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Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 57 So. 2d 218.

102 citing documents.

  • Mella v. Continental Emsco 189 So. 2d 716 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
    Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Company, 227 La.
  • LaCoste v. J. Ray McDermott & Co. 185 So. 2d 553 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
    408 , , stated the applicable principle thusly: “ , , and Myers v. Jahncke Service, Inc. (La.App.), , that the employer was entitled to credit for every week that the employee worked after the commencement of disability in March, 1959, because he continued to work as a common laborer, no matter what the job classifications were, and thus was
  • Millet v. Pullman Co. 181 So. 2d 237 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
    in which it was held that the prescriptive period did not begin to run until the delayed injury manifested itself, save the claim.
  • Carpenter v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance 178 So. 2d 486 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
    In Madison v. American Sugar Refining Company, supra, in 243 La., at page 415 , *489 144 So.2d, at page 380 , the Supreme Court said: “[2-4] , , and Myers v. Jahncke Service, Inc. (La.App.), , that the employer was entitled to credit for every week that the employee worked after the commencement of disability in March, 1959, because he continued to work as a common laborer, no matter what the job classifications were, and thus was
  • Lindsey v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 175 So. 2d 831 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
    In any event, , (1952) holds that when a claimant sustains successive on the job injuries, but continues to work, prescription does not - begin to run until the injuries manifest themselves into a condition of total disability.
  • Russell v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. 169 So. 2d 82 La. 1964
    Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Company, 227 La.
  • Forrestier v. A-1 Moving & Storage Co. 164 So. 2d 644 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
  • Smith v. Sohio Petroleum Company 163 So. 2d 124 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964
    The answer to this argument, as pointed out by the district judge, , , which was later followed in Watson v. United States Tobacco, supra, and other cases, does not hold that the prescription of one year is interrupted until the claimant leaves his employment.
  • Guidry v. Mud Supply Co. 155 So. 2d 105 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
    in interpreting the meaning of LSA-R.S.
  • Bernard v. LOUISIANA WILD LIFE AND FISHERIES COM'N 152 So. 2d 114 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1963
    23:1031.1, we feel that a , .
  • Parker v. Laclede Steel Co. 154 So. 2d 98 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
    Plaintiff argues that the work he performed during this period was dissimilar to the work he was performing when he was injured and that under the jurisprudence he was entitled to collect both wages and compensation, citing Madison v. American Sugar Refining Co., La.App., ; , ; Myers v. Jahncke Service Inc., La.App., .
  • Whatley v. Insurance Co. of North America 154 So. 2d 220 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
    despite such handicap, after one year and before two years of the time he leaves his employment, citing: Malone’s Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law and Practice, Section 384, page 175, 1962 pocket part; Croswell v. Wells (2nd Circuit, 1958, writs denied), La.App., ; Brewster v. City of Shreveport (2nd Circuit, 1959), La.App., ; , ; Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La.
  • McKee v. International Paper Co. 146 So. 2d 268 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
    23:1209, , (1952) that “the injury did not develop into total disability until March 11, 1947, at which time the plaintiff could no longer pursue his trade as a glass cutter.” In Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc. et al., 229 La.
  • Gaudet v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 143 So. 2d 252 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962
    Corp., Ltd., La.App., ; , ; White v. Calcasieu Paper Company, La.App., , These cases cite and discuss many others on the subject.
  • Madison v. American Sugar Refining Company 144 So. 2d 377 La. 1962
  • Howard v. Globe Indemnity Co. 147 So. 2d 912 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
    White *918 v. Calcasieu Paper Co., La.App., ; Myers v. Jahncke Service, Inc., La.App., ; Pohl v. American Bridge Division U. S. Steel Corp., La.App., .
  • Jackson v. T. L. James & Co. 141 So. 2d 475 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
    Wallace v. Remington Rand, 229 La.
  • Lindsey v. Continental Casualty Company 138 So. 2d 543 La. 1962
    Pohl v. American Bridge Division United States Steel Corporation, La.App., ; and several other decisions of the Courts of Appeal.
  • Lawes v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance 135 So. 2d 920 La. 1961
    228 , , , Brannon v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company et al., supra, Reed v. Calcasieu Paper Company, supra, and certain Court of Appeal decisions.
  • Madison v. American Sugar Refining Co. 134 So. 2d 646 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
    Predicated on these cases, defendant rationalizes that the plaintiff must actually quit his job because of pain before his injury is established as one which developed after the accident, and to fortify this conclusion he points to the following language extracted from a relatively recent case: 7 “Analyzing the pronouncements in Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass *650 Co., , , Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La.
  • Fruge v. Hub City Iron Works, Inc. 131 So. 2d 593 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
    651 , ; , ; D'Antoni v. Employer's Liability Assur.
  • Griffin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 131 So. 2d 153 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961
    Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 1952, , ; White v. Calcasieu Paper Co., La.App., 1 Cir., 1957, ; Myers v. Jahncke Service, La.App.Orleans, 1955, ; Scalise v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
  • Lindsey v. Continental Casualty Co. 130 So. 2d 470 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
    “The plaintiff relies on a , .
  • Fontenot v. Great American Indemnity Company 127 So. 2d 822 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
    The plaintiff on the other hand contends that the present case comes within the doctrine of the landmark case Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 1952, , , and its progeny, Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Company, 227 La.
  • Istre v. Molbert Brothers Poultry and Egg Co. 125 So. 2d 436 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1960
    964 , ; , ; Michel v. Maryland Cas.
  • Woodson v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance 121 So. 2d 571 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
    For a discussion of this point reference is made to Malone’s “Louisiana Compensation Law and Practice”, § 402, p. 154, 1960 Supplement, , and Myers v. Jahncke Service, La.App., .
