Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Parish of Iberia v. Cook, 116 So. 2d 491.

54 citing documents.

Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Hill 788 So. 2d 1154 La. 2001
State, , (1959); State, Dept. of Transp.
West Jefferson Levee D. v. Coast Quality 640 So. 2d 1258 La. 1994
State, , (1959); State, Dept. of Transp.
CALCASIEU-CAMERON HOSP. SERV. v. Fontenot 628 So. 2d 75 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993
at 494 (1959), quoting City of New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La.
Board of Com'rs v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. 625 So. 2d 1070 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1993
(1959); Parish of Jefferson v. Marsh Investment Corp., supra, at 27.
State, Through Dept. of Highways v. Luling Indus. 443 So. 2d 672 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1983
(1959), and in various subsequent cases, including Consolidated Sewerage District of the City of Kenner v. OKC Dredging, Inc., (La.App.
Town of Rayville v. Thomason 404 So. 2d 1290 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981
1036 , (1963); , (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Company v. Simmons, 229 La.
Parish of Jefferson v. Marsh Inv. Corp. 398 So. 2d 27 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1981
Emerson v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 393 So. 2d 691 La. 1981
Parish of Jefferson v. Boudreaux 383 So. 2d 437 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1980
(1959); Texas Pipeline Company v. Barbe, 229 La.
Consolidated Sewerage District of Kenner v. OKC Dredging, Inc. 380 So. 2d 657 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1980
In setting the criteria for determining the highest and best use of expropriated property for market value purposes, , (1959) stated in part: “The possibility for its use for all available purposes for which it is adapted and to which it might in reason be applied should be considered.
City of New Orleans v. Giraud 346 So. 2d 1113 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977
State, Dept. of Highways v. Terrace Land Co., Inc. 298 So. 2d 859 La. 1974
Thus, , (1959), the parish expropriated an entire tract, fronting 100 feet on the highway by a depth of 500 feet and situated between a hospital and a nursing home.
State, Dept. of Highways v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc. 292 So. 2d 842 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1974
Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc. v. Davis 291 So. 2d 489 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1974
Louisiana Power & Light Company v. CHURCHILL FARMS, INC. 292 So. 2d 183 La. 1974
Department of Highways v. Terrace Land Co. 282 So. 2d 814 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
On the other hand, the Department urges that the willing seller-willing buyer rule should apply herein pursuant to which the owner of raw acreage is entitled to the market value of the land in the condition in which it exists at the time of taking, which does not include a developer’s profit, as has been held in numerous instances including, but not limited to, , ; State, Department of Highways v. Monsur, La.App., ; State, Department of Highways v. Wolfe, La.App., ; State, .
Lafayette Airport Commission v. Roy 265 So. 2d 459 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972
STATE, DEPT. OF HIGHWAYS v. Monsur 258 So. 2d 162 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972
Greater Baton Rouge Airport District v. Carrick 258 So. 2d 640 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
Property owners cite the case, Parish of Iverville [Iberia] v. Cook, , 238 La.
Evangeline Parish Police Jury v. Deville 247 So. 2d 258 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1971
(1959); Texas Pipeline Company v. Barbe, 229 La.
Cypress-Black Bayou Recreation & Water Conservation District v. Conger 234 So. 2d 212 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1970
1036 , (1963); , 116 So.
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Chesson 229 So. 2d 763 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
2d 35 , especially when merely conjectural, , , in the absence of a real and present effect upon market value.
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Colomb 225 So. 2d 280 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
612 , ; , ; State, Through Department of Highways v. Givens, La.App., .
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Calvert 209 So. 2d 759 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
(1950), discussed the issues of the owner’s intent and the time element involved in development of property as follows: “In determining the market value of property expropriated, it must be conceded that it is not merely the value for the use for which it has been applied by the owner that should be ta
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Wm. T. Burton Industries, Inc. 205 So. 2d 724 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
However, plaintiff cites also the case of Parish of Iberia v. Cook (1959) , , which is in point.
