Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 52 So. 2d 847.
- McConnico v. Red Oak Timber Co. 847 So. 2d 191 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003
- Jones v. Don Edwards Timber Co., Inc. 516 So. 2d 1256 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
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Versai Management, Inc. v. Monticello Forest Products Corp.
479 So. 2d 477
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
art. 2315; , (1951); (La.App.
- Morgan v. Fuller 441 So. 2d 290 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983
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Boswell v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co.
355 So. 2d 33
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1978
He stated in his reasons for judgment that “actual damages are not limited to the pecuniary loss sustained,” and that he “took into consideration the amount of acres involved, the denuded condition of the land, the effect this situation has on a sole proprietor who is obviously over 50 years of age.” , (1951), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: “The measure of damages allowable for the unlawful cutting of timber is well settled in this State.
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McGee v. SECO Timber Co.
350 So. 2d 1265
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1977
the court set forth the criterion to be applied: "The measure of damages allowable for the unlawful cutting of timber is well settled in this State.
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Conques v. Coleman
315 So. 2d 805
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1975
398 , (1960); , (1951); (La.App.
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Terral v. Riley
293 So. 2d 912
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
As pointed out in the written opinion of the trial judge, , (1951), as follows : “ .
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State v. Placid Oil Company
274 So. 2d 402
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
2nd Cir. 1949); , (1951); Roy O. Martin Lumber Company v. St.
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Cookmeyer v. Cookmeyer
274 So. 2d 739
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1973
111 , ; , ; McCann v. Todd, 203 La.
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Succession of Lambright v. Lambright
252 So. 2d 349
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
Bartholomew v. Impastato, La.App., 12 So.
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Estate of Boyett v. L. L. Brewton Lumber Co.
223 So. 2d 495
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
(1951), the Louisiana Supreme Court prescribed the method of assessing damages for the unlawful cutting of timber as follows: “The measure of damages allowable for the unlawful cutting of timber is well settled in this State.
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Knoll v. Delta Development Company
218 So. 2d 109
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1969
(1951); Terry v. Butler, 240 La.
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Joseph v. Tri Parish Flying Service, Inc.
201 So. 2d 321
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
2nd Cir. 1949) ; , (1951); Roy O. Martin Lumber Company v. St.
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Gray v. State, Through Department of Highways
191 So. 2d 802
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967
2d 190 ; , ; Coastal Transmission Corp. v. Lejeune, La.App.
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Champagne v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.
170 So. 2d 226
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1965
Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Drew Inv.
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Shell v. Greer
171 So. 2d 669
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
Such is made clear in the following cases: Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co. (1951), , ; Terry v. Butler (1960), 240 La.
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Dunnington v. Magee
152 So. 2d 391
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
See Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., et al., , .
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Coastal Transmission Corporation v. Lejeune
148 So. 2d 111
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1962
: (1) If the trespass has been reckless and willful, the trespasser is said to be guilty of moral bad faith and is liable for the manufactured value of the timber, without deduction for costs and expenses of manufacture.
- Longlois v. Ackel 146 So. 2d 289 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
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Terry v. Butler
123 So. 2d 865
La. 1960
Thus, , (primarily relied on by plaintiffs), this court said: “The measure of damages allowable for the unlawful cutting of timber is well settled in this State.
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Williamson v. Roberts
103 So. 2d 499
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1958
780 ; Kennedy v. Perry Timber Company, 1951, , , and Posey v. Fargo, 1937, 187 La.
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Spiers v. Davidson
96 So. 2d 502
La. 1957
79 , ; , ; Ane v. Ane, 225 La.
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Dendinger Inc. in Liquidation v. Thompson & Thompson Forest Products
94 So. 2d 62
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
at page 851 (Italics and footnotes ours) : “The measure of damages allowable for the unlawful cutting of timber is well settled in this State.
- Motichek v. Perriloux 93 So. 2d 190 La. 1957
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Kline v. Dawson
89 So. 2d 385
La. 1956
This was procedurally incorrect (see Bartholomew v. Impastato, La.App., ; , and Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. v. Saint Denis Securities Co., 225 La.
- Oliver v. Shreveport Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board 88 So. 2d 405 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
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Illinois Central Railroad v. Pope Construction Co.
90 So. 2d 139
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
and Daily States Publishing Co. v. Uhalt, 169 La.
- Liquefied Petroleum Gas Commission v. E. R. Kiper Gas Corp. 86 So. 2d 518 La. 1956
- Swinney v. Jones 79 So. 2d 104 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
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Ane v. Ane
72 So. 2d 485
La. 1954
The exception, as has been observed by this court, “addresses itself to the sufficiency in law of the petition and is triable on the face of the papers.” , .
- Havard v. Luttrell 68 So. 2d 798 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
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Timmons v. Lakeside Lumber Co.
68 So. 2d 796
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
Even a trespasser may be in good faith if he believes and has good reason to believe that he is authorized to cut and remove timber, , , 851: “And in cases where the trespasser is in good faith, that is, where he believes that the timber belongs to him and there is no valid reason for him to suppose otherwise, he is liable only for its stumpage value.” Under our finding of facts we conclude that defendant Lakeside Lumber 'Company was i
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Harding v. Wattigney
62 So. 2d 190
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1952
and Daily States Publishing Co., Ltd. v. Uhalt, 169 La.
- Quatre Parish Co. v. Beauregard Parish School Board 57 So. 2d 197 La. 1952
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Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co.
57 So. 2d 211
La. 1952
wherein it was held that where the trespasser believes himself to be the owner, but should have known from information available to him or ascertainable facts which would have placed a reasonably prudent man on notice, he is held to be in legal bad faith and not moral bad faith.
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Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Co.
57 So. 2d 211
La. 1952
> , , wherein it was held that where the trespasser believes himself to be the owner, but should have known from information available to him or ascertainable facts which would have placed a reasonably prudent man on notice, he is held to be in legal bad faith and not moral bad faith.