  • Walters v. General Accident & Fire Assur. Corp., Ltd. 119 So. 2d 550 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
    White v. Calcasieu Paper Co., La.App., ; Myers v. Jahncke Service, Inc., La.App., 76 So.
  • Daniel v. Transport Insurance Co. 119 So. 2d 107 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
    Mottet v. Libley [Libbey]-Owens-Ford Glass Co., [ ] .” In support of their contention that the plaintiff should not be considered as totally permanently disabled, defendants point to certain conceded facts, first of which is that, for some twenty months preceding the date of the trial, plaintiff had done identical work for the same employer and at the sa
  • Powell v. Travelers Insurance Company 117 So. 2d 610 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1960
    747 , ; , ; Hughes v. Enloe, 214 La.
  • Finley v. Hardware Mutual Insurance Company 110 So. 2d 583 La. 1959
    and Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La.
  • Pohl v. American Bridge Division US Steel Corp. 109 So. 2d 823 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
    [14] Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 1952, , ; Myers v. Jahncke Service, Inc., La.
  • Brewster v. City of Shreveport 108 So. 2d 801 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1959
    Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La.
  • McKinney v. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. 107 So. 2d 835 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
    941 , ; , ; Watson v. United States Tobacco Company, La.App., 87 So.
  • Ceasar v. Calcasieu Paper Company 102 So. 2d 314 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
    941 , , , our Supreme Court has held that an injury or disability is not legally manifest, when an employee injured at work continues in his employment with the same employer and fully earns his wages, until the date the employment terminates.
  • Croswell v. Wells 102 So. 2d 794 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1958
    Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La.
  • Bynum v. Maryland Casualty Company 102 So. 2d 547 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
    941 , , , , our Supreme Court overruled pleas of prescription filed by employers to compensation suits filed by employees more than a year (but within two years) following accidents which produced what was held to be total disability, holding that it would be conjectural to find the disability legally "manifest"
  • Finley v. Hardware Mutual Insurance 96 So. 2d 238 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
    App.1953, ; Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 1952, , .
  • White v. Calcasieu Paper Company 96 So. 2d 621 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
  • Murray v. Royal Indemnity Co. 94 So. 2d 690 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1957
    We think it unnecessary to quote from most of the numerous decisions touching on the subject but shall discuss what was said by the Supreme Court in the Wallace case, supra, , , in which latter case the Supreme Court said that “the suit of an employee who is actually earning wages cannot be dismissed on a plea of prematurity because he is not receiving compensation.” The Court also said that “the wages paid * * * cannot be considered in the nature of compensation * * ” I
  • France v. City of New Orleans 92 So. 2d 473 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
    '" , , cited *479 in the Wallace case, a workman was injured in January 1946 and his injury diagnosed as neuritis, but he continued his work until March 11, 1947.
  • Watson v. United States Tobacco Co. 87 So. 2d 205 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
    Counsel for appellant assigns error to the judgment from which appealed in that it is in conflict with the following authorities: Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 1952, , ; Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Company, Inc., 1955, 227 La.
  • McAlister v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 87 So. 2d 354 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
    In the case lastly cited, , , and held that wages may be earned by an injured workman even from the same employer in a higher job classification without loss of the claimant’s right to workmen’s compensation for total and permanent disability.
  • Bigham v. Swift & Company 86 So. 2d 59 La. 1956
    supports this conclusion.
  • Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc. 86 So. 2d 522 La. 1956
    This court has but recently considered and construed the quoted provision in two cases, , and Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Company, 227 La.
  • Scalise v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 84 So. 2d 88 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    It should be noted that in the recent Myers v. Jahncke Service, Inc., La.App., , our brothers of the Orleans Court reached the conclusion that no credit should be given an employer for weekly wages earned by an employee at lighter but different duties (as pusher, instead of as ship-fitter), , , where it was held that "wages paid the plaintiff as night watchman were earned in a different kind of work * * * and cannot be considered in the nature of compensation" (Italics ours).
  • Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Company 81 So. 2d 2 La. 1955
  • Michel v. Maryland Casualty Company 81 So. 2d 36 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    There are at least several other cases in our jurisprudence where the initial medical injury received through what is an "accident" under our compensation law is so slight as to cause the medically uneducated employee not to relate the delayed disabling symptoms to an accident, but often to non-traumatic ailments; , ; Morgan v. Rust Engineering Company, La.App., ; Stephenson v. McCook Brothers Funeral Home, Inc., La.App., .
  • Frisby v. International Paper Co. 76 So. 2d 621 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
    In Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 1952, , -219, our Supreme Court held under the facts therein shown the injury “did not develop into total disability until March 11, 1947, at which time the plaintiff could no longer pursue his trade as a glass cutter.” Mottet was a glass cutter and although his condition had *623 caused disability for some tim
  • Myers v. Jahncke Service 76 So. 2d 436 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
    However, , , which is contrary to what we held in the Daigle case, we would adjudicate the issue before us on the basis of our conclusion in the Daigle case, which, incidentally, was followed by our brothers of the Second Circuit in Goodman v. Hillyer, Deutsch, Edwards, Inc., La.App., .
  • Johnson v. Cabot Carbon Co. 75 So. 2d 389 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
    e evidence that a misdiagnosis of plaintiff’s disabling condition had been made on the first examination and that it was not rightly determined until some time in July, 1952, that the plaintiff suffered a more serious accident and'disability than -had been first determined, and based his decision for overruling the plea of peremption on the case of Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 1952, , , and Morgan v. Rust Engineering Company, La.