Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Jackson v. Jones, 69 So. 2d 729.

40 citing documents.

Bordelon v. Pelican State Mut. Ins. Co. 599 So. 2d 511 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 499 So. 2d 146 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
Co., , (1954); Bodin v. Texas Co., 186 So.
Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. City of New Orleans 426 So. 2d 1385 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
Vidrine v. White 352 So. 2d 776 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1978
Yates v. Brown 344 So. 2d 37 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977
Appellant also complains of the trial judge’s refusal to charge the jury that *40 a seven-year-old child is incapable of contributory negligence in the absence of a showing of extraordinary conditions (as held in Jackson v. Jones, 1953, , ).
Simmons v. Beauregard Parish School Board 315 So. 2d 883 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1975
Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp. 320 So. 2d 917 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1975
(1954); Traders & (La.App.
Contranchis v. Parish of Jefferson 299 So. 2d 513 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974
(1954); Salter v. Zoder, 216 La.
Waggenspack v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. 297 So. 2d 733 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974
the Court applied the criterion that the person creating the danger could or should reasonably foresee the accident that might occur and if such were the case that he would be liable notwithstanding the intervening cause.
Murray v. Volkswagen Mid-American, Inc. 297 So. 2d 236 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
Station v. Travelers Insurance Company 292 So. 2d 289 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
Hernandez v. Toney 289 So. 2d 318 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
Smolinski v. Taulli 276 So. 2d 286 La. 1973
(1954); Salter v. Zoder, 216 La.
Skains v. Allstate Insurance 264 So. 2d 230 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
which involved a child 7 years of age.
Allen v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance 254 So. 2d 69 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
(1954), the court held that a child of seven years was not capable of contributory negligence in the absence of extraordinary conditions.
Miller Car Washes, Inc. v. Crowe 245 So. 2d 485 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1971
70, pp. 726, 727; , 69 So.
Curry v. Fruin-Colnon Contracting Co. 202 So. 2d 345 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
a stack of piled lumber was held to be an attractive nuisance to a seven year old child who was pushed by a playmate and fell upon a protruding nail.
Scott v. Boh Bros. Construction Co. 195 So. 2d 353 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1967
there is dicta to the effect that the leaving of building material, not inherently dangerous, unguarded at a construction site where children play, is not an act of negligence.
Helgason v. Hartford Insurance Company 187 So. 2d 140 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1966
(1954) and cases there cited.
Smith v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company 185 So. 2d 857 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1966
Lee v. Peerless Insurance Company 183 So. 2d 328 La. 1966
Barreca v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 182 So. 2d 138 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1966
Hebert v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance 161 So. 2d 92 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
Danna v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., La.App.
Kimball v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance 161 So. 2d 307 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
Under the law of Louisiana, a child under eight years of age is ordinarily incapable of contributory negligence ( , ), although a child of eight years and over may be old enough to fall within the rule of contributory negligence (Lynch v. Knoop, 118 La.
Simoneaux v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance 159 So. 2d 742 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
He relies upon the holdings in four Louisiana cases: Oldham v. Hoover, La.App., ; Bergeron v. Houston-American Insurance Company, La.App., ; , ; and Salter v. Zoder, 216 La.
Danna v. London Guarantee & Accident Company 147 So. 2d 739 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1962
Likewise, , (1954) and Dipino et ux.
Clair v. Gaudet 144 So. 2d 638 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962
Rainwater v. Boatright, La.App., ; Wise v. Eubanks, La.App., 159 So.
McMurray v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 141 So. 2d 898 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
and in the opinion of Judge Ellis in Edelman et al. v. Refrigeration Equipment Company, La.App., (First Circuit, 1954, writs denied).
Oldham v. Hoover 140 So. 2d 417 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
and O'Bier v. Manufacturers Casualty Company et al., La.App., .
Brechtel v. Lopez 140 So. 2d 189 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962
Spiers v. Consolidated Companies, Inc. 132 So. 2d 879 La. 1961
In arriving at this conclusion the court cited and relied on a decision of this court, , , and held, in effect, that Consolidated’s truck driver should have foreseen that- the obstructing vehicle would hamper the inherently dangerous operation of the heavy and hard-to-stop railway trains and would cause a collision or the dangerous maneuver of a sudden train stop to avoid a collision.
Rogers v. T. L. James & Co., Inc. 128 So. 2d 829 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
If such were the case, then he is liable notwithstanding the intervening cause.” , .
Lanza Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co. 129 So. 2d 91 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
Mason v. Herrin Transfer & Warehouse Co., La.App.
Felt v. Price 126 So. 2d 330 La. 1961
938 , ; , ; Succession of Brower, 228 La.
Perera v. Johnson 125 So. 2d 493 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
* * * ” See: , : Lee v. Powell Bros., etc., 126 La.
Thornton v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc. 123 So. 2d 885 La. 1960
938 , ; , , at page 733; Rizley v. Cutrer, 232 La.
Williams v. American Mutual Liability Insurance 121 So. 2d 545 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
The intervention of independent intervening causes will not break causal connection if the intervention of such forces was itself probable or foreseeable.” , .
Snodgrass v. Centanni 87 So. 2d 127 La. 1956
( , and cases therein cited, and Thomas v. Checker Cab Co. of New Orleans, Inc., 229 La.
Thomas v. Checker Cab Co. of New Orleans, Inc. 87 So. 2d 605 La. 1956
and authorities therein cited.
Edelman v. Refrigeration Equipment Co. 72 So. 2d 627 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
403, , decided by this Court and in which writs were granted to the Supreme Court and the latter reversed the holding of this Court, it held: “Lastly, we direct our attention to the point that Jones is not responsible because the proximate cause of the accident was the push given plaintiff’s child by another playmate