40669 Precedential Processed

George W. Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris

Louisiana Supreme Court · Filed July 2, 1954 · 75 So. 2d 28

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Opinion text

On Application for Rehearing. PER CURIAM. In his application for rehearing the defendant advances the argument that subsequent to the decisions of this Court in State ex rel. Brenner v. Noe, 186 La. 102 , 171 So. 708 ; Martel Syndicate v. Block, 154 La. 869 , 98 So. 400 ; First National Bank of Arcadia v. Johnson, 130 La. 288 , 57 So. 930 , and City Nat. Bank of Selma v. Walker, 130 La. 810 , 58 So. 580 , cited in the opinion, the Legislature adopted Act 124 of 1936 (amending Article 333 of the Code of Practice), requiring that all dilatory exceptions be filed in limine and at the same time, so that the above cases were in effect overruled by the 1936 Act; and that the Court overlooked the cases of Browne v. Gajan, La.App., 173 So. 485 , Schultz v. Long Island Machinery & Equipment Co., La.App., 173 So. 569 , and particularly the case of State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037 , 20 So.2d 305 , wherein “this Court unequivocably held that, by virtue of Act 124 of 1936, the exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae is not waived if coupled in the alternative with other dilatory or declinatory exceptions * * In the Younger case, unlike the case at bar, the exceptions were filed “only in the alternative, with full reservation of and without waiving his exception to the jurisdiction of the court, and solely for the purpose of complying with the requirements of Act No. 124 of 1936;” 1 where *133 as here, the exceptions to the jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae were submitted together, without reservation, and with the prayer “that these exceptions be maintained and that there be judgment herein in his favor and against plaintiff, dismissing exceptor at plaintiff’s costs for these proceedings.” Without further discussion, the other assignments of error are equally without merit, and the application is therefore refused. . The case of Browne v. Gajan (Ct. of Appeal, First Circuit) is similar; in the case of Schultz v. Long Island Machinery & Equipment Co. (Ct. of Appeal, Second Circuit), reference to the citation was “ ‘merely for the purpose of showing that the court had no jurisdiction’ ” and was not “ ‘in its proper sense, an exception to the citation so that it did not serve as a waiver of the plea to the jurisdiction.’ ” 173 So. at page 572.