State of Louisiana Versus Willis John Lucas
State of Louisiana Versus Willis John Lucas, No. 26-KH-433 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Oct. 7, 2026).
Opinion text
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana
No. 26-KH-433
STATE OF LOUISIANA
versus
WILLIS JOHN LUCAS
IN RE WILLIS JOHN LUCAS
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, PARISH OF ST JAMES, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE
JOHN H. SMITH, DIVISION "C", No. 31,91
October 07, 2026
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Scott U. Schlegel, and Timothy S. Marcel
WRIT DENIED
Defendant-relator, Willis John Lucas, seeks review of the district court’s
order denying his application for post-conviction relief (APCR). For the reasons
stated below, we deny relator’s writ application.
Facts and Procedural History
On March 30, 2000, a St. James Parish Grand Jury indicted relator on one
count of forcible rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1; one count of attempted
aggravated rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:42; and two counts
of aggravated burglary in violation of La. R.S. 14:60.
On September 18, 2000, relator pled guilty to the amended charges of one
count of forcible rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1 and one count of aggravated
burglary in violation of La. R.S. 14:60. On the same date, pursuant to a plea
bargain, the trial court sentenced him to 40 years imprisonment at hard labor
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on the rape count,
and 20 years imprisonment at hard labor on the burglary count. The trial court
ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Relator did not file a motion for
appeal.
Relator filed the APCR with the district court on July 22, 2026. Relator
relies on the “facts not known” exception of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1) and
asserts the following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) involuntary
guilty plea; (3) involuntary statement obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona1;
(4) insufficient factual basis for the forcible rape conviction; (5) materially
inconsistent identification evidence for the aggravated burglary conviction; and (6)
Brady2 violations. As support for his claims, relator submitted documents recently
obtained from his case file, including copies of statements from the victims,
relator, and a suspected co-participant, along with investigative reports and a DNA
analysis report. On July 28, 2026, the district court denied relator’s APCR without
issuing any written reasons.
On August 19, 2026, relator filed a notice of intent with the district court.
On August 21, 2026, the district court set a return date of September 11, 2026.
Relator filed his writ application on September 11, 2026.
Analysis
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 provides that an APCR must be filed within two years
of the date that the judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final, unless
certain exceptions are met. Relator was sentenced on September 18, 2000, and he
1
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
2
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
did not appeal. When a defendant fails to file a timely motion for appeal, his
conviction and sentence are final. State v. Brown, 16-141 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/22/16),
202 So.3d 585, 587-88. Consequently, relator’s convictions and sentences became
final over 20 years ago, and his APCR, filed with the district court on July 22,
2026, is untimely, unless an exception enunciated in Article 930.8 applies.
Relator relies on the “facts not known” exception of La. C.Cr.P. art.
930.8(A)(1), which provides in pertinent part:
The application alleges, and the petitioner proves or the state
admits, that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not
known to the petitioner or his prior attorneys. Further, the petitioner
shall prove that he exercised diligence in attempting to discover any
post conviction claims that may exist. “Diligence” for the purposes of
this Article is a subjective inquiry that shall take into account the
circumstances of the petitioner. Those circumstances shall include but
are not limited to the educational background of the petitioner, the
petitioner's access to formally trained inmate counsel, the financial
resources of the petitioner, the age of the petitioner, the mental
abilities of the petitioner, or whether the interests of justice will be
served by the consideration of new evidence. New facts discovered
pursuant to this exception shall be submitted to the court within two
years of discovery.
Relator claims that he only recently obtained the documents from his case
file after his brother began reviewing materials from his case in 2025. According
to the August 22, 2026 affidavit submitted by relator’s brother, his brother took on
the role of relator’s “lay advocate” because their family was unable to afford post-
conviction counsel.
This argument is unavailing. The inability to secure retained counsel does
not satisfy the diligence requirement of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1). See State v.
Obney, 99-592 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/11/99), 746 So.2d 24, 27 (per curiam), writ
denied, 1999-2667 (La. 5/5/00), 760 So.2d 1190 (“We have consistently rejected
the notion that an applicant’s incarceration or lack of legal counsel are valid
excuses for failing to comply with the article 930.8 time limits.”). Indeed, a post-
conviction applicant is not entitled to an attorney to file his petition unless so
ordered by the trial court. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.7.
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2 provides that “[t]he petitioner in an application for
post-conviction relief shall have the burden of proving that relief should be
granted.” Relator made no showing that the statements and investigative reports
from his case file were not disclosed to the defense before he pled guilty, and thus
the items do not qualify as newly discovered evidence within the meaning of La.
C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1). In fact, the DNA report was turned over to the defense by
the State on August 8, 2000 in a Notice of Intent to Use Certificate of Analysis.3
This was over one month prior to relator’s guilty plea on September 18, 2000.
Relator alternatively argues that the State violated Brady in that it
suppressed documents and evidence that were favorable to him. However, the bare
allegation of non-disclosure, standing alone, does not meet his post-conviction
burden of proof under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.
Further, although relator concedes that the DNA testing itself was not newly
discovered, he contends that “its significance and the questions it raises … could
not reasonably have been evaluated from what petitioner or his family previously
possessed.” However, a defendant’s late realization that an error may have
occurred at trial or with respect to a guilty plea does not qualify as discovery of a
new fact for purposes of Article 930.8(A)(1)’s exception. See State v. Parker, 98-
256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694, 695. And La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(F) provides that
“[a]ll of the limitations set forth in this Article shall be jurisdictional and shall not
be waived or excused by the court or the district attorney.” Thus, this Court does
3
The DNA report stated that relator was not excluded as the sperm cell donor, and that
the suspected co-participant was excluded as a DNA donor. Thus, relator is hard-pressed to
show how the DNA results would have bolstered his claims of insufficient factual basis.
not have jurisdiction to consider an untimely APCR when the relator fails to carry
his burden to show that an exception to the time bar applies.
Even if relator’s APCR were timely filed, relator has still failed to meet his
burden of proof. When a defendant pleads guilty, he normally waives all non-
jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea, and the
review of such defects either by appeal or through post-conviction relief is
precluded. State v. Turner, 09-1079 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10), 47 So.3d 455, 459.
The minutes of the guilty plea and the plea form do not indicate that any pretrial
rulings were preserved for appellate review pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d
584 (La. 1976). Thus, relator’s claims challenging the State’s factual basis or the
involuntariness of his statements to the police would not be viable even if raised
timely.
Accordingly, relator’s application for post-conviction relief is denied.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 7th day of October, 2026.
SUS
SMC
TSM
SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN
TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS
DAY 10/07/2026 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
26-KH-433
E-NOTIFIED
23rd Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable John H. Smith (DISTRICT JUDGE)
No Attorney(s) were ENOTIFIED
MAILED
Willis John Lucas #432942 (Relator) Honorable Ricky L. Babin (Respondent)
Dixon Correctional Institute District Attorney
Post Office Box 788 Twenty-Third Judicial District
Jackson, LA 70748 Post Office Box 66
Convent, LA 70737