Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., 94 So. 2d 13.

14 citing documents.

Mid-South Car & Truck Rental v. Moore 516 So. 2d 1224 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
Roy, Inc., , (1957); Equitable Life Assurance Soc.
Boudreaux v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury 422 So. 2d 1209 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
Roy, Inc., , [1957]; 11 La.L.Rev.
First National Bank of Abbeville v. Pillette Enterprises, Inc. 352 So. 2d 440 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977
Article 1111: “The defendant in a principal action by petition may bring in *442 any person, including a co-defendant, who is his warrantor, or who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the principal demand.” Weill and the bank cite Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , (1957) as a leading case construing the above statute.
Karam v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company 281 So. 2d 728 La. 1973
340 , (1957); Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , (1957).
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Allen 225 So. 2d 75 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1969
P. Art. 1111; Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , .
McGee v. Demery 176 So. 2d 679 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
In Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., 1957, , , it was held that a third party action could not be maintained where the alleged indebtedness of the third party to the defendant did not arise out of or have any causal connection with the principal demand.
Breaux v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. 147 So. 2d 693 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
The pertinent provisions of the initial statute read as follows: “That in any civil action presently pending or hereafter filed the defendant in a principal action may by petition bring in any person (including a co-defendant) who is his warrantor, or who is or may be liable to him for *695 all or [any] part of the principal demand.” In Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , , our Supreme Court held that the purpose of the statute, modeled on the federal third-party practice act, is to provide a method o
Vidrine v. Simoneaux 145 So. 2d 400 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1962
See also Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , .
Ensminger v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. 134 So. 2d 686 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961
In Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., 1957, , , it was held that a third party action could not be maintained where the alleged indebtedness of the third party to the defendant did not arise out of or have any causal connection with the principal demand.
AK Roy, Inc. v. Board of Com'rs for Pontchartrain LD 117 So. 2d 60 La. 1960
In that ease (see Bourree v. A. R. Roy, Inc., , ) this Court rejected the attempt of A. ft Ro^, Inc., plaintiff herein, by third party action, to recover against the Levee Board the assessed value of the realty appropriated, but specifically reserved to the plaintiff here the right to proceed against the Levee Board in a direct action for such redress
A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners 111 So. 2d 765 La. 1959
This case is a sequel to the case of Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , , in which the purchaser, Mrs. Bourree, sued for rescission of the sale of this property and for a return of the purchase price.
Brown v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. 112 So. 2d 150 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
* * * ’ “For a discussion of this statute see Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , ; Ferrantelli v. Sanchez, La.App., ; Motors Securities Co. v. Hines, La.App., ; Automotive Finance Co. v. Daigle, La.App., .
Elum v. Kling 98 So. 2d 700 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
In Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , , our Supreme Court held a third party action could not be maintained where the alleged indebtedness of the third party to the defendant did not arise out of or have any causal connection with the principal demand.
Plummer v. Motors Insurance Corporation 96 So. 2d 605 La. 1957
* * * ” For a discussion of this statute see Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., , ; Ferrantelli v. Sanchez, La.App., ; Motors Securities Co. v. Hines, La.App., ; Automotive Finance Co. v. Daigle, La.App., .