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Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Succession of Pizzillo, 65 So. 2d 783.

28 citing documents.

  • Karen Cohen Kinnett Versus Jarred Brandon Kinnett La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2020
  • Wooley v. Lucksinger 14 So. 3d 311 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009
    We reiterate the following pronouncement in Flowers, above: “There is indeed a difference between prescription and peremption as noted by the Court of Appeal and as pointed out in the Succession of \2mPizzillol , ], supra.
  • State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso 838 So. 2d 792 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002
    1986); , (1953); Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry.
  • Nelson v. Burkeen Construction Co. 717 So. 2d 261 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998
    |7In , (1953), the supreme court held that an adoption which lacked the signature of one of the natural parents was not “absolutely null” such that this defect could never be cured or waived.
  • State v. McInnis Bros. Const. 701 So. 2d 937 La. 1997
    For example, in , (1953), this court addressed whether Act 46 of 1932 providing that an action to annul any adoption validated by that Act would be "prescribed after the lapse of six months from and after the promulgation of this Act" was peremptive or prescriptive.
  • A.S. v. M.C. 685 So. 2d 644 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
  • As v. MC 685 So. 2d 644 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
  • Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Serv., Inc. 657 So. 2d 1307 La. 1995
    See Flowers, ( , (1953)); James F. Shuey, Comment, Legal Rights and the Passage of Time, 41 La.L.Rev.
  • Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hosp. 486 So. 2d 717 La. 1986
    [10] The period of time (six months) within which certain adoptions made valid by statute may be annulled was found to be peremptive in Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La.328, (1953).
  • Griffin v. SUCCESSION OF BRANCH EX REL. SMITH 480 So. 2d 313 La. 1986
  • Nepveaux v. Fitzgerald 480 So. 2d 346 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985
    1935); , Ancor v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 260 La.
  • Stewart v. Goeb 432 So. 2d 246 La. 1983
  • Harris v. Guardian Funds, Inc. 425 So. 2d 1322 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
    The defendant/tax purchaser argues plaintiffs had three years to redeem the property and this time period is one of peremption, not prescription, [4] and cites , (1953) which distinguished the two: The difference between prescription and peremption is that the former simply bars the remedy whereas, in the latter, time is made of essence of the right granted and a lapse of the statutory period operates as a complete extinguishment of the right.
  • Stewart v. Goeb 417 So. 2d 59 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
  • Tharpe & Brooks, Inc. v. Arnott Corp. 406 So. 2d 1 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981
  • Pounds v. Schori 377 So. 2d 1195 La. 1979
    415 (La.1935); , Ancor v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 260 La.
  • Pounds v. Schori 369 So. 2d 1090 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1979
    2 The Supreme Court in , (1953) stated: “The difference between prescription and peremption is that the former simply bars the remedy whereas, in the latter, time is made of essence of the right granted and a lapse of the statutory peri *1092 od operates as a complete extinguishment of the right.
  • Flowers, Inc. v. Rausch 364 So. 2d 928 La. 1978
    The Court of Appeal detailed the differences between peremption and prescription, in one instance quoting the following from , (1953): "The difference between prescription and peremption is that the former simply bars the remedy whereas, in the latter, time is made of essence of the right granted and a lapse of the statutory period operates as a complete extinguishment of the right.
  • Flowers, Inc. v. Rausch 354 So. 2d 641 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977
    280 .” The distinction or difference between prescription and peremption was explained by the Supreme Court in , (1953), to wit: “The difference between prescription and peremption is that the former simply bars the remedy whereas, in the latter, time is made of essence of the right granted and a lapse of the statutory period operates as a complete extinguishment of the right.
  • Succession of Donellan 310 So. 2d 143 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1975
    t this prescriptive period shall apply solely to actions having the purpose of setting aside and annuling acts of adoption by reason of such adoption not having been effected by an authentic act, but by private act before witnesses and acknowledged, or that all necessary parties did not sign the act of adoption.” The correctness of the result was specifically recognized in , (1953) (La.App.
  • Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans v. Sanders 264 So. 2d 270 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1972
    Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. C/B Mr. Kim, 345 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1965); Page v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 259 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1958); , (1953); Succession of Aurianne, 219 La.
  • Ancor v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc. 256 So. 2d 122 La. 1971
    (1953); Brister v. Wray Dickinson Co., Inc., 183 La.
  • Jackson v. Hanna 206 So. 2d 779 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1968
    The distinction between prescription and peremption is set forth clearly in the , : "* * * The difference between prescription and peremption is that the former simply bars the remedy whereas, in the latter, time is made of essence of the right granted and a lapse of the statutory period operates as a complete extinguishment of the right.
  • Choate v. O'BRIEN 163 So. 2d 157 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1964
    Stevens v. Johnson, La.App., ; , ; Close v. Rowan, supra; Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry.
  • Crumpacker v. Spalding 132 So. 2d 875 La. 1961
    In , , appellant contended that Section 13 of this act was unconstitutional if its purpose was to validate all prior adoptions even though the natural parents did not consent thereto.
  • Crumpacker v. Spalding 126 So. 2d 625 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
    ter the promulgation of this act; but this prescriptive period shall apply solely to actions having the purpose of setting aside and annuling acts of adoption by reason of such adoptions not having been effected by an authentic act, but by private act before witnesses and acknowledge, or that all necessary parties did not sign the act of adoption.” The Supreme Court in the , , held: “Section 13 of Act 46 of 1932 does not authorize the adoption of children without the consent of the natural paren
  • Lyons v. Goodman 78 So. 2d 424 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    In , , our Supreme Court stated that a 1924 notarial adoption was validated and could not be attacked following expiration of the six-month period after effective date of the 1932 Act, even though neither of the natural parents of an illegitimate child had signed.
  • Succession of Williams 71 So. 2d 229 La. 1954
    the notarial act of adoption of said child in order for it to be valid” and (2) “in not recognizing that any defects in the act of adoption of James Burnell Williams were cured by Act 46 of 1932, Section 13.” Supporting appellant’s second contention, obviously decisive of this cause, and making unnecessary a consideration of the quoted first contention, is our decision in , , rendered April 27, 1953 or subsequent to the judgment of the district court herein.