State, Department of Highways v. Mouledous 200 So. 2d 384 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967
Under those circumstances, , , "The measure of compensation in such instances should not be the aggregate of the prices of the lots into which the tract could be divided, for so many contingencies may intervene as to make such measure of compensation too uncertain and conjectural.
State, Dept. of Highways v. Christ Baptist Church 197 So. 2d 83 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
State, Through Dept. of Highways v. Ragusa, 234 La.
Texas Gas Transmission Corporation v. Pierce 192 So. 2d 561 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1966
3 Cir., , as well as of his request for an alteration to a more convenient location of it across the landowner's property [1] , , , Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Bowie Lumber Co., La.App.
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Busch 188 So. 2d 495 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
The test in determining market value in the instant case is set forth by our State Supreme Court in the case of Iberia Parish *497 v. Cook, , , in which the court held as follows: “In determining the market value of property expropriated, it must be conceded that it is not merely the value for the use for which it has been applied by the owner that should be taken into consideration.
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Fontane 185 So. 2d 573 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
State Through Department of Highways v. Riley, La.App., , , , State Through Dept. of Highways v. Rapier, 246 La.
State, Department of Highways v. Gielen 184 So. 2d 737 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1966
Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Prestridge 182 So. 2d 334 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1966
Since there was no present market for the individual lots, we held the property should be valued as a whole, as if sold to a developer for resale who would, of course, make proper allowance for interest on his investment while waiting for sales, expected profits, development costs, sales commissions, etc. A , (1959) also relied on by plaintiff in the present matter.
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Bowie Lumber Co. 176 So. 2d 735 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
Also see: United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Company, (1963) ; , ; Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. Watson, 224 La.
City of New Orleans v. Comeaux 162 So. 2d 76 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Treat 163 So. 2d 578 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
201 , ; , , and other cases.
Orleans Parish School Board v. Dorsett 154 So. 2d 545 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
* * * ” , , had this to say: “The extent of property to be expropriated and the location thereof are within the sound discretion of the body possessing the power of eminent domain, and the determination of same will not be interfered with by the courts if made in good faith.
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Hayes 150 So. 2d 667 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
133 , ; , ; Rapides Parish School Board v. Nassif, 232 La.
State Ex Rel. Department of Highways v. Hayward 150 So. 2d 6 La. 1963
965 , ; , ; State Through Dept. of Highways v. Havard, 239 La.
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Davis 149 So. 2d 164 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Whitaker 143 So. 2d 408 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1962
1 Aside from certain treatise reference concerning the law of other states, the majority in reaching its result chiefly relies upon a , .
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Riley 143 So. 2d 396 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
In our opinion, , (1959), in which the court held as follows: “In determining the market value of property expropriated, it must be conceded that it is not merely the value for the use for which it has been applied by the owner that should be taken into consideration.
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Johnson 141 So. 2d 54 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
State v. Barrilleaux 139 So. 2d 242 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
ds the value to develop the property and place it on the market so as to obtain the $1,800 comparable value, it being their contention the market value of the land expropriated in the instant case is what a prospective purchaser for subdivision purposes would have been willing to pay for the property relying on the cases of State v. Hedwig, Inc., La.App., ; , .
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Madden 139 So. 2d 21 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
201 , (1955); , (1959); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company v. Morehouse Realty Company, Inc., La.App., (2d Cir. 1961).
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Latil 137 So. 2d 735 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1962
Rapides Parish School Board v. Nassif, 232 La.
State Ex Rel. Department of Highways v. Levy 136 So. 2d 35 La. 1961
133 , ; , ; Rapides Parish School Board v. Nassif, 232 La.
State v. Hedwig, Inc. 133 So. 2d 180 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1961
2d 528 ; , ; State, Through Department of Highways v. Givens, La.App., .
State v. Williams 131 So. 2d 600 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Pace 131 So. 2d 118 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
In commenting upon those facts, the Supreme Court, , , stated: “ * * * In those instances it is apparent that the square footage method was the appropriate and fair method of appraising this type of property.
State v. Boyer 130 So. 2d 738 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
See La.Law Rev., Volume XVIII, at page 551, , .