In Re Byrd
In Re Byrd, 75 So. 2d 331 (La. 1954).
Cited by
- In Re: Daniel Hamilton McCarthy Applying for Intrafamily Adoption of G.M.V. La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2021
- In re the Successions of Lain 147 So. 3d 1204 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014
- In Re TML 951 So. 2d 364 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006
- In re T.M.L. 951 So. 2d 364 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006
- In Re Shavor 428 So. 2d 952 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- Moreland v. Craft 244 So. 2d 37 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1971
- Roy v. Speer 192 So. 2d 554 La. 1966
- Roy v. Speer 184 So. 2d 796 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
- In Re Hughes 176 So. 2d 158 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1965
- In re Adoption of Meier 169 So. 2d 583 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1964
- In re Adoption of Gordon 135 So. 2d 673 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
- In Re Harville 96 So. 2d 20 La. 1957
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Green v. Paul 212 La. 337
- State Ex Rel. Simpson v. Salter 211 La. 918
- State Ex Rel. Terry v. Nugent 212 La. 382
Opinion text
HAWTHORNE, Justice (dissenting). I fully agree that consent of the natural parents is a requisite to an adoption under Act No. 228 of 1948, R.S. 9:421 et seq., but, when it is legally established and proven that their consent has been freely and voluntarily given and adoption proceedings have been commenced in the juvenile court, I cannot agree that the withdrawal of consent prior to rendition of the final decree is a bar to the adoption as though the consent had never been given. Justice Hamiter is of this view, as disclosed by his dissenting opinion in Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So.2d 819 , and after further consideration I am convinced that I was in error in concurring in the decree in that case, and that Justice Hamiter was correct. In a case such as this, the basic consideration of the decree premitting or denying the adoption shall be, as set forth in Section 12 of Act No. 228 of 1948, R.S. 9:432, the best interest of the child, and the fact that the natural parent or parents have withdrawn consent should not, of itself, be decisive. In my opinion, the juvenile court, after taking into consideration information from all sources concerning the adoption, should be free to determine what is to the best interest of the child and to render a decision accordingly. If the juvenile court were permitted such freedom, I am sure that there would be cases in which adoption would be denied upon a showing that the consent had been withdrawn if the juvenile judge was of the opinion that such a decree was to the best interest of the child, and the natural parents could take appropriate action to regain the custody of the child. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the case of Green v. Paul, supra, should be overruled, and, if the decision in State ex rel. Simpson v. Salter, 211 La. 918 , 31 So.2d 163 , is, as stated in Green v. Paul, authority that continuing consent of natu *201 ral parents is a requisite for a final decree of adoption, then it should likewise be overruled. See State ex rel. Terry v. Nugent, 212 La. 382 , 31 So.2d 834 . I respectfully dissent.