Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Collins v. Brunet, 118 So. 2d 454.

13 citing documents.

  • Drachenberg v. Parish of Jefferson 563 So. 2d 523 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990
    cited by the Drachenbergs, only supports this result.
  • Davis v. Stern 348 So. 2d 726 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977
  • Heth v. Moore 316 So. 2d 764 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
    736 , , (1960): “ ‘The reason or the philosophy of the rule which, as an exception, flows logically from the very terms of the general rule, is that parol evidence, in such cases, is admitted, not against or beyond what is contained in the acts as a contradiction of the clear recital or legal meaning of the st
  • Delcambre v. Dubois 263 So. 2d 96 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972
    (1960), a case similar to the present matter, the apparent agreement was a sale of land, and the counter letter was a reciprocal agreement to reconvey the property, under LSA-C.C.
  • Neblett v. Placid Oil Company 257 So. 2d 167 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1972
    Plaintiff filed a supplemental petition in which he alleges in the alternative that if the correction deed is ambiguous, in that it does not expressly state whether the mineral reservation remained unchanged, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the intent of the parties to the correction deed, , ; Krauss v. Fry, 209 La.
  • Choctaw Home Builders, Inc. v. Lena, Inc. 246 So. 2d 212 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
    ragraph 1 above shall be returned by Sellers to Buyer and upon such return Buyer shall have no further claims under this contract.” (Exhibit P-1, Record, pp. 18, 19) When the matter was previously before the Court on appeal, 1 we held that the option provisions of the contract were ambiguous, , (1960), remanded the same, ordering that parol evidence which had been excluded by the trial judge might be offered to show the true intent of the parties.
  • Delcambre v. Dubois 236 So. 2d 249 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970
  • Choctaw Home Builders, Inc. v. Lena, Inc. 223 So. 2d 23 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
    Plaintiffs point out, however, , , that parol evidence is admissible in an action for specific performance of a contract to sell real property to show intent or clear ambiguities when offered to enforce the terms of such an agreement rather than invalidate or destroy the contract.
  • Reilly-Benton Co. v. Gurtler, Hebert & Co. 212 So. 2d 514 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1968
    The Snow-White Roofs, Inc. v. Boucher, supra, case was cited in the case of Washington Aluminum Co. v. Pittman Construction Co., 5 Cir., 383 F.2d 798 , which also cites the following cases on the subject: Capizzo v. Traders and General Insurance Company, La.App., ; Snow-White Roofs, Inc. v. Boucher, supra; Marcann Outdoor, Inc. v. Hargrove, infra; , ; Cardos v. Cristadoro, 228 La.
  • Bash v. Sims 210 So. 2d 180 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1968
  • Gisclair v. First National Bank of Lafayette 180 So. 2d 595 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
    If the written agreement D-3 be regarded as ambiguous in such respect, the parole evidence (admissible to uphold the agreement, although not to contradict it, , ) proves this without contradiction to be the intent and meaning of the agreement.
  • Wimbush v. Jones 136 So. 2d 704 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1961
  • Love v. Dedon 118 So. 2d 122 La. 1960