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Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Rogillio v. Cazedessus, 127 So. 2d 734.

42 citing documents.

  • Barbara Miguez v. Platinum Underwriters Reinsurance, Inc. La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
  • Miguez v. Platinum Underwriters Reinsurance, Inc. 926 So. 2d 55 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006
  • Mahaffey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 679 So. 2d 129 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996
    There, Justice Tate reasoned that: Nevertheless, I believe that the omnibus insuring clause should be interpreted more broadly, in accord with our pre- Rogillio [ v. Cazedessus, , ] [(1961)], jurisprudence.
  • Panzico v. Price 658 So. 2d 1310 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995
    (1961), the Louisiana Supreme Court enunciated the rule regarding second permittees.
  • Williams v. Forbes 650 So. 2d 337 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995
    Earlier cases which involve operation of a vehicle by an unlicensed driver revolve around the issue of permission, , (1961)
  • Panzico v. Price 647 So. 2d 1154 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994
    In 1961, , our Supreme Court set forth a new rule regarding second permittees.
  • Perkins v. McDow 615 So. 2d 312 La. 1993
  • Sam v. Rogers 559 So. 2d 1001 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990
    1st Cir.1960), modified on other grounds at Deshotels v. United States Fire Ins.
  • King v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Ins. Co. 549 So. 2d 367 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1989
    Rogillio v. Cazedessus, (concurring opinion, Sanders, J.), , (1961).
  • Southern v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 496 So. 2d 1349 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
    In addition, ‘each case must depend upon the facts and circumstances revealed there.’ American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, supra; , (1961).” In the instant case, we must look to the facts of the relationship between the first permittee, Chammy Roberts, and the second permittee, the decedent.
  • Francois v. Ybarzabal 483 So. 2d 602 La. 1986
    Rogillio v. Cazedessus (concurring opinion of Sanders, J.), , (1961); [4] Swanson v. Comeaux, supra.
  • Bldg. Special. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 440 So. 2d 984 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
  • Jacobs v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. 432 So. 2d 843 La. 1983
  • Jacobs v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. 432 So. 2d 843 La. 1983
  • Aurillo v. Gressaffa 405 So. 2d 664 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1981
    Arts 1901 and 1945; , (1961); (La.App.
  • Morgan v. Matlack, Inc. 342 So. 2d 167 La. 1977
  • Hughes v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. 340 So. 2d 293 La. 1976
    American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, supra; , (1961).
  • Gremillion v. Goleman 316 So. 2d 810 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
    (1961) the Supreme Court held that a policy provision identical to that in this case should be given strict application and that permission necessary to extend coverage to a non-owner-user of the automobile could be given " only [by] the named insured or his spouse."
  • Jones v. Breaux 289 So. 2d 110 La. 1974
  • Swanson v. Comeaux 286 So. 2d 117 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974
    See for comparison, , (1961).
  • Jones v. Breaux 274 So. 2d 802 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
    3 Cir. 1962); , (1961); (La.App.
  • Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 274 So. 2d 769 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1973
    It would serve no purpose to discuss in detail the various treatments courts have accorded the omnibus insured clause under the differing factual situations ( , [1961]) because here, Philip Morris' established policy was to restrict use of the automobile to business use and personal use by Chauvin and his wife.
  • Moore v. Prudential Insurance 263 So. 2d 456 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    263 , ; , ; Monteleone v. American Employers’ Ins.
  • Cormack v. Prudential Insurance Company of America 259 So. 2d 340 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1972
  • Prestenback v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America 257 So. 2d 698 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1972
    1901 and 1945; , ; Albritton v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
  • Devall v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 249 So. 2d 282 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
    applicable to such a situation is that the minor child of the named insured, be he or she classified either as an additional insured as a resident relative of the named insured's household or as first permittee, cannot violate the express restriction by the named insured by permitting another to use the insured vehicle so as to cause such user to become an omnibus insured, , (1961); (La.App.
  • Williams v. Buckelew 246 So. 2d 58 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1971
  • American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki 230 So. 2d 253 La. 1969
    (1961) Chief Justice Four-net said: But counsel for said companies confidently declare that in other cases we 'have, either expressly or- by denying writs to the Courts of Appeal, so extended the interpretation of “permission of the named insured” that it applies to anyone who has been given
  • Normand v. Hertz Corporation 229 So. 2d 104 La. 1969
    Faced with a somewhat similar provision in another case, we said, “The result sought by counsel * * * would do violence to the provisions of the policy, which are clear and unambiguous.” , 127 So.
  • American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki 216 So. 2d 115 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
    The holding of the court seems to be more in keeping with the position of Justice Sanders, dissenting [concurring] in Rogillio v. Cazedes-sus, than with the majority opinion.” , (1961), in a concurring opinion, very ably stated the initial permission rule in the following language: “Concisely stated, this doctrine is that initial permission, express or implied, is sufficient to constitute the operator of a vehicle an insured under the omnibus clause.
  • Matthews v. Standard Life Insurance Company 213 So. 2d 128 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1968
    Co. of Tennessee, supra; , (1961)
  • Krupp v. Pan Air Corp. 183 So. 2d 403 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
  • Peterson v. Armstrong 176 So. 2d 453 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1965
  • Wischan v. Brockhaus 163 So. 2d 572 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
    189 , ; Rogillio et al. v. Cazedessus, Individually, et al., , .
  • Smith v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania 161 So. 2d 903 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
    In the recent case of Anderson v. Adams, La.App., , we indulged in a , , and Hurdle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
  • Touchet v. Firemen's Insurance Co. of Newark, NJ 159 So. 2d 753 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964
    Coco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., La.App., .
  • Bowab v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 152 So. 2d 66 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1963
    Green v. National Bellas Hess Life Insurance Company, *69 La.App.
  • Townsend v. Peerless Insurance 153 So. 2d 520 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
    Therefore, the District Court did have before it evidence with regard to whether the car was being used without the owner’s permission and based on such evidence the Court found the car was being used without the owner’s permission and followed the ruling of the Supreme Court as laid down in Rogillio et al. v. Cazedessus, et al., , , and by our brethren of the Third Circuit in Coco v. State Farm Mutual Ins.
  • Anderson v. Adams 150 So. 2d 585 La. 1963
    (concurring opinion) and Parks v. Hall, 189 La.
  • Anderson v. Adams 148 So. 2d 347 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
    as authority for the proposition that the permission contemplated by the aforesaid omnibus clause may be granted by or emanate only from the named insured.
  • Coco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 136 So. 2d 288 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
    denied); Garland v. Audubon Insurance Company, supra; , 127 So.
  • Hurdle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 135 So. 2d 63 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961
    (1961) is controlling and adverse to appellee's contentions.