Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Felger v. Doty, 46 So. 2d 300.
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Short v. Fink
372 So. 2d 705
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1979
843 , ; , ; Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 214 La.
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Bruner v. Bruner
364 So. 2d 1015
La. 1978
843 , ; , ; Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 214 La.
- Moon v. Moon 345 So. 2d 168 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1977
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Knight v. Knight
331 So. 2d 102
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1976
(1950), the Supreme Court said: "[T]he word "fault" as so used contemplates conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission on the part of the wife, violative of her marital duties and responsibilities, which constitute a contributing or a proximate cause of the separation and continuous living ap
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Hermes v. Hermes
327 So. 2d 639
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1976
1032 , , , , and Smith v. Smith, La.App., .
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Carter v. Carter
316 So. 2d 829
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
34 , (1958); , (1950); (La.App.
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Fulmer v. Fulmer
301 So. 2d 622
La. 1974
34 , (1958); , (1950); certiorari denied, 257 La.
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Carter v. Carter
262 So. 2d 163
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
“This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if the wife remarries.” In interpreting the meaning of the word “fault” as used in Article 160, the Supreme Court said, , (1950): “But the word ‘fault’, as employed in the quoted codal provision, does not mean merely the wife’s engaging in quarrels more or less of a trivial nature; for, as said in Armstrong v. Whalen, 161 La.
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Adler v. Adler
239 So. 2d 494
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1970
843 , ; , ; Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 214 La.
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Gautreaux v. Gautreaux
220 So. 2d 249
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
Chapman v. Chapman, supra, and cases cited therein.” With the above jurisprudence and codal article in mind we look to the evidence in the instant case.
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Davidson v. Jenkins
216 So. 2d 682
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1968
[4] , (1950) defines fault under LSA-C.C.
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Smith v. Smith
216 So. 2d 391
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1968
Article 160 , (1950) as follows: "But the word `fault', as employed in the quoted codal provision, does not mean merely the wife's engaging in quarrels more or less of a trivial nature; for, as said in Armstrong v. Whalen, 161 La.
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Estrade v. Chandler
211 So. 2d 762
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
Plaintiff contends that the proximate or at least a contributing cause of the separation and continuous living apart ( , ) was habitual intemperance on the part of his wife.
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Gradney v. Gradney
191 So. 2d 161
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
Chapman v. Chapman, supra (La.App, ), and cases cited therein.” The record reveals that the defendant left the premises and carried with her most of the family belongings.
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Kelly v. Kelly
179 So. 2d 458
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
Chapman v. Chapman, supra [La.App., ], and cases cited therein.” The record in the instant case reflects that the parties had married in 1941, and separated in 1962.
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Sachse v. Sachse
150 So. 2d 772
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
fault was held to connote misconduct of a serious nature.
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Moreau v. Moreau
142 So. 2d 423
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1962
Chapman v. Chapman, supra, and cases cited therein.
- Chapman v. Chapman 130 So. 2d 811 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
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Bernard v. Broussard
128 So. 2d 787
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
382 , ; , .” The testimony of plaintiff and defendant is in conflict in many respects but in our opinion there is ample evidence in the record to support the following finding of fact by the trial judge: “The court will not discuss this evidence in detail, but finds after considering the whole case, that the atti
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Primus v. Primus
129 So. 2d 925
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
“This alimony shall be revocable in case it should become unnecessary, and in case the wife should contract a second marriage.” In Felger v. Doty, 1950, , , the Supreme Court in interpreting Article 160 held : “Thus, when the bonds of matrimony are dissolved by a judgment of divorce rendered on the ground that the parties have been living separate and apart for the statutory period, the wife will be denied alimony if she has been at fault.
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Rogers v. Lasseigne
120 So. 2d 462
La. 1960
at the married persons have been living separate and apart for a certain specified period of time, and the husband has obtained a divorce upon the ground of such living separate and apart, and the wife has not been at fault, then the Court may allow the wife in its discretion, out of the property and earnings of her husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income * , .
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Vicknair v. Vicknair
112 So. 2d 702
La. 1959
In construing the provisions of Article 160 , , it was observed: “Rather, the word ‘fault’ as so used contemplates conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission on the part of the wife, violative of her marital duties and responsibilities, which constitute a contributing or a proximate cause of the separation and continuous living apar
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Franks v. Franks
107 So. 2d 415
La. 1958
Regarding the question of fault in suits of this nature, , , had this to say: “Thus, when the bonds of matrimony are dissolved by a judgment of divorce rendered on the ground that the parties have been living separate and apart for the statutory period, the wife will be denied alimony if she has been at fault.
- Kendrick v. Kendrick 106 So. 2d 707 La. 1958
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Davieson v. Trapp
66 So. 2d 804
La. 1953
it is stated that the “fault” mentioned in Art. 160 of the LSA-’ Civil Code, “contemplates conduct or sub-, stantial acts of commission or omission on the part of the wife, violative of her marital duties and responsibilities, which constitute a contributing or a proximate cause of the separation
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Richards v. Garth
65 So. 2d 109
La. 1953
673 , ; , ; and Creel v. Creel, 218 La.
- Breffeilh v. Breffeilh 60 So. 2d 457 La. 1952
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Creel v. Creel
49 So. 2d 617
La. 1950
we said: “Rather, the word ‘fault’ as so used contemplates conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission on the part of the wife, violative of her marital duties and responsibilities, which constitute a contributing or a proximate cause of the separation and continuous living apart, the g