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Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 174 So. 2d 529.

28 citing documents.

  • canal/claiborne, Limited v. Stonehedge Development, LLC 156 So. 3d 627 La. 2014
    That is, , (1965), and notes that the legislature’s use of “sue and be sued” language was at issue.
  • Chamberlain v. State, Through DOTD 624 So. 2d 874 La. 1993
    Commenting on that amendment, , (1965): [T]he Legislature of 1960 in adopting the aforementioned proposed amendment did so with the express purpose of nullifying the effect of [a pair of] decisions of this court ...
  • Harrison v. State, Dept. of Highways 375 So. 2d 169 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1979
    (1965) and Board of C. of P. of New Orleans v. Splendour S. & E. Co., conclusively established the liability of the City of Shreveport for its torts, *175 and the above cited jurisprudence recognizes the duty of the city to maintain its streets free of hazards to motorists ex
  • DI VINCENTI BROS. v. Livingston Parish S. Bd. 355 So. 2d 1 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1978
  • Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans 284 So. 2d 905 La. 1973
    Art. III, § 35; , (1965)
  • Board of Comm'rs. of Port of New Orleans v. Splendour S. & E. Co. 273 So. 2d 19 La. 1973
    Splendour argues that the legislative history of the Board shows that it was intended to have the powers of a corporation to sue and be sued, and, therefore, , , the immunity from suit was waived.
  • Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Durand 250 So. 2d 207 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
    (1965); Herrin v. Perry, 254 La.
  • Eschete v. City of New Orleans 245 So. 2d 383 La. 1971
  • Eschete v. City of New Orleans 245 So. 2d 383 La. 1971
  • McDaniel v. Welsh 234 So. 2d 833 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970
    it was held that pursuant to Article 3, Section 35 of the Constitution, where the Charter of the City of Shreveport stipulated that *838 the municipality was "capable of suing and being sued", the city had no immunity from suit whether acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, irrespective of
  • Reymond v. State Ex Rel. Department of Highways 231 So. 2d 375 La. 1970
    the scope of this amendment cannot be limited by this court since it is clear and precise in its wording.
  • Herrin v. Perry 228 So. 2d 649 La. 1969
    we observed that the above constitutional amendment nullified the decisions of Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 238 La.
  • Compass v. Department of Highways 224 So. 2d 102 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
    In both of those cases as in Reymond v. State, Through Department of Highways, La.App., , decided December 16, 1968, , (1965), 2 which was interpreted as having the effect of overruling the earlier opinion of the Supreme Court in Westwego Canal and Terminal Co., Inc. v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 200 La.
  • City of Natchitoches v. State 221 So. 2d 534 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1969
    Toppi v. Arbour, La.App.
  • Bazanac v. State ex rel. Department of Highways 218 So. 2d 121 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
    48:22, , (1965) , La.App.
  • Reymond v. State ex rel. Department of Highways 217 So. 2d 488 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
    The first breach in the State’s traditional immunity from a tort suit arising from the performance of a , .
  • Herrin v. Perry 215 So. 2d 177 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
  • Grumble v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury 212 So. 2d 496 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
    (1965); Terrebonne Parish School Board v. St.
  • Pierce v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York 205 So. 2d 831 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
    (1965) in support of the above contention and also for the proposition that there is no longer a valid distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions of a municipality in actions dealing with tortious conduct of governmental employees.
  • Warfield v. Fink & McDaniel Plumbing & Heating 203 So. 2d 827 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
    ge and Water Board] is empowered to institute expropriation proceedings, and therefore to sue and to be sued.” *829 The Legislature has thus granted authority to appellant to sue and he sued which amounts to a , ; Walesch v. City of New Orleans, La.App., ; Binnings Const. Co. v. Sewerage Dist.
  • Snell v. Stein 201 So. 2d 876 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1967
    * * *" , (1965) in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that where there has been a legislative waiver of immunity such waiver applies to both governmental and proprietary functions of the state and its sub-divisions: "* * * it is obvious that the argument of counsel for the defendant that the Legislature, in
  • Walesch v. City of New Orleans 195 So. 2d 302 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
    governmental bodies; and each authorization by the Legislature for suit against the State or other such public body, heretofore and hereafter enacted or granted, shall be construed to be and shall be effective and valid for all purposes, as of and from the date thereof, as a waiver of the defendant’s immunity both from suit and from liability.” , , decided that the above constitutional provisions eliminated the right of the City of Shreveport to impose as a defense its governmental immunity as a
  • Gray v. State, Through Department of Highways 191 So. 2d 802 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967
    48:22, permitting the Department to sue and be sued, and upon our Supreme Court's recent construction of the 1960 amendment of Article III, Section 35, , as effectuating such waiver so as to obviate special legislative permission to sue for injuries caused subsequent to the amendment.
  • Lambert v. Austin Bridge Company 189 So. 2d 752 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
    (1965), wherein the Court held that the legislature, in incorporating in the city charter of Shreveport language authorizing the city to sue or be sued waived the immunity of the city from suit in view of the legislative power to waive immunities granted by Article 3, Section 35, of the Louisiana Const
  • Hall Houston v. City of Shreveport 188 So. 2d 923 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
    (1965), which held that the city was not immune from either suit or liability because the city charter, a special legislative act, provided that the city “shall be capable of suing and being sued,” and that such an action comes within the purview of the aforesaid constitutional provision even though no
  • Miller v. Housing Authority of New Orleans 190 So. 2d 75 La. 1966
    Pittman Construction Company v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, supra; , .
  • Overruled Hamilton v. City of Shreveport 180 So. 2d 30 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1966
    Upon trial of this issue in the Supreme Court, the plea of immunity was overruled and, accordingly, the judgment of this court was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings ( , ).
  • Fredieu v. City of Winnfield 180 So. 2d 48 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1965
    However, the decision of the trial court sustaining the exception of no cause or right of action and motion for summary judgment predicated upon the immunity of the City of Winnfield from tort liability decided February 3, 1963, , decided May 3, 1965 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that LSA-Const.