Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Skinner, 204 So. 2d 370.

17 citing documents.

  • State v. Palmer 448 So. 2d 765 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
    (1967); State v. Brown, supra.
  • State v. Carter 326 So. 2d 848 La. 1975
    The prosecution, on the other hand, , (1967), required that the jury be instructed on the law of conspiracy for the sole reason that the crime charged had been committed by two or more persons.
  • State v. Cousin 307 So. 2d 326 La. 1975
  • State v. Kibby 294 So. 2d 196 La. 1974
    982 , (1970); , (1967), on rehearing.
  • State v. Ackal 290 So. 2d 882 La. 1974
  • State v. Kaufman 278 So. 2d 86 La. 1973
  • State v. Jones 270 So. 2d 489 La. 1972
    (1967), which at first blush may appear to be against the position advocated by the defense, we respectfully.
  • State v. Cryer 263 So. 2d 895 La. 1972
  • State v. Williams 263 So. 2d 306 La. 1972
  • State v. Himel 257 So. 2d 670 La. 1972
    356 , (1956); , (1967); State v. Kreller, 255 La.
  • State v. Shaffer 257 So. 2d 121 La. 1971
    certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted 393 U.S. 473 , 89 S.Ct.
  • State v. Polk 247 So. 2d 853 La. 1971
    State v. Jackson, 250 La.
  • State v. Stafford 246 So. 2d 849 La. 1971
    Art. 712 (which will not be disturbed on review in the absence of arbitrary or unreasonable exercise, , 1967 ) was here not abused: An accused may not obtain a delay merely by discharging or replacing previous counsel on the day of the trial and then claiming that his new counsel does not have adequate time to prepare his defense.
  • State v. Richardson 245 So. 2d 357 La. 1971
  • State v. Kreller 233 So. 2d 906 La. 1970
    Writ of Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted, 393 U.S. 473 , 89 S.Ct.
  • State v. Clack 222 So. 2d 857 La. 1969
  • State v. Schoonover 211 So. 2d 273 La. 1968
    Bill of Exception No. 2 was reserved when the court allowed the assistant district attorney to ask: “ * * * Do you all understand the Judge’s instructions with regard to what a conspiracy could be?” I , (on rehearing), holds that where the crime charged necessarily involves a conspiracy, it is proper for the judge to instruct the jury on the law of conspiracy even though conspiracy is not the crime charged.