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Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Gueno v. Medlenka, 117 So. 2d 817.

23 citing documents.

  • Ford v. Lester 139 So. 3d 22 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014
    (1960), addressed the open mines doctrine and the respective rights of a usufructuary and a naked owner under the Civil Code of 1870, which was in effect in 1965.
  • Cecil Malone v. Dayline, Inc. La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
  • St. Mary Operating Co. v. Champagne 945 So. 2d 846 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
    The reason for that exception to the freedom of contract is in the fundamental rule of public policy that a debtor, or an obligor in the case of a servitude or real right, cannot renounce in advance the benefit of the prescription which may release him or his land from the obligation* * *' And, in Gueno v. Medlenka, [ , (La.1960)] supra, the same court held: `* * * In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that it is contrary to the public policy of this State to hold property out of commerc
  • St. Mary Operating Company v. Lester Joseph Champagne La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
    The reason for that exception to the freedom of contract is in the fundamental rule of public policy that a debtor, or an obligor in the case of a servitude or real right, cannot renounce in advance the benefit of the prescription which may release him or his land from the obligation***’ And, in Gueno v. Medlenka, [ (La.1960)] supra, the same court held: '*** In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that it is contrary to the public policy of this State to hold property out of commerce and
  • Ross v. Ross 857 So. 2d 384 La. 2003
    (1960) (usufruct); Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La.
  • Cohort Ener. v. Caddo-Bossier Parishes Port 852 So. 2d 1174 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003
    In the recent case of Gueno v. Medlenka, 1960, , , the Supreme Court restated the basic principle as follows: ` * * * it is contrary to the public policy of this State to hold property out of commerce and this Court has consistently applied the liberative prescription of ten years in dealing with the exercise of mineral rights.'
  • Succession of Becker 704 So. 2d 825 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1997
  • Myers v. Colfax Timber Co. 640 So. 2d 513 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
    See, , (1960) (usufruct); Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La.
  • Succession of Doll v. Doll 593 So. 2d 1239 La. 1992
    See, , (1960) (usufruct); Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La.
  • Terrell v. Messenger 428 So. 2d 1241 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
  • In re the Succession of Blake 428 So. 2d 1118 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
  • United States Daughters of 1812—Chalmette Chapter v. Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism 404 So. 2d 941 La. 1981
  • Alexander v. Alexander 357 So. 2d 1260 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1978
    955 , (1961); , (1960); Jackson v. Shaw, 151 La.
  • River Rouge Min., Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minn. 331 So. 2d 878 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1976
  • Lafayette Airport Commission v. Roy 328 So. 2d 182 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1976
  • Delcambre v. Dubois 263 So. 2d 96 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972
    Our jurisprudence establishes a public policy in this state against holding property out of commerce, , ; Freed Realty Co. v. Singer, 12 La.App.
  • BERWICK MUD COMPANY v. Stansbury 205 So. 2d 147 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967
  • LeBleu v. LeBleu 206 So. 2d 551 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967
  • Wilson v. King 165 So. 2d 70 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1964
    955 , , , both of which were decided in 1960, prior to the seizure here.
  • Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co. 131 So. 2d 635 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961
    In the recent case of Gueno v. Medlenka, 1960, , , the Supreme Court restated the basic principle as follows: "* * * it is contrary to the public policy of this State to hold property out of commerce and this Court has consistently applied the liberative prescription of ten years in dealing with the exercise of mineral rights."
  • Buffington v. Buffington 126 So. 2d 326 La. 1961
    The Court of Appeal, in reaching this result, , , as dispositive of the issues—observing specifically that what this Court said in the Medlenka case and what it, the Court of Appeal, was saying in the instant case was based entirely on the fact that, at the time of the commencement of the usufruct, there was neither lease nor production of minerals.
  • Succession of Rickerfor 120 So. 2d 320 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
    For an apparent contradiction of this rationale see Gueno v. Medlenka, La., 1960, .
  • Buffington v. Buffington 119 So. 2d 519 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
    1018 , , has settled the question as between the usufructuary and the owner in so far as the royalties in this case are concerned.