Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Lacy v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis., 98 So. 2d 162.

17 citing documents.

  • Falgout v. Dealers Truck Equipment Co. 748 So. 2d 399 La. 1999
    Co. of Wisconsin, , (1957), this court held that the modification statute required that the original judgment of compensation be extant in order for a plaintiff to seek modification of his workers' compensation judgment.
  • Jackson v. Iberia Parish Government 732 So. 2d 517 La. 1999
    Going beyond the issue of whether Jackson properly pleaded his cause of action, however, the hearing officer found that even if Jackson had sought modification based on an alleged change in condition, , (1957), prohibits the re-examination of claims when the trial court has determined that the worker's disability had terminated prior to the original trial.
  • Townsend v. PPG Industries, Inc. 628 So. 2d 1204 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993
  • Zachary v. Bituminous Cas. Corp. 371 So. 2d 1249 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979
    Co. of Wisconsin, , (1957).
  • Landreneau v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 309 So. 2d 283 La. 1975
    Plaintiff's rule to reopen was dismissed by the trial judge, , (1957).
  • Landreneau v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 295 So. 2d 459 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
  • Nini v. Volume Merchandise, Inc. 282 So. 2d 748 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
    Article 2164; Robinson v. Fidelity Casualty Company of New York, La.App., ; Lacy v. Employers Mutual & Liability Insurance Company, , ; Guillory v. Employers Mutual & Liability Insurance Co., La.App., , and Hoffpauir v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., La.App., .
  • Jackson v. Allied Chemical Corp. 259 So. 2d 664 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    (1957); McGee v. Augenstein Construction Company, La.App., (1st Cir. 1962).
  • Robinson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York 181 So. 2d 318 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1965
    Unlike an employer who can reopen an adverse award six months later, a disabled claimant to whom compensation is awarded for less than six months may forever lose his right to further compensation even though subsequent evidence might indicate that the work-caused disability truly persisted for longer, , , Guillory v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., La.App., , 19 La.L.Rev.
  • Ryan v. W. S. Bellows Construction Corp. 151 So. 2d 508 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
    Co. of Wis., , , the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted LSA-R.S.
  • McGee v. Augenstein Construction Co. 147 So. 2d 889 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
  • Guillory v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance 121 So. 2d 273 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
    Co., , , 166 that: “* * * in cases where the judgment of the trial court fixes with definiteness the duration of the employee’s incapacity to work to be a period of less than six months from the date of its rendition, such a judgment is not within the purview of R.S.
  • Washington v. Independence Oak Flooring Co. 114 So. 2d 599 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
    Inc. Co., , , cited to-us by defendants-appellees, is not authority to the contrary.
  • Gaspard v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York 109 So. 2d 278 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
    Co., , , 165, the Supreme Court said: “From our interpretation of R.S.
  • Roberts v. City of Baton Rouge 108 So. 2d 111 La. 1958
  • Buhler v. Villec 102 So. 2d 417 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1958
    of Wis., 1957, , , footnote 3; Lewis v. Lewis, 1924, 155 La.
  • Lambert v. American Policyholders Ins. 100 So. 2d 267 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
    Co. of Wis., , , wherein they said: “(1) that the award of compensation in the first instance is a final judgment fixing the extent and duration of disability for the period stated therein subject, however, to modification, after six months have elapsed and compensation is still due, upon allegations by either pl