in this state to the jurisdiction of the
insurance commissioner and state and federal courts in suits by or on
behalf of the state.

26-C-289

The allegations of the petition in this case do not fall within any of

the six enumerated purposes within La. R.S. 22:1901. Admittedly, the

list is not exclusive. Nevertheless, the six enumerated purposes are all

regulatory in nature, and each states a category which has a “necessity

for regulation.” Further, La. R.S. 22:1901 specifically states that La.

R.S. 22:1902, et seq, shall be applied to “promote its underlying

purposes.” [Emphasis added.] The illustrative list of “underlying

purposes” are in La. R.S. 22:1901. Adjudication of this case by the

commissioner does not promote any of the enumerated purposes or

satisfy any “necessity for regulation.” This is simply a tort case which

does not fit into any category comparable to the six illustrative purposes

of the various provisions of La. R.S. 22:1902, et seq, and would not

promote these or similar “underlying purposes.”

Plaintiffs herein are not insureds, an insurance company, or in an

insurance-related business. Plaintiffs are merely business entities

performing service repairs for individuals that defendants insure.

Plaintiffs do not have an insurance-related relationship with

defendants, contractual or otherwise.

Further, defendants’ alleged tortious activity against plaintiffs is

not insurance-related. The petition alleges that defendants are

intentionally attempting to drive customers away from plaintiffs by

making defamatory statements about plaintiffs, refusing to pay or

failing to timely pay for work performed by plaintiffs, causing conflict

between plaintiffs and their customers, knowingly and intentionally

writing unreasonable repair estimates on vehicles, declaring vehicles

as total losses despite having minor, repairable problems, and telling
2

defendants’ insureds that plaintiffs are overcharging. As reflected by

these allegations, the LUTPA claim focuses on defendants’ allegedly

intentional actions of interfering with plaintiffs’ auto repair businesses.

These are common claims and allegations in vehicle accident cases

during the squabbling over the amount of property damages which are

due, with or without the LUTPA claim, and they don’t usually deprive

the plaintiff of access to courts of law and relegate him to the

administrative process where his procedural rights are significantly

reduced.

Defendants rely on Taxicab Ins. Store, LLC v. Am. Serv. Ins. Co.

Taxicab Ins., 17-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 07/12/17), 224 So.3d 451, 455. The

Taxicab case involved allegations by one insurance company against

another insurance company and its two individual producers that the

defendants were working together to solicit business from the

plaintiff’s customers by offering illegal insurance policies at

unapproved premium rates. The Taxicab case is inapplicable and

clearly distinguishable from the present case as that case involved

insurance-related activities of marketing and selling insurance policies

between two separate insurance companies.

Although I recognize that defendants’ alleged activities do involve

insurance claims adjusting, the allegations of the petition do not

involve adjusting plaintiffs’ claim, and plaintiffs and defendants do not

have any insurance-related relationship. These claims are not unlike

other tort claims adjudicated by a court. The LUTPA cause of action

does not fit into any of the purposes in the list of “underlying purposes”

in La. R.S. 22:1901, nor does it promote, or is it alleged to promote, any
3

similar or related other purpose. Adjudication of this case by the

commissioner would not genuinely promote any of the enumerated

purposes or satisfy any “necessity for regulation.” I therefore see no

justification to deprive the plaintiffs of access to the courts and relegate

them to the administrative law process, where by law, the purposes are

dictated more by the list in La. R.S. 22:1901 (generally supporting a

healthy insurance industry in this state), than by the evidence, which

will likely be more difficult to come by when considering the lack of

ordinary full discovery.

Thus, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment granting

defendants’ exception of no cause of action on the LUTPA claim and

find plaintiffs have asserted sufficient facts to state a LUTPA cause of

action against defendants.

Lastly, the contrary argument in this case seems to rely on the

existence of a LUTPA claim. The unfair trade practices claim can be

dropped, and plaintiffs’ can proceed with an ordinary tort claim for

damages. I therefore further disagree with the majority’s declaration

that the petition cannot be amended to cure the objection raised by the

no cause of action exception.

SJW

4

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
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TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
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THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

26-C-289
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