Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Rhea v. Daigle, 72 So. 2d 643.

22 citing documents.

  • Sherman v. Allstate Insurance 264 So. 2d 667 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    In the Soudelier case, we quoted extensively from Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , wherein we said: “We believe under the above quoted expressions that while the driver of the following vehicle is charged with driving so as to have his car under control to avoid foreseeable dangers and emergencies he is not to be charged with anticipating an emergency such as presented itself here.
  • Green v. Talley 217 So. 2d 232 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
    This rule was followed and elaborated upon in Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , decided by our brethren of the First Circuit (writs denied), in which were cited, inter alia, Adams v. Morgan, La.App., 173 So.
  • Lobell v. American Indemnity Co. 211 So. 2d 439 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
    540 , the Court, after citing the above regulation, said: “Whilst he (the following motorist) is expected to be prudent in following another, the driver of the car in the rear can anticipate a reasonable observance of the rules of the road and of driving, by the driver of the car ahead of him.” (ours) , .
  • Henderson v. Ancona 197 So. 2d 150 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
    Pertinent to decision of the case at bar is the rule announced in Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , to the effect that the driver of a following vehicle is not required to adhere to the rule that he must be able to stop within his clear range of vision in instances where unforeseeable hazards occur.
  • Taylor v. Genuine Parts Company 192 So. 2d 241 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1967
    2d 39 ; Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , (cert.
  • Morgan v. Whittington 191 So. 2d 911 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
    This rule was followed and elaborated upon in Rhea v. Daigle [La.App.,] , decided by our brethren of the First Circuit (writs denied), in which were cited inter alia, Adams v, Morgan, La.App., 173 So.
  • Pierce v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 184 So. 2d 241 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
    372 ; Gandy v. Arrant, La.App., ; Ray v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., La.App., ; Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., ; Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice Section 751.
  • Hester v. Stewart 177 So. 2d 430 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
    The exception relied upon by esteemed counsel for defendant Stewart is explained .at some length in Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , from which we approvingly quote the following: “We likewise find in 104 A.L.R.
  • Martin v. Sanders 163 So. 2d 923 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
    Counsel for Sanders relies on the case of Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , wherein the Court held the driver of the following car was not negligent per se in colliding with a lead car of which the driver suddenly stopped as a result of a head-on collision with an approaching vehicle upon its driver negligently crossing into the lead car's lane of traffic.
  • Ray v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 152 So. 2d 566 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1963
    1st Cir., 1954, (writs denied), followed and elaborated upon the aforesaid rule and cited, among others, Adams v. Morgan, La.App.
  • Nomey v. Great American Indemnity Company 121 So. 2d 763 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1960
    decided by our brethren of the First Circuit (writs denied), in which were cited, inter alia, Adams v. Morgan, La.App., 173 So.
  • Henderson v. Shewbart 112 So. 2d 727 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
    1 Cir., ; cf., Guidry v. Crowther, La.App.
  • Youngblood v. Allstate Insurance Co. 98 So. 2d 570 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
    Rhea v. Daigle, La.App.1954, ; Potomac Insurance Co. v. City of Alexandria, La.App.1953, ; Hogue v. Akin Truck Line, La.App.1944, 16 So.
  • Soudelier v. Johnson 95 So. 2d 39 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
    as held by the trial judge.
  • Currie v. Government Employees Insurance Company 90 So. 2d 482 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1956
    1954, ; Potomac Insurance Company v. City of Alexandria, La.App.
  • Brockman v. Calvin 90 So. 2d 525 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
    Rhea v. Daigle, La.App,1954, ; Potomac Insurance Company v. City of Alexandria, La.App.1953, ; Hogue v. Akin Truck Line, La.App.1944, ; Dyck v. Maddry, La.App.
  • Exner v. Flowers 82 So. 2d 47 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    On the other hand if the Exner car was pushed in her path almost simultaneously with her striking it, it would appear that she could not have reasonably avoided the accident, see, e. g., Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., 1 Cir., , Stevenson v. Campbell, 17 La.App.
  • Dyck v. Maddry 81 So. 2d 165 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1955
    Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., First Circuit, 1954, ; Potomac Insurance Company v. City of Alexandria, La.App., Second Circuit, 1953, ; Hogue v. Akin Truck Line, La.App., Second Circuit, 1944, .
  • Peranio v. Superior Insurance Company 76 So. 2d 315 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    We had this same proposition before us in the case of Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., in which the cases of McDaniel v. Capitol Transport Co., Inc., supra, and Hill v. Knight, La.App., 163 So.
  • Woodward, Wight & Co. v. Douglas Public Service Corp. 75 So. 2d 896 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
    This was the case of Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., .
  • Delta Iron Works v. Daigle 72 So. 2d 653 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
    For the reasons assigned in the case of Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , the judgment appealed from is reversed insofar as Edgar J. Hebert and the Maryland Casualty Company are concerned and the plaintiff’s suit against them dismissed.
  • Gatlin v. Daigle 72 So. 2d 654 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
    For the reasons assigned in the case of Rhea v. Daigle, La.App., , the judgment appealed from is reversed insofar as Edgar J. Hebert and the Maryland Casualty Company are concerned and the plaintiffs’ suit against them dismissed.