Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Bernard Brothers v. Dugas, 85 So. 2d 257.

20 citing documents.

  • Succession of Montgomery 506 So. 2d 1309 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
  • Fontenot v. Estate of Vidrine 401 So. 2d 584 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1981
    (1956); Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Company, supra; (La.App.
  • Kenworthy v. Outlook, Inc. 368 So. 2d 1229 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1979
  • Brashears v. Williams 294 So. 2d 246 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
  • O'Neal v. Williams 290 So. 2d 393 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
    So.2d 257 (1956), as follows : “Under the Negotiable Instruments Law of this state and the jurisprudence of this court, every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration.
  • Harrison v. Occhipinti 251 So. 2d 188 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
    (1956) explained the nature of this rebuttable presumption : “Under the Negotiable Instruments Law of this state and the jurisprudence of this court, every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration.
  • Piper v. Neyrey 222 So. 2d 558 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
    “Absence or failure of consideration is a matter of defence as against any person not a holder in due course; and partial failure of consideration is a defence pro tanto, whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise;” , (1956) the Supreme Court made these remarks concerning the application of those two statutes in cases such as we have before us herein: “[1-4] Under the Negotiable Instruments Law of this state and the jurisprudence of this court, every negotiable inst
  • Lighthouse Life Insurance v. Johnson 180 So. 2d 108 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
    295 , (1949); , (1956); Cooper v. Succession of Cooper, 234 La.
  • Moore Steel, Inc. v. Clear Lite Window Co. 178 So. 2d 376 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
    2d 655 ; , ; 17 La.Law Rev. 466, 482-83.
  • Atlas Drilling Co. of Opelousas v. Creole Explorations, Inc. 170 So. 2d 123 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
    295 , , , , and Cooper v. Succession of Cooper, 234 La.
  • Chenevert v. Lemoine 161 So. 2d 85 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964
    Eskew v. Walker, La.App.
  • Laborde v. Dauzat 158 So. 2d 637 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
    Eskew v. Walker, La.App.
  • Service Parts Co. v. Culpepper 142 So. 2d 498 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
    Belknap Hardware & Mfg.
  • Tatum v. Four Pac Oil & Chemical Corp. 132 So. 2d 569 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
    See, e. g.: , ; Moss v. Robinson, 216 La.
  • Home Finance Service of Lafayette Parish, Inc. v. Black 131 So. 2d 547 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
    rden upon the defendant of proving any absence or failure of consideration; but “if during the trial of the case the defendant offers evidence which casts doubt upon the reality or the amount of the consideration, the presumption that the note was given for value is rebutted, and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove consideration by a preponderance of the evidence,” , .
  • Eskew v. Walker 127 So. 2d 210 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
    The law applicable as correctly found by the trial judge, , , 258: "Under the Negotiable Instruments Law of this state and the jurisprudence of this court, every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration.
  • Trailer Enterprises, Inc. v. Eikenbary 122 So. 2d 655 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
  • Foster v. Washington 105 So. 2d 741 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1958
    For instance, , , and much earlier, in Steeg v. Codifer, 157 La.
  • Cooper v. Succession of Cooper 101 So. 2d 686 La. 1958
    (Here numerous authorities are cited)” , .
  • Redi-Spuds, Inc. v. Dickey 88 So. 2d 801 La. 1956
    • ,He also *411 , (to the same effect as Moss v. Robinson, supra), and also on LSA-R.S.